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I.  I. l  C'i~ II Note 
The  original  text of  the Report  (I)  by  Judge  H.  Kutscher,  President  of 
Chamber, was drawn up in German 
The original  text of  the  Report  (II)  by  Professor  C.  Hamson,  Q.C.,  was 
drawn up in English 
The original text of the Report (III)  by Mr F. Duman, First Advocate-General 
at the Belgian Cour de Cassation, was drawn up in French 
The original  text of the Report (V)  by  Mr Advocate-General J.-P. Warner 
was drawn up in English 
The original text of the Report (VI)  by Judge P.  Pescatore was drawn up in 
French 
In view of the very short period of time within which the manuscripts had 
to be translated and printed, it was not possible for the authors to arrange 
for  the translations of  their texts  to be revised. 
2 Preface 
At the end of a period of activity of almost 25  years the Court of 
Justice of  the European Communities took the initiative in inviting a  new 
type of reflection upon its methods of interpretation. 
The time appeared to be particularly ripe in that, following the rise in the 
number of  requests  for preliminary rulings  submitted under the Treaty of 
Rome, the European Court of Justice is receiving an ever-increasing number 
of  questions  concerning  the interpretation  of  the  Brussels  Convention  on 
Jurisdiction  and  the  Enforcement  of  Judgments  in  Civil  and  Commercial 
Matters. 
It was therefore of the greatest interest to the Court to bring together senior 
members of the judiciaries of the Member States and qualified representatives 
of the national Bars and famous universities in order to submit to their critical 
assessment the whole of its case-law. Such was the first aim of the Judicial and 
Academic Conference held in Luxembourg on 27 and 28  September 1976 in 
which more than 150 people took part. 
The Conference was also an exceptional opportunity to give the nine Ministers 
responsible for the administration of justice the chance to meet - for the 
first  time - lawyers from all  the Member States and to obtain an overall 
picture of the comparative vitality of Community law in each of those States. 
Three papers were to introduce the discussion on the methods of interpretation 
employed by the Court. So that the area of criticism should be as wide as poss-
ible  three  'rapporteurs' from  different  environments were asked to present 
papers. Mr Kutscher, then President of Chamber at the Court, was to bring 
to the Conference his wide experience of an enterprise in which he has been 
intimately involved  within the Court, whilst two other 'rapporteurs' from 
outside the  institution were also invited to submit their own critical obser-
vations. A prominent lawyer - Mr  Duman, First Advocate-General at  the 
Cour de  Cassation of Belgium - and an eminent professor from a  British 
3 university- Mr Hamson, former Professor of Law at Cambridge- were in 
fact particularly well qualified to present the views of lawyers from both civil 
and common law countries on the theory and practice of the Court. 
The lively, deep and varied discussions which followed under the chairman-
ship  of,  first,  Mr Alberto Trabucchi, Advocate-General, and, secondly, Mr 
Aindrias O'Keeffe, President of Chamber, were based on those three significant 
documents. 
The themes were very varied. Approval alternated with criticism, often from 
the same contributors. At the risk of over-simplifying the discussion, let me 
refer,  among the problems most frequently touched on, to those raised by 
Professor Hamson in relation to the direct effect of the Treaties as it results 
from the judgment in Van Gend and Laos and those referred to by Mr Duman, 
First Advocate-General, in relation to the principle of equal pay for men and 
women acknowledged in the Defrenne judgment. The time available was, of 
course, insufficient to exhaust the debate. However, the number, the authority 
and the diverse national origins of the contributors1 gave great weight to the 
critical examination undertaken in a remarkable community of spirit. 
The instructional part of the meeting, to which the second day was devoted, 
enabled the same audience,  which then included the Ministers  responsible 
for the administration of justice of the various Member States,  2  to appreciate 
the vitality of Community law in all its various forms. 
1  Despite the crowded timetable the following participants were able to contribute: 
Mr Olmi, Director-General of the Legal Department of the Commission of the European 
Communities, Sir  Derek Walker-Smith,  Chairmen of the Legal Affairs  Committee of the 
European  Parliament,  Viscount  Ganshof  van  der  Meersch,  Emeritus  Public  Prosecutor 
at the Cour de Cassation of Belgium, Professor Van Gerven from Louvain, Professor Lando 
from  Copenhagen,  Professor  Boerner  from  Cologne,  Mr  Deringer  from  Cologne,  Mr 
Monguilan, First President of the Cour de Cassation of France, Mr Touffait, Public Prosecu-
tor at the Cour de Cassation of France, Mr Bellet, President of Chamber at the Cour de 
Cassation of France, Professor Vedel from Paris, Professor Teitgen from Paris, Mr Catalano 
from Rome, Professor Monaco from Rome, Senator Bosco from Rome, Professor Ubertazzi 
from Milan, Councillor Liesch from Luxembourg, Professor Verloren van Themaat from 
Utrecht, Professor Schermers from Amsterdam, Lord. Denning, Master of the Rolls, from 
London, Professor Lipstein from Cambridge, Professor Graveson from London, Professor 
Lawton from  Belfast. 
2  Mr van  Agt  for  the  Netherlands,  Lord Elwyn-Jones  and Lord  King  Murray for  Great 
Britain,  Mr M0ller for  Denmark,  Mr Erkel  for  the Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  Mr 
Guichard  for France, Mr Cooney  for Ireland, Mr Bonifacio  for Italy  and Mr Krieps  for 
Luxembourg. 
4 It was first necessary to define for the Ministers the various trends which had 
emerged from the previous day's discussion on the methods of interpretation 
employed by the Court. That task fell  to Mr J. Mertens de Wilmars, Judge. 
Mr J.-P. Warner, Advocate-General, then traced the evolution of the work of 
the Court from its earliest days and Mr Gundelach, Member of the Commis-
sion,  described  the difficulties  of  interpretation  which that body has  also 
encountered. 
The final  stage was to be a  survey  of the ways in which the Treaties and 
Regulations  are applied in the Member States.  This task was entrusted to 
Mr P.  Pescatore, Judge, who spoke, in comparative terms, of the evolution 
of the case-law of the national courts, the progress made and the difficulties 
which persist here and there. 
In a well-documented and penetrating address Mr van Agt, President of the 
Council of Ministers for Justice of the Community, then sought to describe 
the development of integration through the case-law of the Court of Justice 
and of the national courts and to express the confidence of the Member States 
in those bodies. 
What conclusions are to be drawn from such a conference? 
First of all, this novel formula may be applied again in future. It appears to 
be useful to submit a body of case-law to the constructive criticism of such an 
assembly, as it may bring about a closer alignment of theory and practice and 
a closer cooperation between the Court of Justice and national courts. Certain 
of the latter are ~ven proposing to try the same formula at their own level. 
Moreover,  this  high-level  conference  brought out the  essential  features  of 
Community law. The frequent emphasis on the need for a uniform body of 
case-law showed the importance which the audience attached to the  basic 
principles of a single system of law which is common to all the Member States 
and whose uniform interpretation and application binds their nationals more 
closely together. 
It also became apparent that close  cooperation between the national courts 
and the Court of Justice is a decisive factor in the success of Community law. 
It is, in fact,  as  a result of several thousand questions submitted by several 
hundred courts and tribunals that the case-law has developed step by step in 
an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. It is the national court which, 
5 by taking the initiative, has been the driving force of that development. Thus 
the case-law of the Community is  both progressive and collective in nature. 
The results of the Conference to which I have just referred highlight possible 
future progress towards new developments. Experience has shown that the 
repercussions of any Community provision, however unimportant it may, be 
hasten judicial integration - the experience of the Brussels  Convention on 
Jurisdiction  and the  Enforcement  of  Judgments  in  Civil  and  Commercial 
Matters is the most recent illustration of this; it must therefore be recognized 
that here is a discreet but effective practical method of bringing about gradual 
integration whilst other, more ambitious, projects are marking time. 
In this regard, it would be very easy, with a little imagination, to draw up an 
impressive list  of subjects in which substantial progress  might  be  achieved 
towards the adoption of a uniform attitude by the national courts. A methodi-
cal examination of commercial law and, on a  more general level, of private 
law,  might  lead  in  particular to  the discovery  of  numerous  international 
conventions, for example, on negotiable instruments or commercial sales, of 
which various  Member States  are  signatories.  This  list  could  lead  to the 
extension of those conventions in the Community context, either in the search 
for identical common solutions or in an attempt by the contracting Member 
States to elaborate uniform interpretative procedures. 
If, as  this Conference has confirmed, the foundations of legal  Europe have 
been laid, is  it not time for the Member States to start building on them? 
Robert LECOUR  T 
6 Programme 
Monday 27 September 1976 
Discussion  on methods  of interpretation of Community law by  the  Court of 
Justice and national courts 
9.15  a.m.  Welcome to the participants in the conference by the President of the Court 
Under the chairmanship of Mr Advocate-General A.  TRABUCCHI: 
- Brief statements by the authors of the reports on the salient points of their 
reports  which  will  have  been  distributed  to the participants  in  advance 
(10  minutes for each statement) 
Authors of the reports: 
(1)  Judge  H.  KUTSCHER,  President  of  Chamber  at  the  Court  of  Justice: 
'Methods of interpretation as  seen by a judge at the Court of Justice'; 
(2)  Professor C.  J. HAMSON, Q.C., of the University of Cambridge: 'Methods 
of interpretation. A critical assessment of the results'; 
(3)  Mr F.  DUMON, First Advocate-General at the Belgian Cour de Cassation 
Professor V.U.B.  (Free  University  of Brussels):  'The case-law of the Com 
munity. A critical examination of the methods of interpretation'. 
10.00  a.m.  Coffee  interval 
10.15  a.m.  Discussion.  Those wishing to speak are  asked to make their intention known 
by  filling  in  the  slips  which  will  be  available.  (In  view  of the  size  of the 
gathering the number able to speak will depend on the brevity of the speeches) 
1.00  p.m.  Lunch given by the Court (4th Floor) 
3.15  p.m.  Under the chairmanship of Judge A.  O'KEEFFE, President of Chamber: 
A brief re-opening of the discussion by Judge A.M. DONNER (10 minutes) 
and further discussion 
4.30  p.m.  Coffee  interval 
4.45  p.m.  Continuation  of  the  discussion 
6.45  p.m.  End of discussion followed by a buffet reception in the Great Hall. 
7 Tuesday 28  September 1976 
In the presence of the judges and of the professors presentation to the Ministers 
of Justice of the nine Member States of a review of twenty years of Community 
judicial  activity 
9.45  a.m.  Welcome to the Ministers by  the President of the Court 
Address  by  Judge  J.  MERTENS  DE  WILMARS  on  the  previous  day's 
discussions ; 
Address  by  Mr Advocate-General  J.-P.  WARNER  on the evolution  of  the 
work of the Court of Justice; 
Address  by  Judge  P.  PESCATORE  on  the  application  of  the  Community 
law in each of the Member States; 
Address by  the Minister-President of the Council 
Closure of the proceedings by the President of the Court 
1.00  p.m.  Closing lunch with the Ministers at the Municipal Theatre. 
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The commentary is limited as a rule to references to the provisions of the EEC Treaty. Differences 
between these provisions and those in the ECSC and the Euratom Treaties have been disregarded. I .  - The methods of  interpretation common 
to  the  national  legal  orders  and 
Community law 
1.  Principles of interpretation of written law 
In his comprehensive study of Political Integration by Jurisprudence A. W. Green 
states  that  almost  every  judgment  of the  Court of Justice  of the  European 
Communities refers to principles which enable it to interpret Community law and 
decide the particular case. 1 
This finding made in 1968 could still apply today. It reflects the fact that every 
court, whether national or European, has to determine or ascertain 'the law', in so 
far as it is not apparent, whenever it applies it to a legal issue and decides this issue. 
Only rarely is 'the law' apparent when the issue is brought before the court. It is the 
determination of issues by interpreting the law which is the proper function and 
basic task of every court. 
Jurisprudence has endeavoured for centuries to explain what the Court actually 
does and how it proceeds when it interprets the law. It has analysed and arranged 
the case-law from this point of view, established and itself proposed methods of 
interpretation. The number of the principles and methods which the court has at its 
disposal  when  interpreting  the  law  is  almost  incalculable.  It  extends  from 
comprehensive systems to well-established technical rules, of which reasoning by 
analogy or the argumentum e contrario are suggested by way of example. 
However European Jurisprudence has not so far developed any doctrine of legal 
interpretation which could be described as  conforming to an opinio communis. 
Nevertheless there is a common body of  scarcely disputed concepts of the methods 
of interpreting written law. 
You have to start with the wording of a provision, with its  ordinary or special 
meaning. 
The Court can take into account the subjective intention of the legislature and the 
function of a rule at the time it was adopted. 
The provision has to be interpreted in its context and having regard to its schematic 
relationship with other provisions in  such  a way that it has a  reasonable and 
effective meaning. The rule must be understood in connexion with the economic 
and social situation in which it is  to take effect.  ' 
I-5 Its purpose, either considered separately or within the system of rules of which it is 
part, may be taken into consideration. 
Considerations based on comparative law are admissible or necessary. 
In new fields of law the Court must feel its way from case to case: continental legal 
thought is  fully conversant with reasoning from case to case.  · 
Unquestionably the emphasis given to each of these methods of interpretation_ 
varies in the nine Member States. More significant differences are found between 
the  countries  belonging to  the continental legal  system  and the common law 
countries.  Common  law  principles  and  methods  also  have  an  effect  on the 
interpretation of statute law. The combined European legal resources available for 
the interpretation of written law is  however intact. The Member States of the 
Community share it with the other countries of Western Europe in spite of all the 
differences of detail. 
There is  not doubt, and for this no proof is  required, that the said methods of 
interpretation are also applied by the Court of Justice of the Communities. Its 
methods of  interpretation are thus basically the same as those of  the national courts 
of the Member States. 
In this respect also the case-law of  the Court of  Justice does not present any special 
featares in comparison with that of all the national courts when the said methods 
are applied side by side. This phenomenon is well known to national courts. Finally 
the  Court of Justice  of the  Communities  shares  with  the national  courts  a 
reluctance  to  give  in  its  judgments  general  rulings  on  the  problems  of 
interpretation. It explains the rule and also indicates which methods it is using in 
the process but does not express an opinion on the basic questions of the methods 
of interpretation. The Court, just like the national courts, leaves this rather to 
jurisprudence which  has  also  concerned itself with these  questions.  The legal 
writings  on  the  methods  of interpretation  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
Communities are unusually comprehensive. 
In  this  respect  the  Court  keeps  within  generally  recognized  principles  of 
interpretation when it takes account of the special features of the particular legal 
matter. It is  obvious that in international law for example methods have to be 
applied, which are different from those used in national law, and that even  in 
national law modifications and gradations are necessary which depend upon the 
legal  matter  to  which  the rule  to. be  interpreted  belongs.  The  rules  for  the 
interpretation  of  criminal  law  are  not  the  same  as  those  applied  in  the 
interpretation of economic and administrative law and again other methods of 
interpretation are called for in the case of revenue law. Each legal matter makes 
specific  demands  on  interpretation.  Although  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
1-6 Communities  has  applied  all  the  traditional  and  recognized  methods  of 
interpretation, it is nevertheless obvious that in its case-law only minor importance 
is attached to some methods, whereas others-and in particular the interpretation 
of  the rules of  Community law according to their place in the system of  the Treaties 
and in the light of the aims and objectives of the Communities, that is schematic 
and teleological interpretation-are very much in evidence. Is this emphasis which 
emerges from the case-law of the Court of Justice justified? This will have to be 
considered.  At  this  point  it  is  sufficient  to  state  that  specific  methods  of 
interpretation which derogate from the general principles of interpretation are 
appropriate for each legal matter and this applies also to Community law. 
2.  Interpretation in a wider sense 
If  'interpretation' is understood in a narrow sense, then words, phrases, sentences 
or paragraphs of written  texts  are  its  subject  matter.  It  is,  however,  almost 
self-evident that the interpretation of the law is not limited to this. 
(a)  Determination of  the applicable law; interpretation and legal sources 
The Court has to determine, to ascertain the law, whenever it applies it to a specific 
case. This law does not only consist of written texts. The interpretation of law is 
thus closely and indissolubly linked with the inquiry into the sources of law. The 
determination of the applicable law is  also 'interpretation' in this wider sense. 
The legal order of the Community covers not only the network of treaties, their 
annexes and the mass of derived Community law which the institutions of the 
Communities have enacted. 
In order to enable the Court of Justice to carry out the tasks entrusted to the 
Community  the  Treaties  expressly  place  it on  the same  footing  as  the  other 
common  institutions  (Article  4  EEC  Treaty).  It  has  to  ensure  that  in  the 
interpretation and application of the Treaties 'the law' is  observed (Article 164 
EEC Treaty). It reviews the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission, the 
actions of  which may be null and void because of  infringement of the Treaties or of 
·any 'rule of law' relating to their application (Article 173 EEC Treaty, Article 146 
Euratom Treaty). It decides whether the Community in the case of  non-contractual 
liability has to make good any damage 'in accordance with the general principles 
common to the laws of the Member States' (Articles 178,215 EEC Treaty; Articles 
151, 188 Euratom Treaty). 
I-7 These provisions of the Treaty make it clear that unwritten legal principles are also 
part of the legal order of the Community. Their applicability in Community law 
depends in the last resort on common consent. The law of the Community is 
founded on the national legal orders, the basic principles and structures of which 
permeate Community law. The principles of the ius commune europaeum are also 
at the root of  and leave their mark on the Community legal order. Article 215 of the 
EEC  Treaty  confirms  that  Community  law  and  national  legal  orders  are 
interwoven. A system which is in part legal and limited basically to the regulation 
of  economic and social matters cannot be interpreted and applied without recourse 
to general legal principles. 
The Court has in its decided cases laid down and applied a not inconsiderable 
number of such 'general principles'. They include, to mention only one example, 
fundamental rights, in protecting which the Court is  bound to draw inspiration 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States (Case  11/70 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft  [1970]  ECR  1134; Case 4/73 Nold [1974] 
ECR 507). 
Unwritten rules, which would be classified as customary law, have not, as far as I 
can see, been found so far in Community law, if relations between the institutions 
are disregarded. 
The Court decides the law which it must apply whenever it has to determine the 
significance and scope of international agreements for the Community legal order. 
This also comes under interpretation, giving this word a wide meaning. 
Thus the Court has held that the provisions of the Association Agreement with 
Greece  form  'an integral  part of Community law'  (Case  181/73 Haegemann 
[1974] 460). According to the judgment of 12 December 1972 in Joined Cases 21 
to 24/72 International Fruit [1972] 1219 the European Economic Community is 
to a certain extent bound by the provisions of GATT. According to the judgment 
already mentioned in  the Nold case  international treaties for the protection of 
human rights can supply guidelines for the protection of fundamental rights which 
should be followed within the framework of Community law. Finally the Court 
has ruled that certain limitations in Community law on the powers of Member 
States in respect of  the supervision of aliens are a specific manifestation of  the more 
general principle enshrined in the provisions of the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights  (Case  36/75 Rutili  [1975]  ECR  1232).  These  examples  of 
international agreements which were considered, may suffice. 
(b)  Rules and legal concepts which have not been precisely defined 
. It has often been pointed out that the Treaties contain numerous rules and use a 
great many legal concepts which are not precisely defined. To mention only two 
examples: Article 30 of the EEC Treaty prohibits in principle all measures having 
1-8 an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports; according to Article 36 • 
and Article 48 et seq. certain restrictions on free movement of goods and freedom 
of movement for persons are permissible if justified 'on grounds of public policy, 
public security or public health'. The prohibition against 'concerted practices' 
(Article 85 EEC Treaty) and 'abuse ... of a dominant position' (Article 86 EEC 
Treaty) are also not precisely defined. There are likewise a great number of vague 
rules and concepts in derived Community law. 
As  far back as  1963 at the Europaischen Arbeitstagung in Cologne Von Simson 
stressed that vague rules and concepts were part of the technique of the Treaties, 
had to  last  for  a  long  time  and  that the  intention  was  that they  should  be 
developed.2  The vagueness of many of the concepts of the Treaty is  intended to 
ensure that the institutions of the Community have a certain freedom of action. 
There can be many kinds of reasons why a set of rules is vague: for example the 
inability to foresee the economic trend or lack of  the common consent of  the parties 
to the Treaty or they can be found within the legislative body. If  the legislature or, 
so far as the Treaties are concerned, the States which are parties to the Treaty, are 
content, no matter what their reasons may be, when dealing with a matter, to use 
vague or imprecisely defined provisions and concepts, the Court has the task of 
putting right what the legislature neglected to do by defining the rule or concept. 
This situation has often been confirmed and its implications for the relationship 
between the legislature and the Court have also been described in detail: the Court, 
especially vis-a-vis the administration, exercises legislative functions. 
To sum up it may be stated that the definition by way of interpretation of vague 
rules and concepts is also one of the Court's tasks. As an example the defining of 
the  expression  'quantitative  restrictions  on imports  and  all  measures  having 
equivalent effect' (Article 30 EEC Treaty) may be mentioned. The Court defined 
this expression more precisely by stating that all trading rules enacted by Member 
States  'which  are  capable  of  hindering,  directly  or  indirectly,  actually  or 
potentially, intra-Community trade' are to be considered as such measures (Case 
8/74 Dassonville [1974] ECR 852). 
A special  problem arises  whenever vague  legal  concepts  are  used  to limit the 
Commission's  powers  to  take  action,  especially  powers  to  adopt  general 
regulations in the field ·"of organizations of the market for agricultural products. 
The Court has constantly in its case-law interpreted such powers as  giving the 
Commission extensive freedom both to assess the economic situation and to decide 
as to the means to be adopted to meet it. When the Court considers whether such 
freedom has been lawfully exercised, it cannot substitute its own evaluation for 
that of the competent authority, but must restrict itself to ascertaining whether the 
evaluation of the competent authority contains a patent error or constitutes a 
misuse of power. 
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'where the balance of the market in cereals is  likely to be disturbed' (cf. the 
judgments  of 18  March  and  25  June  1975  on  denaturing premiums  for 
common wheat, Case 78/74 Deuka I [1975] ECR 432 and Case 5/75 Deuka II 
.[1975] 770). 
The Court is thus reticent when the issue to be determined is whether measures to 
deal with economic matters in the context of an organization of the market are 
appropriate or necessary. It  has not endeavoured to put itself in the position of  the 
administration. 
(c)  Filling in  lacunae 
The power vested in the Court to ensure that in the interpretation and application 
of Community law the law is  observed certainly includes the power to  fill  in 
so-called lacunae in the law and here it should be noted that the concept 'lacuna' 
presupposes that there is an integral and perfected legal order which in principle 
has  dealt with  all  conceivable  cases  and  situations.  Community law must be 
understood in this sense as an integral and perfected legal order in respect of the 
matters which it covers. 
As an example of a 'lacuna' Article 228 (2) of the EEC Treaty may be mentioned, 
which provides that international agreements concluded by the Community are 
binding on Community institutions and on Member States, although is does not 
state what effects the provisions of such agreements have within the Community. 
In its judgment of 5 February 1976 (Case 87/75 Bresciani which has not yet been 
published) the Court decided that the provisions of such agreements (in this case it 
was  the  Yaounde Agreement  of 1963)  could  create  rights  for  the  benefit  of 
individuals which the national courts  had to protect (  cf.  the abovementioned 
judgment of 12 December 1972 in the case of  International Fruit). The Court thus 
filled in a lacuna. 
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In this connexion it should however be mentioned that the Court has refused to 
fix, on its own volition, limitation periods for infringements of Articles 85 and 
86 of the EEC Treaty. In order to fulfil their function of  ensuring legal certainty 
limitation periods must be fixed in advance. It is for the Community legislature 
to fix  their duration and the detailed rules for their application (Case 45/69 
Bohringer [1970] ECR 795). 
The Court repeated this view in a later judgment but nevertheless added that 
although,  in  the  absence  of  any  express  provisions  on  the  matter,  the 
fundamental requirement of legal  certainty has the effect of preventing the 
Commission from indefinitely delaying the exercise of its power to impose fines, its conduct in that case could not be regarded as constituting a bar to the 
exercise of that power (Judgment of 14 July 1972 in Case 48/69 ICI [1972] 
Rec.  650). The limitation period has in the meantime been dealt with by a 
regulation of the Council. 
(d)  Development of  the law 
The question whether the Court is competent to develop the law is the subject of 
discussion in all Member States even if not everywhere with the same intensity. The 
question arises not only in the field of statute law but also in the case of law which 
has been developed and laid d<?~n  by the superior courts. It  is especially important 
when long-standing statutory rules and regulations are no longer suited to quickly 
changing economic and social circumstances. May the Court take account of such 
a  situation by  developing the law?3  This question  touches on the  relationship 
between case-law and legislation and the principle of the separation of  powers. The 
question, however, loses  some of its importance when the laws have not been 
adopted  by  a  directly  and  democratically  elected  parliament  and .where  the 
legislative bodies, especially the Council and the Commission, are not subject to 
any  effective  control  by  a  representative  parliament,  but the  legality  of their 
legislative activity has nevertheless to be reviewed by the Court by virtue of an 
express provision to that effect (Article 173 EEC Treaty). The examination of the 
Court's power  to  develop  the  law  must  be. looked  at with  due  regard  to its 
relationship to the structure of the Community institutions, that is  to say in  a 
constitutional context. The constitutional structure of the Community diminishes 
the importance of this question. It is  therefore also less important for the Court 
than  for  certain  national  legal  orders,  because  the  texts  which  have  to  be 
interpreted are  not held in  such  high  respect on account of their age  as  some 
national codes. 
On the whole it must, however, be recognized that the task entrusted to the Court 
to  ensure that the law is  observed includes  the power to  develop  the law by 
interpretation. 
The power of the Court to interpret in the wider sense, that is  in particular to 
determine the applicable law, to fill in lacunae and to develop the law can be based 
on Article 164 of  the EEC Treaty, which gives it the task of ensuring that the law is 
observed even if this provision is  thought to be only declaratory. 
The  significance  and  scope  that the  Court itself  attributes  to this  provtston 
becomes clear from its judgment of  8 April1976 in Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena, 
which has not yet been published. The Court stresses that the effect of Article 119 
of the EEC  Treaty (men and women should receive equal pay for equal work) 
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obligations  arising  from  the  Treaty and that the reaction  of the  Community 
institutions to this failure to act was inadequate. To approve the contrary view, the 
Court adds, would entail the risk of elevating a legal infringement to the level of a 
rule of interpretation, a view which the Court could not accept without acting in 
contravention of the task entrusted to it by Article 164 EEC Treaty. 
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Community law 
1.  Interpretation  and  application.  The  reference  for  a 
preliminary ruling under Article 177 of  the EEC Treaty 
as a link between the national and Community court. 
The interpretation of Community law by the Court is  done very largely in  the 
cont~xt of the reference for a preliminary ruling under Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty. The interpretation of the law in the context of this procedure presents 
special features. 
The national court interprets the law while applying it to a specific case. Article 177 
of the EEC Treaty however p.t:oceeds on the basis that there is a clear separation of 
functions: it does not empower the Court to apply Community law and to decide 
the case in question; on the contrary these two functions lie in the province of the 
national  court.  Article  177  of the· EEC  Treaty  proceeds  on  the  basis  of a 
hierarchical  jurisdiction  and cooperation between  the national court and  the 
Community Court (cf. Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585). Community 
law is  by no means applied only by the Community Court but on the contrary 
mainly by the national courts which to this extent likewise function as 'Community 
courts'. The main characteristic of judicial interpretation is  as  a rule that it is 
undertaken in  the course of applying the law to a specific case and therefore in 
relation to that case and its special features. In proceedings under Article 177 of  the 
EEC Treaty the Court is, however, bound to interpret a provision in a general and 
abstract way which does not only apply to the particular case. This procedure thus 
compels the Court to give a ruling on the content and scope of a rule, which, due to 
its general nature, may itself assume the nature of a general rule. In this connexion 
it must not be overlooked that such rulings, which are generalizations extracted 
from particular cases, help to make Community law uniformly applicable. 
It  is true that under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty the Court can answer questions 
of interpretation in a more or less general way. From the wording of the questions 
and on the basis of the facts referred for a preliminary ruling the Court can, and 
must if necessary, extract the questions falling within its jurisdiction and which 
pertain  to  the  interpretation  of Community  law  (cf.  Case  78/70  Deutsche 
Grammophon, [1971] ECR 498). The Court has never disregarded the fact that its 
answer  must  enable  the  national  court  to  decide  the  case  without  further 
difficulties of interpretation.4 Therefore the Community Court cannot completely 
lose sight of the case in question. The Court is  in particular fully aware of the 
danger of general rulings which could affect groups of cases which have not been 
discussed and examined. The Court must therefore in its answers steer a middle 
course between the general applicability required by Article 177 of the EEC Treaty 
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national court.5 This can prove to be difficult. 
In the field of  interpretation Article 177 of  the EEC Treaty does not grant the Court 
a  monopoly but a  prerogative:  in  the  final  analysis  only  the  Court gives  an 
authoritative interpretation of Community law. This arises from the duty of the 
courts of last instance to make references for a preliminary ruling. This prerogative 
is indispensable for maintaining the uniformity of Community law which can only 
apply in aj.l Member States uniformly; that is, if  it is subject to the same rules of 
interpretation. Otherwise it would cease to be Community law. The interpretation 
of  the Court binds only the judge and the parties to the main action as emerges from 
the case-law according to which a reference is admissible for the purpose of  a ruling 
if th~ Court adheres to an interpretation given in an earlier case. The President, 
Mr Lecourt, has correctly pointed out that the spectre of government by judges 
would be revived if the interpretive judgments of  the Court were held to apply erg a 
omnes and its interpretation was treated as being quasi-legislative.  6 It is however 
obvious that the authority of  interpretive judgments extends beyond the particular 
case. Once a rule has been construed its interpretations is usually accepted by the 
national courts, although it is not legally binding on them. As the Court's decided 
cases show, it assumes that this is the effect of its interpretive judgments, for the 
courts of last instance are not obliged to make a reference for a preliminary ruling 
under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty if the Court has already settled a question of 
interpretation in  an earlier reference. 
Article 177 of the EEC Treaty has created a procedure under which the national 
courts and the Community court work closely and directly together. The doubts 
which  the  national  court  has  with  regard  to  the  correct  interpretation  of 
Community law as well as the questions, which it consequently refers, reflect the 
methods  of interpretation  with /which  it is  familiar.  In  its  answer  the  Court 
interprets  Community  law  according  to  its  own  methods.  The  methods  of 
interpretation of the national and Community Court meet and intermingle in this 
procedure. To this extent this procedur~also contributes to the 'integration' of the 
law of the Member States and the Community and also their legal systems. 
The effect of the special features of the procedure under Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty is that the interpretation of Community law by the Court is more effective 
and has wider application. The Court is  aware of this fact. 
2.  Choice of methods of interpretation 
In the first part of this talk an attempt was made to give an outline of  the combined 
European legal resources available for determining methods of interpretation of 
written law. It  is difficult to group these methods together. Any such attempt is to a 
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particular  their  concepts  and  terminology.  Itt  is  also  quite  clear  that  legal 
traditions, which have influenced whomever as lawyer and judge attempts such a 
grouping, form part of these resources. 
Subject to these reservations it is possible to distinguish: the literal or exegetic, the 
historical, the comparative law, and the schematic and teleological methods. 
The question arises whether these groups of methods of schological interpretation 
stand in  such  a  hierarchical  relationship  to  each  other that the Court has  to 
consider first  one and then,  if this  does  not produce the answer, another and 
possibly a third or fourth method. All that can probably be said of  this procedure is 
that the interpretation must proceed on the basis of ascertaining the ordinary or the 
special  meaning  arising  out  of the  context  of  a  word,  phrase,  sentence  or 
paragraph. If  the literal interpretation gives a clear, unambiguous meaning and it 
stands up to an ex·amination in the light of other methods of  interpretation, should 
that be necessary, then the question of interpretation is answered. Such cases are, 
however, rare: it can be assumed that there will as a rule be no application to the 
Court for an interpretation if the meaning of the text is 'clear' in this sense. If  the 
literal interpretation is unsuccessful then the Court must resort to other methods. It 
is hardly possible to establish any order of  priority or succession between them. It  is 
not unusual for one method to be chosen while one or more other methods are 
adopted to confirm the result. Or several methods of  interpretation are used at the 
same time. Case 6/72 Continental Can  [1973] ECR at p. 243 states: 'in· order to 
answer this question (whether Article 86 of the EEC Treaty applies to changes in 
the structure of an undertaking), one has to go back to the spirit, general scheme 
and wording of Article 86, as well as to the system and objectives of the Treaty.' 
The Court thus interprets Article 86 of the EEC Treaty on the basis of its wording 
and at the same time schematically and teleologically, that is  to say it construes 
Article 86 separately, and also in the light of the system and objectives of the 
Treaty. 
Obviously in the choice of  one or the other or several methods the judge's intuition 
or what is commonly called his 'Judiz' plays a not insignificant part. This 'Judiz' 
applies not only to the determination of  the issue but also to the way which. leads to 
its determination. The field which the parties have chosen for their argu~ents is 
also  capable  of  influencing  the  Judge.  The  judge's  intuition  formed  and 
strengthened by the large number of cases and difficult situations with which he 
has been confronted, his experience and his 'Judiz' should lead to the choice of 
methods of interpretation, which meet the requirements of the special problems 
raised by the particular case, that is, which are suitable having regard to the 'nature 
of the case', no less than the specific demands for interpretation made by the legal 
issues in the context of which the case has to be decided. 
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interpretation if it is faced with new material, questions and problems for which it 
does not have any continuous or established case-law to help it, that is  in fields 
where 'reasoning from case to case' is particularly called for. With regard to the 
case-law of the Court reference may be made in this respect, by way of example, to 
the case-law on non-contractual liability of the Community (Article 215 of the 
EEC Treaty).7 In the case of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty Mr Advocate-General 
Mayras rightly stressed that the concept of abuse of a dominant position is not 
defined by this Article, which goes only so far as to give some examples and it must 
therefore  be  determined  'according  to  the  individual  case'.  (Opinion  of 
12 February  1974 in  Case  127/73  BRT v SABAM  [1974]  ECR  at p.  324). 
Proceeding in this way the Court in its judgment of 27 March 1974 (ibid p. 316 et 
seq.)  laid down a number of criteria for the abuse of a  dominant position by 
'imposing unfair trading conditions' (Article 86 (a))  which took account of the 
particular case, which was concerned with a company exploiting copyrights, and, 
in answer to the question put by the national court, limited itself to the finding that 
there could be  an  abuse if an  undertaking entrusted with the exploitation of 
copyrights and occupying a dominant position imposes on its members obligations 
which are not absolutely necessary for the attainment of its object and which thus 
encroach unfairly upon a member's freedom to exercise his copyright. 
Although therefor in particular, on the one hand, an order of  priority or succession 
of methods  of interpretation cannot be  established, it is,  on  the other hand, 
nevertheless quite clear that the Court uses some methods of interpretation only 
rarely and attaches only limited importance to them, but clearly prefers other 
methods.  The literal  and historical  methods  of interpretation recede  into  the 
background. Schematic and teleological interpretation including the application of 
the principle of effet utile is  of primary importance. Interpretation drawing on 
comparative law has a certain significance. 
What follows is not intended to be even an approximately exhaustive explanation 
of  when and in what circumstances the Court uses this or that method. It is limited 
rather to some propositions and examples. 
The propositions imply that the methods of interpretation preferred by the Court 
are not only justified but forced on it by the special features of the Communities 
and Community law. 
If  proof of the correctness of these propositions is accepted, this means that two 
objections which have from time to time been made against the case-law of the 
Court must be rejected. These objections are to this effect: 
1.  In certain fields of Community law the Court, by an interpretation which is far 
too dynamic and evolutionary, focuses too much on the objectives laid down in 
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development of Community law and, moreover, in a manner which it has no 
right to adopt. For this reason a gap has developed between the position on 
European integration taken up  by  the  case-law of the  Court and the  real 
situation in Europe, which can only be improved by the political institutions of 
the Community adopting a policy of progressive integration. In other words: 
although from the point of view of integration policy the case-law of  the Court 
is to be welcomed it is nevertheless not legally convincing. The Court has not, 
or at least not always, kept within the limits pla{:ed on all judicial activities. 
2.  Further  misgivings  are  sometimes  voiced,  because  the  interpretation  of 
Community law by the Court focused on the 'system' of the Treaties and their 
objectives has been accepted in the six 'old' Member States, and runs the risk, 
particularly in the two new common law Member States, of  not being accepted 
in the same way without difficulties. Although a judge experienced in common 
law is familiar with schematic and teleological interpretation, he is nevertheless 
inclined to keep more closely to the wording of  a law and to adopt the inductive 
method,  whereas  the  Court,  using  methods  of interpretation  which  take 
account of the system of the Treaties and stress the objectives of integration, 
adopts primarily in its arguments the deductive method. 
Before these questions are discussed a few observations are nevertheless called for 
on literal, historical and comparative interpretation. 
3.  Literal interpretation 
It is obvious that every interpretation of a rule has to start with its wording and the 
'ordinary meaning' of a word, phrase or sentence, and its meaning determined by 
'common  usage'.8  Where  appropriate this  meaning  must be  ascertained  by  a 
grammatical exegesis.  This applies both to the national and Community court. 
I shall not go  further into the questions which can arise from this grammatical 
interpretation. 
In this respect Community law is, however, in a special position since the texts to be 
interpreted, apar_t from the ECSC Treaty,9 are in several languages. The texts of  the 
EEC  Treaty and the Euratom Treaty are equally authentic in  seven  languages 
(Danish, German, English, French, Italian, Irish and Dutch), while the whole of 
derived Community law is equally authentic in six languages (the seven mentioned 
above apart from Irish).10 
The  obligation  to  consider  all  the  relevant  linguistic  versions  in  interpreting 
Community law applies  to  the Community Court in  the  same  way as  to the 
national court. It can, however, be stated that national courts, just as they do when 
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applying and interpreting Community law to adhere exclusively to the version of 
the text in their own language.11 The immediate danger of such a practice is that 
problems of interpretation may be overlooked. By accepting the apparently clear 
wording  of  one  version  as  authentic  the  Court  disregards  the  fact  that 
consideration of  the versions in the other languages may perhaps cast doubt on the 
correctness of the result of the interpretation. Indeed the special feature of the 
interpretation of texts in several languages lies  inter alia  in  the very fact that 
questions  of interpretation  arise  only  if the  meaning  and  significance  of the 
wording in the various languages appear to differ from each other, that is, if the 
ascertainment of  the meaning of  a provision cannot just be based on one version or 
equally on the versions in all the languages. 
An example of the dangers which can arise from considering only the text in 
one's  own  language  is  the  order  of  the  second  Senate  of the  German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) of 29 May 1974 (the 
order in Solange  BVerfGE  37, 271).  The order distinguishes  between  the 
validity  and  the  applicability  of  a  provision  of  Community  law.  The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht  can  never  decide  as  to  the  validity  of  such  a 
provision; it may, however, come to the conclusion that such a provision may 
not be applied in the Federal Republic of Germany to the extent to which it 
conflicts with a fundamental right contained in a provision of the Basic Law 
(ibid. p. 281 et seq.). The question may be asked whether the majority of the 
Second  Senate  of  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  would  have  drawn  this 
distinction  between  the  validity  and  applicability  of  a  rule  of  derived 
Community law with the same impartiality, if they had taken note of the other 
versions of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. Whereas the German version states 
that the Community regulation 'gilt unmittelbar in jedem Mitgliedstaat', the 
versions  in  English,  French  and Italian use  the words 'directly applicable', 
'Directement  applicable'  and  'direttamente  applicabile'.  Upon  a  proper 
construction the EEC Treaty recognizes no distinction between 'validity' and 
'applicability' of a Community regulation. An examination of the versions in 
the other languages, which had to be carried out, would at least have 'made the 
fact that the distinction between the validity and applicability of a Community 
regulation is  not compatible with Community law stand out more clearly. 
There are, however, cases where a national court is  aware of the difficulties of 
interpretation arising from the fact that the texts exist in more than one language 
and therefore makes a reference under Article 177 to the Court of Justice of the 
Communities for the interpretation of Community law. 
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Thus, for example, the Sozialgericht (Social Court) Gelsenkirchen gave as the 
grounds for its order of  reference for a preliminary ruling dated 11 May 1976 in 
Case 40/76 Kermaschek on the interpretation of provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 inter alia that it was not in a position to ascertain whether particular 
considerations  had  been  decisive  and  were  adequately  expressed  on  the 
adoption of  a provision, and in particular that it, the Sozialgericht, did not have 
any opportunity of  making a critical analysis of the wording of  the regulation in 
the  official  languages  of  the  European  Communities  which  govern  its 
interpretation. 
The risk that problems of interpretation arising from the existence of texts in more 
than one language might be overlooked by the Court of  Justice of the Communities 
is small. For each judge reads the texts which are relevant to the decision in his 
mother tongue  as  well  and will  point out difficulties  which  might arise if the 
interpretation were  based  on  only one or some  of the versions in  the various 
languages. 
The Court has often stressed, although this is actually self-evident, that  the need for 
a uniform interpretation and application of Community law in all Member States 
precludes the examination of a provision in one of its versions in isolation and that 
this requirement makes it necessary to interpret it in the light of  the other versions if 
there is any doubt as to its meaning.12 This rules out any preferential treatment of 
the language of the case which is  relevant to the particular court proceedings. 
The result of such an interpretation which pays due regard to all the language 
versions is certain in so far as they can all only have the same content, meaning and 
scope; otherwise the uniformity of Community law in all Member States and in all 
language versions, which is absolutely necessary, would no longer be guaranteed. 
How is this result achieved? Certainly not by giving 'equal' consideration to all the 
versions:  indeed it is  just when the meaning of the various language versions 
appears to differ that interpretation becomes necessary. It  will be however just as 
difficult to achieve by searching for the minimum common to all versions. 
The situation will often arise that a greater number of versions appear to have the 
same meaning whereas a smaller number on the other hand - whether agreeing or 
not inter se- suggest a different construction or one which is not clear. In such 
cases the 'majority' have in practice the greater chances of  prevailing. However, the 
Court then determines the correct meaning of the provision by adopting other 
methods of interpretation. As  an example let me mention first the judgment of 
12 November 1969 (Case 29/69 Stauder [1969] ECR 419). 
This case was concerned with a decision of the Commission addressed to all the 
Member States on the sale of butter at reduced prices to persons in receipt of 
welfare benefits. The German and Dutch versions provided that those persons 
entitled  to  benefit  could  receive  butter  only  in  exchange  for  a  'coupon 
indicating their names'. One such person regarded this obligation to reveal his 
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French and Italian versions stated only that a 'coupon referring to the person 
concerned' must be shown, thus making it possible to employ other methods of 
checking and preferred this more liberal ~ording. 
In the grounds of this judgment it is stated that the most liberal interpretation must 
prevail, provided that it is  sufficient to achieve  the  objectives  pursued  by  the 
decision  in  question. It cannot, moreover, be  accepted that the authors of the 
decision intended to impose stricter obligations in some Member States than in 
others. 
In the Court's judgment of 13 March 1973 in Case 61/72 Mij PPW Internationaal 
N. V.  [1973] ECR 301 the issue was inter alia whether certificates for the advance 
fixing  of export refunds  are  'issued',  which  in  the relevant Dutch version  is 
translated sometimes by 'afgeven' and sometimes by 'overhandigd'. The Court 
stated that no  argument can be  drawn either from any linguistic divergencies 
between the various language versions, or from the multiplicity of  the verbs used in 
one or other of those versions, as the meaning of the provisions in question must be 
determined with respect to their objective. 
In its  judgment of 23  October 1975 in  Case 35/75 Matisa  [1975]  ECR at 
p. 1212 which was concerned with the interpretation of tariff headings of the 
Common Customs Tariff, the Court preferred the more liberal meaning of the 
wording of the other language versions to the narrow German wording but it 
based its decision in the end on the fact that the various versiorts of the tariff 
headings requiring interpretation were no obstacle to the Explanatory Notes to 
the Brussels Nomenclature relating thereto being accepted as an authoritative 
source for the purpose of interpretation which made it possible to classify the 
imported goods with absolute certainty under a particular tariff heading. 
In a further decision on the interpretation of the Common Customs Tariff the 
Court found  that although  the  German  wording  of the  tariff heading in 
question  'does  not perhaps  bring  out this  difference  clearly',  the French, 
English and Italian versions 'leave no doubt in  this matter' (judgment of 18 
February 1976 Joined Cases 98-99/75 Cartens Keramik at paragraph 12 of 
the grounds, not yet published). Here too the determining factor was not that 
the versions accepted were those of the majority but that they were  much 
clearer. 
As a result it can be stated that the difficulties of interpretation arising from the 
multilingual nature of Community law are frequently  resolved· not through a 
grammatical interpretation but by resorting to an examination of  the object of the 
provision and its place in the system of the Treaty. It is true that this finding does 
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shows that the Court accords only limited significance to literal interpretation: 'the 
Court cannot ...  be content with a literal interpretation' (Case 6/60 Humblet Rec. 
1960 p. 1125). 
4.  Historical interpretation 
Historical  interpretation  can  mean  two  things:  Reference  back  to  the  actual 
intention of the legislature, that is a subjective historical method, or reference back 
to the 'objective' intention of the legislature, and in particular to the function of a 
rule at the time it was adopted (an objective historical method).13 Furthermore the 
historical method can also include a form of  interpretation which traces the history 
of  individual legal concepts or institutions (such as the 'institutions of Roman law') 
and draws conclusions from it.  However the observations which follow do not 
take this aspect of interpretation into account. 
First, so far as the Treaties are concerned, it would be better in this connexion to 
speak  of the  common  intention  of the  parties  to  the  Treaty.  This  'common 
intention' has been  referred to in  earlier cases,  albeit only occasionally, by the 
Court as a possible source of information. In its judgment of 16 December 1960 in 
Case 6/60 Humblet, Rec. 1960, p. 1125 the Court nevertheless was constrained to 
hold forthwith that it was impossible to establish any such consensus on the part of 
the Member States which could serve as a guideline for the interpretation of  Article 
11  (b)  of the Protocol on the Privileges and Immunities of the ECSC. The Court 
cannot rely on preparatory work which provides a history of how the Treaties 
came into being. In so far as  any such preparatory work exists at all- essential 
questions were obviously only discussed and decided within working groups- it 
has in any case not been published. Documents which are not generally accessible 
must, however, be ruled out as  aids to interpretation for constitutional reasons. 
On the other hand official opinions and explanatory memoranda relating to the 
Treaties laid by the governments of the Member States before their parliaments as 
well as parliamentary debates have been published. The Court has previously had 
occasion to consider such opinions and memoranda,  14 but has at best made use of 
them as  a means  of providing suggestions and pointers or confirmation of an 
interpretation already arrived at. It is useless to look at such pointers in the more 
recent judgments. This applies also to the three countries which acceded in 1973. 
As far as I can see there is no trace in the case-law of the Court of the method of 
objective historical interpretation which focuses  primarily on the object of the 
particular rule  of the  Treaty  at the  time  the  Treaty  was  concluded.  This  is 
understandable. The aims of the Communities are an increase in integration, an 
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economic and social progress, that is a change in economic and social conditions. 
Interpretations based on the original situation would in no way be in keeping with 
a Community l~w orientated towards the future. 
No greater significance can therefore be given to an historical interpretation of the 
provisions of  the Treaty. This conclusion was reached at the Cologne conference as 
far  back  as  1963  and  convincingly  substantiated  by  our  colleague  Judge 
Pescatore.151t does not, of  course, apply if historical interpretation-giving it in my 
opinion, with reference to what has already been said, too wide a meaning- is 
deemed to include reference back to the objectives of the Communities as  laid 
down in particular in the preambles of the Treaty and the opening provisions 
which set outtheir principles. The clearly expressed intention of  the Member States 
in the Treaties to create a 'Community which will become progressively integrated' 
(these are the words used by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht in its order 
dated 18 October 1967, BVerfGE 22, 296) with all the consequences flowing from 
this is of very great importance for the interpretation of Community law. 
Unlike the position under the Treaties preparatory work (travaux preparatoires) 
for derived Community law is to a certain extent generally accessible. Article 190 
of  the EEC Treaty provides that regulations, directives and decisions of  the Council 
and of the Commission shall state the reasons on which they are based and shall 
refer to any proposals or opinions which were required to be obtained pursuant to 
the Treaty. The proposals, for example of the Commission, and the opinions, for 
example of Parliament, are published in the Official Journal of the Communities. 
The recitals which throw into relief the aims, that is the 'intention' of  the Council or 
Commission on the adoption of  provisions, directives and decisions, are frequently 
examined by the Court for the purpose of interpreting these provisions. As  an 
example the  judgment in  Case  29/69 Stauder  [1969]  ECR at p. 424 may  be 
mentioned which states that the decision of the Commission has to be interpreted 
in  accordance  with  'the  real  intention  of  its  author'.  The  opinions  of the 
Advocates-General also contain references to this preparatory work.16 However at 
the  same  time  opinions  relating  to  and  recitals  of derived  Community  law 
nevertheless help the Court, if only to a limited extent, to clarify the purpose and 
meaning of a provision. The judgment in the Stauder case for example not only 
concentrates on the 'real intention' of the author but also on the aim which the 
decision sought to achieve. 
Viewed  as  a  whole historical interpretation plays  only a  subordinate part in 
Community law; it fulfils at most a subsidiary function. This is a great advantage: 
the Community judge faces up to his law unencumbered by this preparatory work. 
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At the beginning of this section I should like to emphasize again that my remarks 
should not be understood as being an even approximately exhaustive statement of 
the  Court's  methods  of  interpretation.  The  questions  of  comparative  law 
interpretation have many aspects. They have been  discussed frequently and in 
detail.  My  remarks  are  limited  to  stressing  some  aspects  of this  method  of 
interpretation which may have featured in the Court's decided cases. 
I have first of all a preliminary observation: interpreting the provisions of one 
treaty by reference to the provisions of  the other treaties has sometimes been called 
comparative  law  interpretation.  There  is  no  justification  for  this.  Although 
Community law is  based on several Treaties, which however provide for single 
institutions, it must be  regarded as  a single entity, as  the law of the European 
Community. The principle of the uniformity of Community law, which requires 
that  there  must  be  no  contradictions  within  this  uniformity,  means  that  a 
harmonizing interpretation of these Treaties is imperative.17 
A (a) Article 218 of the EEC Treaty (Article 188 of the EAEC Treaty} provides that 
the  Community in  the  field  of non-contractual liability shall  make  good  any 
damage, caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their 
duties,  'in accordance with the general principles  common to the laws  of the 
Member States'. 
The provision is regarded as justification for the view that in the case of  written law 
the main principles  of the ius  commune europaeum,  which the Court has  to 
determine and consider, also form part  of  the legal sources of Community law (see I 
2 (a) above). It  must moreover be borne in mind that Article 215 of  the EEC Treaty 
does not refer to such fundamental legal provisions but, with much more modesty, 
merely to the basic principles of the laws of the Member States relating to liability 
for  breach  of  official  duty.  In  this  connexion  it  is  clear  that  as  regards 
non-contractural liability there is  imposed on the Community only a uniform 
system in compensating for damage (Case 9/69, Sayag v Leduc [1969] ECR at p. 
335). But do such general principles exist?  · 
The  most comprehensive  and thorough  examination to  my  knowledge  by  an 
international colloquium (Heidelberg 1964) of this question of the liability of the 
'State for the unlawful conduct of its institutions' produced only relatively modest 
results.18 The same applies to a further opinion in 197  5, which in particular carried 
out an examination from the point of view of comparative law of the question of 
fault or blame as a condition precedent to liability and also of liability for illegal 
legislation.19 
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Advocates-General Lagrange and Gand as to the scope and effect of the reference 
to 'general principles' in Article 215 so far as the six original Member States were 
concerned. Mr Advocate-General Langrange observed that the only truly common 
legal principle is  that which nowadays disapproves in all I\1ember States of the 
doctrine of the non-liability of the State and that in other respects the systems are 
sometimes fundamentally different. He considered Article 188 of  the EAEC Treaty 
(cf. Article 215 of the EEC Treaty) to be merely a diplomatic formula often to be 
found in international treaties which is significant only to the extent to which it 
refers to certain principles of equity which are normally found in a State governed 
by the rule of law.2o 
The Court in its judgment of 10 July 1969 in Sayag v Leduc refrained from making 
any  reference  to comparative  law  and  determined  the  question  in  issue  (the 
meaning of 'performance of  duties' under Article 188 of the EEC Treaty if a servant 
of the Community uses  his  car in  the performance of his  duties and causes an 
accident) by interpreting the text of Article 188 of the EEC Treaty without relying 
on the 'general principles'. 
In another case concerning the Community's liability for its legislative (as opposed 
to its  executive) activities, the Court was required to undertake more intensive 
comparative law examination. The Court in its judgment of 2 December 1971 in 
Case 5/71, Zuckerfabrik Schoppenstedt, ([1971] ECR at p. 984 et seq.) held that 
applications, based on Article 215 of the EEC Treaty, claiming compensation for 
legislative  acts  of the  Community were  admissible.  The  Court describes  the 
circumstances in which the Community is liable in such cases and which have been 
constantly repeated in the Court's case-law, as follows: 'Where legislative action 
involving measures of economic policy is  concerned, the Community does not 
incur  non-contractual  liability  for  damage  suffered  by  individuals  as  a 
consequences of that action, by virtue of the provisions contained in Article 215, 
second  paragraph, of the  Treaty,  unless  a  sufficiently  flagrant  violation  of a 
superior rule of law for the protection of the individual has occurred'. (see,  for 
example, judgment of 14 May 1975 in Case 74/74, CNTA v Commission [1975] 
ECR at p. 546).  . 
In the first case of this kind after the accession of the three new Member States, 
Professor Ipsen, who assisted the defendants (the Council and the Commission) 
submitted again and emphatically that there was no general legal principle that 
under Article 215 of the EEC Treaty the Community was also liable for legislative 
acts, and in  particular having regard to the legal  systems  of the new Member 
States.  21 There is no trace of these objections in the grounds of the judgment of 13 
November 1973 in Joined Cases 63 to 69/72, Wernhahn and others v Council and 
Commission,  ([1973] ECR 1229).22  On the contrary the Court repeats without 
further reasoning the words already used in earlier judgments ([1973] ECR at p. 
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within the meaning of  Article 215 of  the EEC Treaty after the accession of  the three 
States must from now on be inferred from the legal systems of the nine Member 
States, that in consequence no alteration of the case-law is  however necessary. 
The opinion of Mr Advocate-General Roemer in  this case is  instructive ([1973] 
ECR 1255). He draws attention-I limit myself to the key expressions-to the need 
for  evaluative  comparative law ('wertende Rechtsvergleichung'), emphasizes  a 
certain  tendency  to  further  development in  some  Member States,  mentions  a 
further narrowing of the gap between 'the legal systems, which on the point of 
interest  in  the  present  case  are  largely  negative'  and  the,  if  you  like,  'more 
progressive  legal  systems',  refers  to  the  structure  of  Community  law  with 
Parliament only playing a small part in  the legislative process  and finally lays 
special stress on the concept of the strengthening by the Court of legal protection 
within the Community. 
It  is impossible to ascertain which of these views of its Advocate-General the Court 
considered  important.  The  fact  remains  that it has  not  altered  its  case-law 
according  to  which  legislative  acts  can  also  fall  within  the  Community's 
non-contractualliability. 
(b)  If  Community law uses concepts which have clearly been borrowed from one 
or more of the legal systems of individual Member States, the first question which 
arises is whether this is to be regarded as a reference by Community law to national 
law-that is that the concept has the specific meaning which it has under national 
law - or whether it is  a concept of Community law the meaning of which - as 
defined by Community law-can differ from that by which it is understood under 
one or several national legal systems. 
Reference to national law excluding a comparative law interpretation is rare (for 
example the expression 'companies or firms' in Article 58 of the EEC Treaty). In 
general the concepts taken from the laws of individual Member States have within 
the framework of Community law specific meanings different from their meaning 
under the national legal systems, which spring from the system of Community law 
and the objectives of  the Treaty. This applies-to mention only a few examples-to 
the concept 'worker' (Articles 48 to 51 of the EEC Treaty, judgment of 19 March 
1964 in Case 75/63, Unger, [1964] ECR 177) and also 'offer' in the organization of 
the market in cereals. In this organization of the market the intervention agencies 
are bound in certain circumstances to buy in cereals which are 'offered' to them. 
The Court held that intervention agencies cannot derogate from the Community 
concept of an offer and gave as its reason, inter alia, that terms used in Community 
law must be uniformly interpreted and applied throughout the Community except 
where  an  express  or implied  reference  is  made  to  national law  (judgment of 
, 1 February 1972, Case 49/71, Hagen,  [1972] ECR 35). 
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has also modified the meaning of the concept for the purposes of Community law, 
it  has done so in the case of  the concept 'nationals of  the State in whose territory ... 
they [the officials] are employed' (Article 4 of Annex VII to the Staff Regulations, 
which deals with the expatriation allowance). The concept of 'nationals' contained 
in this article must be  interpreted in such a way as  to avoid any unwarranted 
difference  as  between  male  and  female  officials  who  are,  in  fact,  placed  in 
comparable situations. It  is therefore necessary to exclude nationality imposed by 
law on a female official upon her marriage with a national of another State and 
which she was unable to renounce (judgment of the Court (Second Chamber), of 
20 February 1975, Case 21174, Airola [1975] ECR 221). 
If  there is no reference to national law and Community law uses specific concepts 
with which the national legal systems are familiar, then an interpretation of the 
concept in Community law has much to recommend it, which traces its meaning in 
the laws of the individual Member States on a comparative law basis. However, 
such an interpretation based on a comparison of the relevant legal systems, which 
is intended to define the concept and make outlines more clear-cut, is only rarely 
found in the judgments of  the Court although more frequently in the opinions of  its 
Advocates-General. For an example reference should be made to the detailed and 
exhaustive examination by Mr Advocate-General Lagrange in the case of  Assider v 
High  Authority,  (Case 3/54, 1954/55 Rec.  p.  157 et seq.)  'misuse of powers' 
('ErmessensmiGbrauch', 'detournement de pouvoir', 'sviamento di potere') which 
is  found in Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty and Article 173 of the EEC Treaty. 
(c)  Interpretation or supplementation on a comparative law basis is also called for 
if  Community law is silent on particular questions, with which the legal systems of 
individual Member States have for a long time been familiar and which they have 
answered. In its judgment of 12 July 1957 in Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7157,Algera and 
others, [1957] Rec. p. 115) the Court, on the question whether the revocation of 
measures creating subjective rights was admissible, gave its judgment 'with due 
regard to the legal rules acknowledged by the laws, legai writings and case-law of 
the Member States'. An 'examination based on comparative law' of just under two 
pages follows. It  has been correctly stated that a comparative examination in such 
detail has never since then been carried out in any of the Court's decided cases.24 
Later judgments confine themselves to recording the result of the comparison of 
the various legal systems. Attention is drawn by way of example to the judgment of 
4 July 1963 in Case 32/62, Alvis, ([1963] ECR 55) which held that according to a 
generally accepted principle of administrative law in force in the Member States, 
the administrations of these States had to give their servants the opportunity of 
replying to allegations before any disciplinary decision is taken concerning them.  25 
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1976, Joined Cases 56 to 60/74, not yet published) the issue was whether, under 
Articles 178 and 215 of the EEC Treaty, the Court could be asked to determine the 
non-contractualliability of  the Community for imminent damage foreseeable with 
, sufficient certainty. The Court affirmed that an application for such a declaration 
was admissible and substantiated its view with reference to the legal systems of the 
Member States:  most, if not all, of these legal  systems recognize an action for 
declaration of liability based on future damage, which is sufficiently certain. The 
judgment does not indicate what degree of certainty is  required. 
In its interlocutory judgment of 15 June 1976 (Mills v European Investment Bank, 
Case 110/75, not yet published) the Court proceeded on the basis that the legal 
relations between the Bank and its servants are of a contractual nature. The next 
point to be clarified was whether, in the event of  a possibly wrongful dismissal, the 
Court can only award the dismissed servant compensation for the material and 
non-material damage which he suffered as  a result of the wrongful dismissal, or 
whether the Court can make a declaration to the effect that the dismissal is void. 
The Court emphasizes that, although the continuation of a contract depends upon 
the mutual consent of the parties,  the  law of contract as  well  as  the general 
principles of the law governing labour, to which the Staff Regulations of the Bank 
refer, place limits on the intention of  the parties, and that consequently in the event 
of a wrongful dismissal of a  serious nature, the Court can declare that such  a 
dismissal is  void. An application for  a declaration that the dismissal  is  void  is 
therefore admissible-and the interlocutory judgment had to decide only whether 
such an application was admissible. 
The reference in the judgment to 'the general principles of the law of master and 
servant'  which  are  not further  specified,  is  all  the  more  remarkable  because 
Mr Advocate-General Warner in his opinion of 6 May 1976 examined the legal 
situation in the Member States with reference to this question in greater detail and 
came to the conclusion that there was no general principle common to the laws of 
the Member States that a court may declare a dismissal to be void. 
The Court's decision must be understood as meaning that, having regard to the 
development which  is  evident in  every  Member State and from  an evaluative 
comparative law approach in line with social progress, it came to the conclusion 
that in serious cases  it can declare that the dismissal has no legal  effect.  Some 
Member States have already expressly made provision to this effect, while in others 
the  courts,  on the strength  of more  recent legal  provisions,  can  in  any  case 
recommend  reinstatement  of  the  wrongfully  dismissed  employee  with  its 
corresponding financial consequences if the recommendation is not followed. 
(d)  Those general legal principles, not being the legal principles for the narrower 
sphere of particular legal areas (for example administrative law, labour law or 
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law, form part  of  Community law. Above all they comprise fundamental rights (see 
I 2 (a) above) which moreover-at all events in the view of some Member States-
include the prohibition ne bis in idem, the right to be heard in legal proceedings and 
the principles of proportionality and protection of legitimate expectations. 
The judgments of the Court which find that these general legal principles are an 
integral part of Community law do not contain a more detailed exposition based 
on comparative law. The Court has merely stated that they are inspired by the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States and that no measure can 
be regarded as lawful which is  incompatible with the principles recognized and 
guaranteed by the constitutions of these States. Furthermore the judgments in the 
Nold and Rutili cases (see I 2 (a) above) show that the protection of fundamental 
rights by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, to the 
extent to  which  it ratione  materiae  applies  to  Community law,  also  sets  the 
minimum standard for the protection of fundamental rights for Community law-
but it is only to be regarded as a minimum standard, which must not be lowered 
and which the Court can indeed, and is obliged on occasion, to raise. 
In this field the Court has so far only had to decide cases where infringement of a 
fundamental right was not a serious issue, so that it was unnecessary with reference 
to a specific problem to consider on a comparative law basis what is  or is  not 
compatible with the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. At all 
events there has  so  far  been  no known case where the Court has held that a 
provision  or measure was valid  which  the constitution of any  Member State 
regarded as  incompatible with fundamental rights. 
B (a)  The Court's abstention from references to comparative law in the grounds of 
its judgments should not obscure the fact that within the Court a considerable 
amount of time  and energy is  devoted to comparative law, although it is  not 
specifically reflected in the judgments. The pleadings of the parties, particularly 
those of the Commission, often contain a discussion of the relevant problems from 
the point of view of comparative law and the Court frequently supplements this 
through its Research Department. From time to time the Commission is requested 
to state how certain questions are dealt with in the Member States (for example the 
question what time-limits apply for challenging notices imposing charges and how 
the reimbursement of charges which have been imposed illegally is arranged: the 
Rewe case 33/76, letter of 15 July 1976). The Advocates-General frequently set 
out in their opinions expertly compiled and evaluated comparative statements of 
the laws of the Member States. It can be assumed that in a court composed of 
judges from all  the Member States, important strands of all  the national legal 
systems are woven into its judgments, even if the judges may prefer-particularly 
having regard to the generality of  the general principles-to limit themselves in this 
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comparisons of the law of Member States in the' grounds of judgment. This may 
explain the terse findings which are frequently found in the grounds of judgment.26 
(b)  There is complete agreement that when the Court interprets or supplements 
Community law on a comparative law basis it is not obliged to take the minimum 
which the national solutions have in  common, or their arithmetic mean or the 
solution produced by a majority of  the legal systems as the basis of its decision. The 
Court has to weigh up and evaluate the particular problem and search for the 'best' 
and 'most appropriate' solution. The best possible solution is the one which meets 
the specific  objectives  and basic  principles  of the  Community - of which  the 
protection of fundamental  rights  of citizens  is  an  integral part - in  the  most 
satisfactory way.27 This is  the meaning which must be  attached to the Court's 
finding  that the  protection of fundamental  rights  must be  ensured  within  the 
framework of the structure and objectives of the Community (judgment in  the 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft Case, see I a (a)). 
Mr Advocate-General Lagrange has already stated in his opinion of4 June 1962 in 
Nederlandsche Hoogovens, Case 14/61 ([1962] ECR at p. 283) that a considered 
and evaluative comparison of the relevant laws  is  necessary. The Court has to 
choose those solutions which, having regard to the objectives of the Treaty, appear 
to it to be the best or, if this expression may be used, the most progressive. The 
Court has up till now been guided by this principle. It must be added that the Court 
draws its inspiration from this principle in 1976, in exactly the same way as it did i'n 
1962, whenever  it interprets  Community  law  by  using  the  comparative  law 
method or - in  a law-making capacity - supplements it. 
What has been said explains the meaning of and the limits to interpreting and 
supplementing Community law on  a comparative law basis.  A comparison of 
national provisions of law makes the outlines of the problem which has to be 
solved stand out more clearly, contributes to mastering the essential issues in a case 
with more certainty and makes it easier to select the best, most appropriate and 
fairest of several possible solutions. 
Member States should have the same objective in mind when they undertake the 
approximation of laws (Article 100 of the EEC Treaty). 
6.  On schematic and teleological interpretation 
The  foregoing  exposition  has  confirmed  that  the  methods  of interpretation 
employed by the Community judge are not fundamentally different from those 
which the national judge applies in interpreting his law. This is true of the literal 
and historical interpretation of a provision, although in this respect the emphasis 
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to interpretation by comparison of laws, which, however, in the nature of things is 
of greater importance in Community law than in the national legal syste  __ 'ls. 
The interpretation of rules in their schematic relationship with other rules and with 
the regulation of a matter as a whole (including consideration of the 'place' of the 
provision to be interpreted and of the 'structure' of the regulation of a matter) as 
well as their interpretation according to their purpose and design, that is to say, 
their teleological interpretation, are also familiar to the judges of all the Member 
States. But both of these methods are so prominent in the interpretation by the 
Court of Justice of Community law as  to suggest in this respect a conversion of 
quantity into quality. The importance which the Court of  Justice attributes to them 
can only be understood if one has in mind the special nature of  the Community and 
its legal system as well as  the special functions of the Court of Justice. 
a.  The special nature of  the Community and its legal system; the special functions 
of the Court of  justice 
(1)  What is  the 'special nature' of the Community? 
The Court of Justice was not slow to distinguish it, principally in its judgments of 
5 February 1963 (Van Gend &  Laos, Case 26/62, [1963] ECR 1) and of 15 July 
1964 (Costa v ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] ECR 585). The Community Treaties are 
to be distinguished from 'ordinary international treaties'. The Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community was concluded for an unlimited duration and 
created a Community with legal capacity and capacity of representation on the 
international plane and having its own legislative, executive and judicial organs. 
The Community has been granted its own sovereign rights which stem from a 
definitive limitation of the authority of the Member States or from the transfer to 
the Community of sovereign powers. Only by virtue of an express provision of  the 
Treaty can the tasks assigned to the Community be removed from it and restored to 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Member States (judgment of 14 December 1971, 
Commission v France,  Case 7/71, [1971] ECR 1018 ). 
Thus it was that the founding Treaties were intended by the parties thereto to 
create an independent Community; this came about through the establishment of 
its  institutions.  The  sovereign  power  assigned  to  it  is  different  from  and 
independent of the sovereign power of the Member States; it may only be exercised 
for the purposes of the aims of the Treaties and the interests of the Community. 
The Treaties were ratified without any substantial reservation by all the Member 
States. Every national authority was aware of the scope and the irrevocability of 
the decision which was taken in ratifying the Treaties. Every national authority 
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set  up  against  the  obligations  which  were  solemnly  undertaken  withn the 
establishment of the Community (cf. Order of 22 June 1965, San Michele,  Case 
9/65, [1967] ECR 27). 
The nature of the Community Treaties is in this respect twofold, in that on the one 
hand they create international obligations between the Member States but on the 
other contain a constitution common to these States in respect of part of their 
sovereign functions. By virtue of  the special nature of the Treaties the Community 
cannot be regarded as an association of States to be judged primarily according to 
public  international  law.  The  constitutional  nature  of  the  Treaties  is  the 
predominant factor. 
Digression:  The principles of interpretation under public international law cannot as a general rule be 
employed for the purposes of Community law. 
On the negative side it follows from the special nature of the Community that the 
principles  of interpretation peculiar to and governing public international law 
treaties cannot as  a general rule be enlisted for the purposes of interpreting the 
Community Treaties. It may suffice  to give  two examples  in  support of this, 
although it must not be forgotten that the rules of interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention of 1969 on the Law of Treaties  (Articles 31  to 33) may lead to a 
standardization and also, to a certain degree, to a modification of the rules of 
interpretation hitherto applied in public international law. 
So far as the Community Treaties are concerned the principle that limitations on 
the sovereignty of the contracting States are in case of doubt to be interpreted 
narrowly ('in dubio mitius') does not apply. In this respect, the rules applying in the 
case of the law on coordination in public international law cannot apply for the 
purposes of interpreting the law on integration under Community law.29 Unlike 
treaties governed by public international law, therefore, the Community Treaties, 
as  the constitution of the Community, are to be interpreted broadly rather than 
restrictively,  according  to  the  methods  of  interpretation  applicable  to 
constitutional jurisdictions, and thus like national constitutional law. On the other 
hand  the  maxim  'in  dubio  pro  communi  tate',  which  indicates  the  opposite 
tendency and is  occasionally advocated, is  equally  unacc~ptable. 
In addition the rule of interpretation according to which it is within certain limits 
permissible and appropriate to call in aid the subsequent concurrent conduct of the 
parties to a Treaty for  the purposes of interpreting it finds  no application in 
Community law, whether in  order to reach a conclusion from this subsequent 
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modification of the content of the Treaty based on concurrence.  30 
In another part of  this paper (II 4) it has already been stressed that on the one hand 
it is impossible to call in aid the subjective intention of the parties to the Treaty for 
the purposes of interpreting individual Treaty provisions but that on the other 
hand the intention of the contracting States-and this applies to the 'old' as well as 
the  'new' Member States - to  create  a  Community designed  for  progressiv~ 
integration was unquestionably embodied in the Treaties. 
According to the Treaty the Commission shall, in order to ensure the proper 
functioning and development of the Common Market, ensure that the Treaties are 
applied (Article 155, EEC Treaty).lt can take action against Member States which 
in its opinion have failed to fulfil obligations under the Treaty (Article 169, EEC 
Treaty). The Member States can bring before the Court of Justice an infringement 
of the Treaty by another Member State (Article 170, EEC Treaty). The Court of 
Justice can  within the limits  of its  jurisdiction declare  that there has  been  an 
infringement of the Treaty by the Member States as well as  by  the Council or 
Commission (Article 169, 170, 173, 175, EEC Treaty). In addition the Parliament, 
too, has supervisory powers (Article 137, EEC Treaty). Through these provisions 
of the Treaty the institutions of the Community-especially the Commission and 
the Court of Justice-are given the task of ensuring the observance of the Treaties. 
This of necessity includes the power to take decisions on their content and scope. 
Thus the Treaties themselves have entrusted their interpretation to the institutions 
of the Community; this, too, is expressive of their constitutional nature. This fact 
rules out of the question recourse to the subsequent conduct of  the Member States 
for the purpose of determining the content of the Treaties. 
The Court of Justice takes this view as its point of departure. In its judgment of 
8 April  1976  (Defrenne,  Case  43/75,  not  yet  published)  it  declared  that  a 
resolution by the six Member States of 30 December 1961 which proposed the 
elimination by 31  December 1964 of all discrimination in  the field  covered by 
Article 119 of  the EEC Treaty (equal pay for men and women for equal work) in no 
way altered the fact that the application of Article 119 was to be fully secured as 
from 1 January 1962 (paragraph 2 of  the ruling, and grounds 47, 48, 56, 57, 58,65 
and 66 of the judgment). An  amendment of the Treaty could only be made by 
means of the procedure prescribed for  that purpose under Article 236 of the 
EEC Treaty. 
(2)  What is the 'special nature' of  the legal system of the Community? 
(aa)  In its judgments delivered in 1963 and 1964 in the Van Gend & Loos case and 
in the case of Costa  v ENEL the Court of Justice made it plain that with the 
founding of the Community a new, separate legal order, a 'legal body' was created, 
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citizens. This legal order, to which the Treaties and subordinate Community law 
belong, is independent; Community law stems from an autonomous source of  law. 
This independence of the Community legal system is the foundation on which the 
twin pillars which bear it rest: the direct validity and applicability of  its rules and its 
precedence over national law. 
The case-law of the Court of Justice on the direct applicability of provisions of 
Community law is familiar. It has drawn the inescapable consequences from the 
fact that the Community legal system is not only binding as regards the institutions 
of the Community and the Member States in general but is directly binding also as 
regards the administrative authorities and courts of those States, and, above all, 
their citizens. The case-law of the Court of Justice, according to which even those 
provisions of the Treaty which from their wording appear to be addressed to the 
Member States may, under certain conditions, be directly applicable in this sense 
(thus, to use the terminology of public international law, self-executing), has been 
firmly established since the judgment in Van  Gend &  Laos and belongs to the 
'acquis communautaire' which can no longer be seriously called in question. In this 
connexion it must be borne in mind that the vigilance of individuals concerned to 
protect their rights  (see  the judgment in Van  Gend &  Laos) has proved to be 
-particularly through the procedure under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty- an 
exceptionally  effective  supplement  to  the  supervision  which  the  Commission 
exercises in order to ensure that the Treaties are observed. 
The same has been true, as regards the precedence of  Community law over national 
law, since the judgment in Costa v ENEL. It cannot be seriously denied that the 
realization of the aims  of the Treaty would be  seriously jeopardized and that 
discrimination within the Community would result if Community law were to vary 
in  validity  and  to  be  variously  applied  from  one  Member  State  to  another 
according to the respective national legal systems. Community law stands and falls 
by its uniform validity and application in  all the Member States. 
(bb)  The  legal  system  of the  Community  of  the  Member  States  is  further 
characterized by the fact that it employs a large number of undefined rules and 
concepts and contains only a relatively small number of precise, substantive rules 
of law  and  that,  above  all,  it  prescribes  objectives,  indicates  directions  and 
establishes  principles.  Essentially  the  Treaties  establish  a  great  plan  and 
programme  together  with  the  procedure  for  their  realization.  The  mass  of 
subordinate Community law on the other hand only contains, as a general rule, 
implementing provisions of a technical nature. 
The plan and the objectives the realization of which the Treaties are intended to 
serve were defined with great clarity, particularly in the Preamble to and in the 
introductory provisions of  the EEC Treaty: an ever closer union among the peoples 
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elimination  of  the  barriers  dividing  Europe;  the  unity  and  harmonious 
development of their  economies;  the  progressive  abolition  of restrictions  on 
international trade (Preamble to the EEC Treaty). 
The first objective is the realization of a common market founded on a customs 
union (Articles 2, 3  (b)  and 9 of the EEC Treaty). The free  movement of goods 
within the Community is  to be ensured by the elimination, as  between Member 
States, of all customs duties and charges having equivalent effect as well as of all 
quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect (Articles 3 (a), 12 et 
seq. and 30 et seq.) The four freedoms stipulated by the Treaty are directed towards 
an economic union: freedom of movement for workers (including the measures 
necessary to this end in the field of  social security), freedom of  establishment and to 
provide services, and the free movement of capital (Articles 3 (3 ), 48 et seq., 52 et 
seq., 59 et seq. and 67 et seq.). Finally the Treaty provides for the realization of a 
common agricultural, transport and commercial policy (Articles 3 (b), (d) and (e), 
38 et seq., 74 et seq.  and 110 et seq.) and for a competition policy in respect of 
which the principle of free competition within the entire Common Market applies 
(Article 85 et  seq., including the prohibition of  State aids which distort competition 
-Article 92 et seq. and tax provisions-Article 95 et seq.). The economic policy of 
the Member States is to be coordinated (Articles 3 (g),  103 et seq.). In addition 
there are provisions on the aims of social policy of the Treaty (Article 117 et seq.). 
Subject to certain exceptions the end of the transitional period prescribed in the 
Treaty (31 December 1969) constitutes the latest date by which all the rules laid 
down must enter into force  and all the measurres required for  establishing the 
Common  Market must  be  implemented  (Article  8  (7) ).  The  prohibition  of 
discrimination on grounds of  nationality in principle applies to all fields (Article 7). 
The fact  that the legal  system  of the Community contains a  large  number of 
undefined rules and concepts and confines itself, in respect of wide areas, to stating 
aims  and principles and that therefore it needs  in  a large measure to be  given 
precision and concrete detail by judicial decision, presents the Community judge 
with tasks  of a  special  and difficult nature when it comes to interpreting and 
applying Community law in the individual case. 
(cc)  These difficulties  are  made the more acute  by  reason  of the well-known 
difficulties,  which  will  not be  recounted  in  detail  here,  which  encumber  the 
legislative procedure of the Communities. It  has often been remarked that-to give 
but one example- numerous questions, e.g. freedom of movement, competition 
law,  State aids,  tax law, the adjustment of State monopolies of a commercial 
character, the relationship  of the principle of the  free  movement of goods to 
industrial property rights, are still waiting for  closer regulation by the Council, 
whether by means of regulations or directives. The number of the Commission's 
proposals which has not been dealt with by the Council is considerable. But the 
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must solve  them. It is  a  well-known fact  that the inactivity of the legislature 
compels the courts to decide questions and to solve problems the settlement of 
which properly belongs to the province of the legislature. A certain shifting of the 
burden from the legislature to judicial decision is then inevitable (see supra I 2 b). 
The 'legislative short-fall' which results from the inactivity of the legislature is one 
of the reasons which so often compel the Court of Justice to have recourse to the 
aims  of the  Community  and  to  general  principles  of law when  interpreting 
Community law. In this connexion it should not be forgotten that this case-law, 
which fills  'gaps' in  a  sense  other than the usual, is  subject always  to  a later 
· legislative solution which at most must keep within the bounds assigned by the 
Treaties. Joseph H. Kaiser's statement that the area of the judge's jurisdiction is 
co-determined by the state of  the law to be applied31 applies also to this 'gap-filling' 
case-law of the Court of Justice. 
In the judgments of the Court of Justice there are indications which point to the 
unsatisfactory state of Community law in  this respect. Thus in the judgment of 
18 February  1971  (Sirena,  Case  40/70,  [1971]  ECR)  it is  observed  that the 
national rules concerning the protection of industrial and commerfial property 
have  not yet  been  unified  within  the  framework  of the  Community.  In  the 
judgment of 22 June 1976 (Terrapin, Case 119/75, not yet published) and also in 
other  judgments  a  more  cautious  reference  is  made  to  the  'present  state  of 
Community law'. 
(dd)  Closely  bound  up  with  the  difficulties  under  which  the  Community 
legislature labours and with the 'legislative short-fall' of Community law is  the 
constant danger to the Commu·nity and to the realization of its aims constituted by 
centrifugal forces emanating from the Member States. The national judge gives 
judgment within the framework of a State apparatus the existence of which is not 
~ailed into question. The Community judge, on the other hand, on occasion finds 
himself compelled  to  consider the interpretation of Community law from  the 
standpoint of the existential necessities of the Communities and the maintenance 
of their capacity to function. To give but one example: the uniform validity and 
application of Community law in all the Member States, thus the question of its 
precedence, concerns one of the bases of the Community. 
(3)  What are the special functions of the Court of Justice? 
Reference may be made, as regards this matter, to earlier remarks (supra I 2 a and 
II 6 a (1) Digression). In the constitutional structure of  the Community the Court is 
given a position of equal rank with that of the other institutions. Owing allegiance 
only  to  the  Treaties,  it rules  with  binding  effect  upon  the  interpretation  of 
Community law, the validity of  subordinate law and on whether the conduct of  the 
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It is  not an  international court of justice; it exercises functions which combine 
.  those of a constitutional court, an administrative court and a civil court. In this 
respect its position differs from that of most national courts. 
If  one adds together the special features of the Community, its legal system and the 
special functions of the Court of Justice one is left with the necessity of according 
precedence to the schematic and above all to the teleological interpretation of 
Community law. 
b.  Remarks on schematic interpretation 
It would  be  superfluous  to point out once  more  what importance schematic 
interpretation  has  in  the  case-law  of  the  Court  of  Justice.  Its  application 
corresponds to the special  features  which  characterize the legal  system  of the 
Community! If  this legal system takes the form of a broadly conceived plan and if it 
confines itself essentially to setting aims and directions as well as to establishing 
principles and programmes for individual sectors, and if in  addition there is  no 
legislature  which  fills  in  the  framework  drawn  up  by  the  Treaties  within  a 
reasonable time (see supra II 6 a (2)), the judge is compelled to supplement the law 
on his own and to find the detailed rules without which he is unable to decide the 
cases  brought before  him.  The judge can succeed  in  this  task only by  having 
recourse to the scheme, the guide-lines and the principles which can be seen to 
underlie  the  broad plan  and  the programme  for  individual  sectors.  Without 
recourse to these guide-lines and principles it is not even possible to give precise 
definition to the significance and scope of the general rules and concepts of which 
the Treaties make such abundant use  (see supra I 2  b). It is  plain that such a 
schematic  interpretation  which  sees  the  rules  of  Community  law  in  their 
relationship with each other and with the scheme and the principles of the plan, 
cannot escape a certain systematization and therefore on occasion demands that 
the solution of a problem be inferred by deduction from general principles of law. 
It  is neither possible nor appropriate in the context of this paper to give a detailed 
account of the schematic interpretation of  Community law by the Court of Justice. 
I will therefore limit myself to a few observations on two aspects of this method of 
interpretation. 
(1)  As an example of recourse to general principles of  Community law reference 
may be made to the interpretation of Article 37 (1) of the EEC Treaty (adjustment 
of State monopolies of a commerciel character so as  to ensure that when the 
transitional period has ended no discrimination regarding the conditions under 
which goods are procured and marketed exists  between  nationals of Member 
States) in three judgments which were delivered in February 1976. They concern 
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judgments it is stated: Article 3  7 (1) must be interpreted in its context in relation to 
the other provisions of the article and taking account of its 'place' in the general 
scheme of the Treaty. The duty laid down in this provision is intended to ensure 
compliance with the fundamental rule of the free movement of goods throughout 
the Common Market (judgments of 3 February 1976, Manghera,  Case 59/75, 
[1976] ECR 91, and of 17 February 1976, Miritz, Case 91/75, [1976] ECR 217). 
The prohibition of  any discrimination regarding the conditions under which goods 
manufactured  or sold  by  nationals  of the  Member  States  are  procured  and 
marketed is  a fundamental principle in  the application of the Treaty which by 
virtue of its legal nature concerns the economic and legal position of the nationals 
of the Member States. Provisions of the Treaty requiring Member States to abolish 
all discrimination within a specific period become directly applicable even when 
the duty has not been discharged before the expiry of that period (judgment of 
17 February 1976, Rewe, Case 45/75, [1976] ECR 181). The interpretation of 
Article 37 (1) of the EEC Treaty was therefore essentially determined by the basic 
rules of the free movement of goods and of the prohibition on discrimination. 
A further example is  afforded by the judgment of 21  July 1974 (Reyners,  Case 
2/74, [1974] ECR 649) which for the purpose of interpreting the provisions on 
freedom of establishment calls in aid the 'general programme' laid down in Article 
54 of the EEC Treaty, declares in this connexion that the rule on equal treatment 
with nationals is 'one of the fundamental legal provisions of the Community', and 
in support of  the direct applicability of  Article 52 of  the EEC Treaty refers inter alia 
to Article 8 (7) of the Treaty. The Court of Justice employed analogous reasoning 
in interpreting the provisions on freedom to provide services (Article 59 et seq. of 
the EEC Treaty)  (judgment of 3 December 1974, Van  Binsbergen,  Case 33/74, 
[1974] ECR 1299). 
The exception which the Treaty makes to the basic rules of equality of treatment, 
freedom  of movement and freedom to provide services  have been  consistently 
given  a narrow interpretation by the Court (see,  e.g.  judgment of 4 December 
1974, VanDuyn, Case 41/74, [1974] ECR 1350; judgment of 28 October 1975, 
Rutili, Case 36/75, [1975] ECR 1231). This case-law which defines the powers of 
the Member States operates at the same time 'pro communi  tate' and 'pro libertate' 
(for further examples of schematic interpretation, see under II 6 c (1)). 
(2)  The interpretation of a provision in its relationship with others governing the 
same or related matters, that is to say, its schematic interpretation, calls for it to be 
interpreted in such a way as not to stand in  contradiction to other rules of the 
Community legal system which-just like national legal systems-is to be regarded 
as a unity (cf. supra II 5, beginning). 
The  so-called  interpretation  of subordinate  Community  law  in  terms  of its 
conformity with the Treaties may be regarded as an exception to a harmonizing 
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interpretation  are  to  be  applied  for  the  interpretation  of  the  Treaties  and 
subordinate law this principle only finds application to measures adopted by the 
institutions of the Community. Under this principle the measure taken  by  the 
institution is to be interpreted-if at all possible-so that it is compatible with the 
superior law of the Treaties and the general principles of law which, too, are 
attributed a status superior to that of  subordinate law. Other interpretations which 
would lead to incompatibility with the superior law, and thus to the inapplicability 
or to the invalidity of  the measure adopted by the institution, are to be disregarded. 
The superior rule of law, then, is  not a criterion of examination but serves  to 
determine the context of the subordinate rule. 
The Court of Justice has frequently proceeded according to this principle, without 
expressly mentioning it. 
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Regulation  No 3  on social security for  migrant workers which was  made 
pursuant to Article 51  of the EEC  Treaty (measures  in  the field  of social 
security as are necessary to provide freedom of movement for workers) must be 
interpreted 'in the context and within the bounds of this article and having 
regard to the fundamental principles which it lays down' (judgment of 7 May 
1969, Torrekens~ Case 28/68, [1969] ECR 125). 
Article 28  (2)  of Regulation No 4  (providing implementing procedures and 
supplementary  provisions  in  respect  of Regulation  No  3)  can  pursue  its 
objective of simplifying administration  only within the context and limits 
imposed by  Article 51  of the EEC Treaty and cannot be  allowed to affect 
adversely  the  rights  stemming  from  that article  in  favour  of individuals 
(judgments of 1 December 1970, Mutualites  Socialistes~ Case.J2/70, [1970] 
ECR 987). 
The concept of 'nationals' must be restrictively interpreted so that a provision 
of the  Staff Regulations  on  the  grant of expatriation  allowances  remains 
compatible with the principle of equality of treatment of female  and male 
officials  (judgment of the  Second  Chamber of 20 February  1975, jeanne 
Airola~ Case 21/74, [1975] ECR 229, see supra II 5 A b). 
Rules governing the denaturing premium for common wheat (Regulation No 
849/70) had to be applied, 'for the sake of legal certainty', in such a way that 
quantities of goods which satisfied certain requirements might still  benefit 
from those rules. 'Interpreted in this way, Regulation No 849/70 contains no 
provision the validity of which could be doubted' (judgment of 8 March 1975, 
Deuka I, Case 78/74, [1975] ECR at 433 and 434; followed in the subsequent 
case, judgment of 25 June 1975, Deuka II, Case 5/75, [1975] ECR at 711. It must not be forgotten that the interpretation of secondary Community law in 
terms of its conformity with the Treaties displays certain features which are to be 
found also in the interpretation of statutes in terms of their conformity with the 
constitution, as practised by the Supreme Court of the United States of America 
and - following that court- by some continental constitutional courts. As in the 
case  of  interpretation  according  to  conformity  with  the  constitution,  the 
relationship  of  the  judge  in  particular  to  the  legislative  institutions  of  the 
Community plays a part in the case of interpretation according to conformity with 
the Treaties. The general requirement of judicial restraint which applies to this 
relationship demands that measures adopted by the other Community institutions 
shall only be regarded as invalid or inapplicable where it is impossible to arrive at 
an interpretation in which they remain compatible with superior law and therefore 
valid. 
c.  Observations on teleological interpretation 
The  special  nature  of the  Community,  which  must  be  regarded,  not  as  an 
association of States subject to international law, but as a community sui generis is 
orientated to the future and designed with a view to the alteration of economic and 
social relationships and progressive integration, rules out a static and requires a 
dynamic and evolutionary interpretation of Community law. The Community 
judge must never forget that the Treaties establishing the European Communities 
have laid the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe and 
that the High Contracting Parties were anxious to strengthen the unity of their 
economies and to ensure their harmonious development (Preamble to the EEC 
Treaty). The principle of the progressive integration of  the Member States in order 
to  attain  the  objectives  of  the  Treaty  does  not  only  comprise  a  political 
requirement; it amounts rather to a Community legal principle, which the Court of 
Justice has to bear in mind when interpr.eting Community law, if it is to discharge 
in a proper manner its allotted task of upholding the law when it interprets and 
applies the Treaties. How else should the Court of Justice carry out  thi~ function 
which it has been assigned except by an interpretation of Community law geared to 
the aims of the Treaty, that is  to say, one which is dynamic and teleological. 
To what extent and with what effect the Court has referred to the general and 
specific objectives of  the Treaty-which have been summarized above, see II b a (2) 
-when specific provisions of  Community law have to be interpreted has often been 
described and demonstrated in detail. There is no need to demonstrate this all over 
again. In this connexion reference can be made in particular to the articles of the 
President of our Court and of Pierre Pescatore.  32 I will therefore confine myself to 
observations on some aspects of this teleological method of interpretation. They 
deal with the close connexion between schematic and teleological interpretation, 
the principle of  effet utile (effectiveness) and of the principle that the Community's 
capacity to function must be safeguarded. 
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the case-law of the Court and frequently can only be separated with difficulty. It 
may suffice to give three examples of this. 
The Court in its judgment of 5 February 1963 in Van Gend & Laos (Case 26/62 
[1963] ECR 12 and 13) stated that in order to decide whether the provisions of the 
Treaty  have  direct effect  in  national  law  their spirit  (esprit),  general  scheme 
(economie) and wording (termes)  must be considered. The Court then described 
the objectives of  the Treaty and also the special features of  the legal order which the 
Treaty creates. This is  followed  by  observations on the general scheme of the 
Treaty as it relates to customs duties and charges having an equivalent effect (on 
Articles 9 and 12 and their place in that part of the Treaty which deals with the 
foundations of the Community). 
In  Continental  Can  the  Court, in  order  to  answer  the  question  whether  the 
expression 'abuse' of a dominant position refers to changes in the structure of an 
undertaking (by  merging with other undertakings), had recourse to the spirit, 
structure and wording of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty as well as the system and 
objectives of the Treaty (judgment of 21 February 1973, Case 6/72, [1973] ECR 
243 ). The interpretation of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty which followed combines 
considerations which refer to the relationship of  Article 86 to Article 85 of  the EEC 
Treaty and arguments inferred from the objectives of  the Treaty set out in Article 3 
(f)  and Article 2 of the EEC Treaty. 
In the judgment of 8 April 1976 (Defrenne, Case 43/75 not yet published) it is 
stated that in order to answer the question whether Article 119 of the EEC Treaty 
was directly applicable, one must look to the nature (Ia nature) of  the principle that 
men and women should receive equal pay for equal work, the objective (fobjectif) 
of this provision and on its place in the Treaty. The dual purpose-economic and 
social - of Article  119 of the EEC  Treaty as  well  as  its  relationship  to  other 
provisions (Article 117: the need to promote improved working conditions and an 
improved standard of living for workers) is  set out. 
Although a  detailed  analysis  would perhaps make it possible to find  that the 
deliberations of the Court were centred on the 'general scheme' of the 'objectives' 
and 'purposes' of the Treaty or on rules governing a sector, it is however obvious 
that the various arguments were intertwined. This is understandable. Article 86 of 
the EEC  Treaty for example must unquestionably be considered and construed 
having regard to its connexion with the other rules on competition of the Treaty 
(Articles 85 to 94 ).  But the 'general scheme' of these rules on competition can in 
turn only be understood if the objectives of the Treaty, to the attainment of which 
these rules are intended to contribute, are considered at the same time. The same 
applies for example to the provisions on the elimination of  quantitative restrictions 
in trade between Member States (Articles 30 to 37 of the EEC  Treaty), on the 
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17) or to the tax provisions (Articles 95 to 99). The 'general scheme', which plays 
an important part in  interpretation and which  underlies the rules  adopted for 
specific  fields  (competition, the customs  union,  free  movement of goods,  free 
movement of persons and services, common policies), must be understood within 
the framework of the objectives which it is  the intention of the Treaty to attain. 
Schematic and teleological interpretation are therefore necessarily interwoven. 
(2)  The  rule  of effectiveness  (regie  de  l'effet utile)  has  been  borrowed  from 
international law. It  does not only mean that a rule has to be interpreted in such a 
way that it has a meaning; that goes without saying. What it states is that the 
provisions of the Treaty are to be so interpreted that their purpose is, if possible, 
achieved, that they have a 'practical value' and that their 'effectiveness' can be 
developed. It can therefore be understood as meaning that preference should be 
given  to the· construction which gives  the rule its  fullest effect and maximum 
practical value. 
The Court has frequently enlisted this principle of interpretation, for example in 
the judgment of 29 November 1956 (Case 8/55, Fedechar, Rec. 1955/56, p. 312) 
and  later  on in  two  judgments  of 15  July  1960  (Case  20/59), The  Italian 
Government v High  Authority;  Case 25/59, Netherlands  Government v High 
Authority, Rec.  1960, at pp.  708  and 781 ).  The essential point made in these 
judgments is that legal theory and case-law are agreed that the provisions of a 
Treaty (the three cases were all concerned with the ECSC Treaty) included those 
legal  principles  without which  they  could  not be  applied  in  a  sensible  and 
reasonable way. In all three cases the question was whether the High Authority had 
certain powers which had not been expressly conferred upon them by the Treaty. 
The Court acknowledged that such 'implied powers' existed.33 
In its judgment of 15 July 1963 (Case 34/62, Germany v Commission, [1963] ECR 
144) the Court held that a particular interpretation of Article 29 of  the EEC Treaty 
would deprive the Common Customs Tariff of all effectiveness (tout effet utile). 
The Court has moreover decided that the abolition or alteration of aids to be 
decided by the Commission under Article 93(2) of the EEC Treaty, if it is  to be 
'effective' may also include the obligation to require repayment of aid granted in 
breach  of the Treaty  (judgment of the  Court of 13  July  1973, Case  70/72, 
Commission v Germany [1973] ECR 829). 
The conclusion to be drawn from these cases can be summarized as follows. The 
Court, in  accordance  with  the  principle of effet utile  gives  preference  to  the 
construction which produces the maximum eff~ctiveness and enables its effect to 
be developed to the greatest possible extent. But what are the criteria by which the 
effectiveness of a rule is to be judged? The only possible answer to this question is 
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the principle of effet utile preference is to be given to the interpretation which is 
best able to further attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. The principle comes 
under teleological interpretation. 
In its judgment of 31  March 1971 (Case 22/70, Commission v Council, [1971] 
ECR p. 2  73 et seq.), which is frequently quoted, the Court relied for the purpose of 
interpreting the Treaty and finding that the Community has powers in the field of 
external relations, not  on the 'effectiveness' (effet utile) but on the 'necessary' effect 
(effet necessaire) of an internal set of Community rules.  34 This judgment is a very 
good example of an interpretation of  the Treaty which simultaneously proceeds on 
the  basis  of the schematic,  teleological,  deductive  and  evolutionary  methods 
towards attainment of the objectives of the Treaty. By limitating the powers of 
Member States  it furthered  the  activity of the  Community and its  functional 
integration in the field of the common commercial policy. 
(3)  In European legal articles the principle of effet utile has often been equated 
with  the principle  that the  capacity of the  Community  to  function  must be 
safeguarded.  35 The Court has also turned to this principle in order to determine the 
scope of  certain provisions of  the Treaty. For an example reference should be made 
to its opinion of 11  November 1975 (Opinion 1/75, conditions for the grant of 
export credits [1975] ECR 1355) which stated thatthecommon commercial policy 
(Article 113 of the EEC Treaty) was designed to promote the functioning of the 
common market and to protect the interests of the Community as  a whole. The 
retention by Member States, in reliance on parallel powers, of a certain freedom of 
action is incompatible with this concept. The Community has sole power to enter 
into an international agreement concerning the conditions for the grant of export 
credits. 
The principle that the capacity of the Community to function must be safeguarded 
was consequently decisive for the purpose of interpreting Article 113 of the EEC 
Treaty. This principle, too, belongs to the rules  of interpretation to which the 
Court is  entitled to turn.  It  plays  a  particularly important part if centrifugal 
tendencies originating in the Member States are a serious threat to the attainment 
of  the objectives of the Treaty. The common commercial policy is a very important 
objective of the Treaty. 
7.  Filling in a gap in Community law: effect of 
judgments 'in time'  (the Defrenne judgment) 
Closely connected with the schematic and teleological interpretation of  Article 119 
of the EEC  Treaty in  the Defrenne judgment (the partial direct effect  of the 
provision from 1 January 1962, for. the new Member States from 1 January 1973) 
1-42 is the Court's decision on the question from what date female workers can benefit 
from the direct effect of Article 119 of the EEC Treaty. This connexion may justify 
discussing only at this point and following on from the observations on schematic 
and teleological interpretation the problem of the effect of judgments 'in time'. 
The Court held that the direct effect of Article 119 cannot be relied on in order to 
support claims concerning pay periods prior to the date of the judgment (8  April 
1976),  except  as  regards  those  workers  who  have  already  brought  legal 
proceedings or made an equivalent claim. After mentioning special circumstances 
which  mainly concern the conduct of some  of the Member States  and of the 
Commission the Court gave as  the main reason for its decision that important 
considerations of legal  certainty make it impossible in  principle to re-open the 
question of pay as  regards the past. 
Professor Jean-Victor Louis (Brussels)36 rightly stated in one of  the first analyses of 
the judgment that this decision represents a compromise between 'the demands of 
justice and of legal certainty'. Is it not unjust to refuse women workers, who have 
failed to make a claim before 8 April1976, the benefits of the consequences of the 
direct effect of Article 119 of the Treaty? Does this not mean that those women 
workers who took the struggle for their rights as far as the courts obtain an unduly 
high bonus, and one which discriminates against their less tenacious colleagues? 
Professor Louis' comment that by its decision the Court has proved that it is  a 
'genuine constitutional court' indicates how this question should be answered. 
It is true that constitutional courts usually attach no importance to the question 
whether a rule has direct effect and to the further question from what date this 
effect runs. However they attach much more importance to the question from what 
date a rule, which is acknowledged to be incompatible with the constitution, has 
ceased or ceases to have effect. Ex tunc or ex nunc or merely with effect from a date 
to be determined by the Court which is after the date when it delivered judgment? 
The effects 'in time' of a decision of a court in which it is held that a rule has direct 
effect and those of a judgment which holds that the rule  is  to  be  regarded as 
unconstitutional and therefore void are perfectly comparable. In both cases the 
decision of the court can have grave consequences for the past which can scarcely 
be disregarded. This applies in particular when such a decision is only made when a 
relatively long period has elapsed  (in the Defrenne case: partial direct effect of 
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty for the six Member States from 1 January 1962, 
judgment of 8 April 1976). If I correctly understand the position constitutional 
courts recognize two different solutions of the problems which arise in such cases. 
Both solutions depend in the final analysis upon weighing the justice demanded by 
the  particular case  against  the  undesirability  of excessive  litigation  and  legal 
certainty. The one solution provides that unconstitutional laws are annulled with 
effect ex nunc; when making such a decision the Court can still postpone the date 
from  which a  law is  to cease  to be  valid.  37 This principle  (rendering the rule 
1-43 infringing the constitution invalid ex nunc) is  however modified in  the case of 
proceedings which are pending or are about to be brought before administrative 
authorities  or  courts.  The  other  solution  is  based  on  the  assumption  that 
unconstitutional laws are invalid ex tunc,  38 but modifies this principle by leaving 
undisturbed by the declaration of  invalidity decisions based on the rule declared to 
be  void  and which  can  no longer be contested.  39  So  far  as  the effects  of the 
annulment of rules following an action for annulment are concerned (Article 173 
of the EEC Treaty) Community law has decided in favour of the second of the two 
solutions which I have described: measures which are declared to be void are void 
ex tunc;  they are to be  'deemed non-existent'  (first paragraph of Article  174; 
judgment of 31  March 1971, Commission v Council, AETR, Case 22/70 [1971] 
ECR.  In  the  case  of a  regulation  the  Court can  however  under  the  second 
paragraph of Article 174 state which of its effects shall be considered as definitive. 
The Court  ha~iven  this provision a wide interpretation (judgment of  5 June 1973, 
Commission v Council, Case 81/72, [1973]ECR 586). This provision offers the 
Court  an  opportunity  of mitigating  the  possibly  serious  consequences  of  a 
provision's being held to be void ex tunc, in particular with the object of  protecting 
legitimate expectations  and in  the interest of legal  certainty.  Further,  for  the 
purpose of protecting legal certainty the Court (Second Chamber) has dismissed 
applications by women officials for payment of the expatriation allowance based 
on the judgment of 7 June 1972 (Sabbatini,  Case 20/71, Rec.  1972, p. 350) in 
which the Court (Second Chamber) did not apply a provision of the law relating to 
officials  (Article 184 of the EEC Treaty), because it was incompatible with the 
principle that male and female  officials must receive  the same treatment. The 
applicants had failed to make use at the appropriate time of opportunities open to 
them to take proceedings: consequently they were unable to rely on the judgment 
in the Sabbatini case (judgment of 21 February 1974, Kortner-Schots and others v 
Council, Commission and Parliament, Joined Cases 15 to 33 [1974] ECR 191). In 
other words: measures, which can no longer be challenged are unaffected by the 
fact that a rule has under Article 184 of the Treaty been declared to be inapplicable 
with effect inter partes. 
In cases where a rule is inapplicable (Article 184 of the EEC Treaty) Community 
law has decided in favour of legal certainty and against doing justice in every single 
case. In the event of a rule being declared to be void (Articles 174 and 176 of the 
EEC  Treaty)  Community law grants  the  Court the opportunity of giving  the 
principle of legal  certainty priority over doing justice in  a particular case  (the 
second  paragraph  of Article  174  of the  EEC  Treaty).  There  are  however in 
Community law no  corresponding provisions which  cover the case where the 
Court-even though belatedly, but here the principle of  no action, no judge applies 
-has to declare that a rule of Community law has direct effect as from a date well 
before the date of the judgment. Has the Court overstepped the limits imposed 
upon every court and assumed in an impermissible way legislative functions by 
giving priority in principle to legal certainty in  a situation such as  the one with 
1-44 which it was confronted in the Defrenne case on the basis that to those who had 
dared to fight for their rights fell the fruits of victory? Or should the Court, in view 
of the grave consequences of a judgment with no temporal limitation of its effect, 
have capitulated and-contrary to its ~onvictions- ruled against the partial direct 
applicability of Article 119? On this point the Court was surely right in stressing in  . 
the Defrenne case that although the practical effects of  every judicial decision must 
be carefully considered, this must not be allowed to go so far that the objectivity of 
the law is distorted and its application suppressed, only because the judgment of a 
court may have certain repercussions as  regards the past. To sum up, it may be 
stated that in the Defrenne case the Court found  an appropriate solution of a 
difficult problem for which Community law makes no express provision. This 
solution follows provisions which Community law contains for a parallel problem 
(nullity of a legal rule). When the Court made its decision as to the effect 'in time' of 
the Defrenne judgment it did not act as  a legislator: on the contrary it confined 
itself to filling in the particular gap in Community law in  accordance with the 
general scheme of the Treaty. 
1-45 III - Final observations 
It is  recognized  that when a  judge  states  the law, gives  it concrete form and 
precision,  fills  gaps  in  and develops  it,  he is  participating in  the  law-making 
process, and thus that legislative bodies cannot be said to have a monopoly over the 
procreation of the law, but that the courts and the legislature share this task. This 
also  applies  to  the  Community  judge  and  to  the  legislative  bodies  of the 
Community. 
It is  true that the case-law of the Court has furthered the economic and social 
integration of the States associated together in the Community and their peoples. 
The Court's methods of interpretation and its decided cases can be described as 
leaning in favour of  integration. However the Court has not achieved this result by 
overstepping the  limits  assigned  to  every  judicial  function  and  assuming  the 
functions of a legislative body. These effects are due rather to the fact that the 
Court has  to give  priority to  a  schematic and above all  to a  teleological  and 
dynamic interpretation geared to the objectives of the Treaty. It is  only these 
methods of  interpretation which match the special features and requirements of the 
Community  and  its  legal  system.  The  inevitable  result  of  the  schematic 
interpretation  of  Community  law  is  that  at  times  the  arguments  and  the 
interpretation  in  the  Court's  judgments  are  deductive  in  nature,  although 
reasoning from case to case has its place. It may be added that a schematic and 
teleological  interpretation is  particularly well  suited  to  the  legal  system  of a 
Community which has set as its objective the integration of modern States with 
very·advanced economic and social structures which present and demand a high 
degree of rationality. 
The court has developed 'weapons for limited warfare' against situations which 
offend  against  the  concept  of  the  Community.40  Interpretation  of  derived 
Community law in terms of  its conformity with the Treaty as well as the limitation 
'in time' of the effect of judgments are to be counted among these weapons. They 
also include 'admonitions' to the legislative institutions of the Community which 
are  sometimes  found,  carefully formulated, in  the Court's judgments  (see  for 
example the judgment of 13 November 1973, Werhahn and others v Council of  the 
European Communities, Joined Cases 63-69/73, [1973] ECR 1229 and 1252). In 
acting in this way the Court has not exceeded the functions assigned to it by the 
Treaties. It is  in keeping with the constitutional nature of the Treaties that the 
Court has  to  exercise  the particular functions  of a  constitutional  court.  The 
methods and 'techniques' which I have mentioned form part of the specific means 
available to a constitutional court. 
The case-law of supreme courts can in the final analysis only produce effects if it is 
'accepted' by those affected by it because of a far-reaching consensus. This applies 
1-46 in particular to constitutional courts whose judgments cannot really be enforced. 
The effect of its judgments is  to an unusual degree dependent upon a consensus 
which recognizes that they are binding and must of necessity be followed. Public 
opinion plays a not unimportant part in  this connexion. 
It cannot be said that in  this respect the case-law of the Court has encountered 
difficulties. Its judgments have been 'accepted' and followed by those affected, the 
citizens and institutions of the Community as well as the Member States. At most 
there  has  been  on  occasion  a  certain  delay  before  acceptance.  There  is  no 
foundation  for  the  view  that the  Court's  decisions  which  lean  in  favour  of 
integration have gone much too far  ahead of European realities. 
All things considered the Court has so far, in my opinion, fulfilled the task assigned 
to it by the Treaties of ensuring that in the interpretation and application of the 
Treaties the law is observed and in so doing has not overstepped the limits placed 
on every court. 
1-47 My commentary has its origin in many respects in ideas which my colleague, Pierre 
Pescatore,  has  expressed  in  numerous  articles,  lectures  and  talks.  With  his 
agreement I have decided not to make any detailed references to them but I would 
like  nevertheless  to  stress  that  certain  essential  lines  of  reasoning  in  my 
commentary are to be attributed to Pierre Pescatore. 
Notes 
1  A. W. Green, Political Integration by Jurisprudence-The Work of the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities in  European Political Integration-, Lei den 1969, p. 416. 
2  Cf.  Simson,  Reinecke  und  Mathijsen,  Der  Gerichtshof  und  die  unbestimmten 
Rechtsbegriffe,  in:  10  Jahre  Rechtsprechung  des  Gerichtshofs  der  Europaischen 
Gemeinschaften, Europaische Arbeitstagung Koln, April  1963, Kolner Schriften zu·m 
Europarecht (KSE)  Vo,  1, p. 396 et seq. 
3  Cf. Robert Fischer, Die Weiterbildung des Rechts durch die Rechtsprechung, 1971 with 
notes. 
4  Cf.  on this  point and generally  on  'interpretation and application':  A.  M.  Donner, 
Uitlegging en Toepassing, Miscellanea Ganshot van der Mersche, 1972, Vol. 2, p. 103. 
5  In the view ofTomuschat, Cahiers de Droit Europeen, 12 (1976) p. 58 et seq., the Court 
succeeded in doing so in Case 36/75 Rutili (1975] ECR 1219. See also on this point the 
opinion of Mr Advocate-General Mayras in Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 
320 and Daig, Aktuelle Fragen der Vorabentscheidungen nach Art. 177 EWG-V, EuR 
1968, p.  259 and Handbuch fiir  Europaische  Wirtschaft,  Kommentar zu  Art.  177 
EWG-V. 
6  R.  Lecourt, Le  juge devant le marche commun, 1970, p.  57. 
7  Cf. Lord Mackenzie Stuart, The Non-Contractual Liability of the European Economic 
Community, Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence 1975, Proceedings of the British 
Academy,  Volume  LXI  (1975),  especially  pp.  13  and 23.  (Common  Market Law 
Review, Vol.  12  (1975), p.  493). 
8  Judgment of 21  December 1954 in Case 1/54, France v High Authority, Rec. 1954, p. 7; 
Judgment of 23  December 1961 in  Case 30/59, Steenkolemijnen,  Rec.  1961, p.  1. 
9  Only the French version is authentic, Article 100 ECSC Treaty; exceptions, however, to 
this  emerge  from,  for  example,  Article  8  of the convention  on  certain  Institutions 
common to the European Communities of 1957 and Article 39 of the Merger Treaty of 
1965. 
10  Cf. Article 248 EEC Treaty, Article 225 Euratom Treaty, Articles 160 and 155 of  the Act 
of Accession. 
11  Cf. Hilf, Die Auslegung mehrsprachiger Vertrage, 1973, passim. 
12  Cf.  judgment of 5 December 1967 in Case 19/67 Sociaale  Verzekeringsbank  (1967] 
ECR 345; 
Case 29/69 Stauder (1969] ECR 419. 
13  Cf. Zuleeg, Die Auslegung des Europaischen Gemeinschaftsrechts, EuR 4 (1969), p. 97; 
reference is  also made elsewhere to the observations of Zuleeg. 
1-48 14  For instance the Luxembourg opinion on the Euratom Treaty, judgment in Case 6/60 
Humblet,  Rec.  1960, p.  1125 at p.  1155; 
Debates on the ECSC Treaty in the Netherlands Parliament, Joined Cases 2 and 3/60 
Niederrheinsche Bergwerks-AG Rec.  1961, p.  261  at p.  290. 
15  Kolner Schriften zum Europarecht, Vol. 1 (Note 2) p. 177 et seq., in particular p. 201 et 
seq.,  p.  209 et seq. 
16  Cf. for example the opinion of Mr Advocate-General Reisch) of 6 April 1976 in Case 
111/75 Mazzalai:  reference  to  an  opinion  of the  Economic  and Social  Committee 
which, however, was not followed in the judgment of 20 May 1976, which has not yet 
been published. 
Cf. also Bernhardt, Die Auslegung volkerrechtlicher Vertrage, 1963, p.  116. 
17  Cf. Wolf, Kolner Schrifterizum Europamarkt Vol. 1 (Note 2) p. 199, Zuleeg (Note 13), 
p.  102 et seq; 
Examples of such a harmonizing interpretation: 
judgment of 13  June 1958 in  Case 9/56, Meroni,  Rec.  1958, p.  27~ judgment of 16 
December 1960 in  Case 6/60, Humblet,  Rec.  1960, p.  1196; 
judgment of 12 May 1964 in  Case 101/63, Wagner  [1964] ECR  195; 
judgment of 21 January 1965 in Case 108/65, Officine Elettromeccaniche [1965] ECR 
1. 
18  Max-Planck-Institut fiir  auslandisches  offentliches  Recht und Volkerrecht, Beitrage 
Vol.  44,  1967. The colloquium had before it inter alia  reports from  all  the present 
Member States with the exception of  Denmark and Ireland as well as a report on the law 
relating to the liability of the Community. The object of the colloquium was to ascertain 
the 'general principles' within the meaning of Article 215 of the EEC Treaty, see in 
particular Jaenicke loc cit.  pp. 859-877. 
19  Zur  Reform  des  Staatshaftungsrechts,  Rechtsvergleichendes  Gutachten  des 
Max-Planck-Instituts  fiir  auslandisches  offentliches  Recht  und  Volkerrecht,  1975, 
published in  the digest 'Recht' and issued by the Federal Ministry of Justice, Bonn. 
20  Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Gand in the said case Sayag v Leduc loc. cit. p. 340; 
Lord  Mackenzie  Stuart  (Note  7)  p.  7  et  seq.;  cf.  also  Ress,  Die  Bedeutung  der 
Rechtsvergleichung  fiir  das  Recht  internationaler  Organisationen,  Zeitschrift  fiir 
auslanidsches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, Vol. 36 (1976) p. 227 (259 et seq.). 
21  Ipsen, Zur Haftung fiir normatives Unrecht nach Europaischem Gemeinschaftsrecht, 
Festschrift fiir  Hermann Jahrreiss, 1974, p.  85. 
22  Lord Mackenzie Stuart (Note 7)  p.  14 et seq. 
23  Further examples: 
The  concept  'force  majeure'  (judgment  of  11  July  1968,  in  Case  4/68, 
Schwarzwaldmilch, [1968] ECR 377; 
The concept 'public service' within the meaning of Article 48  (4)  of the EEC Treaty 
(judgment of 12 February 1974 in Case 152/73, Sotgiu, [1974]ECR at p. 162 et seq.). 
24  Meessen, Zur Theorie allgemeiner Rechtsgrundsatze des internationalen Rechts - Der 
Nachweis  allgemeiner  Rechtsgrundsatze  des  europaischen  Gemeinschaftsrechts, 
Jahrbuch fiir internationales Recht, Vol.  17 (1975), pp. 283 and 300. 
1-49 25  Further examples: 
judgment of 10 December 1957 in Case 8/56, ALMA, Rec.  1957, p.  179; 
judgment of 25 February 1969 in  Case 23/68, Klomp,  [1969] ECR at p.  50; 
judgment of 16 March 1971 in  Case 67/69, Simet,  [1971] ECR 197. 
26  Cf. Bothe, Die Bedeutung der Rechtsvergleichungin der Praxis internationaler Gerichte, 
Zeitschrift fiir auslandisches offentliches Recht und Volkerrecht, Vol. 36 (1976), p. 280 
et seq. 
27  Fuss, Der Grundrechtsschutz in den Europaischen Gemeinschaften aus deutscher Sicht, 
Heule (Belgium), 1975, p. 71 et seq.; Meessen (Note 24 ), p. 301 et  seq.;Bothe (Note 26); 
all have further references; Zweigert, KSE  Vol.  1 (Note 2), p.  203 et seq. 
28  On this principle see Bernhardt (Note 16) p.  143 et seq. 
29  This formula is  found - in a different context- in Petersen's Auswartige Gewalt und 
Volkerrechtspraxis der EWG (ZaoRV, Vol. 35 (1975) p.  273). 
3°  Cf. for example Bernardt (Note 16) p. 166 et seq.; Degan, Procedes d'interpretation tires 
de Ia  jurisprudence de Ia Cour de Justice des Communautes Europeennes, RTDE 1966 
pp. 189,217 and 218; Art. 31  (3)  of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
31  Archiv des offentlichen Rechts., Vol.  101  (1976), p.  91. 
32  Robert Lecourt, L'Europe des Juges, 1976, in particular p. 241 et seq.; 
Pierre  Pescatore,  Les  objectifs  de  Ia  Communaute  Europeenne  comme  principes 
d'interpretation de Ia  jurisprudence de Ia Cour de Justice, 
Miscellanea W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, Vol. 2 (1972), p.  325 et seq. 
33  On the judgment in the Fedecher  case and generally on the principle of effet utile, see 
Boulouis  and  Chevallier,  Grands  arrets  de  la  Cour  de  Justice  des  Communautes 
Europeennes, Vol.  1 (1974), No 21- p. 101- for further references. 
34  On this judgment see Boulouis and Chevallier (Note 33) at No 22-p. 104-and also 
Chevallier in: France and The European Communities, 1975, p. 459 (464 and 465). 
35  Hans Peter Ipsen, Europai,sche Gemeinschaftsrecht, 1972, p.  280. 
36  Europiiische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift, Strassburg!Kehl, 1976, p.  178. 
37  This  applies  for  instance in  the  case of the jurisdiction of the Austrian and Italian 
constitutional courts. 
38  This applies for example in the case of the jurisdiction of  the constitutional courts of  the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
39  The rules described which have been in part developed by case-law are more varied than 
they are represented to be in this article. They modify the particular principle even more 
for example in the case of convictions, the enforcement of decisions, claims based on 
unjust enrichment etc.  For further 'techniques' which judges of constitutional courts 
adopt  in  order  to  mitigate  the  effects  of their  findings  that  particular  laws  are 
unconstitutional,  see  the  instructive  articles  on  'Admonitory  Functions  of 
Constitutional Courts' (West Germany, Italy, USA) by von Rupp-v. Briinneck, Vigoriti 
and Linde in: American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 20 (1972) p. 387 et seq. 
Linde refers inter alia to the 'technique' of prospective overruling (limiting the new rule 
to prospective applications) 'practised' by the Supreme Court. 
40  This formulation is  attributable to Cappelletti, Judicial Review in the Contemporary 
World, New York, 1971. I am indebted for it to the review of this book by Hans G . 
. Rupp, Rabels  Zeitschrift fiir  ausliindisches  und internationales Privatrecht, Vol. 40 
(1976), p.  157. 
1-50 Corrections 
In the course of transcribing the manuscript into type and print, 
certain errors have crept in which are now corrected as  below: 
1.  Page  18 
The last three sentences of the first indented paragraph should read as follows: 
'Whereas  the  German  version  states  that  the  Community  regulation 
"gilt unmittelbar in jedem Mitgliedstaat", the versions in English, French, 
Italian and Dutch use expressions which in German would be rendered 
as "unmittelbar an  wend  bar" ("directly applicable", "directement appli-
cable", "direttamente applicabile", "rechtsstreeks toepasselijk"); only the 
Danish  version  ("gadder  unmiddelbart")  corresponds  to  the  German, 
whilst the Irish ("infheidhme go direach"), apparently is to be understood 
in the sense of "shall have immediate force", Whatever significance may 
be attributed to the fact that other provisions of the Treaty, and not only 
in the German version, make a distinction between "validity" ("Giiltig-
keit",  "validite"  etc.)  and  'applicability'  ("Anwendbarkeit",  "applica-
bilite" etc.) -see  Article 177 on the one hand and Article 184 on the other 
- the suggested consideration of the non-German versions would in any 
event, without there being any need to go beyond a literal interpretation, 
have brought home with greater clarity the fact it is  not compatible with 
Community law to distinguish  between  "validity" and "applicability" 
in relation to the effect of a Community regulation in the Member States, 
including its binding effect upon the national courts.' 
2.  Note 2. 
Note 2.  - reference to papers given  at the Europaischen Arbeitstagung in 
Cologne, April 1963 - should be supplemented by the following paragraph. 
'At this conference the methods of interpretation employed by the Court 
of Justice were thoroughly discussed;  see  in particular the main paper 
given by Monaco, the supporting papers given by Wijckerheld Bisdom 
and Wolf, and the contributions to the discussion by Ophiils, Pescatore, 
Zweigert, Constantinesco, Bulow, Waelbroeck and Lagrange and others 
p. 177 et seq.  Reference may be made to these papers and contributions 
on which the following observations are in various ways based.' 
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1976 When, under President Lecourt's most stimulating guidance, we 
first met to discuss the three papers to be prepared for this part of the con-
ference,  it was decided that Mr Dumon would concern himself principally 
with the general principles of interpretation, Judge Kutscher would give an 
account of how the Court actually applied them,  and I  would attempt an 
appraisal of some aspects of the Court's activities. My undertaking is in any 
event temerarious, particularly at this conference where the level  of know-
ledge, intelligence and distinction of the participants is  unusually high; but I 
am at least excused from reviewing the corpus of the Court's case law. My 
contribution should be regarded as  a prolix appendix or addendum to Judge 
Kutscher's and Mr Dumon's  excellent paper. 
President Lecourt also exhorted us that we should each seek to define our own 
'line of approach'. I found this suggestion most helpful, and it seems to me 
to provide my best starting point. The comment which I propose to offer is 
that of an academic lawyer interested in comparative law; and I wish to try 
to specify that standpoint both negatively and positively. 
First, negatively, this is not a paper by a representative of the United Kingdom. 
It  is no doubt not entirely accidental that the author of one paper is a German, 
of the other a Belgian and of the third a British subject. But nationality 'must 
be and is' (to use Lord Atkin's famous conjunction) irrelevant to the matter 
in hand. In any event there is  no British approach to Community Law. It is 
not necessary to remind this audience of the extreme variety which exists in 
the British Isles: there is not even a British legal system. It is well-known that 
the British judge on the European court - an expression which is  strictly 
meaningless  (Article  167  does  not  reproduce  the  nationality  requirements 
applicable to the  Commission  now contained in Article  10  of  the  Merger 
Treaty) -practised in the Scots Law, the legal system operating north of the 
Border, and not in the Common Law of England (which is  the legal system 
normally associated with the British Isles in the continental mind). The fact 
is that if there is a British judge, there is no English judge upon the European 
Court. 
Secondly, and again negatively, this paper is not the paper of a representative 
of the common law.  Though I  cannot wholly divest myself  of the bias  or 
prejudice which springs from my connection with that law and from my great 
admiration of it at least in its classical form, I have been too long in commerce 
with foreign law, and notably with French law, to be able fully to trust my 
instinct as to the common law. And instinct, in the sense of an informed and 
11-3 settled  habit  of  mind,  is  a  great  deal  more  important than  learning  and 
reasoning in these matters however much the latter may have contributed to 
the former and however important it may be to return to check with consecu-
tive reason the instinctive conclusion. There would obviously be a great many 
exponents of a  common law approach more appropriate than myself. 
I may be permitted here to call attention to an inherent ambiguity in the term 
'common law'. It is  often, and in my opinion properly, used, especially upon 
the continent of Europe, to denote the legal system of that part of the British 
Isles which is confused with the whole. As such it is a synonym of the English 
legal system. But it is also used in a larger and more historical sense to denote 
the matrix out of which the present English legal system itself sprang. In that 
sense the common law has  a  very  numerous progeny. The present English 
legal system is  one only of a considerable family, though in my opinion still 
probably the most authentic member of it. Within that family there is  great 
diversity- as great as, perhaps greater than, the diversity between European 
continental systems. As the mother of that progeny the common law can be 
compared not with any existing continental legal system but with the Roman 
law itself  - I  mean  with the  classical  and authentic  Roman Law  of  the 
Republic and the Principate when Roman law was a  making, not with the 
Roman law which had degenerated into the Digest of Justinian and still less 
with the rediscovered Roman law of the glossators. In this acceptation of the 
term, the federal law of the United States of America, and the law of many of 
those states, is  a  sort or kind of common law, even if aberrant. And what 
has  occurred there is  a  specimen  only  of  what has occurred elsewhere, and 
probably not the most interesting or instructive. More instructive, I believe, 
is  the reception  of  the Common law in the sub-continent of India and its 
fortunes there. 
Who would venture to represent the common law in that acceptation of the 
term? The method of interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court of the 
United S'tates in relation to the constitution is  special and peculiar. It consti-
tutes  in  my  opinion  a  most  notable,  a  remarkable,  achievement. It is  not 
matched by anything done in recent time at least by the English courts, which 
fortunately  have  not  been  called  upon  to  deal  with  similar  fundamental 
problems. Is it in that method of interpretation-if method it can be called -
that the spirit and genius of the Common law is to be found? I doubt it. And I 
am even more doubtful that it should be offered to the European court as a 
model or pattern to be followed, or even as a source of inspiration. What it 
does exemplify is  the manner in which  '1  common law court- I think that 
the United States Supreme Court may fairly be called that- could and did 
react to a novel and unprecedented situation; but the situation which faces 
the European court, as I see it, is  not the situation which faces  or faced  the 
United States court. 
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person seeking to acquaint himself with a  system  by  hypothesis foreign, to 
use his utmost endeavours to divest himself of those axioms or concepts or 
preconceptions which are natural to him because highly appropriate to his 
own legal system - to reduce himself to a state of at least relative innocence 
in order to be able to perceive and actually to observe that which is new and 
novel, the foreign system. There are few things so silly or so presumptuous as 
the offer to transpose into the categories of one's own system a system which 
is  different precisely because it is  not only ignorant of those categories but 
refractory  to  them.  The  intellectual  exercise  involved  in  this  attempted 
denudation is difficult and seldom wholly successful. But it is an effort which 
a  comparative lawyer should  endeavour to  make;  and indeed  he  must go 
further. In order to be able to appreciate the foreign system for what it is, 
and not for what he might fancy it ought to be, he requires to have for it and 
with it a high degree of sympathy. Sympathy has little to do with judgment of 
good and bad, or better and worse. The model is  Fabre with his insects -
he took a profound delight in the animal he observed, marvelled at its beauty 
and skill, at the ingenuity it displayed in coping with its environment, at its 
extraordinary tenacity and determination, and above all  he rejoiced with it 
in its success, whether or not on another level of values it was a beneficent or a 
most noxious specimen.  This direction of the attention to success,  and the 
ability to appreciate success, is I believe a critical matter for the comparative 
lawyer,  both  because  a  foreign  legal  system  really  has  in  some  measure 
actually attained success in the very fact of being in existence and operative 
as a legal system, and because we are likely to know a thing better (as indeed 
we do a person) if we attend to what it does, and is  capable of doing, well 
rather than to its failures. For what we judge to be its failure may be no more 
than a disinclination to want to do what we think it ought to do. 
Accordingly  as  a  comparative lawyer I  approach the European court in  as 
pure a state of innocence as I can manage, concerned to observe it for what 
it is, not desiring to classify it by constraining it upon the Procrustean bed of 
categories already known to me' in order to fit  my pre-existing fancies,  but 
on the contrary animated by the highest degree of benevolence and predisposed 
most sympathetically to appreciate and to admire the triumphs and successes 
which  I  confidently  expect  it  to  have  achieved.  Nevertheless  I  remain  an 
academic lawyer- a person, as I see it, who is detached from the event, who 
should consider it as  he would if it had occurred a  century ago,  and who 
should judge it with a similar impartiality and severity. This is a less agreeable 
trait and is  apt to irritate the practitioner whether at the Bar or upon the 
Bench.  From  his  remote  and  privileged  position  the  academic  lawyer  is 
inclined to conclude - and there is obviously warrant for the conclusion -
that the practitioner,  whatever  his  good intentions,  is  almost certainly  in 
error, that his  action, even if  excusable because of the pressure of circum-
u-s stances,  is  insufficiently  considered and insufficiently  informed and insuffi-
ciently aware of the nature of the conjuncture in which he acts. In this detached 
judgment there is  a considerable measure of condescension. That is  a misfor-
tune; but I do not see how it can be avoided however great may be the sym-
pathy of the academic lawyer with the predicament of the practitioner. 
If  we are to  appraise the operation of  the European  Court of 
Justice the first  question to ask is  evidently,  what has it achieved? It will 
universally  be  agreed,  at least  as  a  first  approximation,  that in the  areas 
subject to its authority, the Court has constructed and is constructing a supra-
national legal system which not only maintains the integrity of the Treaty 
and  its  pre-eminence  within the national systems  but imposes  upon each 
state positive legal duties directly enforceable against the state in the state's 
own courts. The system is  logically coherent, technically brilliant and, as it 
seems  to me  aesthetically  satisfying.  In the construction of this  system  the 
Court has shown great energy and a high degree of boldness, and the system 
so constructed displays a striking continuity in its development and an equally 
striking internal consistency. And moreover this remarkable result has been 
achieved in a very short space of time and in circumstances of considerable 
difficulty. 
The natural reaction of the comparative lawyer is to shout hurray; and in this 
signification of approval he will be joined by many, including I would suppose 
Lord  Denning,  to  judge from  the opinion  he  expressed  in  Bulmer Ltd v 
Bollinger S.A.  (1974)  Ch. 401, 415.  The methods which the Court has used 
in its work have been admirably analysed for us in the important contributions 
of Judge Kutscher and Mr Dumon; and no purpose can be served by  any 
attempted rehearsal by myself of what has been much more adequately stated 
by them. 
The Court regarding itself as having been appointed by Article 164 to be the 
custodian of the law of the Treaty has assumed the duty to secure that the 
principles  defined  by  the  Treaty  are  observed  and its  objectives  attained. 
I think it fair to say that the Court's purpose is  that, so far as that may be 
possible by  the exercise  of  any powers vested  in itself,  the Community as 
envisaged by the founders and as  delineated by the terms and the objectives 
formulated in the Treaty be effectively realized as an existing and functioning 
entity. I believe that the steadfastness of its purpose is best manifested in the 
cases where there has been a default in the performance by a person of a duty 
cast upon him by the Treaty. The Court appears to me to show considerable 
zeal in attempting to deal with the resulting situation as if the default had not 
occurred and to seek  to remedy the damage done to the Treaty, if  at all 
possible, rather than simply to exact performance by the person in default. 
II-6 It is submitted that the nature of the Court's operation is  well or even  best, 
exemplified by its action in situations of default, and I propose to examine 
two cases in that area - both of them well known - in order to discover 
the actual mode of the Court's operation and to try to assess its advantages 
and disadvantages.  The first  is  Van  Gend en Loos v N ederlandse adminis-
tratie der  belastingen~ 26162 of 5 February 1963 [1963]  ECR 1. which may be 
regarded as the first in the series;  the  second  is  Defrenne  v  Sabena  S.A. 
43175 in which judgment was given on 8 April1976 which is for the time being 
the culmination of the series. 
As is well known in Van Gend en Laos a statute in the Netherlands brought 
into force modifications of the Benelux tariff resulting from the acceptance by 
the Benelux  countries of the Brussels  customs  nomenclature. The required 
reclassification resulted in increased custom duties payable on certain amino-
plastic products imported into the Netherlands from Germany by Van Gend 
en Laos.  Article  12  of the Treaty expressly provides 'Member States  shall 
refrain from ... increasing (the customs duties)  which they already apply in 
their trade with each other'. There are of course numerous statements in the 
Treaty that the basis and a fundamental objective of the Treaty is a customs 
union involving the prohibition of customs duties  between Member States. 
The importer in  the  Netherlands  objected  to payment of  the higher  duty 
deman?ed by the Netherland customs on the grounds that the Treaty pre-
cluded any increase thereof. 
The Tariefcommissie, the administrative agency of last resort in fiscal matters 
in the Netherlands, referred to the Community court under Article 177 two 
questions.  The questions  were  not  aptly framed  for  they  appear to  raise 
queries as to the effect in the Netherlands legal system of obligations resulting 
from the Treaty, whereas the Court's jurisdiction is limited to the interpretation 
of the Treaty. Indeed two of the Member States who appeared as  they are 
entitled  to  do,  in  order to oppose the importer's claim  and the reference 
under Article 177, founded themselves precisely upon that ground- namely 
that the Court was being asked not so  much to interpret the Treaty as  to 
consider its application within the framework of the Constitutional law of the 
Netherlands. That question of application was within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of the national court. It raised some difficult questions - for example the 
effect of the competition inter se within the Dutch legal system of obligations 
arising  from  the Benelux  Treaty  and those  arising  from  the EEC Treaty, 
whereas the interpretation of the EEC Treaty was in the circumstances self-
evident- if the customs duties had been increased the Netherlands govern-
ment was in default. In the case of default by a Member State in fulfilling its 
obligations under the Treaty, Articles 169 and 170 make express provision for 
the process to be followed to secure the remedying of that default - as to 
which it is  sufficient here to say that considerable regard is  paid to national 
susceptibilities  and the opinion of the Commission must be sought before 
II-7 the matter is  brought before the Court. That process is,  to say the least, in 
strong contrast with the direct and  immediate  confrontation  between  the 
individual and his own government which would arise if  the default of the 
Member State was  justiciable  under Article  177.  Additionally,  the  Belgian 
government objected to the Court's jurisdiction under Article 177 on the ground 
that  the  question  asked  by  the  Tariefcommissie  was  not  relevant  to  the 
determination by the Tariefcommissie of the issue before it. 
The manner in which the Court dealt with these preliminary objections is 
hightly instructive, particularly in a case such as this which arose early in its 
judicial history. First the Court showed great willingness to disentangle the 
possible ambiguities of the questions submitted to it: it was at pains to dis-
cover what it could regard as the basic point, being a matter within its com-
petence, which the referring judge could be taken as having submitted for its 
opinion.  Even  if  the  question  as  framed  might  include  matter outside  its 
competence,  it  would - ut res  magis  valeat  quam  pereat  - neglect  the 
irrelevant material and direct its  answer to what it had defined as relevant. 
So  in our case it treats the Tariefcommissie's reference as  raising a question 
only of the interpretation of the Treaty and not of the application of the Treaty 
according to the principles of Dutch internal law; and it proceeded to answer 
only the point so formulated,  or reformulated,  by  itself.  Secondly it stated 
with great punctiliousness that the question how the Treaty, as  interpreted 
by itself, was to be applied to the issue  before the Dutch courts according 
to the principles of Dutch internal law was a matter falling within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of that court. This recognition of the separation of functions has 
become a ritual formula of the European court; and indeed the concept of 
the  co-existence  of  the  Community  legal  system  with  the  national  legal 
systems is basic to the Court's legal philosophy whatever may be the complex-
ities of their inter-relation or inter-action. Thirdly because of this separation 
of functions  it was no part of the business of the European court to enquire 
why the national court had raised a question touching the interpretation of 
the Treaty, nor whether the question was relevant or not to the issue before 
that court; it was sufficient if such as question had in the view of the European 
court been asked by the national court and effectively remained to be answe-
red. Fourthly the Court treated as wholly distinct from each other a reference 
to  itself  under Article  177  and any possible proceedings under Articles 169 
and 170. 
A  hesitant or timorous court could I think have legitimately declined juris-
diction upon the ground of any of the preliminary objections proposed to it. 
Not only did it not do so but it showed an unusual degree of vigour and energy 
in striking down such objections and manifested a very firm  determination 
to use the process of reference established by Article 177 in order to vindicate 
and enforce the provisions of the Treaty to the utmost of its powers. 
Il-8 The Court's decision on the substance of the reference was not less significant. 
Article 12 in terms creates immediate obligation upon Member States- it is 
they who are directed to refrain from increasing customs duties. The German 
government jointed the Belgian and the Netherlands governments in urging 
it  upon the Court that Article  12  created  only  this  obligation  incumbent 
upon Member States, with the corollary that the only method of implementing 
the Treaty, and of enforcing the law which Article 164 enjoined the Court to 
observe, was to require the Netherlands government to conform its  action 
to the Treaty's provisions if indeed it had departed from them. This contention 
of the three governments was moreover adopted by the Court's own Advocate-
General, Roemer, in his opinion. It has not I think been sufficiently noted that 
the Court's decision was upon the 'conclusions contraires'  of its advocate-
general, that is  to say of the person to whom it turns for impartial and con-
sidered advice upon the law which it is  its duty to apply. The force of the 
contention whi~h faced the Court was considerable: three of the six signatory 
governments  were  agreed  upon what they  had  done  and intended in  the 
Treaty (and I have no doubt that one at least of the other governments  also 
would have concurred if it had at that time been taking an interest in what  was 
happening in the Community's institutions)  and this view  appeared  to  the 
advocate general to be the reasonable and appropriate view,  though it  was 
opposed by the EEC Commission which also appeared. 
Again  what is  striking is  not merely the fact that the  Court  rejected  this 
contention but the energy with which it rejected it and the far-reaching reasons 
upon which it founded its rejection. The relative importance of these reasons 
is  no doubt a  matter of subjective appraisal: what seems to me basic is the 
Court's sense that if  it did not recognize and directly enforce rights arising 
in an individual Community law it would risk becoming idle and ineffective. 
'A restriction of the guarantees against an infringement of Article 12 by Member 
States to the procedures under Article 169 and 170 would remove all direct 
legal protection of the individual rights of their nationals ... The vigilance of 
individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervis-
ion in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the dilig-
ence of the Commission and of the Member States'. In the view of the Court 'the 
objective of the EEC Treaty .... implies that this Treaty is  more than an 
agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting 
States.' This implication is  held to be confirmed by various considerations 
rehearsed by the Court and not least by the very existence of Article 177 which 
indicates  that the States have obligations capable of being invoked by their 
nationals before the national courts. The Court therefore concludes 'that the 
Community constitutes a new legal order ... the subjects of which comprise 
not only Member States but also their nationals.' This legal order can and 
does confer rights upon individuals not only when an explicit grant is made by 
the Treaty but when obligations are imposed, in a clearly defined manner upon 
II-9 others. In particular Article 12 is  'ideally adapted to produce direct effects in 
the legal relationship between Member States and their subjects.' It sets out 
a dear and unconditional prohibition, which is not a duty to act but a duty not 
to act.  'The fact that under this  Article  it  is  the Member States  who  are 
made the subject of the negative obligation does not imply that their nationals 
cannot  benefit  from  this  obligation.'  Accordingly  the  Court  rendered  its 
decision  in the terms  'Article  12  of  the  Treaty establishing  the European 
Economic  Community produces  direct  effects  and creates  individual rights 
which national courts must protect.' 
This is  not the place to analyse the manner in which the Court has in sub-
sequent cases developed the principles set out in the Van Gend en Loos judg-
ment, though I may be permitted to say that this development shows a high 
degree of consistency and logical coherence. With an ever-increasing emphasis 
the Court establishes Community law as an autonomous and distinct supra-
national legal system organically linked with the national legal systems and 
respecting their independence but nevertheless exercising a jurisdiction which 
is  paramount to theirs. No comparative lawyer can fail to admire the ability 
and devotion shown by the Court in creating this legal system and, not less, 
the solidity of the system they have created. This admirable construction is in 
large  part immediately founded  upon Van  Gend en  Loos.  Nevertheless  I 
propose to criticize this decision - at least the manner in which the Court 
reached its conclusion and formulated its reasons.  A  mere commentator is 
well advised to show prudence in criticizing a judgment which forms the basis 
of the Court's case-law; and I am not willing to suggest that the Court was 
fundamentally in error in its actual decision; it might well have stultified itself 
had it decided the contrary of what it did decide. But with Van Gend en Loos 
the Court embarked upon a course which has had, and will continue to have, 
consequences which are as confusing as they are dangerous. 
My criticism of the terms and method of the decision is not, I believe, due to 
hindsight- though in any event that is  a prerogative of the academic lawyer, 
but before embarking upon that criticism and in lieu of any analysis of the 
numerous and very  important cases  which developed the principles  of Van 
Gend en Loos, I propose arbitrarily to select a recent case- 43175 Defrenne 
v Sabena in which judgment was rendered on 8 April 1976 - as exemplifying 
the end result attained in this critical area of Community law. 
The Defrenne case- which I shall identify as Defrenne No 2 since Mlle. De-
frenne had already appeared before the Court (80/70) on a connected issue in 
1971-is again a reference to the Court under Article 177, on this occasion by 
the Labour Appeal Court (Cour du Travail) of Brussels. The reference raised 
the question of the interpretation of Article 119 of the EEC  Treaty,  and of 
11-10 its  direct applicability in the Belgian legal system.  The text of Article  119, 
first paragraph is  as follows: 
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure, and subsequently 
maintain, the application of the principle that men and women should 
receive equal pay for equal work. 
Mlle.  Defrenne had been employed under various contracts by the Belgian 
Airways Company, Sabena, as  an air hostess from 10  December 1951  until 
15  February 1968  when she attained her fortieth  year,  the retiring  age  for 
female air-borne staff. It was admitted that the work of an air hostess is identi-
cal to that of a male steward; but up to 1 February 1966, when Sabena introdu-
ced a new pay code, the air hostess's pay was inferior to that of a steward of 
equal  standing.  After the termination of  her contract, on 13  March 1968, 
Mlle. Defrenne sued Sabena in the Tribunal de Travail of Brussels claiming 
the difference between the wages she had received and those which a  male 
steward would have received between 15 February 1963-the terminus a quo 
fixed by the Belgian Statute of Limitations - and 1 February 1966. The sum 
involved was 12 716 Belgian francs, that is to say about£ 100 at that date. She 
also claimed that she should have received a larger 'severance payment' and that 
her pension should have been calculated at a higher rate. 
The court  of  first  instance rejected all three claims.  The Labour Court of 
Appeal affirmed the decision as to the severance payment and pension rate, 
but decided to seek the European Court's ruling on the claim for wage arrears, 
and under Article 177 raised two questions. The first is straightforward- did 
Article 119 directly confer upon a worker, without the intervention of national 
legislation, a right of action in the national court to enforce the principle of 
equal pay, and if yes, from what date. The second question asked, apparently 
alternatively, whether Article 119 became enforceable in the national court by 
reason of subsequent acts of the Community authorities, (and if  yes, which 
and from  what dates)  or whether its  enforceability should be  regarded as 
depending exclusively from the competence of the national legislature. This 
question is to some extent redundant or repetitive but the confusion reflects the 
confusion and ambiguities of the conduct of the Community itself. 
The passage from the first to the second stage of the Community's transitional 
period was conditional upon  a  finding  that the  objectives  specifically  laid 
down in the Treaty for the first stage had in fact been attained in substance. 
It was quite clear that the first stage objective enunciated in Article 119  had 
not been attained when a conference of the Member States was called in 1961 
to consider the situation. Nevertheless on 30 December 1961  - as  always, 
at the last moment - the conference decided that the second stage should 
start on 1 January 1962, the due date. So far as  Article 119 was concerned, 
II-11 they passed a resolution which added some details to its provisions touching 
equal pay but which went on to accord a grace period of a further three years 
-to  31 December 1964-for the complete elimination of pay discriminations 
based  on sex.  The purpose of the resolution was no doubt to suspend the 
effect of passage to stage two on the provisions of Article 119.  In Defrenne 
No 2 the Court held that the resolution was wholly ineffective to suspend those 
provisions: the Treaty could be amended only in accordance with Article 236, 
which required inter alia that amendments be formally ratified by all Member 
States. 
In spite of this purported extension of time during the grace period little was 
done by the States in default to remedy their default. The Commission acting 
under Article  155  called various conferences for the purpose of expediting 
action and submitted a  number of reports of which the last dated 18  July 
1973  gave notice that it proposed to begin enforcement proceedings  under 
Article 169 against Member States still in default; but no such proceedings 
were in fact  started.  However, on 10  February 1975  the Council issued  a 
directive  (No  75/117)  to Member States  requiring  them  to  conform  their 
legislation to Article 119  and to further details  set out in the directive  but 
giving them a further delay of one year to attain that result. Again in Defrenne 
No 2 the Court held categorically that whatever additional obligations may 
have been created by Directive 75/117 that directive could not affect the obli-
gations immediately resulting from Article 119 or the time of their coming 
into operation.  Accordingly  these  obligations  became effective,  in the case 
of the original members of the Community, from the beginning of the second 
stage (that is to say from 1 January 1962) and in the case of the new members 
from the date of the coming into force of the Treaty of Accession (that is  to 
say from 1 January 1973). 
Article  119  was  thus  cleared  from  its  entanglement  with  resolutions  and 
directives,  and the naked question  remained  as  to its  meaning  and effect. 
Answering that question the Court rendered a judgment which is more exten-
sive than usual and which considered as an intellectual exercise is, if I may say 
so arresting. It manifests a fixed  determination to promote the objectives of 
the Treaty by giving direct legal efficacity within the national system to Com-
munity provisions, and to do so to the utmost limits of the possible-which 
indeed are stretched with considerable ingenuity. 
The stages of the exposition or argument - omitting some specific answers 
to specific  objections made by  the parties - may perhaps be recapitulated 
as  follows.  First  the Court emphasised  that Article  119  touched the  very 
foundations of the Treaty because the purpose of the Article was to achieve 
conditions of fair competition between Member States by denying to any of 
II-12 them the unfair advantage of employing female labour at depressed rates of 
pay,  and because  its  further  purpose was  'to promote improved  working 
conditions and an improved standard of living for workers' which, as stated 
in Article 117 and in the preamble, was another dominant objective of the 
Treaty. (It must suffice here to note that the Court was anxious to place the 
Article in this kind of context, perhaps to justify the urgency it felt to give to 
the Article its fullest legal effect.) 
Next the Court is  concerned to establish that the text of  the Article gives 
indications which of themselves are precise enough to define enforceable legal 
obligations. Accordingly it states (1)  that the context of the Article makes it 
clear that equality of pay can be secured only by raising the lower level to the 
higher and (2)  that a distinction must be made between direct and overt dis-
criminations based on sex and those which are indirect and covert. It goes on 
to admit that the abolition of all such discriminations, covert as well as overt, 
might well' require further community and national legislation  establishing 
appropriate criteria. Overall abolition is no doubt the objective of convention 
No 100  of the International Labour Office  of 1951  which speaks  of equal 
remuneration for work of 'equal value', whereas Article 119 is  concerned to 
secure  equal pay for the same work  (the  French text has  'pour un meme 
travail' where the English reads 'for equal work'). The limited direct overt 
discrimination struck at by Article 119 can without difficulty be identified by 
a court, especially if that discrimination results from legislative or administra-
- tive provisions or from collective bargaining agreements or where in one of the 
same undertaking (whether a public service or a private enterprise) a female 
worker is, for the same job, paid less than a male worker. (At this point the 
argument must be taken as  assuming that if the terms of Article 119 can be 
made sufficiently precise the Article should be construed as  directly creating 
legal obligation between individual in the national counts.) 
The Court goes on to say that objection to this conclusion cannot be raised 
from the terms of Article 119, and in particular not from the use of the word 
'principle', since that word as  used in the Treaty means that the provision 
in  question is  fundamental: to treat it as  providing merely  'une indication 
vague' would be to upset the very basis of the Treaty. (The logic of the argu-
ment  again  falters  here:  the  only  alternative  to  giving  Article  119 direct 
internal effect is not to treat it as 'une indication vague' - the real alternative 
is to construe it, as the text would seem to require, as improving an immediately 
binding positive obligation upon the Member States). 
It had further long ago  been established by  the  Court's decisions  that the 
fact that an injunction is  formally addressed to the Member States does not 
prevent the injunction from creating enforceable rights in individuals. More-
II-13 over Article 119 categorically imposes  an absolute duty upon the States to 
attain a  specified result by a determined date: the binding character of this 
obligation is  affected neither by the non-performance  of  the  states  nor  by 
the default of the Community's organs in  enforcing performance. To hold 
otherwise would be to permit lawlessness to become the measure of the legal 
duties created by the Treaty, a course not open to a court which had regard 
to the function attributed to it by Article 164. 
Accordingly the Court concludes as follows: 
'The reply to the first  question must therefore be that the principle of 
equal pay contained in Article 119 may be relied upon before the national 
courts and that these courts have a duty to ensure the protection of the rights 
which this provision vests in individuals, in particular as regards those types 
of discrimination arising directly from legislative provisions or collective 
labour agreements, as well as in cases in which men and women receive 
unequal pay for equal work which is carried out in the same establish-
ment or service, whether private or public.' 
That might have been taken to be the end of the matter. It was not. In the 
course of argument the representative of Ireland and the representative of the 
United Kingdom both of whom had appeared in order to sustain the view 
that Article 119 did not have direct internal effect,  had submitted inter alia 
that the giving of such an effect to the Article would produce economic chaos. 
The United Kingdom representative submitted that the burden of arrears of 
wages from 1 January 1973 though falling unequally on various sectors of the 
economy,  depending  upon the proportion of women employed and the dis-
parity existing between male and female wage scales, would hit with great 
severity a number of enterprises which he listed, and especially the clothing 
industry. The cost, which might be estimated at about 3.5% of the total natio-
nal wage  and salary bill,  would inevitably exacerbate the rate of  inflation 
and lead to innumerable bankruptcies in series. The Irish representative estim-
ated that the cost of the additional payment to those women only whom the 
Irish State employed in the public sector would exceed the total allocation 
to be made to Ireland by the Community's Regional Fund for the entire period 
1975-1977. 
The Court, evidently impressed by these submissions, held that though consi-
deration of the hardships which a judgment might produce in situations already 
brought into existence  could not be  permitted to influence  the objectivity 
~f the Court's decision upon what the law required to be done as to the future, 
nevertheless the Court was under duty to weigh carefully the practical con-
sequences  of its  decisions.  In the exceptional circumstances  of the present 
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would be affected by the ruling had been misled by the conduct of Member 
States  and by  the re-iterated  opinion of the Commission as  well  as  by  its 
default in bringing enforcement proceedings, and they had been induced to 
believe that it was proper to continue practices which though not prohibited 
by the rules  of the national systems  were contrary to Article 119.  In these 
circumstances  it  was  desirable,  in  order to maintain the stability  of  legal 
relations, in principle not to permit completed transactions to be re-opened, 
and in consequence except where action or its equivalent had already been 
started Article 119 could not be invoked to sustain a claim for wages relating 
to a period anterior to the date of the present judgment. 
Well there it is. The Court has travelled a long way from the sim-
plicities of Van Gend en Loos. Though no doubt Mlle. Defrenne No 2 is  an 
extension of the principles established in Van Gend en Loos, its result was 
I think inherent in those principles as formulated unless great care was shown. 
And it is an odd result. The interpretation which the Court has put upon the 
Treaty is  such that in order to avoid mere chaos the Court is  compelled to 
claim  and to exercise  a  dispensing  power which  is  I  believe  not  known 
to any modern court of any of the Member States. The Supreme Court of the 
United States of America and the courts of some of its constituent states have 
indeed, under the doctrine of 'prospective over ruling' claimed, and exercised 
a power to declare for the future a rule which is not to be applied to the past 
and two members of the House of Lords have indicated, obiter, that the doctrine 
may deserve consideration in the United Kingdom. But the power to suspend 
as  to the past (where it is  admitted at all,  for there is  a  considerable bias 
against retroactive legislation)  and the power to declare law de  novo  as  to 
the future (i.e. to make it effective as from a given date) is inherently the mark 
of the legislative function and there is  an obstinate belief upon the continent 
of Europe that a  court does not have a legislative function. Such a function 
does not appear to have been allocated to the Court of Justice by Article 164, 
to which the Court has very frequently  referred  as  constituting its  charter. 
Moreover when acting under Article 177 the Court had previously  with  a 
special punctiliousness  re-iterated that it was concerned only with the inter-
pretation of the law, and not with the application of it which it left to the 
national  courts.  The distinction  between  interpretation  and  application  is 
evidently  fine  and  difficult;  but  surely  the  consideration  of  the  practical 
consequences of a judgment pertains upon any view to the sphere of the applic-
ation of the law. The end product of Van Gend en Loos is certainly very ques-
tionable, and it is evidently necessary to examine more carefully the premises 
from which the Court starts, the principles which it adopts and the method 
which it employs in reaching its conclusions. 
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ation of provisions of the Treaty within the national legal system of a Member 
State. That is the only aspect of the extensive case law of the Court of Justice 
which is the subject of this enquiry. The first question is whether any provisions 
of the Treaty (or of any Treaty)  should have direct application. It is  well-
known that within the English legal system treaties do not have such applica-
tion. Within that system the orthodox view today (I venture no opinion as to 
what the orthodox view might be in fifty  years' time) undoubtedly is  that the 
EEC  Treaty is  directly  applicable  because the European  Communities Act 
1972 enacts that it shall be.  However, it is  equally well known that on the 
continent of Europe many if  not all of the legal systems do directly receive 
international treaties into their internal law upon ratification, though some 
- as for example the French- hedge such reception with precautions, re-
quiring that there be reciprocity or that the Executive be consulted. It cannot 
therefore be a matter of surprise that in 1963  a continental European Court 
of Justice held that the EEC Treaty should be and was directly applicable in 
the sense that it was immediately received within the national legal systems; 
and it very properly reinforced its conclusion with considerations drawn from 
the aims and objects of the Treaty and from its nature and structure and not 
least from Article 177 which evidently envisaged that questions concerning 
the meaning of the Treaty or of the acts of its  organs would directly arise 
before national courts. 
Nevertheless so far as the express terms of the Treaty go, it is only to Regulat-
ions within the meaning of Article 189 that direct applicability is  attributed. 
And that appears to be eminently reasonable, at least in one sense  of direct 
applicability.  Even  if the Treaty becomes immediately part of the national 
legal system becomes immediately part of the national legal system and in that 
sense is  directly applicable it is  a question whether a directly applicable pro-
vision is apt to engender in an individual a particular kind of right enforceable 
by action. It is clearly the scheme of the Treaty that the very wide obligations 
undertaken by the parties to the Treaty should be given precision and concrete 
detail  by  concerted  legislative or administrative  action  on the part of the 
Member  States or by regulations issued by the Council of the Commission or by 
both modes of implementation. The draftsman may have meant what he said 
and may indeed have intended to give to this Subordinate Community legis-
lation, and to it only, direct applicability in the sense of engendering in an indi-
vidual a right enforceable by action within the national legal system in the very 
terms in which the right had been defined. Such a view does not necessarily re-
quire us to classify the EEC Treaty as a constitutional instrument - though 
that seems to me a possible opinion. It is reasonable, and quite normal, in the 
case of ordinary legislation dealing with complex matters - let alone matters 
as complex as those of the EEC Treaty-to make provision for its implemen-
tation by, and only by, subordinate legislation. Of its nature this subordinate 
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orderly implementation of the principles declared in the principal instrument 
can be secured and enforced. Nor is Article 177 deprived of its efficacy on this 
view: the subordinate legislation will indeed come before the national courts 
and the courts may have to submit to the European court questions touching 
the interpretation not only of the subordinate legislation but of the Treaty also 
when under Article 184 the validity of the subordinate legislation is in issue. 
Accordingly it suggested, in limine, that there is a good deal of weight in the 
contention of the three governments and of the Advocate-General in Van Gend 
en Loos itself that Article 12 did not have direct applicability in the sense that 
it did not immediately engender in an individual an enforceable right of the 
kind which the plaintiff claimed. A supplementary question arises and requires 
to be answered - not whether the national court is empowered to recognize 
and to give effect to a provision of the Treaty but whether that provision is 
apt immediately and of its own force to create in the plaintiff a right of the 
kind which he claims. This supplementary question has been identified as the 
question whether the particular provision has 'direct effect'. That expression 
is  convenient and is  here adopted to connote this supplementary question. 
When we consider the provisions  of the Treaty we find  that exceptionally 
some are not merely imperative-I believe most of the provisions to be impe-
rative - but categorical in that they prescribe a  particular consequence. A 
good example, perhaps the best, of such a categorical provision is Article 85  (2) 
which  provides  that 'any  agreements  or decisions  prohibited  pursuant to 
this Article shall be automatically void.' If any kind of provision was intended 
to have 'direct effect'  surely  this  provision should be so regarded: it may 
reasonably be suggested that a national court empowered to give effect to the 
Treaty must if an agreement of the defined class is  brought before it declare 
it to be void. Yet even in the case of Article 85 (2) there is a considerable doubt 
whether this was the intention of the draftsman; for he goes on to provide 
in Article 87  that 'the Council shall  . . .  adopt any appropriate regulations 
or directives to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 85 and 86' (italics 
added). It looks as if here also the draftsman is following his favoured scheme 
of  relying  upon subordinate legislation  to  bring into  operation and make 
effective the principles of a policy which the Treaty declares, however defini-
tely the policy may have enunciated. 
Where a  Treaty provision is  not merely imperative but categorical also,  it 
may not be too great a  strain upon the Treaty to regard  the provision  as 
having 'direct effect', even though the draftsman may have intended the con-
trary; but even here such action may further complicate the application of the 
Treaty which is  complicated enough. But some at least of the provisions of 
the Treaty to which the Court has attributed 'direct effect' are not categorical 
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-expressly issue directions to third parties- Member States in these instan-
ces - to act or not to act in a manner which is specified. The directions are 
of course imperative and may be precise and even very precise; but if the direc-
tions are not observed the provisions themselves do not and cannot produce 
in the real world the result which would have been then produced if the direc-
tions  had been  observed.  If  the Commission  has  been  directed  to issue  a 
Regulation of a specified kind and the Commission fails to do so, then quite 
simply  the Regulation does  not exist. In this type of case, if the Court pro-
poses to give 'direct effect' to the provision the Court must take a further step 
and in my view a critical step. It  must decide that it will deal with the situation 
as if the direction had been observed. This does not mean that the Court is 
suffering from a hallucination: it means that the Court has  decided to sever 
the legal world - the world in which it operates - from the world of what 
are called real or actual events. 
There is nothing particularly shocking in such a severance- it happens fre-
quently enough and it may even be necessary for the full flowering of a legal 
system. But it does entail certain dangers, particularly in an enterprise as novel 
and as complicated as the setting up of a European common market, and in 
any event the Court ought manifesty to give the appearance of appreciating 
the dangers and the limits of the course upon which it is embarking. The justi-
fication of Van Gend en Loos is that the separation proposed - the ecart -
between the legal and the real world is  or appears to be really rather small. 
Article 12, as the judgment itself notes, is strictly negative and imposes a nega-
tive  duty - the Member States  shall  refrain from  increasing  the  customs 
duties already applicable. This state has increased this duty. Instead of repri-
manding the state- which in any event was not open to the Court in the 
process before it - all that needs be done is  to direct the national court to 
deal with the matter as if the increase had not been made. The resulting dis-
location in the real world appears to he tiny - the substitution in the tariff 
list of a  previous figure  instead of an existing  figure.  (Actually  the  whole 
transition from the Benelux to the Brussels tariff could have been imperilled). 
At so  small a cost the Court will exemplify its  power and authority; it will 
vindicate and enforce the law of the Community; it will enlist to promote that 
law the energies of individuals in claiming their rights; and it will notably 
encourage those who are labouring to establish the Community in spite of the 
recalcitrance and backslidings of some of its component parts. What looks 
like heroism has evidently a  powerful attraction for some  types  of judicial 
temperament; and there may be some excuse for a Court's desire to strike a spec-
tacular attitude, especially if the cost appears to be small. As a commentator 
and spectator I am not willing to conclude that the Court took a wrong turn 
precisely here, but I do say that there was something seriously wrong in the 
form of its judgment and the manner in which it has grown into a precedent. 
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serious handicap of having a natural bias in favour of a different form.  On a 
personal level perhaps my handicap is  less  than it might be as I have great 
admiration for some types of continental judgments and notably for those of 
the French Conseil d'Etat.  They are no doubt of a highly esoteric character; 
they are succinct and have, or had, the precision and all the interest which the 
old writs had. And they are of course Collegiate: they record the conclusions 
of the Conseil d'Etat 'statuant au contentieux'. They differ toto caelo  from 
the repetitions and prolixities and approximations  of modern English appel-
late judgments but I find them attractive and I believe them to be effective. 
It is  not therefore the collegiate character of the European Court's judgment 
which is as such the cause of my reserve. That collegiate  character cannot at 
present be avoided: the court itself appears to be quite convinced that it is 
essential  to maintain  for its  members the  self-protection which corporate 
action and 'le secret du delibere' provide. I would not venture to differ from 
that view, though it may be a pity that it is so. However, it is a consequence 
that the European Court confronts, or attempts to confront its audience with 
what I may call a finished article: whatever the influence of the 'juge rappor-
teur' the judgment consists of a text upon which there has been joint deliberat-
ion and which has been agreed as a text by at least the majority. The Court 
is careful to recite the arguments of the parties, especially if it proposes to dis-
sent from them; but it necessarily recites them as it understands them and 
normally as constituting objections to the course which it has decided to adopt. 
There is  not the same necessity in justice or in self-justification to rehearse 
the points made by the party whose views the Court is  accepting. 
Having set out the objections made, the Court then states its  opinion. The 
manner and form of this statement reminds me most powerfully of the 'Res-
pondeo dicendum' in an 'articulus' of the great mediaeval 'Summa Theologica' 
of St. Thomas Aquinas. It is  in principle a rounded and complete answer, and 
it may be compelling; but it is one which does not admit of any doubt or hesi-
tation in  the mind of  the person answering.  If  there have  been doubts or 
hesitations they have been ironed out before the answer is  formulated: now 
it is 'sic et non sic'. 
Whatever may be the case in theology, in a legal  decision of any difficulty 
the judicial mind ought to have,  and normally has, considerable hesitation, 
however firmly it may eventually conclude on the one side or the other. In a 
difficult case there are powerful reasons on either side and it is a small matter, 
or a special slant, which may decide the issue. It is  highly desirable that the 
actual impact of the argument, and the reaction to it of the judicial mind, 
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other deficiencies,  is  that it does  permit or even  require the actual impact 
to be made manifest- not merely at the hearing (where, even in an appellate 
court, the spectator is  effectively assisting at the 'delibere' itself in that he is 
present at the occasion at which the individual judge is  forming his opinion 
and can watch the process)  but also in the form of the English judgments in 
which the judge expresses his own personal view of the facts and the law It 
is not, I think, sufficiently appreciated that the English system puts upon the 
judge a very considerable strain. No doubt he is  enured to it by his previous 
life as counsel, and he is fortified by the panoply of the law and by the long 
tradition of his office. Nevertheless it is no small credit to him that he is  able 
and willing to endure that strain and that in the discharge of the duties of his 
onerous office he normally attains a high level of performance. 
I have heard it expressed as a criticism of the European Court that it does not 
respond to the argument addressed to it. This is not correct: the argument is 
recorded and the answer given to it clearly appears from the conclusion reached 
by the Court. But the criticism is justified in so far as the form of the trial and 
the formal agreed text of the judgment preclude us from observing the process 
whereby the Court has reached its conclusion. We have the agreed conclusion 
but in lieu of any account of how that conclusion was in fact reached, of what 
influence which argument or which view  may have had, we have a  recital 
ex post facto of the reasons which in the opinion of the Court justify the con-
clusion which has been reached. 
The European Court accordingly delivers a judgment which is  armoured and 
dogmatic if I may so describe it. Such a form of judgment has many advantages. 
It is, I think, quite clearly what was expected of the Court. The Court after all 
was instituted by our continental colleagues 'pour dire droit', and this is pre-
cisely what it does. The law which it declares is categorical, but is it not appro-
priately categorical? It may read  as  if it were the section of a statute; but I 
doubt if the Community in the confused process of formation could afford 
the luxury of an English type of judgment which issues in no agreed precise 
formulation of the law to be applied, and only in the fortunate case allows an 
inference to be made of the limits within which subsequent decisions are likely 
to fall. Moreover in the field with which we are dealing the Court under Article 
177 is asked to determine a question of law and has made it clear that it is not 
concerned  with  its  application.  Such  a  question  encourages  and  perhaps 
requires an answer which is  abstract and absolute. 
Judgments of this kind are not conducive to that development of the law which 
is  associated with the doctrine of precedent  as  understood in common law 
countries. They indicate a different preferred mode of progress - that of the 
tram rather than of the bus. The critical decision lays down a line to be followed 
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of the instant case. Thus in Van Gend en Loos the decision is that Article 12 
of the EEC Treaty has 'direct effect' within the territory of a  Member State 
and enures to the benefit of citizens whose individual rights the internal courts 
should protect. Article 12 is  specifically  directed  to Member States and im-
poses upon them a general duty. What has been decided is that from a general 
duty so imposed upon third parties an individual enforceable right can arise. 
In fact the duty imposed by Article 12 was also a negative duty and in further 
addition it appeared to be relatively a simple matter to determine what the 
situation would have been had the third party acted as the Treaty required; 
but these 'circumstantial contingencies'  are no more incorporated into the 
decision than are any hesitations or doubts which the members of the Court 
may then have had. 
The Court starts its consideration of the next case upon interpretation to come 
before it with the naked principle or premise that general duties can and do 
create individual rights, together with the conviction that it is the business of 
the Court to give legal efficacity to the terms of the Treaty if it possibly can. 
Thus, in the Defrenne No 2  case though the Article  119  then in question 
imposes a positive duty upon the States and  one moreover the performance 
of which requires, as is admitted by the Court, (see paragraph 19 of the judg-
ment), the intervention of a whole mass of Community and national legislation, 
these  'circumstantial contingencies' are treated as  equally irrelevant to  the 
application of what is  regarded as the established principle (see paragraph 31 
of the judgment), that rights in individuals are created by obligations cast upon 
States. Accordingly, as it would be evidently impossible to impose upon the 
national courts the duty of dealing with cases brought before them as if the 
required mass of rules and regulations with unspecified particulars had actually 
been enacted, the Court, if  it is set upon creating a directly enforceable right in 
an individual, must somehow spell out of the generalities of Articles 117 and 
119  a  specific  obligation  independent  of  the non-existing  regulations  and 
capable of  being directly enforced. 
This the Court proceeds to do by calling in aid a really very ingenious distinc-
tion between what it names overt and covert discrimination. There is  overt 
discrimination if by regulation (for example in the civil service) or by the terms 
of a collective wages agreement a difference in remuneration is established on 
the basis of sex or if in one and the same enterprise or undertaking, public or 
private, a man and a woman earn different rates of pay for the same work. 
Such overt discrimination is capable of being identified by the national courts 
'Solely by reference to the criteria laid down by Article 119 . . .  on the basis 
of  a  purely  legal  analysis  of  the  situation'  (see  paragraph  21  of  the 
U-21 judgment).  In  those  situations  Article  199  is  capable  of  direct  application 
and can therefore create in individuals rights which the national courts must 
protect. (Paragraph 24 of judgment). It is apparently taken as axiomatic that 
because on such an interpretation Article 119 can create individual rights it 
must be held that it does create them. 
Even if the application of the decision is  limited to the future the resulting 
complication is  formidable. In each national jurisdiction non-discrimination 
rights, if I may so describe them, will stem from three separate sources- the 
national legislation which the Article requires, Community regulations which 
the Court envisages, and the direct operation of the Article  itself which the 
Court establishes. Whereas it seems  tolerably  clear  that  in  the draftsman 
non-discrimination rights should in each country depend from the legislative 
provisions of that country subject to the power of the Commission to require 
each country to attain the appropriate level  of protection, by amendment if 
necessary of those provisions. The scheme proposed by the draftsman may be 
judged to be a good deal more sensible than the result attained by the Court's 
decision, especially in an area as complex and difficult as  non-discrimination. 
By way of further comment on the mode of the Court's operation 
as illustrated by these two cases, this may be added: 
(i)  the decision in Defrenne No 2 is not carried by the decision in Van Gend 
en Loos. There are profound differences between the two instances and 
no consideration is given to the question whether these differences should 
be critical ; 
(ii)  there appears to be an over-riding determination in the Court to treat 
general provisions in the Treaty, if it possibly can, as capable of creating, 
and  creating,  directly  individual  rights  enforceable  in  the  national 
jurisdictions; 
(iii)  to achieve that result it is willing to treat somewhat cavalierly the expres-
sed intentions of the draftsman of the Treaty and to use a considerable 
degree of technical ingenuity in its interpretation; 
(iv)  it is  not deterred by consideration of the legal and practical difficulties 
resulting from its decisions but is  willing, in order to deal with some of 
them, to call  in  aid  a power of suspending the law which is commonly 
believed to be a legislative power. 
What seems to have happened is that, whatever have been the successes of the 
communal undertaking, there has been in some degree and in some instances 
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into that fullness of existence which the founders envisaged with perhaps an 
excessive optimism. To achieve their purpose they required the cooperation, 
or the joint operation of a  variety of  organs or entities  and specified  and 
distributed to each a variety of tasks. Of the work entailed the principal burden 
lies, and necessarily I think must lie, upon the Member States: whatever may 
be individual falterings in individual instances, the Community was unlikely to 
get under way-or indeed long to continue to function-without the willing 
and active cooperation of the Member States. This the draftsman evidently 
recognizes by the great number of obligations which the Treaty specifies as 
incumbent on the Member States. The Treaty of course created some  organs 
of its own, of which the principals are the Council, the Commission and the 
ofourt; for the Assembly in the original state of things appears to have a peri-
Cheral function.  These organs,  as indeed the Community itself also, have of 
pourse an existence separate and independent from the Member States; and 
chey are of critical importance in the construction of the Community, particu-
tarly in so far as they (and the Commission especially) can aid and promote 
and incite and direct and secure the performance by the Member States of 
the tasks allotted to them. But however important may be any of the partici-
pants in the joint operation, none I think can supply the place of the other. 
Indeed any attempted usurpation is calculated to destroy the equilibrium upon 
which the Treaty rests. 
The scheme envisaged by the draftsman in allocating functions and duties is 
tolerably clear and seems in principle sensible. Having distributed duties as 
appeared to him right - with a  preponderance of them cast upon Member 
States-he institutes a Court of Justice to see that the provisions of the Treaty 
are carried out-or, to use his own words, to ensure that in the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty the law is observed (Article 164). When he defines 
its jurisdiction he gives pride of place,  as seems right,  to its jurisdiction over 
Member States which are alleged to be in default of their Treaty obligations, 
but is careful to limit the right of initiating such a process to the Commission 
and to fellow Member States only and subject in each case to preliminary pro-
ceedings  by  the Commission.  (Articles  169  and 170).  He then proceeds in 
Articles 173 and 175 to give jurisdiction to the Court over the Council and the 
Commission, again limiting the right to initiate process. 
Article  173  is  of special  interest.  The draftsman is  evidently  proposing to 
give to the Court the jurisdiction  exercised over the administrative field  in 
France by the Conseil d'Etat, which, as is well known, is classified under four 
'cas d'ouverture'-'incompetence', 'vice de forme', 'detournement de pouvoir' 
and 'violation de Ia loi ou des principes generaux du droit'. The intention and 
the difficulties of the draftsman appear most clearly in the French text. He 
can transpose direclty into the Treaty the first three 'cas d'ouverture' and he 
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paraphrases it as 'violation du present traite ou de toute regie de droit relative 
a  son application.' And the parallel with the 'Conseil d'Etats' jurisdiction is 
further exemplified by the grant by Article 184 topartiesgenerallythe'exception 
d'illegalite' developed by the Conseil d'Etat. It would I  think  be  clear to a 
continental lawyer that upon any delimitation of separate jurisdictions a court 
having the jurisdiction specified would also have jurisdiction 'a titre prejudi-
ciel' -which might I think be translated as a preroJative right- over the 
field over which the jurisdiction extends. Accordingly by Article 177 the Court 
is  given  a  pre-eminent authority in questions concerning the interpretation 
of the Treaty of the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of 
the Community; so that should any such question arise in a national jurisdic-
tion, any court may and the court of final instance, must, refer that question 
to the European Court to enable that Court to give what the English text 
describes as  a preliminary ruling. 
In the area of the law with which we are concerned-namely where the Court 
is asked to rule upon a situation resulting from the failure of a Member State 
to perform an obligation cast upon it by the Treaty- the real question is not 
the technical  question  whether a  particular provision  can  be construed as 
immediately creating a directly enforceable right, for that is  merely a device 
to secure a consequence to which aliunde preference has been given. The real 
question is  a  much more difficult and over-riding question - what should 
the  Court regard  as  its  duty when faced  with a  breakdown in  the treaty 
scheme of things ? 
In respect of  defaulting States the draftsman  has given  to the Court  only 
a  carefully limited  jurisdiction,  and  he  has  been  careful  to  make  directly 
applicable  in  Member  States  only  regulations  issuing  from  the  Council 
or the Commission which he no doubt envisaged as containing detailed pro-
visions of a kind impossible in a treaty. In the circumstances of the Van Gend 
en Loos case it must have been an extreme temptation to the Court to do 
something more effective than piously abstaining. The State no doubt was in 
default but it was largely an accidental default. There did not appear to have 
been any deliberate intention to increase customs duties; the increase seemed 
to be an unconsidered side effect of the laudable performance of the State's 
obligations under the Benelux treaty. It must have seemed a very simple thing 
in such a case for the Court to remedy the default directly -to  require the 
national  court to  disregard  the  increase,  if  increase  there  had  been.  The 
contention of the three governments - that the Court should abstain, that 
the increase should be cancelled by the State's internal mechanisms  or that 
the default  be  dealt  with  by  the  Commission  with possible  process under 
Article  169  - has  an air of extreme unreality. It is a delaying tactic and is 
requiring that a steam hammer be used to crack a nut. After all everybody is 
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and there is no difficulty in ascertaining what the duty should have been if it 
had not been increased. 
The temptation to the Court to act in Van Gend en Loos  was. very  great. 
And there were all manner of other considerations. In 1963  the Community 
was not developing as  rapidly and as happily as the founders had expected. 
It  would  be  a  considerable  encouragement if  it  were  made  manifestly  to 
appear that at least one organ of the Community was in business and meant 
to do business. The Court by its action would demonstrate that the Community 
was in effective operation, and that in the most striking way - by  giving a 
direct  remedy  to the individual in  front  of  the courts  with which  he  was 
familiar, and vindicating that remedy in the name of the Community. By such 
action not only would the Community be made real but the individual would 
in promotion of his own interests be incited to become the protagonist in the 
development  and  enforcement  of  Community  rules.  There is  moreover  a 
diversity in judicial temperament; and for some what is described as a realistic 
boldness has considerable attraction. Bani iudicis est ampliare ;urisdictionem: 
it is his paramount duty to develop and extend the law he administers and to 
give it efficacity. The European Court, I think, regards itself as the trustee of 
the hopes and aspirations, the purposes and the objectives of the founders of 
the Community and is  anxious not to fail in the performance of this trust. 
The decision in Van Gend en Loos is accordingly justifiable and may be justi-
fied by the fillip it gave to the development of the Community. But it is of no 
less  importance that the Court should not become  more royalist  than the 
King. It  is to be regretted that the form of judgment of the Court did not permit 
it to make clear that it appreciated the danger of the course upon which it 
might appear to have been embarking. It proposed to short-circuit the scheme 
elaborated in the Treaty. Even  if  the immediate result attained in the Van 
Gend en Loos case is satisfactory, the consequences as exemplified in Defrenne 
No 2 are unacceptable and grave. That the Court should be disturbed by the 
manifest failure  of  the contracting parties to perform the obligations  they 
have undertaken is understandable and appropriate; and it must be commen-
ded for its firm  determination to provide a  remedy for the failure.  But the 
remedy provided may produce evils greater than those which it is  sought to 
cure, particularly if, as seems to be the case here, the economy of the Treaty 
is  disturbed. Even in the short run it would have been more reasonable to 
require the Member States to perform the obligations they had undertaken 
in the Treaty, and to perform them in the manner prescribed by the Treaty. 
In lieu  of  that, the Court declares  that the rights  which would have  been 
established if those obligations had been performed had in fact  been estab-
lished 'de plein droit' within the founding members since January 1963, to the 
extent of securing to men and women workers equal pay for the same work. 
H-25 The declaration will  sound odd in the ears  of women  workers  who have 
received inferior pay for the same work and who are told that they have no 
remedy for the injury  which they  have sustained. If such  a  declaration is 
accounted a  vindication  of Community law, it is  a vindication in a wholly 
unreal world. 
The Court,  it is  submitted,  should  be at pains to keep its world in closer 
contact with the actual world which includes defaulting Member States and 
an insufficiently active Commission. The Court's impatience  may  be  justi-
fiable;  but it should  not permit  that impatience  to induce  it to  trespass 
outside its  province and to attempt to  establish  by  its  own fiat  what the 
Treaty directs to be established by a very different process. Whatever may be 
the advantages of zeal or impatience, the Community will, I suspect, be more 
solidly and durably established if account is taken of its  hesitations and fail-
ings and if it is  encouraged to proceed with 'all deliberate speed' which in  a 
human undertaking of less  complexity has required a period of time longer 
than expected. 
It should be remembered that we are looking at Community law in its infancy. 
It is a lusty infant. We are extremely beholden to the Court for having main-
tained it in so vigorous a condition. It promises well, it has plenty of life, but 
it has still to attain maturity. When it is established and secure I believe that 
it will  experience less  need to justify its  existence or to vindicate itself  by 
spectacular gesture; and will, because accepted, accept to discharge its own 
function in a  more tranquil manner and in a lower key.  And I venture to 
express the hope, now that the Community has been extended, the considera-
tion be given to the manner and form in which judgment is delivered, and in 
particular  as  to whether  it would  be  possible,  while  maintaining if  it  be 
necessary 'le secret du delibere', to give a more adequate response to argument 
and to link a decision  more  firmly to the circumstances and conditions from 
which it arises. 
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111-6 Introduction 
The Treaty of Paris and even more so the Treaties of Rome have 
caught the imagination in many different spheres of activity.  In general they 
were  warmly  welcomed  for  it was  felt  that a  deep-seated  yearning for  co-
operation, collaboration, economic, social and cultural progress, understand-
ing between the peoples of the old Europe and brotherhood could be satisfied 
through these daring and novel designs for Europe. 
The institutions, the working, and the objectives of the European Communi-
ties and their problems were and still are complex. 
Despite the efforts expended, few indeed are those who, even in the so·called 
educated and well-informed circles,  have anything like  a clear conception of 
what those  Communities are, what they can or ought to do  and what they 
have accomplished. 
Their setbacks are more widely-known than their successes and achievements. 
Furthermore  it  is  primarily  those  setbacks  which  attract  the  attentions  of 
certain  political  circles  and  above  all  of  the  press.  The  achievements,  the 
work done, are passed over in silence, no doubt because they lie in somewhat 
technical fields with which it is not easy to make:; an acquaintance. 
Let  us  be  optimistic  and think that this  is  perhaps  because  public  opinion 
wants to see the Communities develop to the full and that it is  disappointed; 
disappointed, if somewhat uninformed, not because of what the Treaties have 
set out to  do  and what they have allowed or have required to be done, but 
because  the Member States  do  not  take  those  fresh  decisions  which  are 
necessary to perfect the European institutions and fail to exercise the political 
options necessary to extend the powers of the Communities in order to create 
a  truly cooperative organization in  the  essential  fields  which  constitute the 
necessary complement of decisions already taken. 
As Mr Tindemans rightly wrote: 
'If we wish to conserve the heritage of the Treaties and to embark upon 
new endeavours the Member States must agree on fresh objectives'. 1 
1  Letter  addressed  by  Mr  Tindemans  to  his  colleagues  of  the  European  Council  on 
29 December 1975. 
III-7 The tasks and responsibilities of the Court of Justice of the Communities will 
no doubt be further increased if such options are exercised; nevertheless those 
which it has already taken on are considerable, although the public at large 
is little aware of them and its work escapes. their notice. 
Nevertheless with each year that passes the Court of Justice is more and more 
asserting  the  European  concept  and  the  European  imperative,  at  an  ever 
increasing  tempo  in  wider  and  wider  and  ever  more  numerous  spheres;  it 
enforces  the  observance  of the  countless  rules  of European  law - I  repeat 
'countless' - cementing the diverse elements of the Communities. 
In the nine Member States all  courts, from  the lowest up to the highest, are 
applying European law regularly,  not to say  daily.  European law,  like  law 
deriving from  national sources,  has  become  part of their positive law.  The 
Court of Justice  is  called  upon  to  coordinate this  Community legal  system 
constructed within the various Member States. 
For  thousands  of  judges,  lawyers  and  citizens  Europe  and  the  European 
Communities  have  become  a  living  and  tangible  reality,  as  they  have  for 
governments  and national administrations, which  are  required to  appear or 
ensure  that they  are  represented before  the  Court of Justice,  and for  many 
industrialists, businessmen and workers who are subject to European rules in 
the  sphere  of  customs,  competition,  transport,  argricultural  and  social 
organization ... 
Even without the fresh  'options' exercised by  the politicians the work of the 
Court of Justice is  ever expanding because, as  the provisions of the Treaties 
and of the ever more numerous regulations and directives filter into the life 
and activities  of institutions, groupings  and individuals  of the nine Member 
States, problems arise and must be submitted to the Court of Justice. 
Indeed the purpose of this account is certainly not to describe the importance 
of the role, work and mission of the Court but, in  the course of setting out 
the interpretation of the rules  of law and of the methods  employed to this 
end, its fundamental importance will necessarily emerge. 
111-8 CHAPTER I 
The concept  of 'interpretation '-interpret-
ation and application-the grounds of  judg-
ment of the decisions of the Court of  Justice 
of  the European Communities 
Section 1  Interpretation-Concept 
1.  The meaning and scope of interpretation 
We  who have been  asked to prepare this  paper cannot aspire to 
provide  a  satisfactory  definition  of this  concept,  which  has  been  discussed 
and indeed elaborated on by so many eminent writers in all  countries, or one 
which could meet with universal approval. 
Nevertheless in  our review we  shall endeavour to  furnish  some information 
and  guide-lines  on  this  concept  and  above  all  on  the  considerable  work 
achieved  over a  period of  more than twenty years  by  the  Court of Justice, 
which we hope will be considered sufficient and perhaps useful. 
In its widest and most general sense 'interpretation' consists of giving a clear 
meaning to something which is obscure. 1 
The interpretation by a court of a law or of any other rule of positive law is 
strictly  speaking  ascertaining  the  meaning of  the  provision  as  it  applies  to 
a specific case. 
2 
Interpretation is  no doubt abstract in  that it seeks  to discover the substance 
of  the  legislative  act  without  any  reference  whatever  to  given  facts  or 
situations and to define a rule of conduct for the future. 
1  Robert, Dictionnaire de Ia  Langue Fran~aise - vide 'Interpretation'. 
2  J.  M.  Polak, Theorie en Practiik der Rechtsvinding, Zwolle, 1953, p.  13;  Pandectes Belges, 
Brussels 1896, vide 'Interpretation des Lois', No 4. 
III-9 Nevertheless  a  court  making such  an  interpretation  with  a  view  to  its 
application to a specific case cannot ignore such a reference if only because 
it  is  difficult  and  often  impossible  for  it  to  separate  interpretation  and 
application. 
The interpretation given  by  a  court can never  be divorced  from  a  specific 
case.  It is  a  link in  a  series  of mental  processes  leading  up  to  a  practical 
application, to the fulfilment of its duty to pass judgment. An interpretation 
can  only  relate  to  a  written  provision  - words  or  phrases,  indeed  the 
context, - but often, or even  generally, it is  a much wider process even in 
the case of an international court required to interpret and apply a conven-
tion.  It is  frequently  asserted  that  a  convention  is  complete  and  that 
consequently it cannot be related to general international law.  Nevertheless, 
on the basis  of the general principle of interpretation that 'no provision of 
written  law  can  be  considered  in  vacud,  the  Permanent  Court,  in  a  case 
relating to certain German interests in Upper Silesia  (C.P.J.I., Serie A,  No 7, 
p. 42)  rejected the argument based on the principle of isolation and declared 
that  the  principle  of  respect  for  established  rights  'forms  part of  general 
international law which on this point inter alia forms the basis of the Geneva 
Convention'. 1 
It cannot  be  disputed  that  the  concept  of  'interpretation'  has  a  strict  or 
narrow meaning and a wide meaning. 
In  the former sense,  as  Professor Renard 2  writes,  interpretation 'means the 
analysis carried out on a specific rule, that is  to say in most cases on a legal 
provision. In this sense to interpret a law is  to clarify its meaning, determine 
its  scope  and  to  establish  its  bounds  and  its  effects.  In  the  wide  sense 
interpretation  means  all  the  mental  processes  to  be  completed  in  order to 
arrive  at the  solution  required  in  a  particular  situation.  In  other  words 
interpretation  encompasses  all  the  procedures  necessary  to  render  objective 
law applicable. Specifically ... it is the total of the processes which should be 
gone  through  before  the law is  applied'.  All  judges,  academic  lawyers  and 
legal  practitioners realize the simplistic and unrealistic nature of the assertions 
of Montesquieu  and  of  Robespierre  to  the  effect  that 'The judges  are  the 
mouthpiece which utters the words of the law;  inanimate beings  which can 
temper  neither  its  severity' 3 •••  'In  a  State  which  has  a  constitution  and 
legislation, the case-law of the courts is synonymous with the law 4• 
1  Ch.  de  Visscher,  •problemes  d'Interpretation  ]udiciaire  en  Droit  International  Public', 
Paris 1963, pp. 108 and 109. 
2  Tours  de  "Sources  du  Droit"  et  Methodologie  ]uridique'  - Presses  Universitaires  de 
Liege, 1969. 
3  •De l'Esprit des Lois', VI, 3. 
4  Assemblee Nationale, Sitting of 18 November 1970. 
111-10 Even the adherents of the exegetical school cannot but perceive the error in 
this. 
These views  can be  explained and justified in  so  far  as  it was  necessary to 
emphasize the separation of the duties  and responsibilities  of the legislature 
on  the  one  hand  and the  judiciary  on the  other:  the  former  apply  to  the 
legislators or to the Nation (spontaneously shaping custom and, in part, the 
general  or other principles  of  law),  the  latter  apply  to  the  courts  and 
tribunals. 
But how great are the duties and responsibilities of the courts and tribunals! 
They must discover  the  rule  or rules  applicable - custom,  'laws' 1  general 
principles 2  determining  their  meaning  and  scope,  and  as  to  the  latter, 
determine  the  powers  and  duties  of  the  authorities,  coordinating  and 
harmonizing those various formal sources of law, without losing sight of the 
fact that the concept of 'law' has a wide meaning both in national law 3  and 
in  international  law 4  or  regional  law . . .  and  extracting  the  rules  and 
principles  which  are contained in  one or more laws  or customs  and which 
follow from such rules or from the very nature of institutions, and so forth. 
Interpretation also involves  determining the order of precedence of the rules 
if a problem of this nature arises 6• 
1 & 2  Even  if it is  particularly  the  interpretation  of the  law  which  is  under  consideration 
it must be said that the scope  of the investigation  must extend beyond written law: 
'The objective  of the law,  the general  principles  of law, previous  legislation  and the 
preparatory work are some of  the  means  of  establishing precisely  that intention if it 
appears  doubtful'  (Repertoire  Pratique  de  Droit Beige,  vide Pourvoi  en  Cassation en 
Matiere Civile, No 492). 
3 & 4  'Laws  comprise  the  provisions  of  a  constitution,  of  decisions  of  the  legislature, 
provisions  contained  in  royal  decrees  or  in  orders,  provisions  issued  by  territorial 
authorities,  sometimes  indeed by  officials,  by  institutions  of public law or by  social 
and/or economic groups ...  ' 
'Law' in the substantive sense, that is  to say a general and impersonal provision issued 
by  an  authority,  comprises  foreign  law  to  which  the  rules  of  private  international 
law apply,  the rules of general international law deriving from  treaties  and the rules 
of European law deriving from treaties, regulations, directives etc. 
5  Normally  there  is  no  difficulty  in  establishing  the  precedence  of  rules  contained  in 
constitutions,  laws  of  the  legislature  and  the  rules  of  the  executive  or  of  agencies 
thereof (decrees  and orders ...  ).  On the other hand problems can and do arise inter alia 
in  connexion  with  the  order  of precedence  of rules  issued  by  authorities  of territories 
and those  issued  by institutions  of public law or economic or social  organization,  joint 
or otherwise. 
There is  no  difficulty with regard to the order of precedence amongst the provisions  o£ 
the Treaties, especially the European Treaties, and the regulations or directives issued by 
the Council or the Commission. 
Ilf-11 'Interpretation'  also  consists  on  the  one  hand  in  settling  questions  of 
precedence if  a  conflict arises  between  a  rule  of internal law and a  rule of 
international  or European law or again if a  conflict occurs  between  a  rule 
of international law and a rule of European law,  and on the other hand in 
filling  in  lacunae  in  laws,  custom  and  general  or other principles  (for  the 
problem of lacunae vide infra Chapter V). 
Law evolves.  Whilst  it  is  as  a  rule  the  task of the legislator to  amend  the 
provisions  of written law in  relation  to  social  changes  and developments it 
is  nevertheless  impossible  to  ignore the role  of the courts in this  sphere. In 
all  systems  of positive  law the  courts  are frequently  called  upon  to  define 
extremely wide concepts (such as  those of public policy, morality etc.)  and to 
adapt them to new developments. 
Conditions in  the life  of society  change  as  does  the abundance of scientific 
and  technical  information  and  as  do  social  and  economic  conditions.  The 
older provisions of the law must be  adapted to this situation and the courts 
very often take the view that if the legislature could have foreseen this change 
it  would  of  necessity  have  taken  it  into  account.  This  also  constitutes 
~erpretation. 
I shall  later 1  consider whether this  interpretation, which  may  be  described 
as  'evolutive',  has  now  been  inherited  by  the  Court  of  Justice  and  if  so, 
whether special problems arise in this connexion. 
Interpretation clearly concerns both the facts  and the law and the Court of 
Justice is frequently called upon to interpret both 2• 
Since a rule is  general and abstract and thus capable of an indefinite number 
of  applications,  the  interpretation  thereof  produces  a  general  effect  which 
the interpretation of the facts,  infinitely  variable  and distinct,  cannot have. 
1  Chapter IV, Section 2. 
2  I shall  content myself  with  referring  by  way  of  example  to  the  judgment of  the  Court 
of Justice of 4 February 1975 in Case 169/73  ([1975]  ECR 117).  In  its judgment the Court 
acknowledged that in law the Community was liable for the inexact information supplied 
to  commercial  operators  by  the  departments  of  the  Communities  and  held  that  the 
existence  of  a  chain  of  causation  between  the  conduct  of  the  administration  and  the 
alleged  damage  presupposes  that this  conduct is  such  as  to  cause  an  error in  the  mind 
of a prudent person. 
The extent  of  the  liability  involves  an  abstract  decision  which  thus  settles  a  point  of 
interpretation in law: whether in fact such  a commercial  operator was or was not misled 
through  an  error  committed  by  a  'prudent person' ... is  a  problem  of interpreting  the 
facts.  The 'causal  connexion' is  sometimes  a  question  of law and sometimes  a  question 
of fact. 
111-12 This does not preclude the existence in addition of a body of case-law, based 
on facts, developed by courts whose task it is  to ascertain and interpret the 
facts:  however that is  not relevant to our problem which is  already extensive 
enough. 
Certain  authors,  especially  outside  France  and  Belgium  are  by  no  means 
satisfied  with the word 'interpretation'  which seems  too  narrow:  alongside 
it  they  rely  on  the  concepts  of  rechtsvinding  (discovery  of  law) t, 
rechtsverfijning  (refining  of  the  law)  and  rechtsvorming  {the  creation  of 
law) 2• 
Amongst  German  writers  and  to  a  certain  extent in  German  case-law  the 
distinction  between  'Auslegung'  (interpretation)  and  'Rechtsfortbildung' 
(development of the law)  is  observed. This distinction is  drawn in particular 
by  von Savigny. If the solution is  going to be compatible with the wording 
of the provision  (of  the written law)  this  constitutes 'Auslegung';  if  it goes 
beyond the interpretation of the words it_constjtutes 'Rechtsfortbildung' 3• 
The  concept  'refining  of  the  law'  ('rechtsverfijning')  may  cover  a  wide, 
restrictive  or  evolutive  interpretation  as  well  as  harmonization  and 
coordination. 
The  concept  'discovery  of  the  law'  ('rechtsvinding'  or 'Rechtsfortbildung') 
certainly  relates  to  the  operation whereby  the  courts  must  ascertain  which 
rules  are  relevant  to  the  matter  before  them.  However  this  concept  also 
concerns the operation whereby the courts seek out and discover unwritten 
rules  which  also  constitute  positive  law in  the  matter  (that  is  to say  they 
seek out the rules which are relevant and must be applied):  custom, general 
and other principles, rules  'implied' in one or more provisions or indeed in 
one or more principles and which emerge from the nature of things and ot 
institutions ... 
2.  Provisions of the European Treaties and interpretation 
Under Article  31  of the ECSC  Treaty, Article  164  of the  EEC  Treaty and 
Article  136  of the EAEC  Treaty the  Court of  Justice  is  expressly  required 
'to ensure that in the interpretation and application'  of the Treaties and of 
the rules laid down for the implementation thereof 'the law is observed'. 
1  C£.  J.  M.  Polak,  op.  cit.  passim;  G.  J.  Wiarda 'Drie  Typen  van  Rechtsvinding,  Zwolle 
1972. 
2  W.  Van Gerven 'Het Beleid van de Rechter', (Antwerp 1973), p. 10. 
3  Larenz, 'Methodenlehre der  Rechtswissenschaft',  1960,  p.  290.  In  case-law the expression 
'interpretation' is sometimes employed (cf. Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 8, 
210 and 220). 
111-13 Article 177 of the EEC  Treaty and Article 150 of the EAEC  Treaty entrust 
it with the special task of interpreting the Treaties together with the acts of 
the  institutions  of  the  two  Communities.  The  Court  of  Justice  thus 
the law common to the Member States and is  indeed the supreme court for 
all  the  courts  of  the  Member  States  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  of 
Community law. 
Regard  must also  be had to Article 41  of the ECSC  Treaty, Article  177 of 
the EEC  Treaty  and  Article  150  of  the EAEC  Treaty in  that they  require 
the  Court  to  settle  the  'validity'  of  the  'measures'  adopted  by  and  of  the 
'acts'  of  the institutions  of  the  Communities.  In  deciding  the  'validity'  the 
Court of Justice must define the powers and jurisdiction of the Council and 
of the Commission, and if neccessary those of other bodies or authorities as 
well  - that  is  define  'the  meaning  and  the  scope'  of  the  provisions  of 
Community law - it must  determine  the  relation  between  written  and 
unwritten  Community  law  and  the  national  systems  of  law,  between 
international law or regional law and Community law and at the same time 
extract the general or other principles which constitute this law. 
The  concept  of  interpretation  having  the  very  wide  scope  which  I  have 
endeavoured to develop  above  by  applying to  it certain elements  borrowed 
from the writers or case-law of certain Member States is  that which may be 
discerned both in  the extremely important body of case law of the Court of 
Justice  and in the work which it has accomplished under Article 31  of the 
ECSC  Treaty, Article  164 of the EEC  Treaty and Article 137 of the EAEC 
Treaty and in the task with which it is  entrusted by Article 41  of the ECSC 
Treaty, Article 177 of the EEC Treaty and Article 150 of the EAEC Treaty. 
It seems  quite unnecessary at this point to define what is  understood by the 
'scope' of one or more rules. We will limit ourselves to the following points: 
(a)  Article  85  of  the  EEC  Treaty  as  it is  worded  does  not state  expressly 
whether the  agreements  between  undertakings . . . and practices  which  may 
affect  competition  within  the  Common  Market  include  agreements  or 
concerted practices between foreign undertakings, that is  to say, those whose 
principal place of business is outside the territory of the Common Market, or 
between  such  undertakings  and  other  undertakings  established  on  the 
territory of the Common Market;  an  answer to this  question is  imperative. 
It will be said that there is  a lacuna. Indeed this is  so if it is  considered that 
there is  a lacuna whenever a clear and precise solution does not emerge from 
the wording, that is  to say  a solution on the basis of the wording for every 
problem which arises (vide Chapter V, Section 5). 
III-14 In  this connexion we may remind ourselves that in the judgment of 14 July 
1972 in Cases 48, 49  and 51  to 57/69, 1 it was necessary to clarify the scope 
of this concept in Article 85.  In defining further the scope of Article 85  the 
Court had to decide whether purely national agreements, that is  to say those 
restricted  to  the  territory  of  a  Member  State  and  which  do  not envisage 
imports and exports, fall within or without the scope of the said article. The 
Court's answer was that agreements which hinder economic interpenetration 
are caught by Article 85  (judgment of 17 October 1972). 
2 
Does  'agreements  between  undertakings'  in Article  65  of the  ECSC  Treaty 
also refer to agreements between a number of associations of undertakings? 
Does abuse of a dominant position, which is  prohibited by Article 86 of the 
EEC  Treaty,  arise  solely  from  'practices'  for  example,  of  one  undertaking 
or also from its  merger with others? Here is  a problem on the scope of the 
concept  'abuse  of  a  dominant  position'.  Does  this  constitute  a  lacuna? 
Undoubtedly, if one expects the legislative provisions to cover every situation. 
Whatever the  outcome may be  regarding the  problem  of lacunae to  which 
we shall thus return it is important to clarify the scope of the concept referred 
by Article 86 of the EEC Treaty. 
(b)  Determining whether or not a provision of a treaty, of a regulation or of 
a  directive  is  self-executing  constitutes  interpretation  in  that it  defines  the 
scope  of  a  rule.  Indeed  in  international  law  it  has  been  held  that  this 
constitutes  'interpreting'  a  treaty.  Even  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the 
European Treaties  national  courts in several  countries  had decided  by way 
of interpretation whether a provision in  an international convention was  or 
was  not  applicable  by  them  and  whether  it  might  be  relied  upon  by  the 
citizen to support a claim, a defence or an objection. 
(c)  Settling the question whether or not a rule is ofitselfcapableof application 
to  a  specific  case  (judgment  of  11 March 1965  in  Case  31/64 3  and  the 
judgment of the same date in Case 33/64 
4  or deciding whether a Community 
regulation  is  complete  in  itself  and  creates  a  right  or whether  national 
provisions  can  or cannot impose  additional  conditions  for  the  recognition 
of this right (judgment of 6 June 1972) 5 again constitutes interpretation. 
1  14  July  1972,  I.  C. I.  and  Others  ([1972]  ECR 619  et  seq.  - not yet  published;  [1972] 
C.M.L.R. 557). 
2  Vereeniging  Cementhandelaren,  Case 8/72  ([1972]  ECR 977 - not yet published;  [1973] 
C.M.L.R. 7). 
3  Case 31/64, Bertholet ([1965]  ECR 81). 
4  Case 33/64, Koster (nee Van Dijk) ([1965]  ECR 97). 
5  Case 94/71, Schluter  und Maack  [1972]  ECR 307 - not yet published;  [1973)  C.M.L.R. 
113). 
III-15 (d)  Interpretation  and  definition  of  the  scope  of  one  or  more  rules  or 
legislative provisions are always involved in: 
(I)  investigating  and  settling  the  application  ratione  personae  of  a 
Community provision (judgment cited supra); 
(II)  determining from what date a Community provision takes effect and 
fixing its  application in  point of time  (judgment of  11 March 1965 
in Case 33/64 cited supra 1; 
(III)  determining when and on what conditions a Community provision 
imposes  obligations  on  the  Member  States  in  particular  with 
regard to their legislation or national rules (judgment of 4 February 
1965, Case 20/64 [1965] ECR 29); 2 
(IV) determining  whether  the  provisions  of  the  European  Treaties  or 
of other sources  of Community law take precedence over previous 
or subsequent provisions or measures  of internal law and whether 
over  all  measures  and  provisions  or  only  over  certain  of  them. 
Determining  the  scope  necessarily  involves  prescribing  the  area 
within which the legislative act or measure is mandatory if these are 
operative  within  the  national  legal  system:  also  determining 
whether  a  Community  provision  must  take  precedence  over  an 
international  agreement,  for  example  the  European  Interim 
Agreement  on Social  Security  Schemes  relating  to Old-Age  signed 
in Paris on 11 December 1953 (judgment of 28 May 1974) 3• 
1  Vide  also  judgments  of the  Court  of  Justice  of  24  November  1971,  Case  30/71  [1971] 
ECR 919- not yet published- [1972]  C.M.L.R. 121; 4 July 1973, Case 1/73, Westzucker 
[1973]  ECR  723;  14  December  1971,  Case  43/71,  Politi  [1971]  ECR  1039  - not  yet 
published - [1973]  C.M.L.R. 60; 7 March 1972, Case 84/71, Marimex  [1972]  ECR 89 -
not yet published - [1973]  C.M.L.R.  907;  25  June 1975,  Case 5/75,  Deuka  [1975]  ECR 
759. 
2  It is  fundamental that provisions apply  everywhere, that is  to say,  throughout the  entire 
Community, in principle at least, at the same time.  Cf.  the opinion delivered before the 
judgment of the Belgian Cour de  Cassation of 16  June 1975,  Revue de Droit Penal et de 
Criminologie 1975- 1976, p. 67 et seq. 
I may cite in this context the judgement of the Court of Justice of 15  December 1971  in 
Case  35/71  ([1971]  ECR  1085  - not yet  published - [1972]  C.M.L.R.  806)  which,  in 
interpreting  Regulation  No  120/67  of  the  Council  on  the  common  organization  of  the 
market in  cereals which provides that the levy  to be charged shall  be that applicable on 
the day of importation, held 'that the  concept "day of importation" wicht is  conclusive 
for the purposes  of the  application  of the levy  scheme,  must have the same  meaning in 
all the Member States, since otherwise there is  a danger that different rates of levy would 
be applied to goods which are in the same situation economically at the same date and the 
introduction of which  into the territory of the  Member States has comparable effects  on 
the market in agricultural products .. .'. 
a  Case 187/73, Callemeyn ([1974]  ECR 553). 
111-16 Determining whether a Community  provision must or must not be 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  an  international  treaty  in 
international  law  which  bind  the  Community  (judgment  of  12 
December 1972 in Joined Cases 21 to 24/72) 1• 
Determining the provisions applicable and discovering the different 
sources  which  exist  in  conjunction  with  the  sources  of  written 
Community  law  also  involves  interpretation  in  the  wide  sense 
(rechtsvinding)  and the  Court of  Justice  has  of necessity  been  led 
to  do  so  frequently.  I  shall  treat  this  task  of  'discovery'  of  the 
formal  sources  of  the  law  at  another  point  in  my  review  (vide 
Chapter III). 
Deciding whether a right or a legislative act takes precedence over 
a right or legislative act deriving from another source - especially 
the  problem  of  relations  between  Community  law  and  national 
law  - involves  ascertaining  the  scope  of  those  rights  and 
legislative acts and thus 'interpretation' as  I have already indicated. 
This  particularly  involves  deducing  the  nature  and  the  effect  of 
Community law, taking account of its  raison  d'etre,  of its  aim,  of 
its  common  institutions  and  of  international  institutions  and  of 
the nature of the European 'construction'. 
It  may  perhaps  be  said  that this  constitutes  'constructing'  on  the 
foundation of law as  a whole;  this again is  a different facet of the 
concept of interpretation but it clearly comes within this sphere. 
This is what was done in the basic decisions of the Court of Justice: 
in  this  connexion  reference  may  be  made  to  the  celebrated 
judgments, of which further details are superfluous, of 15 July 1964 
(Costa  v  ENEL),  13 February 1969  (Walt  Wilhelm),  17 December 
1970 (Internationale  Handelsgesellschaft)  and the order of 22 June 
1965  relating  to  a  rather  unusual  procedural  issue  raised  in  the 
San Michele, case. 
(v)  At this point, in order to illustrate the concept of 'construction 
by  the  court' - which  also  constitutes  an  interpretation - {this 
expression  is  always  capable  of  causing  confusion  for  those  who 
have failed  to consider it sufficiently  and who think that they  can 
1  Cf.  the  opinion of Mr Advocate-General  Mayras  delivered  before  the  said  judgment of 
12 December 1972 and the commentary by Mr Rideau in Cahiers de Droit Europeen 1975, 
No 4, p. 461  et seq. 
111-17 discern  the  court as  an  actual  legislator)  mention  should  also  be 
made of the case-law of the Court of Justice which furthermore is 
in  accordance  with  the  case-law  of certain  national  courts  which 
have  been  called  upon  to  give  a  ruling  in  this  connexion  on the 
revocation of administrative measures which give rise to individual 
rights, especially those appointing officials: lawful revocation if the 
measure  was  illegal,  unlawful  revocation  if  it  was  legal. 1 
'Construction'  it no  doubt is,  but based  on reasoning,  deduction, 
perfection  and  co-ordination  of  various  legal  rules  or principles 
(vide Chapter V, Section 4). 
The law and the rules of law in general cannot foresee and provide 
a  definite  solution  for  every  problem  and  set  out clearly  all  its 
effects.  They  confer  on  certain  public  authorities  the  power  of 
appointing, dismissing and assigning to non-active status ... ; they 
also confer rights and duties on the officials appointed. 
It is  for  the  courts  to  specify  the  nature  and  the  limits  of  such 
powers,  duties  and  rights:  a  veritable  task  of  'interpretation',  or 
more precisely harmonization and. coordination. 
It is  pointless to resort to the convenient concept of 'lacuna' which 
creates  confusion  and  appears  to  confer  upon  the  courts  powers 
which they do not possess. 
Section 2  Interpretation-Problems  peculiar  to inter-
national courts, to national courts and to the 
Court of Justice 
1.  Problems peculiar to international courts 
The nature of international courts  and of their particular task gives  rise  to 
certain special problems which are alien to or different from those pertaining 
to national courts; the same is  true of the Court of Justice  by  reason of its 
nature and tasks and of the nature of Community law. 
Nevertheless  differences  existing  between  the  'methods'  of  interpretation 
must  not  be  exaggerated  as  I  shall  have  occasion  to  point  out  in  my 
consideration of such 'methods'. 
1  Judgments of 12 July 1957 in Joined Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 (Rec. 1957, p. 85). 
III-18 Ch.  de  Visscher 1  writes:  'In  the  overwhelming  maJonty  of  cases  the 
interpretation of law flowing  from  a  treaty only  affects  a  right peculiar to 
the  contracting  parties  (except  for  so-called  "treaties  establishing  laws"). 
The  interpretation  of  custom,  which  represents  a  common  or  general 
international  law,  presents  very  different  aspects.  This  is  why  certain 
judgments of the International Court of Justice have in certain circles aroused 
feelings  of surprise and indeed  of  disappointment. In  this  context reference 
may be made to the judgments in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries  case and in 
the Nottebohm case.  The fact is  certainly to be explained by the vagueness 
of certain customs. Because interpretation of a  custom by the courts affects 
the significance of common or general international law it throws a light on 
its  subject  matter radiating far beyond the relationship  between the parties 
to the dispute.  Is  the application  before the courts of the  interpretation of 
customary  international  law  jeopardized  today  by  criticisms  disputing  the 
authority of the cases  on which it is  based,  a  point of view  for which the 
representatives  of  new  States  have  appointed  themselves  the  interpreters, 
especially in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Security 
Council?'  The author continues:  certain  interpretations  may  be capable  of 
giving rise to active or passive effects in favour or to the detriment of third 
States;  'this is  particularly the case with treaties concluded by the dominant 
powers  at  the  time  the  subject-matter  of  which  is  restricted  in  territorial 
scope,  for  example those treaties  intended to  settle  certain  consequences  of 
the transmission  of the rights  and the obligations  of  a  State  which  has 
disappeared  (succession  with  regard  to  States)  and  the  advantages  which 
certain agreements on international communications confer on third States'. 2 
With regard to methods Mr de Visscher emphasizes a point which all courts 
must heed.  He writes,  'A treaty does  not exist  in  isolation;  it is  conceived 
and can be understood only in the context of  the international legal  order 
and  in  connexion  with  the  subject-matter  to  which  it  relates.  From  this 
follows  the  important consequence  that even  when  the interpretation  of  a 
provision of a  treaty is  recognized as  derogating from  general international 
law  it  can  be  understood  only  within  the  strict  limits  determined  by  its 
provisions'. 3 
2.  The national courts and the Court of Justice 
With regard to the problems  peculiar to the  Court of Justice  as  compared 
with those of national courts I shall merely emphasize the following points: 
(a)  Whilst  the  national  courts  are  required  daily  to  interpret  Community 
law  (interpretation  in  the  broad  sense  which  I  have  adopted  above)  they 
t  Op. cit., p. 47 et seq. 
2  Op. cit., p. 72. 
a  Op. cit., p. 37. 
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Communities  (Article  177 of the EEC  Treaty and Article  150 of the EAEC 
Treaty),  either perceive  in every  case  whether  a  problem  exists  or provide 
a solution to any problem which may exist as can the Court of Justice. They 
do not know the opinions of writers and case-law in the various countries as 
does the Court of Justice, in particular by reason of its specialization and of 
the  information  with  which  it  is  daily  supplied  by  the  representatives  of 
the Member States and of the Commission. 
(h)  Although  they  can  give  rulings,  as  does  the  Commission  and  in  turn 
the  Court of  Justice,  on the  application  of Articles  85  and 86  of the EEC 
Treaty they are not competent- and this is particularly true of courts which 
do  not  specialize  in  this  sphere  - to  give  rulings  as  to  the  effects  of 
agreements, associations and concerted practices within the Common Market, 
as  can the Court of Justice which is  required to deliver a ruling on decisions 
of  the  Commission  which  possesses  information  on  the  situation  in  the 
Common Market as  a  whole whilst a  national court cannot normally have 
such information at its command. 
(c)  Normally a national court will be more 'timid' than the Court of Justice 
in  the face  of problems occasioned by the direct effect of the provisions of 
treaties regulations and directives. 
(d)  The members of the Court of Justice are of nine different nationalities. 
Clearly their training is  by no means identical. The constitutional principles 
peculiar to their countries of origin and indeed the institutions, customs and 
traditions  with which  they  have  lived  may  provoke reactions  and methods 
of  reasoning  which do not arise at all in the institutions of lawyers of the same 
nationality. 1 
(e)  The  European  Treaties  may  be  compared  to  a  constitution.  In  the 
Member  States  the  courts  also  interpret the  constitution  but the  authority 
responsible  for  the  constitution may,  theoretically  at least,  subject them  to 
review  since  by  reviewing  the  constitution the  legislature  may confer  upon 
a rule or provision of the constitution a meaning and scope at variance with 
that settled by the courts. Accordingly the representatives of the nation retain 
the last word. 
It is indeed true that the European Treaties may be amended or supplemented 
or clarified  but unanimity is  necessary for this. It will  be said that because 
of this  the judges of the  Court of Justice must display additional prudence. 
1  I shall endeavour to clarify this finding in the part of the review on the limits assigned to 
the task of the courts (vide Chapter II). 
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with the same care and prudence, whether or not review is possible. 
Besides, it must not be forgotten that the case-law of the Court may undergo 
modifications as  a result inter alia of what may be called a 'rebellion' by the 
national courts who may adopt another interpretation than that established 
by the Court of Justice.  In  the face  of such  a rebellion or even  of reactions 
amongst writers or in political circles the Court may be brought to reconsider 
the problems which it has already settled although it does  not indeed 'yield' 
by  reason  of  rebellion,  expediency  or political  influence.  This  shows  how 
necessary  a flexible  case-law  is  and how hazardous, to  say  the least,  is  the 
desire  to give  effect  erga  omnes to  the decisions  of the  Court in  particular 
to those which  are delivered  under Articles  177 of the EEC  Treaty and 150 
of the EAEC Treaty. 
3.  Certain problems peculiar to Community law 
Let us finally consider certain problems peculiar to Community law. 
The last considerations set out above no doubt relate to such problems. 
(a)  By  reason of the absence of procedure for  the revision  of the European 
Treaties or more precisely because of the need to revise them by  unanimous 
decision can the Court of Justice be regarded as having much greater freedom 
than  that  normally  enjoyed  by  national  courts?  Can  the  Court  of  Justice 
replace  the political authorities of the Member States  which  are answerable 
to the people and their representatives whilst the Court is  not so  or only very 
little?  This  seems  indeed  audacious  and  scarcely  compatible with the  prin-
ciples of a true or even a rudimentary democracy. 
How can one justify the possession of such a 'power' by the Court of Justice 
when, except in  Great Britain, owing to the special  nature of its public law 
the  legislature  is  denied  the right  to  amend  or supplement the constitution 
without recourse to  the procedure for  revision  which conserves  the right  of 
the citizens to intervene directly and the rights of the opposition? 
Nevertheless it is  clear that the Court of Justice must interpret the provisions 
of the Treaties as  the national courts do in respect of the provisions of their 
constitutions. 
(b)  When the Court of Justice must ascertain the general or other principles 
of  Community  law  it  must  consider  not  only  the  basis  and  the  spirit  of 
Community law but in  addition the laws of the Member States  as  a whole 
III-21 whilst  the  national  courts  normally  discern  those  principles  with  exclusive 
reference  to  their  national  legal  systems  and  the  mores  of  their  particular 
politics. With regard to Community law comparative law plays an important 
part.  I  shall  endeavour to  provide further  explanations  on  this  point (vide 
Chapter IV, Section 3). 
The Treaties,  regulations  and directives  employ  words  and  concepts  which 
are familiar  in  the various  Member States  and which  have  a  meaning  and 
scope which  often appear obvious  to  every  national authority and in  parti-
cular  to  the  courts  and  those  assisting  them. 1  However  those  Treaties, 
regulations  and directives  constitute a law common to the various Member 
States;  they  must  have  the  same  meaning  and  the  same  scope  within  the 
territory of each  of those States. A Community meaning and scope must be 
established  by  the  Court  of  Justice.  Many  judgments  and  opinions  have 
emphasised  this  problem which  is  encountered by  all  courts  which  have  to 
interpret  and  apply  Community  law  and  in  particular  to  the  Court  of 
Justice. 
2 
The fact should also be borne in mind that the three Treaties refer to 'vague' 
concepts  (Unbestimmte  Rechtsbegriffe).  Furthermore the Treaties  are  based 
on concepts peculiar or common to the Member States or indeed which  are 
simply expressed in the same manner. 
Finally one must not lose sight of the fact that the Treaties contain a restricted 
number of provisions  of substantive law although provisions  of  this  nature 
are frequent in regulations and directives. 3 
1  J.  Boulouis and R.  M.  Chevallier, 'Grands Arrets de  Ia  Cour de  justice des  Communautes 
Europeennes', Paris 1974, p. 94. 
2  See  in  this  respect the very  interesting opinion of Mr Advocate-General  Mayras in  Case 
152/73  [1974]  ECR  167.  The  proceedings  related  to  defining  the  concept  of  'public 
service' within the meaning of Article 48  (4)  [of the Treaty] to which the principles of the 
freedom  of movement  for  workers  and protection  against  discrimination  do  not apply. 
The Advocate-General  states  that whilst in  international  law the meaning  and scope  of 
this concept may be established in terms of the law of each  of the States concerned (as  it 
is  in  accordance  with  Article  13  of  the  European  Convention  on  Establishment  of 13 
December  1955)  this  does  not  hold  good  with  regard  to  Community  law.  Such 
an interpretation,  based  on the  pre-eminence  of the sovereignty  of States  could  not be 
upheld in view  of the  objectives  and spirit of the  European  Economic  Community.  Mr 
Mayras asks,  'what in  fact would freedom  of movement amount to if it depended upon 
one  State  or to  set  in  operation,  as  it were  automatically,  the  exception  contained  in 
paragraph  (4)  by  entrusing  to  a  public  service,  within  the  meaning  of domestic  law, 
responsibility  for  some  activity  or  other  which  appeared  to  it  to  constitute  a  task  of 
general importance?' 
3  Cf.  P.  Pescatore, 'Les  Objectifs de  Ia  Communaute Europeenne comme Principes  d'Inter-
pretation dans  Ia  jurisprudence de Ia  Cour de  justice' in Miscellanea W.  J.  Ganshof van 
der Meersch, Brussels 1972, p 328. 
III-22 Section 3  Interpretation and application 
1.  General considerations 
In a report drawn up in the name of the Legal Affairs Committee of the Euro-
pean Parliament it was stated: ' ... The distinction between interpretation and 
application is  certainly  amongst the most complex problems  of those raised 
by Article 177. As  a general proposition it may be stated that interpretation 
must be of a particularly abstract nature whilst application is  concrete, that 
is to say it refers to a specific case. In other words whilst interpretation defines 
and clarifies the meaning of the provision, application settles a dispute turning 
on the provision so interpreted. The former operation necessarily precedes the 
second'. 1 
This problem has  been considered by a very large number of writers in  the 
various Member States. Let me mention Mr Ch. de Visscher who writes: 'All 
application  of  a  rule  of  law  is  intimately  bound  up  with its  interpretation 
although the two operations are distinct. Very often a term or rule of custom-
ary law is  applied without the doubt being raised which  gives  rise  to inter-
pretation. On the other hand all  interpretation, whether by governments or 
by the courts, is done in respect of an actual or potential case'. 2 
2.  Procedure under Article 177 
The  former  President,  Judge  Donner  has  recently  published  a  penetrating 
study  of  the  distinction  in  particular with  regard  to the  application by  the 
national courts and the Court of Justice of Article 177 of the EEC Treaty and 
Article 150 of the EAEC Treaty. I shall return to this point. 
Normally the courts  must both interpret and apply the law.  In exceptional 
circumstances  the  two  procedures  are  separated  and  entrusted  in  the  same 
case  to  different courts:  such  'division'  is  familiar  in  national legal  systems. 
In France in particular there is the jurisdiction reserved to the 'administrative' 
courts  or to  the  Government  to  interpret  certain  rules  and in  the  Federal 
Republic  of Germany  and in  Italy the power reserved  to  the constitutional 
court to give a ruling on the compatibility of a provision with the constitution. 
It is  frequently  and properly suggested in  other States  that the constitution-
ality of laws  should by  no  means  be  decided  by  all  courts within the legal 
system but exclusively by the supreme court and also by the Council of State, 
1  European Parliament, Working Documents, 1969-1970, Document 94,  p. 9:  15  September 
1969. 
2  Op. cit  .• p. 27. 
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one of the other courts before which the question has been raised. 
The Court of Justice is clearly required itself to apply the provisions of which 
it has  provided  a  preliminary interpretation, in  particular in  exercise  of its 
jurisdiction with regard to applications for annulment, on the grounds of civil 
liability and the failure of the Member States to fulfil their obligations under 
the Treaty and to, actions brought by officials. 
In its task of cooperating with the courts of the Member States in the admi-
nistration of justice the Court of Justice is  required to interpret Community 
law whilst the former are entrusted with the task of applying it. 
In  this  respect,  then, interpretation and application  are separate just  as  the 
interpretation of Community law on the one hand, and of national law on 
the other, are separate. 1 
Although  the  distinctions  are  no  doubt finely  drawn  and  have  occasioned 
difficulties they are not insurmountable and the extreme flexibility displayed 
by the Court of Justice has been of great assistance in this matter. 
The Court of  Justice  has  frequently  recalled  the  distinction  between  appli-
cation and interpretation. In its  judgment in the Capolongo case of 19  June 
1973 2  the Court considered that: ... 'in exercise of the powers conferred by 
Article  177 ...  , the  Court, having to limit itself to giving  an interpretation 
of the provisions of Community law in  question, cannot consider legal  acts 
and provisions of national law, the risk being that the reply will  correspond 
only imperfectly to the circumstances of the case'. 
The Court further repeated this view in particular on 30 September 197  5:  ' ... 
The Court ... has no jurisdiction to apply the Community rule to a specific 
case ...  ' (case 32/75). 
Certain of the questions submitted to the Court relate rather to application. 
One  such  question  formed  the  subject-matter  of  the  judgment  of  6  April 
1962 3:  'The request from the Court of Appeal of the Hague is concerned with 
1  The  Court  of  Justice  is  entrusted  with  the  interpretation  of  Community  law  and  not 
- within  the  framework  of  Articles  177  and  150  cited  above  - with  national  law. 
Nevertheless  this  distinction  cannot  always  be  maintained  with  regard  to  the  tasks 
entrusted  to  the  Court by  Articles  88  of  the  ECSC  Treaty and  169  to  171  of  the EEC 
Treaty and 141 to 143 of the EAEC Treaty. 
2  Case 77/72, Capolongo [1973]  ECR 622. 
3  Case 13/61  [1962]  ECR 45. 
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Bosch GmbH ... on and accepted by its customers, falls under Article 85  (1) 
of the Treaty. This question cannot be considered as  a pure question of inter-
pretation of the Treaty, since the document on which this summarily, described 
restriction on export appears has not been laid before this Court. This Court 
can accordingly make no decision without a preliminary investigation of the 
facts, and the Court has no jurisdiction to conduct such an investigation ...  '. 
As  the  former  President,  Judge  Donner 1  states  the  Court may  decide  that 
Article 85  of the EEC Treaty prohibits an agreement which has  a particular 
effect but not that an agreement does  or does not have such an effect.  Like-
wise he explains, the Court cannot rule that a specific provision of national 
law is  contrary to the Treaty,  but merely  that under the  Treaty  a  specific 
thing, course of action or decision is or is not permissible ... 
Nevertheless, since interpretation and application are linked, the former being 
required  for  the  latter,  the  questions  submitted  and  the  replies  given  are 
frequently and necessarily 'bound up' with the facts of the case. 
Thus  in  its  judgment  of  12  July  1973 2  the  Court was  required  to  decide 
whether a  business  representative was  covered  by  Article  12  of Regulation 
No 3 concerning migrant workers or by Article 13 ... The Court considered 
that the position of a representative differs basically from that of the workers 
referred  to  in  Article  13  and that consequently  this  latter  provision  is  not 
applicable.  On the other hand since  the  Court was  requested to clarify  the 
meaning and scope of the concept 'residence' as  this word is  employed in the 
first subparagraph of Article 13  (c)  of Regulation No 3 as  amended by Regu-
lation No 24/64 (it should be noted how close we are to the facts)  it replied: 
'In the case  of a  business  representative pursuing the kind of  activities  des-
cribed in the order of reference for a preliminary ruling, the place in which that 
worker has established the permanent centre of his  interests and to which he 
returns in the intervals between his  tours' is  the 'permanent residence' in the 
sense of that provision of the regulation. This judgment of the Court never-
theless remains within the sphere of interpretation although no great problems 
as  to  its  application  remain for the national court since  the  judgment may 
be applied to an indefinite number of other cases (business representatives). 
Another example.  In  its  judgment of  26  April  1972 3  the  Court held:  'The 
provisions of subheading 20.06 B II  (a)  6 (bb)  of the Common Customs Tariff 
read together with Additional Note No 2 to Chapter 20 must be interpreted 
1  A.  M.  Donner,  ·uitlegging  en  Toepassing'  in  'Miscellanea  W.  J.  Ganshoff  van  der 
Meersch', Vol. II, p. 103 et seq. 
2  Case 13/73  [1973]  ECR 935. 
3  Case 92/71  [1972]  ECR 231. 
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ing 20.06 of the tariff, having a sugar content determined in accordance with 
Additional Note No 1 to Chapter 20 which exceeds 9°/o by weight ...  '. 
Summarizing the already extensive case-law and experience of the Court of 
Justice, 11r Advocate-General Mayras 1 explained that if there is both a purely 
abstract  interpretation  and  an  interpretation  which  is  reaJly  useful  in  the 
settlement of the dispute 'the case-law of the Court has followed the second 
course'. 
Judge Donner also  writes:  'De ontwikkeling van de jurisprudentie gaat dus 
duidelijk in de richting van een uitlegging voor het concrete geval. Worden de 
vragen in algemene en abstracte termen gesteld, dan schroomt het Hof niet om 
het dossier te raadplegen en aldus de algemene gestelde vraag in haar concrete 
tekst te zetten alvorens de passende uitlegging te geven' ('The development of 
case-law clearly takes the form of interpreting specific instances. If the manner 
in  which  the questions  are submitted is  too general  and  abstract the Court 
will  not hesitate to consult the file  and to replace the question in its  actual 
context before delivering the interpretation requested'). 
Indeed  the  Court frequently  recalls  the  necessary  distinction 2  but it states 
that  it  can  and  should,  if the  question  is  badly  phrased,  'provide  the 
national  court with the factors  of interpretation  depending on Community 
law which  might be  useful  to  it in  evaluating the  effects  of a  provision  of 
national law'. 
The Court thus provides an interpretation in terms of the application which 
the  national  court will  make  of  it in  future;  this  is  normal  and  does  not 
constitute the application  of Community law by the Court of Justice  (vide 
infra). The Court is  thus led to restate the questions submitted to it, which is 
furthermore natural and extremely useful. 
Nevertheless  this  course is  not without its  hazards:  thus  in  its  judgment of 
6 May 1971 3  the Court did not hesitate, although the national court had not 
submitted  the  question,  to  formulate  questions  and  cases  which  no  doubt 
exceeded the submissions made by the parties to the dispute. 
With regard to the questions  which  are so  frequently  submitted within the 
framework of the procedure under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, let us say 
of  the  'relation'  between  Community  law  and  national  law,  the  Court is 
1  Opinion in Case 127/73, SAB.AM  [1974]  ECR 313. 
2  Judgment of 30 September 1975 in Case 32/75. 
3  Case 1/71, Cadillon, [1971]  ECR 355. 
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rather to decide whether a national law comes within the ambit of a Commu-
nity provision. In its judgment of 15 May 1974 (Case 184/73) the Court held: 
'A provision of national law intended to prevent the simultaneous receipt of 
sickness  benefit  and benefit on account of incapacity to work constitutes  a 
provision for suspension or reduction within the meaning of Article 11  (2)  of 
Regulation No 3'. 
Certainly it is  not the task of the Court to interpret national law but ... in 
order to reply to the questions submitted it is  very often obliged to find that 
a  particular  national  law  decides  a  specific  point - which  constitutes  an 
interpretation; this occurs particularly if a certain Community provision refers 
to  a  specific  situation or advantage which  is  conferred by  national laws  or 
secondary legislation. 1 
Frequently the national court asks whether a condition imposed by a national 
law is  contrary to a specific provision of Community law. 
2  Nevertheless the 
reply  given  by  the  Court is  more  abstract than  the question  and  does  not 
expressly refer to the national law. 
3.  Findings and reflections 
(a)  Any court which is usually required to settle a dispute or give a ruling on 
a situation or a problem which is submitted to it must successively: 
(i) consider  and establish  the  facts,  the  subject-matter of the  dispute, 
situation or problem (this former task is  clearly not incumbent upon 
supreme  courts  - such  as  cours  de  cassation  - which  'take no 
cognizance whatsoever  of the  facts'  and can  only  proceed  on the 
basis of those facts  which have been definitively established by the 
lower courts); 
(ii)  consider  and  'interpret'  the  rule  or rules  relating  to  the  case  sub-
mitted to it; 
1  Judgment o£  30  September 1975,  Case 32/75.  In the opinion which Mr Advocate-General 
Mayras  delivered  in  Cases  190/73  and  1/72  or  in  76/72,  he  was  obliged  to  resort  to 
extensive  considerations  of  the meaning  and  scope  o£  national  legislation.  See  also  the 
typical  judgments  o£  27  October  1971,  Case  23/71,  Janssen  [19711  ECR  853  and  that 
of 22 June 1972, Case 1/72, Frilli  ([1972]  ECR 464. 
2  Vide the judgment of 26 November 1975 in Case 39/75, which deals with the compatibility 
o£  a  provision  o£  Netherlands  law,  relating  to  residence  in  the  Netherlands,  and  a 
provision of Community law. 
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rules  thus  ascertained and interpreted, that is  to say  judge,  that is 
apply the law and rules  to  the particular case  . . .  and give  those 
rules  a  definite effect in accordance with the circumstances of the 
case. 
(b)  The former President Judge Donner is correct in stating that it is possible 
to distinguish interpretation and application but not to separate them. 
1 
This is  a  necessary finding  with regard to the task entrusted to the  courts 
but it is clearly insufficient with regard to legal theory. 
Whether the courts interpret a rule or rules or whether they have to entrust 
the interpretation to another court (for  example through Article  177 of the 
EEC Treaty) they apply an interpreted rule to a. specific case. 
Although  a  court  may  have  interpreted  a  rule  correctly  or  scrupulously 
adopted  (as  it must)  the interpretation supplied  by  the  Court of Justice,  it 
may none the less  have applied them to facts  which have not been properly 
established  or to  badly-drawn  claims  and defences.  This  results  in  a  good 
interpretation ... but a bad application; the distinction reappears. 
A wrong interpretation of a rule may also remain without effect on the legal-
ity  of the  operative part of the  judgment,  and thus  on the decision  of the 
court. Thus a cour de cassation will decide that a misinterpretation of a rule 
is  irrelevant  and will  consequently dismiss  the appeal  if,  despite this  error, 
the operative part of the judgment in dispute is  justified in law by a finding of 
fact by the lower court or on another ground in law which the cour de cassa-
tion substitutes for the ground of the judgment which was delivered. Thus the 
distinction  appears  again  between  interpretation  and  decision  - more 
precisely the operative part of the judgment - which relates to the application 
of rules of law. 
In legal theory rules are interpreted without regard to a specific case although 
'practical cases' are often invoked as illustrations or in order to clarify a point. 
(c)  The courts are not required to give  a general interpretation but one for 
a specific  case  although it is  clear that they must consider that the interpre-
tation they adopt is  that which they must adopt for all  subsequent identical 
cases. 
1  Op. cit., p. 116. 
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latter to interpret the matter in its stead as  for example under Article 177 of 
the  EEC  Treaty,  the  latter court must necessarily  be  permitted to take the 
place  of the former:  thus it must be  fully  informed,  it must be  acquainted 
with the facts  and  the  exact  and  actual  problem  in  connexion  with which 
the question for interpretation arises. 
Does  this invite other courts - such  as  the Court of Justice - to apply a 
rule? This question must be answered in the negative. 
Application constitutes the deduction from the interpretation of the rule and 
from the finding and appaisal of the facts of an exact consequence which will 
form the operative part of the judgment to be delivered. The Court of Justice 
~s  never  required  under  Article  177  of  the  EEC  Treaty  to  find  and  to 
appraise facts  and to draw a  conclusion from them or even  from the inter-
pretation which it places upon the rule. 
It appears to me that the Court of Justice which is  called upon to supply the 
national  court with  an  answer  which  is  helpful  to it,  and  thus  an  answer 
which  gives  proper heed  to the particular case  and to the facts  before  that 
court is not required itself to ascertain from the file what constitutes the facts. 
This is  not its  task ... and, as  all  judges are aware, it is  extremely difficult 
exactly to determine the facts from a mere perusal of the file  without having 
heard the parties and, if necessary, the witnesses. 
The courts must thus themselves state clearly what the facts  are with regard 
to which the question for interpretation arises. 
Nor should the judges  of the Court of  Justice be  required to interpret nat-
ional law ... that is  not their under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty or under 
Article  150  of  the  EAEC  Treaty.  Certain  questions  submitted  by  national 
courts can nevertheless force them to do so. 1 
1  Reference should be made in  this  respect in particular to the judgment of 16  Novembe1 
1972 in Cases  14,  15  and 16/72  [1972]  ECR 1105  et seq.;  the judgment of 30  September 
1975 in Case 32 /75;  the judgment of 30 October 1974  in Case 190/73  [1974]  ECR 1123. 
Reference should also  be made to the opinion of Mr Advocate-General Mayras in  Case 
44/72 (judgment of 13  December 1972) and in the above-mentioned Case 1/72 and in Case 
76/72  (judgment of 11  April  1973)  [1973]  ECR 457  as  also  the opinion of Mr Advocate-
General Reisch! in Case 187/73 (judgment of 28  May 1974)  [1974]  ECR 553. 
In  its  judgment  of  17  February  1976  in  Case  45/75  the  Court  had  to  reply  to  the 
question of whether the levying of the part of the monopoly equalization duty (Monopol-
aufgleich)  called the Monopolaufgleichspitze  (monopoly equalization  margin)  on imports 
of Italian Vermouth - this  levy  was imposed under the German Spirits Monopoly Law 
(Gesetz  tiber  das  Branntweinmonopol)  of  8  April  1922  - violates  the principles  of the 
first  paragraph  of  Article  95  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  The  Court  held:  'Although,  in  the 
111-29 The national  court  making  a  reference  to  the  Court of Justice  must  thus 
supply  the  latter  with  the  interpretation  of  the  national  law  or provision 
thereof which is  necessary for the Court of Justice to interpret a Community 
rule. 
Section 4  The grounds of the judgments of the Court 
of Justice 
(1}  Are these judgments too long, too short, sufficiently clear? 
Opinions  sometimes  vary  in  this  respect.  It is  often  considered  that  the 
judgments are not explicit. Sometimes it is even held that they are ambiguous 
and sibylline. 
The methods  of a  supreme  court  are  not  those  of  another  court.  The 
judgments of the one are succinct whilst those of the other are less  so  and 
even prolix. 
Their respective styles differ. 
In my view those who have scrutinized the judgments of the Court of Justice 
must arrive at the honest finding that they are of the length or extent dictated 
by  the exigencies  of  replying to the submissions  made  and of providing  a 
coherent, comprehensive and sufficient statement of reasons. 
There is  a  belief in  certain  quarters that the Court of Justice is  obliged to 
reply  to  any  questions  and  submissions  whatsoever  even  if  such  a  reply 
cannot  provide  a  basis  for  the  judgment  or  the  reply  which  it  gives  in 
particular to a question of interpretation or of validity. 
context of proceedings  under  Article  177  of  the  EEC  Treaty it is  not for  the  Court to 
rule on the compatibility of provisions of a national law with the Treaty, it does,  on the 
other hand, have jurisdiction to provide the national court with all  the criteria of inter-
pretation  relating  to  Community  law which  may  enable it to  judge  such  compatibility 
' 
When  the Court is  requested to give  such  a  ruling on compatibility it does  so  in terms 
which respect the division of jurisdictions. Vide for example the judgment of 26  February 
1976, Tasca, Case 65/75. 
This  judgment draws  finer  distinctions  than the  judgment of  23  January 1975  in  Galli, 
Case  31/74  [1975]  ECR  47  and  in  particular  entrusts  the  national  court  with  the  task 
of appraising whether a  national provisions  dealing with prices  jeopardizes 'the aims  or 
functioning of the common organization of the market'. 
Vide with regard to the Galli judgment: M.  Waelbroek, •Les  Reglementations Nationales 
de  Prix  et le Droit communautaire, Brussels 1975;  and G.  Motzo, •po!itiche  Nazionale dei 
Prezzi e Politica  di  Congiuntura della  CEE',  Rapport au Colloque de  Grottaferrata 1976. 
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to  all  these  pointless  questions  are  usually  unacquainted  either  with  the 
technique of the courts or their duties, tasks or obligations. 
As  Judge  Donner pertinently  and rightly  said  during  the  course  which  he 
gave  as  visiting  professor  at  the Academie  de  Droit Internationale 1  'This 
would oblige the European Court to follow a particularly onerous procedure 
before giving  a  judgment which would be  of  no  assistance in the particular 
case.  No doubt it is  always  helpful for  the Court of  Justice  to  interpret  a 
provision of European law ... but its  task is  to deliver rulings which are of 
assistance  in  settling  a  case.  It is  not a  body  to  be  consulted  on  abstract 
questions. The Court of Justice has warded off the danger of becoming a kind 
of oracle obliged to give a ruling on anything asked it.' 
Reproaches  of  this  nature  are  frequently  levied,  particularly  by  certain 
academic  lawyers  or commentators  who  are  insufficiently  acquainted  with 
the practice of the courts and in particular with the rights, duties, obligations 
and reponsibilities  of the courts. Numerous  examples  could be  quoted with 
regard  to  the  criticisms  which  are  particularly  directed  in  Belgium  against 
the  judgments  of  the  Cour de  Cassation.  It  should  further  be  added  that 
pleasure  is  to  be  derived  from  demolishing  decisions,  preferably  if  they 
emanate from high places and enjoy prestige and authority. How many times 
has it been said or written that the Cour de Cassation has 'ducked' problems! 
Such  critics  do  not perceive  that the  court  could  not or should  not have 
considered these problems. 
With regard to the complaints of ambiguity and of insufficient clarity in the 
judgments  delivered  by  the  Court  of  Justice:  it  is  true  certain  of  these 
judgments - but  in  my  view  they  constitute  the  exception  - require 
particular scrutiny and sometimes even repeated perusal before it is  possible 
precisely to discern the decision and above all the grounds of judgment of the 
Court of  Justice.  It  is  clear  that no  complaint  will  lie  if the  judgment  is 
difficult  to  understand  for  the  simple  reason  that  the  subject-matter  with 
which  it deals  is  itself  difficult  to  grasp.  Likewise  it is  certainly  impossible 
seriously  to  entertain such  complaints  when,  as  is  often  the  case,  they  are 
the outcome of  a  failure  to  make a  sufficient endeavour to understand the 
reasoning of the Court of Justice in the contexts, often of extreme complexity, 
which the Court of Justice must daily consider. 
1  'Les Rapports entre la  Competence de  la  Cour de  justice des  Communautes Europeennes 
et  les  Tribunaux  Internes,  - extract  from  the  Recueils  de  Cours,  Volume  XI,  1965, 
p. 33. 
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or indeed  sometimes  extremely  difficult  to  grasp:  but is  there  a  national 
court,  even  a  supreme  court,  or  an  eminent  university  professor  or 
commentator against whom such complaints might on occasion be levied? 
(2)  Could it be proper that the personality of different judges may 
appear more clearly in the judgments of the Court of Justice? 
Thus we come to the question of the dissenting opinion. 
The  International  Court  of  Justice,  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht,  the 
European Court of Human Rights, the courts of the Common Law countries 
and also certain South American States are acquainted with and employ this 
procedure. 
Lawyers  and national  courts  usually have  a  liking for  the systems  adopted 
by  their  national  institutions:  dissenting  opinions  or a  general  supposition 
vf  unanimity  or,  let  us  say,  an  anonymous  majority.  However  in  certain 
countries, where the dissenting opinion is  alien to the legal framework, some 
lawyers, who tend not to be  judges or members of administrative tribunals, 
would like it to be introduced there. 
It is  unnecessary to consider this question in this review. Let me limit myself 
to the three following considerations: 
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(i)  The provisions  of the  European  Treaties  provide  no  place  for  the 
opinion  or  opinions  of  a  minority  of  the  Members  of  the  Court  of 
Justice or even for communicating the fine distinctions which individual 
members of the majority might have wished to make known. 
The institution of the dissenting opinion would require the amendment 
of  the  Protocol  on  the  Statute  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  adopted 
unanimously, and this appears quite out of question. 
(ii)  The dissenting  opinion appears  to  me incompatible,  or compatible 
only  with  difficulty,  with  the  conditions  upon  which  the  judges  are 
appointed; their tenure of office is  for a limited period although it may 
be  renewed  as  a  result  either  of  a  special  decision  of  the  political 
authority  of  the  Member States  of  the  Communities,  or even  through 
a choice made by a political assembly or directly by the Nation. (iii)  There is  no  doubt  that the  dissenting  optmon,  or in  general  the 
individual views of the members of courts required to deliver judgments, 
would  constitute  a  considerable  asset  to  legal  writers,  professors  and 
lecturers in universities and even to advocates. Academic lawyers would 
reap  from  the dissenting  opinion  and  the  subtle  distinctions  expressed 
by  the  judges  of  the  majority  a  harvest  of  information  and  of  data 
which would be used in  the 'practicals' or the foot-notes  of judgments. 
Lawyers would be tempted to advise their clients to base an action on  a 
view  of the law of which a supreme court had previously disapproved, 
since they would know that the judge or judges constituting the majority 
which delivered the judgment in question had been replaced by others. 
However . . .  this  would  guarantee  neither  legal  certainty  nor  even  the 
authority of court decisions. Such at least is my opinion. 
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Lin1its of the task of the court - of the  task 
of the Court of  Justice 
Section 1  Introduction 
Interpretation, to enable the court itself or another court to reach 
a  decision  (Article  177  of  the  EEC  Treaty  and  Article  150  of  the  EAEC 
Treaty) involves the performance of an enormous task, as I have endeavoured 
to point out in another part of the review (Chapter I, Sections 1 and 2). 
Nevertheless  no  matter how enormous  this  concept and task it clearly  has 
limits implied by  the very nature of the judicial offices,  and in  particular of 
the  nature  of  the  task  entrusted  to  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities. 
These limits are imposed in particular: 
(1)  by  the  separation of  powers  on  the  one  hand  between  the  political  or 
administrative authority and on the other hand the judiciary, 
(2)  by  the  necessary  separation,  which  is  generally  acknowledged  in  the 
positive law of the Member States, between the responsibilities  and tasks of 
the 'legislature' and those of the courts. 
1 
It is  tempting to think and even to maintain that the Court of Justice enjoys 
wide  powers  of  appraisal  and  freedom  which  the  national  courts,  and,  in 
particular the supreme courts of the Member States, by no means possess. 
It is difficult to draw comparisons and indeed they are often precluded. 
1  As  J.  C.  Gray has  stated, in 'The Nature and Sources  of the  Law', Boston  1963,  p. 93: 
'The judges are the discoverers, not the makers of the law'. 
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of law and not of the diversity and variety of the facts. The task of the Court 
of Justice is wider and the Court is very often acquainted with the facts. 
The national courts have progressively adapted to the complexity of present-
day  society  and its  multifarious  rules  of  law,  written  and  unwritten.  The 
Court of Justice was from the outset entrusted with its  task in the  context 
of a  multinational and supranational society whose cohesion had still  to be 
emphasized; it was a new society in which the rules of written law were few 
whilst the principles of unwritten law had progressively to be discovered and 
asserted. 
Like  a  federal  constitutional  court  the  Court  of  Justice  must  uphold  the 
'policy'  of  the  separation  of  powers  and  of  jurisdictions  within  the 
Communties on the one hand and the Member States on the other (Article  88 
of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  Articles  169  to  171  of  the  EEC  Treaty  and  Articles 
141-143 of the EAEC Treaty). 1 
In exercising its  jurisdiction in  this  sensitive field  does  the Court of Justice 
display  'independence'  and  does  it indulge  in  'politics'?  Are  the  judgments 
of the Court or the grounds therefor based on expediency? 
This has sometimes been claimed. 
A  'political  decision'  should not be  confused  with a  decision  which  entails 
'political consequences'. 
There are  limits  to what courts  do  and  should  do:  it appears  that this  is 
acknowledged  in  all  legal  systems,  or at any  rate in  those  of the  Member 
States.  It is  clear  that differences  and subtle  distinctions  may  be  perceived 
both in  the practice of national or international courts  and in  the views  of 
legal  writers  considering this  matter from the point of view  of de  lege  lata 
or de lege feranda. 
Those who consider the problem from the point of view of de lege lata take 
account,  (or  sometimes  most  unfortunately  fail  to  take  account - which 
makes it impossible for their view to convince informed opinion and deprives 
1  The  Federal  Republic  of  Germany  and  Italy  (the  latter in  connexion  with  its  regions) 
have acquired experience of this. 
In connexion with  the exclusiveness of the rule of the Court of Justice in delivering rulings 
with  regard  to  the  failure  of  the  Member  States  to  fulfil  their  obligations:  - vide 
J.  Mertens  de  Wilmars  and  I.  Verougstreate,  'The  Failure  of  Member  States  to  fulfil 
their Obligation', Common Market Law Review 1971. 
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especially those of systems  of public law which determine which authorities 
are  required to establish or modify,  ususally in  accordance with democratic 
procedures,  rules  of  conduct  setting  up  institutions  and  determine  their 
jurisdictions and duties. 
It is clear that this problem cannot be considered here. 
I shall  nevertheless  consider two aspects  of  this  problem because  the Court 
of Justice  in  its  case-law  could not avoid  considering  it  and has  moreover 
expressly stated its view on this matter. 
These two aspects are: 
(a)  the  separation  of  powers  and  of  jurisdictions  between  the  political 
authorities and the administration, on the one hand, and the courts on the 
other, and 
(b)  the law-making task of the 'legislature' and the judicial offices. 
This  consideration  will  also  allow  discussion  of what is  sometimes  termed 
'interpretation  by  the  courts'  and  the  confusion  to  which  this  expression 
may give rise and which we have already indicated in Chapter I. 
Section 2  Powers of the political authority and of the 
administration  and the  task  of the  courts-
in the sphere of economics 
1.  Law and economics, economic law 
Law  must  be  contrasted  with  politics  since  politics  relates  essentially  to 
choices and options and has regard for expediency whilst this is  by no means 
the  task of the courts.  Law undoubtedly arises  from  prior political  choices 
but once  it  is  created  it has  its  own  objectives  and  subject-matter  just  as 
politics has its. 
Law and economics are not in conflict. Law comes into being or is  developed 
in  terms  of  social,  financial,  budgetary  and  economic  circumstances. 
Phenomena, situations, activities,  economic,  social  and tax problems ... are 
the  substantive  sources  of  rules  of  law,  that is  to  say  they  occasion  their 
coming  into  being  and  amendment.  Rules  of  law  are  based  on  those 
phenomena  and  activities,  and  organize  and  discipline  them.  Private 
III-37 relationships,  family  relationships,  relationships  with  other  social  groups, 
relationships  arising from  chattels,  realty,  commercial operations, the needs 
and  tasks  of  the  public  which  require  agencies  and  resources...  these 
constitute the source and the subject-matter of rules of law, that is  to say of 
rules  which  constitute rules  of  conduct  and  establish  the increasingly more 
numerous regulations, tasks and powers of the public services. 
Law can no more be expressed  as  the opposite of economics than can law 
and society,  law  and social  relationships,  labour relationships,  relationships 
within undertakings, relationships pertaining to wealth and money. 
It is  tempting  to  contrast  economic  law 1  with  civil  law  or  criminal  law 
because these latter categories of positive law often of necessity constitute the 
subject-matter of laws  arranged in codes whilst this  is  not always so  in the 
case of the category of positive  law known as  economic law. 2  The variety 
of the formal  sources  of law relating  to  various  categories  of positive law 
does not affect the nature of those categories. 
Inspired  by  a  desire  to  contrast  economic  phenomena  and  economic  law 
with other social phenomena and other categories of positive law evolution, 
emphasis  is  given  to  the  evolution  and  to  the  rapid  modifications  which 
economic  situations  and problems  undergo.  Nevertheless  the problems  and 
phenomena pertaining to the relationships  of classes  or social  groups,  even 
those concerning family relationships which were governed by old established 
codes  also  undergo  constant  change  calling  for  amendments  to  or  the 
development of rules of law. 
The  'uncertainties'  of  economic  law  are  also  emphasized. 3  It cannot  be 
doubted  that uncertainties  exist  but they  are  inherent  in  new  institutions, 
concepts  and  situations.  'Uncertainties'  are  also  frequently  encountered  in 
social law, European law and international law ... 
2.  Separation of powers- judgments of the Court of Justice 
A.  General considerations 
It is clear that the powers of the political authority and of the administration 
on the one hand and of the tasks of the courts on the other must each remain 
in their respective spheres. 
1  In connexion with this concept, vide G.  Farjat, 'Droit Economique' (P.U.F.  1971), p. 17. 
2  Nevertheless it is  quite possible to  cadify economic law as  is  illustrated by the Czechos-
lovakian Economic Code. 
3  Although  economics  is  not,  in  the  words  of  Mr Advocate-General  Lagrange  in  (1963) 
ECR 184 an exact science, economic law does not necessarily share this inaccuracy. 
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particularly in the economic sphere? 
With  regard  to  actions  for  annulment  Article  33  of  the  ECSC  Treaty 
emphasizes  that  'the  Court may  not,  however,  examine  the  evaluation  of 
the situation, resulting from  economic facts  or circumstances in  the light of 
which the High Authority took its  decisions  or made its  recommendations, 
save where the High Authority is  alleged ...  '. This is  an obvious rule which 
it was  moreover considered  unnecessary  to repeat in the Treaties  of  Rome. 
Furthermore the Court of Justice applies this obvious rule when it is  required 
to  give  a  ruling  withing  the  framework  of  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European  Economic  Community.  Thus  in  its  judgment of  18 March 1975 1 
the  Court  held:  'when  examining  the  lawfulness  of  the  exercise  of  such 
freedom,  the courts cannot substitute their own evaluation of the matter for 
that of  the  competent authority  but must restrict  themselves  to  examining 
whether  the  evaluation  of  the  competent  authority  contains  a  patent error 
or constitutes a misuse of power'. 
In  his  opinion  delivered  in  Case  6/54 2  Mr  Advocate-General  Roemer 
commented  on  this  'separation'  of  powers  and  of  jurisdictions.  He quotes 
the  statement  of  reasons  which  the  German  Government  put forward  in 
support of the draft law authorizing the ratification of the Treaty and which 
states:  'the principle of the separation of powers which prevails with regard 
to the institutions required that the review of the Court of Justice should not 
mean substituting the Court for that of the High Authority as  the supreme 
agency  of the will of the Community in economic matters'. He also  quoted 
the  report  of  the  French  delegation  which  runs  thus:  'accordingly  it  was 
possible  to  effect  the  necessary  reconciliation  between  the  requirement  of 
containing the operations of the High Authority within the limits of the law 
and the  no  less  imperative requirement that these  operations should not be 
hampered  in  a  field  in  which  economic,  political  or  social  considerations 
require  a  constant  appraisal  of  factual  circumstances  or  appropriateness 
which  normally  falls  outside  the  jurisdiction  of the  courf.  The Advocate-
General  concluded  that 'with  regard  to  the  ratio  legis  it  may  be  deduced 
that in  connexion  with  the  ground  of  manifest  failure  to  observe  the 
provisions of the Treaty the Court must be in  a position to make a finding 
without  substituting  its  own  appraisal  of  economic  policy  for  that of  the 
High  Authority ... The Treaty  consequently  makes  arrangements  for  the 
1  18 March 1975, Case 78/74, 'Denaturing premiums for  common wheat' [1975]  ECR 421. 
2  21  March  1955,  Case  6/54,  Government  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Netherlands  v  High 
Authority, Rec 1954-55, p. 201. 
Ill-39 review  of  the  economic  policy  followed  by  the  High  Authority:  under 
Article 24 the High Authority is  obliged annually to submit to the assembly 
a general report on its operations. 1 
The courts do not administer or govern as  does  the administration and the 
legislature and the government is not normally called upon to act as judge. 
Nevertheless fine distinctions are possible when a court must sit in judgment 
on the facts  which  the administration should have known.  In  such  matters 
the training of the lawyers making up the court, the constitutional principles 
and the institutions of their countries influence them or are capable of doing 
so.  Such  training and principles  differ  in  particular with  regard  to  France, 
Italy,  Luxembourg,  the Netherlands  and Belgium  on the one hand and the 
United Kingdom on the other. 2 
Thus  Lord  Mackenzie  Stuart states  in  the  record  of a  conference  held  on 
9 January 1974: 3  'in the absence of express legislation British administrative 
law scarcely ever permits and indeed absolutely excludes review of the facts 
on  the basis  of which  the  administration exercises  its  power of appraisal'. 
The distinguished British Member of the Court of Justice then cites a number 
of decisions of the courts of his country in support of this view. 
Lord Mackenzie Stuart later states:  'Even in the United Kingdom the power 
of the administration is  not unlimited. Any  decision of the courts annulling, 
for  example,  a  measure  issued  by  a  local  authority  on the ground that it 
was  adopted  ultra  vires~  produces  a  certain  effect  on  the  course  of  the 
operations of the administration but despite that it has never been suggested 
that the courts do not have jurisdiction to entertain such an application. What 
is  more,  it is  no  doubt possible  to  call  in  question  the  correctness  of the 
proposition  as  a  whole.  Does  passing  judgment  on  the  administration 
necessarily  involve  administering?'  This  would  be  the case  if the  Court of 
Justice had to substitute its power of appraisal for that of the administration 
1  Mr Advocate-General  Roemer further  stated:  'the rule  as  to the  limiation  of review  by 
the  Court  applies  particularly  to  the  question  of  whether  an  economic  measure  is 
necessary or appropriate ... Owing to their very  nature economic decisions such  as those 
which  are  contested  and which  are  issued  for  a  restricted  period,  must be  justified  not 
only in the circumstances of the period when they were adopted but even more within the 
context of the economic developments following  their implementation and the objectives 
of the Treaty' 
2  Would German, Danish and Irish lawyers please excuse failure to make specific mention 
of their legal systems: this is a simple confession of ignorance!! 
3  Societe de Legislation Comparee : Revue Internationale de Droit Compare - janvier-mars 
1974, p. 61  et seq. 
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of the courts  and not of the administration to annul an implementing measure 
which lacks a valid basis in law or in fact. 
Mr Advocate-General  Lagrange  stated  in  his  opmwn  in  Case  13/63: 1  'In 
French  law,  such  a  defect  (failure  to  state  reasons  or  a  statement  of 
contradictory  reasons)  is  considered  as  falling  under  'infringement  of  the 
law'. But this  is  of little importance: the essential thing is  to see clearly that 
we are here in the sphere of review of the legality of the grounds and not in 
that of a  mere defect  of procedure.  The applicant  also  disputes  on several 
points the material accuracy  of the grounds:  here too review must be made 
by  the Court which has the task, when a question of material inaccuracy is 
raised, whether, in spite of this inaccuracy, the decision remains any the less 
legally  justified. Such are the principles which hitherto seem to have inspired 
the Court in its exercise of judicial review of the grounds of a decision taken 
under a discretionary power'.  2 
B.  Economic choices and the task of the courts/Court of justice 
-certain judgments 
(a)  It is  sometimes  asserted  that the  Court holds  certain  'economic views' 
and that they manifest themselves  in its  judgments ... and that it has made 
certain politico-economic choices. 
I  am  afraid  that  this  is  the  result  of  confusion.  The  Treaties  and  the 
implementing  regulations  are  founded  on  certain  economic  concepts.  The 
decisions of the Commission and of the Council of Ministers may constitute 
the application of a doctrine or of an economic choice. The Court of Justice 
must  determine  whether  such  choices  or economic  policies,  which  come 
1  [1963]  ECR 184. 
2  See  also  the judgment of the Court of 22  January 1976  in  Case 55/75  with regard to the 
limits of the powers of the Court of Justice  and review by  it.  The Court held  that:  'As 
the  evaluation  of  a  complex  economic  situation  is  involved,  the  Commission  and  the 
Management Committee enjoy, in this respect, a wide measure of discretion. In reviewing 
the legality of the exercise of such  discretion, the Court must confine itself to  examining 
whether it contains  a  manifest  error or constitutes  a  misuse  of  powers  or whether  the 
authority  did  not  clearly  exceed  the  bounds  of  its  discretion'.  The  Court  held  that 
Regulation  No  974/71,  as  amended,  'provides  that  the  grant  or  the  imposition  of 
compensatory  amounts  shall  apply  only  where  application  of  the  monetary  measures 
referred  to  ... would  lead  to  disturbances  in  trade  in  agricultural  products.  Under 
Article  6 of this  regulation the Commission,  deciding in accordance with the established 
procedure of management committees, shall  rule  as  to  the  existence  of a risk  of distur-
bance'  The  Court,  then,  considers  the  framework,  that  is  to  say  the  bounds  of  the 
discretion of the Court. 
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Community  and  which  do  not  concern  the  Court,  infringe  a  rule  of  law 
deriving in particular from the Treaty or from the implementing regulations 
or whether they are compatible with such rules of law. 
The authors  of both the Treaty of  Paris  and  of  the  Treaties  of  Rome 
certainly  had  a  certain  concept  of  economic  policy  and  this  is  necessarily 
reflected  in the provisions  of the three  Treaties.  In  cases  brought before it 
the Court of Justice is  clearly required to settle the questions submitted to it 
on the basis  of the rules  and principles  arising from  the Treaties  and thus 
from the economic theories adopted by the authors of the Treaties. However 
it is  clear that it is  by no means the duty of the Court - and it appears to 
me that the Court of Justice has observed this  rule - to approve or reject 
certain  economic  theories  and  thus  possibly  make  political  choices  for  it 
would be putting itself in the place either of the authors of the Treaties or of 
the Council of Ministers or for the Commission which were entrusted with 
tasks other than those of the Court of Justice. 
It is  clear that certain economic concepts and theories influenced the authors 
of the  Treaties. It is  also  clear that one  or  other  theory  or  concept  or 
application  of  economics  engenders  the  agreement  or otherwise  of  certain 
economic  or political  groups  especially  in  the  Member  States.  However 
matters of economic choice do not come within the jurisdiction of courts. 
In  a  noteworthy  study  which  appeared  in  the  'Melanges  en  l'honneur de 
M.  Ganshof van der Meersch' 1  Judge Mertens de Wilmars  referred  to the 
economic concepts which inspired  or may have inspired the authors of the 
European  Treaties  or which  are  favourably  regarded  or otherwise  by  the 
political powers in the Member States. He writes in particular that: 
the  economic  concept  forming  the  basis  of  the  European  Treaties  is  the 
theory of the market economy; 
the Treaties, and particularly the Treaty of Paris,  were  conceived  at a  time 
when it was  considered  almost  unanimously that it was  necessary  to react 
against state planning in times of crises and war; 
the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  are  not  characteristic  of  a  planned 
economy  and  on  the  contrary  they  favour  competition  conceived  as  an 
instrument serving to coordinate the market economy. 
1  'De  Economische  Opvattingen  in  de  Rechtspraak  van  bet  Hof van  ]ustitie',  Volume  II, 
p. 285 et seq. 
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appeared: the State planning necessary to create a Welfare State, bring about 
a  better distribution  of  wealth,  improve  the social  climate,  or to  authorize 
public investment or to allow public authorities to acquire shares in private 
undertakings. 
Judge Mertens de Wilmars further emphasizes that it is  possible to entertain 
a  number  of  concepts  of  competition  within  an  economic  system  and  he 
cites certain particular views with skill and authority. 
Nevertheless ... the  political  and  administrative  authorities  - the  latter 
being  moreover  dependent  on  the  former  - have  the  task  of  and 
responsibility  for  determining  economic  policy  and  what means  are  to  be 
employed in implementing it. The task and responsibility of the courts is  to 
consider, without interfering in the powers  of the said  authorities, whether 
the decisions which they have taken conflict with rules of law. 
Let  us  consider  certain  judgments  and  certain  appraisals  and  comments 
relating to this question. 
(a)  It might be thought that in its  judgment of 18  May 1962 in  Case 13/60 
the  Court,  in  order  to  be  able  to  establish  the  role  of  competition  in  an 
economic oligopoly, has itself drawn a distinction between 'the power to fix 
prices'  on  the  one  hand  and  'the  power  to  determine  prices'.  In  fact  the 
applicant itself  drew this  distinction  and the Court considered whether the 
ECSC  Treaty and the EEC  Treaty distinguished  between these  two powers 
and what was  the  difference  between  them  according  to  the  Treaties.  The 
Court of Justice  interpreted the Treaties  (which  is  a  judicial  function)  and 
ruled: 
'For the undertaking which  is  in  a  position to exercise  it the power to  fix 
prices  is  an objective fact  arising out of an easily  perceptible organizational 
structure. The power to determine prices, however, resides in a power, given 
to  an undertaking in  a  position to  exercise it,  to establish  prices  at a  level 
appreciably different from  that which would be  established by  the effect of 
competition alone.' 
It appears  to  me  clear  that  the  Court of  Justice  has  restricted  itself  to  a 
judicial role. 
In  what  did  the  proceedings  consist?  The High  Authority  had  refused  to 
authorize the applicants to sell their products through a single selling agency. 
On the basis of the provisions of Article 65  (2)  of the ECSC Treaty the High 
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hands of the undertakings concerned the power to determine prices, control 
or  limit  production  or  the  outlets  for  a  substantial  part  of  the  relevant 
product'. The Court met the objection put forward by  the applicant to the 
effect that the single  selling agency could not 'determine the prices'  because 
they resulted from supply and demand and replied by considering the factual 
situation which  existed  on the  market and  more  precisely  within  the  Coal 
and Steel  Community,  and held:  'to see  the  coal  or  energy  markets  as 
perfectly  competitive  atomistic  markets  would  be  to  ignore  realities.  They 
are not made up by  innumerable small  producers,  unable  to  affect  market 
conditions by the weight of their individual supplies, but are made up rather 
of  a  limited  number  of  undertakings,  whose  production  is  almost  always 
substantial.  It is  the  nature  of  things  which  makes  the  energy  market  a 
market in which large units confront one another'. 
The Court had previously stated that the applicants'  conception  'inevitably 
recalls  the  atomistic  markets  described  by  liberal  economics,  where  each 
patiticipant  was  confronted  by a  market  price  which  he  could  in  no  way 
affect by his own policies ...  '. 
Thus the Court does  not give  a  ruling as  to whether a  system of oligopoly 
or of perfect competition is  necessary;  it simply describes the state of affairs 
which it had to find as a fact. 
The  Court  subsequently  states  that:  'such  a  market  is  characteristic  of  a 
state of oligopoly, which is  also one of imperfect competition'. The judgment 
does indeed refer to the 'theory of imperfect competition' and the authority 
'of  a  well-known  author  who  defines  this  oligopolistic  market'  but,  it 
appears to me,  this  is  merely  to  deduce from  them that 'these descriptions' 
of the theory apply exactly to the market in coal and even to that in energy 
as  it has been described by the applicants themselves. In further stating that 
'the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel  Community takes into 
account the technical  and commercial evolution which constantly augments 
the size of economic units, increasingly giving the coal and steel markets the 
character of  an oligopoly'  it appears  to me that the Court merely  clarifies 
the basis of the EEC Treaty taking account of reality. 
Continuing,  then,  to  fulfil  a  'judicial'  role  the  Court states  in its  judgment 
that 'the provisions of Article 65  (2)  and Article 66  (2)  evidence the intention 
of the authors  of the  Treaty  not to  restrict  this  evolution,  provided that it 
serves  the  objectives  of  the  Treaty  and  particularly  that  it  enables  the 
necessary measure of competition between the large units to exist in order to 
safeguard  the  basic  requirement  of  Article  2 ... This  insistence  upon  the 
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competition . . .  has  clearly  inspired  one  of  the  conditions  imposed  by 
Article 65  (2)  upon joint selling agreements ...  '. 
In considering the decision of the High Authority, based on Article 65  (2)  (c) 
of the ECSC  Treaty, not to  authorize the creation of a  single sales  agency, 
the Court of Justice concluded that it 'saw no reason for accepting that ... 
the  High  Authority  has  failed  to  observe  the  letter  and  the  spirit  of  the 
Treaty and particularly the obligations imposed upon it by Articles 2, 3 4 and 
5'. 
The  Court  of  Justice  was  not led  to  decide  whether  a  state  of  imperfect 
competition was politically or economically more advantageous than unlimited 
competition  but  instead  defined  the  factors  which  inspired  the  Treaty  of 
Paris  and  on  the  basis  of  that  Treaty  on  the  one  hand,  it  found  that  it 
allowed the existence in the coal and steel  market of imperfect competition 
deriving from an oligopolistic situation and that it intended a certain measure 
of  competition to continue and on the other hand, it held that in  this  case 
the High Authority had observed the provisions of the Treaty when it refused 
the authorization requested. 
(b)  Whilst the  Court of  Justice,  like  any  court,  must often harmonize  and 
coordinate  rules  of law  (I  shall  give  particulars  of  this 1)  the  political  or 
administrative  authority  must  often  reconcile  and  coordinate  certain 
objectives,  either  because  it  is  empowered to do so  or because  therein  lies 
the essence of government or administration. 
In  its  judgment of 13 June 1958  in  Case 9/56 2  the  Court emphasizes  'that 
the High Authority must effect  the permanent reconciliation  which may be 
implied  by  any  contradictions  existing  between  the  objectives  considered 
separately  and, when such  considerations  are established,  accord to one  or 
more of the objectives of Article 3 the precedence which may appear to it to 
be required in view of the economic facts  and circumstances in the light of 
which  it  adopts  its  decisions'.  The Court of Justice  itself  clearly  does  not 
harmonize and coordinate but it decides  that harmonization is  required  by 
virtue of the nature and of the very wording of the Treaty and that it is  for 
the High Authority and the Commission to  exercise,  within the framework 
of the Treaty, the options necessary to accomplish their task. 
This is indeed a judicial decision. 
1  Vide Chapter V, Section 4. 
2  Meroni, Rec. 1958, p. 11. 
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criteria [set out in Article 29  of the EEC treaty]  relate to different objectives 
which may conflict with each other or not be applicable at the same time, so 
that the  complaint that the  Commission  has  not considered  all  of  them  is 
only valid if they were all relevant to this case. When applying Article 25  (3) 
of the EEC Treaty, account must in the first instance be taken of Article 39, 
although it is  not so  important as  Article 29  because the objectives which it 
sets  out must  be  taken into  consideration and the danger  of impeding the 
attainment  of  these  objectives  must  be  a  factor  in  assessing,  as  the 
Commission is  required to do  under the said paragraph, the expediency  of 
granting an authorization'. 
The same conclusion may be drawn with regard to the judgment of 13 June 
1958. 
(c)  In its  judgment in  Case  8/57 of  29 June 1958 2  (a  so-called  scrap  case) 
the  Court  of  Justice  held  in  particular:  'In  the  sphere  of  production  the 
"indirect  means  of  action"  ... are  to  be  distinguished  from  the  "direct 
influence" referred to in Article 5 not by the aims pursued but by the methods 
appropriate  to  carry  them  out ... The two  procedures,  indirect  or direct, 
modify  the structures which  individual  action would otherwise create;  they 
thus constitute in addition economic intervention procedures but the former 
creates  the  appropriate  conditions  for  engendering  in  producers  the  will 
voluntarily to  adopt the  behaviour which  the  common interest,  referred  to 
in Article  3,  requires  of  them  whilst  the  latter  require,  in  view  of  this 
common interest, different measures from them than the factual circumstances 
induce them  to  undertake willingly . . . Although  they  are  identical in  their 
effects and in the power of intervention which they confer the indirect means 
of action allow the freedom  of decision  of all  the persons concerned in the 
market to be respected whilst the direct influence requires this freedom to be 
restricted if not abolished'. 
Thus the Court of Justice in no way expresses its views as to the effectiveness, 
the opportuneness or the necessity of one or other means of economic action 
on the part of the authority. It states what the Treaty prescribes or allows. 
C.  Competition, protective measures, non-contractual liability; 
judgments of the Court of Justice 
There  are  still  certain  observations  to  be  made  relating,  in  particular,  to 
judgments concerning the rules of competition within the European Economic 
1  Case 34/62 [1963] ECR 131. 
2  Hauts Fourneaux et Acieries Belges, Recueil 1958, p. 223. 
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liability. 
(i)  In interpreting the meaning and scope of the provisions of Article 85  and 
in particular on the basis of the wording thereof, the judgment of the Court 
of  Justice of 13  July  1966 in  Case  32/65 1  emphasized  that the  limitations 
imposed  on competition  are  appraised in  the  light  of the general  principle 
that trade  between  Member  States  must  not  be  hampered  or  paralysed. 
Article  85  furthermore provides  that 'all agreements which may  affect trade 
between Member States ... are incompatible with the Common Market ...  '. 
The  Court stressed  that  in  Community  law  the  essential  objective  of  this 
provision is  to prevent the partitioning of national markets. In its  judgment 
of 13  February 1969 
2  the Court stated, rightly in my  view,  that agreements 
between  undertakings must be  appraised differently  in accordance with the 
provisions  of  Community  law  and  with  those  of  national  law  so  that  an 
agreement  between  undertakings  may  give  rise  to  two  parallel  procedures 
before  the  Community  authorities  and  the  national  authorities.  The Court 
thus determines the separation of jurisdictions. 
In  the  judgment  of  13 July 1966 3  the  Court  held  that  although  sole 
distributorship agreements may be regarded as  lawful under national systems 
of  law  they  may  fall  under  the  prohibitions  of  Article  85  if  they  have  as 
their object or effect the division of the markets. 
In  the  same  judgment,  providing  a  ruling  on  the  application  by  the 
Commission of Article 85  (3)  of the EEC Treaty the Court held 'the exercise 
of  the  powers  of  the  Commission  necessarily  involves  complex  economic 
evaluations . . .  Judicial  review  of  those  evaluations  must  take  account  of 
their  nature  by  confining  itself  to  an  examination  of  the  relevance  of  the 
facts  and  of  the  legal  consequences  which  the  Commission  deduces 
therefrom ... This review must in the first place be carried out in respect of 
the  reasons  given  for  the  decisions  which  must  set  out,  the  facts  and 
considerations on which the said evaluations are based'. 
In all those judgments the Court of Justice has clarified the economic system 
of the Treaties, the powers and tasks of the Commission and of the Council 
of Ministers; it has interpreted Community law. 
It has  not  created  an  'economic  policy'  or substituted  itself  for  or 'placed 
itself over' the political and administrative authorities. It has  carried out its 
'judicial' role. 
1  [1966]  ECR 389. 
2  Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm [1969] ECR 1. 
3  Cases 56 and 58/64 [1966]  ECR 299. 
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certain judgments - I shall, moreover, return to this  aspect 1  - but that is 
another question. 
Let  me  mention at present the Portelange, 2  Bilger 
3  and Haecht 4  judgments 
relating  to  the  concept  of  the  'provisional  validity'  of  agreements ... 
covered  by  Article  85  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  Some  have  been  criticized  or 
approved the first judgments whilst others have done the same in respect of 
the last  judgment.  A  complete  change  of  judicial  attitude  has  certainly 
occurred.  Is  this  to  be  explained  by  political  or in particular by  economic 
choices?  Is  its  origin to be traced to the economic consequences of the first 
judgments  or again  to  the  reactions  of  the  national  courts  and  of  legal 
writers? 
I  consider  that this  change,  like  the  way in  which  it  was  done  and  in 
particular its causes, constitute an entirely normal phenomenon in the exercise 
of purely judicial office. 
In carrying out its task the Court of Justice had at the same time to 'interpret' 
a number of concepts, harmonize and coordinate several  provisions relating 
to  competition  within  the  EEC  and  in  particular to  clarify  the  concept  of 
'nullity'  (Article  85  (2))  the  concept  of  the  exceptions  from  such  cases  of 
nullity  (Article 85  (3))  and the legal  system flowing from  Regulation No 17 
adopted  in  implementation  of  Article  87  of  the  EEC  Treaty.  Such 
interpretation,  harmonization  and  coordination  produced,  with  every  legal 
justification,  the  concept  of  provisional  validity.  But  what was  the  precise 
nature, extent and duration of such provisional validity?  New questions  of 
interpretation. The views  of the national courts and of writers were divided 
in this matter (Vide in particular the opinions in connexion with the judgment 
of 8 June 1967 of the Cour de Cassation of Belgium (Journal des Tribunaux, 
9  September  1967  and  the  Revue  Trimestrielle  de  Droit  Europeen,  1967, 
p.  924).  The Court of  Justice  provided  an  interpretation  of  these  in  its 
judgments  in  the  Portelange  and  Bilger  cases.  This  decision  gave  rise  to 
criticism  and  upset  'judicial  and  doctrinal  circles'  particularly  because  of 
its  repercussions  in  business  life,  for it was  thought that the 'rules  of law' 
did  not justify or scarcely  justified  the said  decision.  On the first  occasion 
the  Court  of  Justice  took  account  of  those  criticisms  and  reactions  and 
reconsidered the problem ... as any national supreme court would have done. 
1  Vide Chapter VI. 
2  Judgment of 9 July 1969, Case 10/69 [1969]  ECR 319. 
3  Judgment of 18  March 1970, Case 43/69 [1970]  ECR 127. 
4  Judgment of 6 February 1973, Case 48/72 [1973]  ECR 77. 
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have  erred  in  a  previous  judgment,  reconsiders  the  question,  due  to  the 
external contributions from writers and the lower courts, and adopting fresh 
lines  of  argument  or legal  considerations  whose  relevance  had  escaped  it, 
and possibly amends its  decision.  The change of attitude on the part of the 
Court in  the Brasserie  de  Haecht judgment 1  is  to be explained and justified 
in this way. 
(ii)  Let  me  mention  some  further  characteristic  judgments  in  which  these 
respective powers and jurisdictions are clarified and respected  and in which 
the Court of Justice provides useful  guides  as  to the nature, the extent and 
the limits of its own jurisdiction. 
Elsewhere in this  review I have  already cited and briefly commented on the 
judgment of 22 January 1976  in  Case 55/75  on the  granting or the levying 
of  a  compensatory  amount  when  the  application  of  certain  monetary 
measures involves disturbances in the trade in agricultural products. 
2 
Helpful guidelines  may  also  be  derived from  the  opinion  of  Mr Advocate-
General Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 37/70, Rewe Zentrale v Hautpzollamt 
Emmerich. 3  A  Member  State  was  authorized  by  the  Commission  under 
Article 226 of the EEC  Treaty to levy  a  countervailing charge in  respect of 
certain imports.  An  importer had  asserted  before the  Court of Justice  that 
in  order to  deal  with the situation which,  according to the Member State, 
existed it would have been possible to adopt other measures less  radical than 
a countervailing charge in respect of imports and which would have entailed 
less  disturbance.  The  Advocate-General  maintained  that:  ' . . .  the  Court 
1  Case 48/72, Brasserie de  Haecht  [1973]  ECR 77. 
2  Vide to the same effect the judgment of 25  June 1975  in Case 5/75  [1975]  ECR 759.  The 
Court is  ruling  on the  validity  and  the  scope  of  Community  provisions.  It first  of all 
recalls  that  in  reviewing  the  legality  of  the  exercise  of  a  power  by  the  Community 
authorities the Court cannot substitute its  appraisal for that of the competent authority. 
Its  task is  merely one of review.  It thus  finds  on the  one hand with regard to the gran-
ting and abolition of the denaturing primes for  cereals  that the Commission enjoys both 
with  regard  to  taking  into  consideration  any  factors  relating  to  disturbance  and  the 
choice  of  methods  intended  to  counter  them  a  wide  discretion  which  it  must exercise 
in the light of the  objectives  of economic  policy  within  the  framework  of the common 
agricultural  policy  . . . In  particular the  Commission  has  the  power entirely  to suspend 
payment of the denaturing prime if the economic circumstances  require.  The Court also 
finds  that account must be  taken  of legal  certainty  and  in  particular of the  legitimate 
expectations of the  persons concerned - review by the  Court - and in  particular that, 
since adjustments of the denaturing system during the marketing year are of an exceptio-
nal  nature,  then  can  be  made  only  where  the  balance  of  the  market  is  likely  to  be 
disturbed. Thus Denaturing undertakings may therefore legitimately arrange their projects 
for the entire cereal marketing year. 
s  [1971]  ECR 43. 
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a discretion it possesses a power of appraisal subject to review by the Court 
and I would personally add that this is  a wide power of appraisal ... In fact 
I consider that in so difficult a matter, regarding the application of what may 
really  be called  "emergency measures" introduced by  the Treaty, solely for 
the transitional period, as  a kind of safety valve intended to prevent, at the 
cost of certain Community sacrifices, general explosions harmful to everyone, 
these two concepts, material error and clear error must form the basis of the 
Court's review if it is  to avoid the risk of allowing the review of legality to 
degenerate into a review of expediency,. 
This opinion is  at one with the view taken in the Order of 5 October 1969 1 
in  which  it was held:  ...  ' . . . suspension of the operation of a  decision  of 
refusal  [of  an  application  submitted  by  a  Member  State  for  authority  to 
adopt certain protective measures]  cannot be  equivalent to the grant of the 
authorization  refused  by  the  Commission.  The  Court has  no  authority  to 
substitute itself for the Commission in order to take within the framework of 
Article  226  [of  the  EEC  Treaty]  decisions  instead  and  in  place  of  the 
executive'. 
(iii)  The judgment of 14 May 1975 in Case 74/74, relating to noncontractual 
liability,  recalls  previous  case-law  in  accordance  with  which:  'since  the 
disputed measure is  of a legislative nature and constitutes a measure taken in 
the  sphere  of  economic  policy,  the  Community  cannot  be  liable  for  any 
damage suffered  by  individuals as  a  consequence of that measure under the 
provisions  of  the  second  paragraph  of  Article 215  of  the  Treaty,  unless  a 
sufficiently flagrant violation of a superior rule  of law for the protection of 
the individual has occurred'. By  Regulation No 189/72 the Commission had 
abolished  compensatory  amounts.  It  was  alleged  in  particular  that  by 
withdrawing  these  amounts  with  retroactive  effect  the  Commission  had 
violated  the principle of legal  certainty,  and  had failed  to  respect the trust 
which the persons concerned might legitimately have in  the maintenance of 
the compensatory amounts for current transactions. The Court did not find 
that  the  complaint  as  to  the  retroactive  effect  was  well  founded.  It held 
nevertheless  that:  'in the absence  of an overriding matter of public interest, 
the  Commission  has  violated  a  superior  rule  of  law,  thus  rendering  the 
Community liable, by failing to include in Regulation No 189/72 transitional 
measures  for  the  protection  of  the  confidence  which  a  trader  might 
legitimately have had in the Community rules'. 
1  Case 50/69 R [1969] ECR 449. 
111-50 In  the  national  legal  systems  and  especially  in  the  Belgian  system  similar 
principles obtain. It has recently been written 1  that it is  certainly not for the 
courts to consider what measures the executive must take in order to govern 
and administer but that it is  the constitutional and legal duty of the courts 
to  settle  whether  the  decisions  of  the  executive  power  are  'legal'  and  in 
particular if the executive power may properly abstain from adopting certain 
measures or decisions ... and whether a decision or failure to take a decision 
can constitute a wrongful act.  The administration is  unfettered in its choice 
in  so  far  as  it  does  not infringe  a  rule  of  law,  in  particular a  rule which 
requires or prohibits the adoption of a specific measure.  The administration 
certainly  makes  this  decision  without  the  supervision  of  the  courts  but if 
that decision infringes a rule of law the courts must act. 
Professor  Dabin  wrote 2  that:  'the  legislature  no  more  administers  when  it 
legislates for the administration than the courts administer when they deliver 
a  judgment on the administration. This is  why,  although the  administrative 
courts do not formally constitute part of the judiciary, they do not lose their 
judicial  nature  when  they  settle  disputes  to  which  the  administration  is  a 
party: the courts judge and do  not administer.  Since  the tasks of the courts 
and  of  the  administration  remain  distinct  the  essence  and  validity  of  the 
separation of powers is preserved'. 
Section 3  Powers of the 'political authority' and of the 
administration  and the task of the Court of 
Justice in other spheres 
Disputes involving officials 
It is  superfluous to recall  the very  numerous judgments and opinions which 
have been delivered in this connexion. The administration has its powers and 
responsibilities ... and the Court of Justice has its. The Court of Justice may 
not substitute itself for the administration whilst the administration may not 
infringe the law. 
Let me mention in particular the judgment of 7 June 1972: 3  the Court found 
that the wording of the Staff Regulations of Officials showed clearly that the 
authors  of  the  Staff  Regulations  intended  to  leave  to  the  administration  a 
1  Rechtkundig Weekblad 1971, Column 1820 (translation supra). 
2  Revue Critique de Jurisprudence Beige 1963, p. 122. 
3  Case 46/71  [1972]  ECR 373. 
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forward in each case in support of an application for a person to be treated 
as  a  dependent child.  This discretion,  which is  necessary to take account of 
the  many  unforesseable  circumstances  characterizing  every  case,  is  not 
incompatible with the general principle of equal treatment for officials. 1 
In his opinion in Case 29/70 (Marcato v Commission) 2 11r Advocate-General 
Dutheillet  de  Lamothe  said:  'you  refuse  to  review  the  administration's 
assessment of the occupational aptitude of the official.  You review only:  the 
regularity of the procedure which has led to the assessment of the merits of 
the  official;  the material accuracy  of the facts  on which  the  administration 
has  based  this  assessment  and  the  compatibility  between  facts  and 
assessment'. 
Section 4  The task of the 'Community legislature' -
as expressed in the Treaties and the amend-
ments thereto and in Community regulations 
and directives - and the task of the courts 
(especially the Court of Justice) 
1.  Introduction 
Do the judges of the Court of Justice of the Communities manifest themselves 
as  too European, too integrationist  and too  'creative'  of  integration and of 
a  true European  Community?  Certain people  take this  view  and complain 
of such an attitude on the part of the Court of Justice.  On the other hand 
others welcome it and consider the Court is entitled to adopt such an attitude. 
A  compromise  is  necessary.  In  so  far  as  the  Court  of  Justice  ensures 
integration through the  judgments which it  delivers  on  the  basis  of  the 
Treaties  and the  spirit  of  the Treaties  it does  not seem  to  me possible  to 
complain that it exceeds the task with which it was entrusted. 
1  Cf.  also  the  judgment of 12  December  1956  in  Case  10/56  (Recueil  1956,  p.  371):  'it is 
for  the  administrative  authority  at its discretion  to  appraise  the ability  of candidates to 
carry out specific duties  and for  the  Court to  review, if necessary,  the ways  and means 
whereby  this  appraisal  was  arrived  at.  An  unfavourable  appraisal  of  the  ability  of  a 
candidate  to  fill  a  post  of  translator  cannot  reasonably  be  made  on  the  judgment  of 
8 July 1965 in Cases 19and 65/63  [1965]  ECR 533 et seq.; and the judgment of 4 February 
1970 in Case 13/69, Van Eick [1970]  ECR 3. 
2  Case 29/70, Marcato [1971]  ECR 259. 
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Court of Justice were to read into the wording and spirit of the Treaties or 
if it were to go beyond the intentions of the authors of the Treaty, especially 
of the nine Member States which are bound by the European Treaties, and 
if  it  were  to  establish  European  integration  by  'stretching'  the  wording, 
principles  and spirit, without being able to base this  on a  definite develop-
ment arising in particular from new Treaties. To deliver a judgment on this 
matter it is  not necessary  to  substitute  a  personal  view  on integration for 
that arising  from  the  Treaties. It is  not  necessary  to  be  for  or  against 
integration to assess  the remarkable work of the Court of Justice. The only 
necessity is  objectively  to appraise whether its  judgments have exceeded the 
rules,  provisions  and  principles  which  are  included  or which  follow  from 
the Treaties, regulations and directives. 
Certain  persons,  including  indeed  responsible  authors,  consider  and  write 
thus that the  Court of Justice has  a  duty and a  power to 'push' European 
integration. This is the opinion of A. W. Green in particular. 
1 
It appears to me self-evident that this is  not the task of Court of Justice and 
that in any event it does not possess such powers. The Court of Justice must 
interpret  the  rules  and  provisions  of  European  law,  accepting  as  its  basis 
what those  rules  and provisions have  settled with regard  to  the powers  of 
the Communities and of the Member States; the extent of integration must be 
deduced by the Court from Community law as  it emerges in particular from 
the  Treaties  establishing  the  European  Communities  or  modifying  or 
supplementing  the  three  original  Treaties.  The  Court  cannot  itself  bring 
about greater integration. A development in relation to this integration may 
be  conceived,  a  development  which  has  been  outlined  since  the  Treaty  o£ 
Paris and the Treaties of Rome. This development is  to be traced not to the 
wishes of the Court of Justice but to what has perhaps been decided by the 
competent political  authority in particular in the Treaties subsequent to the 
Treaties of Paris and of Rome. Can the Court of Justice, on the basis of the 
regulations  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  move  towards  further  integration 
than that which is  to be discerned in the Treaties? It cannot be overlooked 
that another problem  arises  in  this  case:  that of appraising the  conformity 
and validity of such regulations with the provisions of the Treaties on which 
they are or necessarily should be founded. 
1  <Political  Intergration  by  jurisprudence  - The  Work  of  the  Court  of  justice  of the 
European  Communities  in  European  Political  Integration,  - W.  A.  Sythoff  Leyden 
1969;  see  also:  Schlochauer, 'Der  Gerichtshof der  Europiiischen  Gemeinschaften  als  Inte-
grationsfaktor,, Festschrift Halstein 1966, p. 431  et seq. 
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or not liberal at all.  In this  connexion it has been written that the Court of 
Justice shows itself to be liberal when it is  required to interpret Article 33  of 
the ECSC Treaty, especially with regard to the extent of undertakings' right 
to bring an action for annulment whilst in connexion with applications under 
the second paragraph of Article  173  the Court proves  iself  to be  extremely 
rigid  and strict. This view  obviously calls  for  clarification. When the Court 
has  been  required  to  interpret  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  33  it  has 
declared  the  actions  brought by  undertakings  to  be  admissible  on  every 
occasion on which the letter and the spirit of the article allowed it to do so, 
bearing  in  mind  the  general  principle  of  the  state  of  law  which  may  be 
discerned in the ECSC Treaty. When the Court of Justice has been required 
to interpret the second paragraph of Article 173  it has been confronted with 
wording differing from  that of Article 33  and this  was  plainly intended by 
the authors of the Treaty of Rome to restrict the persons referred to in the 
second paragraph who could bring actions for annulment. The Court could 
only bow before the will of the legislature. 
2.  Judgements of the Court of Justice with regard to this impor-
tant question 
I shall limit myself to citing two judgments. 
In  its  ruling with regard to the  Common Customs Tariff and the common 
organization  of  the  agricultural  markets  the  Court held  in  its  judgment of 
26 April1972: 1  'no matter how unsatisfactory it is  in practice, the diversity 
of  criteria  which  may  result  from  those  two  legal  systems  in  determining 
separately the basis for  imposing the levy  and for imposing customs  duties, 
it is  not for  the  Court to  remedy  the  situation,  by  modifying,  by  way  of 
interpretation, the  content of the  provision  applicable to  one  or other case 
since  such  modification  pertains  exclusively  to  the  competence  of  the 
Community legislature'. 
On 14 July 1972  the  Court found  that no  bar by  lapse  of  time  existed  in 
relation  to competition  (Articles  85  and 86  of the EEC  Treaty)  and that it 
was not the duty of the Court to fix  a  time-limit. 
2  Nevertheless  the  Court 
could hold that on the basis of the principle of law relating to legal certainty 
1  Case 92/71  [1972]  ECR 251. 
2  The Council  of  Ministers subsequently  (by  a  Regulation  of  26  November 1974)  fixed  a 
time-limit for bringing proceedings. 
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be declared inadmissible, as  the Court indeed held in another case on 6 July 
1971. 1 
3.  Government by the Court 
Judge Pescatore recently wrote: 2  'The Court has been careful not to exceed 
its  role  as  judge . . .  There has  never  been  any  question  of  setting  up  any 
form of a government by the courts, to use a perennial expression'. 
Judge Mertens  de  Wilmars  also  wrote: 3  'There can thus  be  no question  of 
government by the courts, as has been contemplated in certain quarters'. 
As  we know the concept 'government by  the courts' originates in  the  case-
law of the Supreme Court of the United States of America. 4  The expression 
attained wide currency ... but on many occasions it was and still is  wrongly 
employed and invoked. 
'Government by the courts' indeed obtains if the courts exceed their proper 
task:  if they ignore, infringe or brush aside the rules of law which it is  their 
duty  to  respect  and  apply ... if they  base  their  judgments  on  their  own 
social and economic views or on those of the parties to which they belong ... 
if  their  judgments  stem  from  'choices'  and  from  'policies'  which  have  not 
been  decided by  the political authorities or those with power to  amend the 
constitution or to legislate - and which  do  not emerge from  positive law, 
that is  to say  from  the legal  system  as  a whole,  its  spirit  and development 
and general or other principles. 
Nevertheless  the  courts  'do not govern'  when,  after  the  political  authority 
has made a choice, taken a decision and formalized it in a law or regulation, 
they hold that this decision, that is to say this choice, could not in accordance 
1  Judgment of 6 July  1971  in  Case 59/70, Aids to the Iron  and Steel  Industry  [1971]  ECR 
654. 
2  'Les  Objectifs de  la  Communaute Europeenne  comme Principes  d'Interpretation  dans  la 
Jurisprudence  de  la  Cour  de  Justice'  in  Miscellanea  W.  J.  Ganshof  van  der  Meersch, 
Volume II, p. 325. 
3  'Economische Opvattingen in de  Rechtspraak  van  het Hof van  Justitie  van  de  Europese 
Gemeenschappen'- In Miscellanea W.  J. Ganshof van der Meersch, p. 285. 
4  The expression  originates  in particular - without it  being  necessary  to  list  the  classic 
works  in  this  field  - in  particular  in  an  article  by  L.  B.  Bondin,  'Government  by 
Judiciary'  in  the  Political Science  Quarterly  1911,  and  in  the  work, 'Gouvernement des 
juges dans les Communautes Europeennes' by J.P. Colin, Paris 1966. 
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authority which issued  it in  a  law or regulation,  in particular because  this 
decision falls within the jurisdiction of another authority or the decision was 
prohibited by a rule which the law or regulation has thus infringed. 
A  court and especially  the Court of Justice,  clearly does  not 'govern' if, as 
has  been  wisely  advocated,  it  were  required  to  deliver  a  ruling  on  the 
conformity  with  the  European  Treaties  of the  'laws'  which  the  European 
Parliament  might  be  led  to  adopt  following  a  revision  of  the  European 
Treaties which strengthened its powers and entrusted it with the tasks which, 
on a democratic view, are desirable. 
It would, moreover, be rather difficult to understand why such 'laws', which 
would  take  the  place  of  the  numerous  regulations  which  the  Council  of 
Ministers is  required to adopt within the present European organization and 
which are subject to review by the Court of Justice,  should not be covered 
by the present guarantee of conformity with the Treaties. 
Clearly  it is  highly  desirable  that the  granting  of  wider  powers  to  the 
European  Parliament,  as  a  result  of  revision  of  the  Treaties,  should  be 
coupled  with  the  establishment  of  a  procedure  for  revising  the  Treaties 
similar  to  that  existing  in  Member  States  with  regard  to  the  revision  of 
constitutions. 
It has  sometimes  been  said  or written that the  Court of Justice  either has 
taken  political  decisions  - that  is  to  say  decisions  based  on  political 
expediency or political choices rather than on rules of law - or quite simply 
that it has substituted itself for the Community 'legislature'. 
I am convinced that this view is mistaken. 
Nevertheless  at the  end  of  this  review  I  shall  consider  certain  judgments, 
bearing this opinion in mind. 1 
Before concluding this part of the review there is a final observation. 
It has been said, and also written, on a large number of occasions that owing 
to the complexity and large number of the rules of law the Court of Justice 
in reality chooses the rule which it will apply and that consequently it allows 
itself  to  be  influenced  in  this  choice  by  philosophical,  political  and  social 
views and thus by choices which it makes in this matter. 
1  Vide Chapter VI, in particular Section 2. 
II-56 I  am  convinced  that the  Court of  Justice  does  not make such  a  choice  in 
arriving at its judgment. Confronted with a complex, difficult and variegated 
body  of  law  the  Court  of  Justice  on  many  occasions  indeed  perceives  a 
number  of  possible  outcomes,  and  this  or that principle,  rule  or  line  of 
argument, which may be  taken into  consideration, but it is  the duty of the 
Court to  scrutinize,  weigh  up and ponder divorced from  any preference or 
preferences, in order to arrive at the cogent judgment as it sees it. 
The conclusions drawn by  one judge will not perhaps appear convincing to 
another.  This  is  why,  when  members  of courts discuss  ~he judgment to  be 
delivered,  opposing views  are so  often encountered.  Certainly, alterations in 
judicial attitudes and in case-law also  occur. It is  further true that the same 
question can be settled differently by different supreme courts. 
The  reason  for  these  divergencies  and  alterations  in  attitude  emerges, 
however, both from the diversity and complexity of the work of the courts. 
Methods  of  reasoning  and  the  way  in  which  problems  are  grasped  and 
perceived  are  not the  same  for  all  judges.  Furthermore  it  must  not  be 
forgotten that judges are human and that their capacities and natures differ. 
Clearly  reasoning  and  logical  thought  play  an  essential  part  but. . .  the 
reasoning of the  courts  is  not that of formal  logic  and of  the logic of pure 
mathematics, although the strict reasoning of mathematics is often imperative. 
In  international  courts,  or more precisely  in  courts  which  are  made  up  of 
lawyers  who  have  had a  different  legal  training  or who  have  simply  lived 
among  no  doubt  comparable  but  none  the  less  different  institutions, 
solutions put forward by one judge may,  owing to those differences, fail  to 
coincide with those proposed by other judges.  I  have  already  had occasion 
to emphasize this factor. 
Thus  in  certain  countries  it  is  either  rare,  or exceptional,  or even  out  of 
question that the  provisions  of international treaties  should be  regarded  as 
directly  applicable  by  the  authorities,  the  citizens  and  the  courts.  In  other 
countries,  even  before  the  entry  into  force  of  the Treaties  of  Paris  and  of 
Rome,  the  courts  frequently  applied  provisions  of  international  treaties  in 
the same way that they applied their lavvs, orders or decrees. 
Consequently  it  is  natural that lawyers  who,  although  forming  part of  the 
same international or regional court, have lived in countries where differing 
attitudes prevail with regard to the problem of directly applicable provisions 
should  likewise  react  differently  when  they  are  faced  with  the question  of 
whether a provision of a European treaty, of a regulation or of a directive is 
directly applicable. 
111-57 Nevertheless  it  appears  to  me  clear  that when  the  authors  of the  Treaties 
established  the  European  Communities  they  included  in  these  Treaties  an 
important number of  provisions  with which we  are familiar  relating to the 
rights  and  duties  of  private  individuals  with  the  intention  that  the  rules 
inserted therein should constitute rules  of conduct for all  citizens,  that they 
should  be  applied  in  a  like  manner  in  all  the  Member  States  and  that 
consequently these provisions  should be  directly applicable. If this were not 
the intention of the authors of the Treaties it would be difficult to understand 
why they adopted provisions such as  those in Article 177 of the EEC Treaty 
entrusting  to  a  common  court  the  common  interpretation  on  a  reference 
from  national courts - and consequently the courts necessarily required to 
apply these provisions - the uniform and coordinated interpretation of the 
provisions of the Treaties, regulations and directives. 
III-58 CHAPTER  III 
The formal sources of  Community law 
Section 1  Introduction 
It is  clear that national systems of positive law by no means have 
only  'statutory law'  as  their  sole  formal  source - even  understood in  the 
wide  sense  which  was  explained  above.  International  law  also  has  sources 
other  than  treaties.  National  law  and  international  law  also  comprise 
custom,  general  or other  principles  and  rules  inferred  from  one  or more 
provisions  of 'satutory laws'  or of treaties  or even  of principles  considered 
separately or in conjunction with other sources. 
Likewise European law, that is  to say the law of the European Communities, 
is  not established  solely  by  the treaties,  regulations  and  directives . . . there 
are also other formal sources. 1 
Not only general principles or merely  'principles' but also  and in  particular 
rules  of international law constitute rules  of European law or form  part of 
the law which the Court of Justice must apply. 
It is  for the Court of Justice of the Communities to 'discover' those 'factors' 
of positive European law:  this  constitutes 'interpretation' in  accordance with 
the concept which I have endeavoured to develop above. 
1  The  concept  'formal  sources'  is  understood  in  the  sense  of  the  'forms'  in  which  the 
rules  of  law manifest  themselves:  custom,  laws  and general  principles ... By  'material' 
sources  is  meant the factors,  circumstances  and  phenomena  which  give  rise  to  rules  of 
law and, clearly,  at the same time to their substance:  factors  relating to biology, climate, 
mores, political  and social  ideas,  economic factors  and economic  or social  requirements 
or necessities ... Certain persons also  distinguish 'actual sources'  and 'material sources'. 
The  former  constitute  'the  underlying  elements'  which  explains  why  a  particular  rule 
comes into being ... philosophic views  ... the geographical  structure . . . and economic 
necessity.  The agencies  of the  State which  are  required to bring the rule into being con-
stitute  the  'material' sources:  for  example  the  legislature  ... and  the  executive',  (Vide 
Cl.  Renard, 'Sources  du  Droit  et  Methodologie  ]uridique',  Les  Presses  Universitaires  de 
Liege, p. 40). 
III-59 In the following sections I shall devote a brief review to those principles and 
rules  of international law;  the concept, investigation  and discovery through 
the case-law of the Court of Justice and often by the Court's application of 
those 'rules' and principles. 
Section 2  The 'general principles' or 'principles' of 
Community law 
Subsection 1  - General factors 
'Principles ...  '  also  constitute  elements  of national  positive  law.  Obviously 
I  do  not intend  to  try  to  reproduce  here,  even  summarily,  the  definitions 
which have been put forward and the opinions which have been formulated 
with  regard  to  those  'principles ...  '  in  the  works  of  eminent  writers  in  a 
number of States or in noteworthy judgments of the courts. 
Let me limit myself to the following observations. Unwritten rules constitute 
principles  which  form  the  moral  and  institutional  framework  upon  which 
society  is  based.  Such  rules  bind  the  authorities  empowered  to  issue 
secondary legislation,  the  administration,  the  courts ... sometimes  even  the 
legislature  when  the  rules  have  a  constitutional  status.  They  are  often 
imposed  by  our civilization  and  are  frequently  reproduced  in  laws  or 
regulations.  As  Geny wrote: 1  'these general  principles  represent  an ideal  of 
reason  and  of  justice  which  accords  with  the  permanent  basis  of  human 
nature and are  presumed to form  the basis  of the law. It is  held that they 
must  always  have  been  borne  in  mind  by  the  legislature'.  In  fact  the 
legislature frequently  constructs written  rules  taking account consciously  or 
otherwise of the existence of these principles and supposing that they will be 
applied in particular when the laws are interpreted. 
Principles  of law also  arise  as  a  result  of the  uniform  arrangements  which 
the  laws  have  thus  applied  to  certain  problems  or  to  problems  having  a 
similar nature. 
General  or other principles  further  give  effect  to  common  sense  and  logic 
and it is not always necessary expressly to include them in written laws. 
2 
1  'Methodes d'Interpretation et Sources en Droit Prive Positif', Vol.  I, p. 33  et seq. 
2  This is  the case in particular with, the maxims 'nemo plus juris transmittere potest quam 
ipse  habet'  or 'res  inter alios  acta  nemini  nee  nocet  nee  prodest'.  This  latter  maxim  is 
reproduced by written rules of law, in particular in civil codes. 
III-60 I  should  also  like  to emphasize  that rules  which  are  simply  to  be  inferred 
from  the  nature  of  things  and  in  particular  from  institutions  are  often 
classified as  'principles'. The obligation on a court to provide a statement of 
reasons for its judgments - a principle established in numerous provisions -
follows  'from  the  very  nature of  the  courts'. 1  The same  holds  good  even 
with  regard  to  'the general  principle  of  law  relating  to  the  rights  of  the 
defence. They follow necessarily and logically from the nature of the court's 
task; the court cannot properly carry out its task if the parties do not provide 
it with true information. A  similar  conclusion  may  be  reached with regard 
first  to  the  rule  or the  principle  of  the  continuity  of  public  services  which 
necessarily follows  from the very nature of those services  and of their task 2 
and  secondly  with  regard  to  the  maxim  'patere  legem  quam  ipse  fecistt. 
When  reference  is  made  to  an  unwritten  rule  which  does  not  constitute 
custom  it  is  generally  or very  often  classified  as  a  'general'  principle. 
Undoubtedly  it  may  often  be  said  that  a  'general'  principle  is  a  concept 
which is required by civilization whose law, custom or case-law have applied 
it on one or more occasions and which is  thus still capable of being applied 
on further occasions. In this sense the principle is  obviously 'general'. It has 
recently  been  written:  'The difference  between  a  rule  of  law and a  general 
principle must be  considered in terms of its generality which is,  as  has been 
seen, one of the factors in a rule of law; but it is  not sufficient to state that 
a  principle has  a  more general  scope than a  rule.  A rule of law is  adopted 
with a view to a specific legal situation whilst a principle of law is general in 
that there is  inherent in it a series of infinite applications in law. It may also 
be  stated that a  number of distinct series  of solutions expressed in  rules  of 
law come under the general principle of law'. 3 
In  my  view,  however,  it  is  possible  to  maintain  that  there  are  a  certain 
number,  not to  say  a  large  number,  of  unwritten  rules  of  law  which 
constitute 'principles' but which do not have this characteristic of generality. 
1  Opinion  of  Procureur  General  Hayoit  de  Termicourt in  connexion  with  the  judgment 
of  the  Cour  de  Cassation  of  Belgium  of  9  October  1959  (Bulletin  et  Pasicrisie  1960, 
1.170) 
2  D.  Loschak,  'Le  Role Politique  du  ]uge  Administratif  Fran~ais', Paris  1972,  p.  86.  'The 
court ... sometimes  employs  principles  which  cannot  be  tracted,  even  remotely,  in any 
basic  provision.  The courts  accordingly  infer  these principels  from  the  nature of things 
either  as  the  internal  logic  the  institutions  require  or  if  they  appear  to  be  inherently 
necessary  to  society.  The  principle  of  the  continuity  of  the  tmblic  service  may  be 
included in this category'. 
3  W. J.  Ganshof van der Meersch, 'Propos sur le  Texte de  Ia  Loi et les  Principes  Generaux 
du  Droit',  speech  delivered  at  the  solemn  session  of  the  reopening  of  the  Cour  de 
Cassation of Belgium on 1 September 1970. 
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the wrongdoer or of the principle that all parties tendering for a public works 
contract shall be placed on an equal footing 1 or of the principle of a persona 
ad  personam  non  fit  interruptio 2  or  again  that  the  principle  of  the 
'continuity of public services' are necessarily general? 
The same question could be posed with regard to several  'principles' which 
have been  relied  on before the Court of Justice or which  judgments of the 
Court  of  Justice  and  opinions  of  Advocates-General  have  applied  and  to 
which I shall refer in Subsection 2 of Section 2 of Chapter III. 
The word 'principle'  is  certainly  in  current usage  but it may  be  wondered 
whether in certain cases it is adequate. Is it necessary to classify as a 'principle'. 
a rule which  follows logically and necessarily, let us say even as an imperative, 
from  one  or  more  provisions  of  laws  or  even  from  a  general  or  other 
principle?  For example,  and I apologize for  quoting Belgian  law yet  again, 
Article 9 of the Constitution provides that only a law of the legislature can 
establish  what  constitutes  a  crime  and  prescribe  penalties. 3  From  this 
provision follows the rule that the courts cannot provide an interpretation by 
analogy  with  laws  which  'render persons  criminally  liable'  as  in  this  case 
the  courts  themselves  would  decide  what  act  or omissions  must  result  in 
a  penalty.  Must this  rule,  which  necessarily  follows  from  Article  9,  of 
necessity be classified as a 'principle'? 
Indeed  a  number  of  national  courts  have  adopted  the  same  attitude  with 
regard to the problem of the 'lawfulness' of the annulment of adminstrative 
measures conferring individual rights. However have the courts really applied 
a principle in this sense? Have they not merely deduced the solution from the 
meaning  which  must  be  conferred  upon  a  number  of  rules,  written  or 
otherwise? 4 
In his  opinion in  Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 5  Mr Advocate-General Lagrange 
considered:  'It is  in  fact  a  principle  that when  individual  decisions  are  in 
accordance with the law they cannot be annulled ...  '. 
1  Vide  judgment  of the  Cour  de  Cassation  of  Belgium,  19  November  1970  (Bulletin  et 
Pasicrisie 1971.1.242). 
2  Judgment of  the  Cour  de  Cassation  of  Belgium  of  22  June  1972  (Bulletin  et Pasicrisie 
1972.1.985)  the  principle  - a  persona  ad  personam  non  fit  interruptio  - is  deduced 
from Articles 2246 to 2250 of the Code Civil. 
8  Likewise Article 103  (2)  Grundgesetz. 
4  Vide infra Chapter V, Section 4: The Harmonization or coordination of rules. 
5  Recueil1957, p. 285. 
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arise from the law of the Member States or even, perhaps, from international 
law as  well.  Further general or other principles  arise from  the provisions of 
the European Treaties themselves or of necessity constitute the basis of these 
provisions. 
Sometimes  rules  which are expressly set out in the provisions of the Treaty 
are,  owing to  their importance or their fundamental  nature,  classified  as  a 
'principle'  or  a  'general  principle'.  This  clearly  involves  employing  the 
concept of 'principle' or of 'general principle' in another sense. 
Article  3  (b)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  provides  that  the  institutions  of  the 
Community shall, within the limits of their respective powers, in the common 
interest . . .  ensure  that  all  comparably  placed  consumers  in  the  Common 
Market have equal access  to the sources of production. From this provision 
can,  and  normally  is  deduced  what the  judgment  of  21 June 1958 1  terms 
'the principle  that consumers  shall  be  placed  upon  an  equal  footing  with 
regard to economic rules'. However it appears that in this instance the word 
'principle' is understood in the sense of a 'fundamental' rule. 
In the same judgment the Court of Justice stated that Articles 2 to 5 of the 
ECSC  Treaty  must  always  be  complied  with  because  they  establish  the 
fundamental objectives of the Community ... and that they must always be 
read together in order to apply them adequately; the Court then stated that: 
'it will  be  necessary  to reconcile  to  a  certain extent the different objectives 
of Article 3  as  it is  manifestly  impossible  to  attain  each  and  every  one 
completely  since  the  objectives  constitute  general  principles  towards  the 
attainment  of  which  every  possible  endeavour  must  be  directed'.  This  no 
doubt  constitutes  the  same  meaning  of  'general  principle'  as  that  stated 
above. 
In a remarkable study Judge Pescatore has set out and brilliantly commented 
upon  the  'propositions'  or  'principles'  of  equality  or  non-discrimination, 
liberty,  solidarity  and  the  (economic  and  legal)  unity  of  Community  law. 
A number of these 'principles' are expressly set out in  the provisions of the 
Treaties whilst others arise from or simply  constitute the foundation of the 
Treaties 2• 
1  Case 8/57, Recueil 1958, p. 223. 
2  'Les  Obiectifs  de  la  Communaute Europeenne  comme Principes  d'Interpretation  dans  Ia 
jurisprudence  de  la  Cour  de  justice'  in  Miscellanea,  W.  J.  Gansho£  van  der  Meersch, 
Volume 2, p. 325 et seq. 
111-63 With regard to the non-contractual liability of the Communities, the second 
paragraph of Article  215  of the EEC  Treaty  (like  the second paragraph of 
Article  188  of  the  EAEC  Treaty)  invokes  the  concept  of  'the  general 
principles common to the laws of the Member States'. So  far as  I am aware 
at least this  concept has  not been  clarified  in  the case-law of the  Court of 
Justice.  Nevertheless  Mr  Advocate-General  Gand,  in  his  opinion  in  Case 
9/69 1 tried to clarify its substance. 
As  we  shall  see  later  this  does  not make it impossible  to  consider  several 
'principles'  arising  from  the  laws  of  the  Member  States  in  particular  as 
forming part of Community law. 
A  principle  of  law,  even  one  relating  to  fundamental  rights,  and forming 
part of one or more national laws  must be discarded if  it conflicts with the 
written or unwritten rules  of Community law 2•  'Recourse to the legal  rules 
or concepts of national law  in  order  to  judge  the  validity  of  measures 
adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an adverse effect 
on  the  uniformity  and  efficacy  of  Community  law.  The  validity  of  such 
measures can only be judged in the light of Community law .... therefore the 
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot 
be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as 
formulated  by the Constitution of that State or the principles of a  national 
constitutional structure' 3• 
A principle of law arising from national laws may however affect the validity 
of a Community measure if this principle may be considered as  also forming 
part of Community law. 
The Court also rightly held that a rule of international law, in particular an 
unwritten  rule  of  international  law,  must  be  ignored  if it  conflicts  with 
written or unwritten provisions of Community Law 4• 
1  Sayag [1969]  ECR 339. 
2  Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970]  ECR 1125. 
3  Cf. judgment of 15 July 1960 in Cases 36, 37, 38  and 40/59, Recueil1960, p. 589. 
4  Joined Cases 90 and 91/63 [1964]  ECR 625. 
Two  Member  States  objected  before  the  Court  that  an  application  was  inadmissible, 
·relying upon the rule  of international law to the effect that the party injured by another 
party's  failure  to  execute  his  obligations  is  relieved  from  carrying  out  his  own.  The 
Court replied:  this  rule cannot be  recognized  under Community law.  'The Treaty is  not 
limited to creating reciprocal obligations between the different natural and  legal  persons 
to  whom it is  applicable,  but establishes  a  new legal  order ... therefore,  except where 
otherwise expressly  provided, the basic concept of the Treaty requires  that the Member 
States shall not take the law into their own hands'. 
III-64 Whilst a court must often take into consideration a number of written rules 
of law in order to be able to settle the case  before it, it must also  on many 
occasions have regard at the same time to written or unwritten rules  or to 
a number of unwritten rules or 'principles'. The court must then coordinate 
and harmonize and in  particular clarify the scope  both of the written rules 
and of the umwritten rules.  Thus in  the matter settled  by  the judgment of 
13 December 1967 1  the  Court of Justice  had to take into  consideration  on 
the one hand the rule  of written  law  that  the  authors  of  a  Community 
regulation  fix  the  date  of  its  entry  into  force  and  on  the  other hand  the 
'principle' relating to legal certainty 2• 
Subsection 2  The 'general principles' of law and European law-
judgments of the Court of Justice and opinions of 
the Advocates-General 
A. General considerations 
Such principles form part of European law and constitute formal sources of 
the law of the European Communities. 
In  its  judgment of 21  January  1965 3  the  Court declared:  'The fact  that a 
rule invoked by  a  party does  not form part of written law is  not sufficient 
proof that it does not exist. Such a submission cannot therefore be dismissed 
from the outset as inadmissible'. 
In  his  opinion  in  Case  11/70  ([1970]  ECR  1125)  Mr  Advocate-General 
Dutheillet de Lamothe said that the fundamental principles of national legal 
systems  'contribute  to  forming  that  philosophical,  political  and  legal 
substratum common to the Member States from which through the caselaw 
an unwritten Community law emerges, one of the essential aims  of which is 
precisely  to  ensure the respect for the fundamental rights  of the individual. 
In  that sense,  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  national  legal  systems 
contribute to enabling Community law to find in itself the resources necessary 
1  [1967]  ECR 441. 
2  The Court held:  'an institution cannot, without having  an  adverse  effect on a  legitimate 
regard for legal  certainty, resort without reason to the procedure of an immediate entry 
into  force.  Although  the  preamble to  the  regulation  is  silent  in  this  respect  the  Court 
nevertheless  finds  in the  provisions  which  it enacts serious  reasons  for  holding that any 
interval between the publication and the entry into force  of the regulation might in  this 
.  case  have been  prejudicial to the  Community. Such  a  delay  would in fact  have run tht! 
risk  of  causing  a  hasty  and concentrated  flow  of  transactions  which  would  have  inter-
fered with the very implementation of Article 6 .. .'. 
3  Case 108/63, Merlini [1965]  ECR 1. 
III-65 for  ensuring, where needed, respect for the fundamental rights which form the 
common heritage of the Member States'. 
Mr Advocate-General  Mayras, in  his  opinion in  Joined  Cases  21  to  24/72 
(International Fruit  Company), recalled  that the Court which,  under Article 
164 of the EEC Treaty, must ensure that in the interpretation and application 
of  the Treaty the law is  observed, 'could not limit itself merely to checking 
that the  measures  adopted  by  the  institutions  strictly  conform  with  the 
provisions of the Treaty as  duly interpreted by the Court ... The Court also 
applies  the  general  principles  common  to  the  laws  of  the  Member States, 
which are also general principles of public international law which ...  '. 
B.  Certain  cprinciples  ...  '  invoked before  the  Court  of  justice 
and which the Court of justice may apply 
Fundamental human rights 
The Verwaltungsgericht Stuttgart asked  the  Court of Justice,  under Article 
177 of the EEC Treaty, whether a decision of the Commission was compatible 
with 'the general principles of Community law in force'  and, in its judgment 
of  12 November 1969 \  the  Court of  Justice  held:  'Interpreted in  this  way 
the  provision  at  issue  contains  nothing  capable  of  prejudicing  the 
fundamental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community 
law and protected by the Court'. 
In its judgment of 14 May 1974 
2 in, the Nold case the Court held that: 
(a)  fundamental  rights  form  an  integral  part  of  the  general  principles  of 
law, the observance of which it [the Court] ensures; 
(b)  in safeguarding these rights, the Court is  bound to draw inspiration from 
constitutional  traditions  common  to  the  Member  States,  and  it  cannot 
therefore uphold measures  which  are incompatible with fundamental  rights 
recognized and protected by the constitutions of those States. 
(c)  with  particular  regard  to  the  right  of  ownership  and  the  freedom  to 
engage  in  a  trade  or  profession  those  rights  do  not  constitute  unfettered 
prerogatives  and  must  be  viewed  in  the  light  of  the  social  function  of 
property and activities protected thereunder. 
(d)  within  the  Community  legal  order  it  is  likewise  legitimate  that  these 
rights  should  be  subject  to  certain  limits  justified  by  the overall  objectives 
1  Case 29/69, Stauder [1969]  ECR 419. 
2  Case 4/73, Nold [1974]  ECR 491. 
III-66 pursued by  the  Community, on condition that the substance of these  rights 
is left untouched. 
The decisions of the Court of Justice to the effect that the general principles 
relating  to  fundamental  human  rights  constitute  principles  of  Community 
law  have  received  general  approval.  Nevertheless  certain  lawyers  consider 
that the Court of Justice has in so  doing taken liberties with the law which 
it is  responsible for applying.  Such  a  view  is  natural amongst persons who 
have regard principally if not exclusively to the written rules of law. 
In my view,  such fundamental rights, by their character and quite naturally, 
constitute principles common to the Member States and of which the Court of 
Justice must take account. Let us  recall that a 'general' principle is  often an 
unwritten  rule which legislators,  and  this  includes  those  who  draw  up 
international  conventions,  have  naturally  adopted  as  their  basis  and  they 
are deemed to have done so  or to have referred to it. It appears to me clear 
that  when  the  authors  of  the  European  Treaties  drew  up  and  signed  the 
Treaties  which  were  subsequently  submitted for  ratification  by  their  States 
they  necessarily  assumed  that  they  were  not  creating  exceptions  to  the 
fundamental  principles  of  their  constitutions  and,  in  particular,  to  those 
relating  to  individual  rights 1•  Accordingly  those  principles,  quite  naturally 
and of necessity, constitute 'general' or other principles of Community law. 
Is  it necessary to emphasize that the decisions taken by the Court of Justice 
with regard to fundamental human rights reduce the likelihood of claims that 
the provisions of the European Treaties and of the regulations and directives 
implementing them, on the one hand, are not compatible with the provisions 
of the national constitutions on the other? 
The provisions  of the Treaties,  regulations  and directives  can  or should be 
interpreted on the basis  of those fundamental  rights  and the validity  of the 
regulations,  directives  or  decisions  is  appraised  on  the  basis  of  those 
principles of 'European law'. Nevertheless it is  self-evident that the Court of 
Justice  must  display  prudence  and  caution  in  defining  the  limits  of  the 
concept of fundamental rights in Community law 2• 
1  Vide in  particular judgment  No 183  of  18  December 1973  of the Italian Corte  Costitu-
zionale. 
2  Vide Professor  Colliard  (in  his  report to  the  VII  Congres  of the FIDE  la  protection des 
droits  fondamentaux  par  le  pouvoir judiciaire,  Brussels  1975),  doubts whether  the  Nold 
judgment is  compatible with Article 222  of the EEC  Treaty. He emphasizes that there is 
little likelihood of  a  conflict  between the provisions  of the  Treaty or of secondary law 
and  human  rights  properly  so-called  (p.  26  and  27).  The  same  cannot  be  said  with 
regard to property rights or freedom to trade which indeed may conflict with Community  . 
law. 
111-67 We wish to recall that, in his  report on European union, Mr Prime Minister 
Tindemans suggests  that individuals  should  be  allowed  to  appeal  direct  to 
the Court of Justice against a measure, adopted by one of the institutions of 
the union, which infringes their fundamental rights. 
2.  The objection of illegality 
As  we know, the Treaties of Rome expressly provide that, notwithstanding 
the expiry of the period prescribed for applications for annulment, any party 
may, in a dispute in which a regulation of the Council or of the Commission 
is  called in question, avail himself of the procedures laid down ... to invoke 
the inapplicability of such regulation before the Court of Justice. 
A provision of this nature is  not included in  the Treaty of Paris  (the ECSC 
Treaty)  but provision is  made for the  objection  of illegality  with regard to 
the particular case referred to by the third paragraph of Article 36 thereof. 
In its  judgments  of 13 June 1958 1  the  Court of Justice  considered  that the 
said  third paragraph of Article  36 merely  constitutes  'the application  of  a 
more general principle which Article 36 provides shall  apply to the specific 
case of an appeal in which the Court has unlimited jurisdiction' 2• 
3.  The principle of employing appropriate means to achieve  the 
end in view 
Another European court, the European Court of Human Rights, also applies 
this principle 3• 
In considering the scope of Article  14 of the  Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Court of Human 
Rights considered in particular in its judgment of the Belgian Language case 
that 'a difference  of  treatment in  the  exercise  of  a  right  enshrined  in  the 
Convention  must not only pursue a  legitimate  aim:  if  the  means  employed 
are  not reasonably  appropriate  to  the  aim  pursued  this  also  constitutes  a 
clear infringement of Article 14'. 
t  Cases 9/56 and 10/56, Recueil 1958, p. 13  and p. 115. 
2  In his opinion in Joined Cases 20 to 32/71 Mr Advocate-General Roemer emphasized that 
the  decision  must also  apply in the case  of the law relating to  the Staff Regulations  of 
the Communities. 
3  Vide,  in particular, the language case  of 23  July  1968  (Publications  de  Ia  Cour, Serie  A, 
No 6,  p.  33  to  35,  paragraphs  9  and  10),  also  the  case  regarding  the  National Trade 
Union  of the Belgian Police:  judgment of 27  October 1975  (Med.  Serie  A,  No 19,  p.  19 
to  20,  paragraphs  44  to  47)  and  the  judgment of  19  January  1975  in  the  proceedings 
relating to the SwedishTrade Union of Engine Drivers ... 
III-68 This principle is  acknowledged  above  all  in  German law 1•  In its  judgment 
of  29  May  1974  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  (the  Federal  German 
Constitutional  Court)  held  that  'this  interpretation  corresponds  to  the 
prevailing view in German law (and contained in the constitutional principle 
that the means  employed must be  appropriate to  the  end in view)  that the 
obligee  may  be  relieved  of  the  obligation  in  the  abovementioned  cases  if 
'the  burden  exceeds  the  importance  of  the  obligation',  a  fortiori  since  ~he 
Court of Justice of the European Communities adds that 'the diligence which 
the exporter had to  display'  and 'the extent of the sacrifices  which he had 
to accept' are flexible concepts ... 
2
• 
With regard to the principle that the means should be appropriate to achieve 
the  end  in  view  in  conjunction  with  the  principle  of  legal  certainty  in 
European  law,  reference  should  be  made  to  the  opinion  of  Mr Advocate-
General Mayras before the judgment of 4 July 1973 in Case 59/72 3• 
4.  The application as to time of rules of law 
The judgment of 5 December 1973 4  states that under 'a generally recognized 
principle,  the laws  amending  a  legislative  provision  apply,  unless  otherwise 
provided, to future consequences of situations which arose under the former 
law' 5• 
5.  The 'non bis in idem' principle 
With regard to this  principle,  and in  particular to  the imposition  of a  fine 
by a court of a Member State in addition to a fine payable to the Community 
under Article  85  of the  EEC  Treaty,  reference  should  be  made  to  the 
substantial exposition devoted to comparative law by Mr Advocate-General 
Mayras before the judgment of 14 December 1972 in Case 7/72 6• 
1  It is  not unknown in  French  law.  See,  for  example,  Conseil  d'Etat Franc;ais  of 28  May 
1971, Gazette du Palais of 22 February 1972. 
Cf.  the  French  version  of  this  important  judgment  of  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  in 
Cahiers de Droit Europeen 1975, p. 149 et seq., especially p. 161. 
3  The judgment of the  Court of Justice  of 17  December 1970  in  Case  11/70  ([1970]  ECR 
1125)  is  also  quoted on occasions  as  showing that this  principle has  been  applied.  In  a 
substantial  note  appearing  in  the  Sociaal  Economische  Wetgeving  of  February  1975, 
Judge  Mertens  de  Wilmars  states  that the  Court of Justice  applied  the principle in  the 
judgment of 13  March  1968  in  Case  5/67  and in  Case  11/70  cited  above.  Cf.  also  the 
judgment of 12 November 1969 in Case 29/69 Stauder [1969]  ECR 419. 
4  Case 143/73, Sopad [1973]  ECR 1433. 
5  See also the judgment of 14 April 1970 in Case 68/69  [1970]  ECR 171. 
6  [1972]  ECR 1281. Vide also the judgment of 13  February 1969, Walt Wilhelm, Case 14/68 
[1969]  ECR 1. 
111-69 6.  Respect for established rights 
In its  judgment of 15  July 1960 
1  the Court of Justice held that 'Community 
law, as  it flows from the ECSC Treaty, contains no principle of written law 
or general  unwritten principle  that acquired  rights  must be  protected'.  Mr 
Advocate-General  Lagrange  had  put  forward  a  slightly  different  view 
(Recueil1960 p. 940). 
7.  The 'audi alteram partem' principle 
In  his  opinion  in  Case  17/74  (Transocean  Marine  Paint  Association  v 
Commission)  Mr  Advocate-General  Warner,  after  an  extremely  searching 
study of comparative law, came to the conclusion that this  is  a principle of 
Community law within the meaning of Article 164 
2
• 
8.  The principles  of  legal  certainty  and that persons  are  on an 
equal footing with regard to public charges (see also 9) 
In its judgments of 13 July 1961 in Cases 14, 16, 17, 20, 26, 27/60 and 1/61 3 
the Court had to decide whether the High Authority was guilty of a wrongful 
act or omission. The Court held:  'The undertakings subject to the financial 
arrangements are in competition in so far as the High Authority is  bound to 
ensure with particular care that the principle that all  persons shall be on an 
equal  footing  with  regard  to  official  charges  is  always  most  scrupulously 
observed; in those circumstances the complaint cannot be made that the High 
Authority accorded precedence, albeit at the cost of numerous amendments, 
to  the principle that justice shall  be done in individual cases  rather than to 
the principle of legal security'. 
It is  possible that two principles,  the principle that justice shall be done in 
individual cases  and that of legal  security,  contradict each  other.  In reality, 
it seems that, in this case, the principle that justice shall be done in individual 
cases  was confused with the principle that persons shall be placed upon an 
equal footing with regard to official charges. 
It is  no doubt true that the Court of Justice once again had regard for the 
principle of legal  certainty when it considered whether the Community was 
out of time when it recoverd a sum wrongfully paid to an official  (judgment 
of 18 March 1975) 4• 
1  Cases 36, 37, 38  and 40/59 [1960]  Recueil 1960 p. 885. 
2  Vide also the judgments of 14 July 1972 (Case 48/69 [1972]  ECR 619). 
3  Meroni [1961]  Recueil 1961, p. 345. 
4  Joined Cases 44, 46 and 49/74, Acton and Others [1975]  ECR 383. 
III-70 In  its  judgment  of  14  May  1975 1  the  Court  considered  (a)  whether  the 
behaviour of the Commission violated the principle of legal certainty because 
one  of its  decisions  had retroactive  effect,  or  (b)  whether  the  Commission 
had ignored  the  legitimate  expectations  of  persons  concerned  (that  the 
compensatory amounts prescribed by  a regulation of the Commission would 
be maintained for current transactions) 
2
• 
9.  The principle that persons are on an equal footing with regard 
to public charges. 
The Court of Justice  appears to  have  applied this principle in  its  judgments 
of 13 July 1961 cited above at (8). 
10.  The principle of the protection of legitimate confidence 
This  principle  is  closely  bound up  with  the  principle  of  legal  certainty,  as 
is, moreover, clear from the judgment of 4 July 1973 in  Case 1/73 2  and also 
from the cited judgment of 14 May 1975 in Case 74/74. 
In  its  celebrated  judgment  of  5  June  1973 3  to  which  I  shall  return  in 
considering  the  Court's  task  of  harmonization  and  of  coordination,  the 
Court based its  judgment on  the principle  of  legitimate confidence. It held: 
'Taking  account  of  the  particular  employer-staff  relationship  which  forms 
the background to the implementation of Article 65  of the Staff Regulations, 
and  the  aspects  of consultation  which  its  application  involved,  the  rule  of 
protection  of the  confidence  that the  staff  could  have  that  the  authorities 
would respect  undertakings  of this  nature,  implies  that the  Decision  of 21 
March 1972  binds  the  Council  in  its  future  action.  Whilst  this  rule  is 
primarily  applicable  to  individual  decisions,  the  possibility  cannot  by  any 
means be excluded that it should relate, when appropriate, to the exercise of 
more general powers'. 
The judgment of 4 February 1975 4  also appears to be based on this principle 
although  this  is  not expressly  stated.  It is  based  on  legitimate  confidence, 
1  Case 74/74, CNT  A [1975]  ECR 533. 
2  In  its  judgment of 4  July  1973  in Case  1/73  the  Court also  appraised  the validity  of  a 
measure  of  Community  institutions  in  relation  both  to  the  principle  of  legal  certainty 
and that of the protection of legitimate confidence.  (Cf.  Alexandre Oser, 'Reglementation 
communautaire de  la  concurrence et securite ;uridique',  Revue  du  Marche  Commun  No 
192, January, p. 28  et seq. 
3  Case 81/72 [1973]  ECR 575. 
4  Case 169/73 [1975]  ECR 117. 
111-71 'legal  certainty'  or  even  the  principle  known  m  Netherlands  law  as 
'behoorlijk bestuur' (proper administration) 1• 
According to this judgment when, in a resolution passed to inform and guide 
commercial  operators on the subject of  the  contents  of  a future regulation, 
the  Council  omits  to  make  reservations  on  the  possible  application  of  a 
provision  of the  Treaties,  knowledge  of which  is  important for  action  by 
those concerned, it distorts the task of informing which it has  assumed and 
makes  or  may  make  itself  liable.  In  his  opinion  Mr  Advocate-General 
Trabucchi expressly  invoked  this  principle of legitimate  confidence  and,  in 
particular, stated: 'It is  a principle recognized in the Community legal system 
that assurances relied upon in  good faith  should be  honoured'. Further, the 
Court of Justice has recently had occasion to take a decision on this point in 
its judgment delivered on 4 July 1973 in Case 1/73 
2 3• 
In its judgment of 14 May 1975 in Case 74/74 the Court of Justice considered 
whether by its behaviour the Commission had inter alia ignored the legitimate 
expectation of persons concerned that the compensatory amounts prescribed 
by  a  regulation  of  the  Commission  would  be  maintained  for  current 
transactions. 
In  his  opinion  in  Case  81/72 4  (judgment  of 5  June  1973)  Mr Advocate-
General Warner stated: 'It is true that in the law of certain Member States ... 
a  promise  given  by  a  public  authority  as  to  the  manner in  which  it will 
exercise a discretionary power vested in it can to some extent and in certain 
circumstances have a  binding effect.  But I apprehend that the application of 
that doctrine  is  confined  to  promises  given  in  individual  cases  and that it 
cannot be invoked to fetter a legislative power'. 
1  The concept in  Dutch  law of 'in  het  algemeen  rechtsbewustzijn  levend  beginsel  van be-
hoorlijk  bestuur'  (the  proper principle  of  administration  as  it emerges  from  the general 
conception  of justice)  has  been  very  well  summarized  by  President  Wiarda,  Tijdschrift 
voor Bestuurwetenschappen en publiek recht 1970, Jubileum Nummer, p. 369. He explains 
that  this  concept  covers  natural  justice,  ('Zorgvuldigheid'  or  provision  of  a  adequate 
statement  of  reasons),  good  faith,  equality,  proportion  (evenwichtigheid)  and  legal 
certainty. 
2  Case 1/73 [1973]  ECR 723. 
3  With  regard to  liability  arising  from  incorrect information,  cf.  the  judgment of 13  July 
1972  in  Case  79/71  ([1972]  ECR 579)  and  the  judgments  of  28  May and 9  July  1970 
([1970]  ECR 325  and 347);  cf.  also  Conseil  d'Etat of France  of 20  March  1974,  Recueil 
des Decisions du Conseil d'Etat 1974, p.  197 and of the Cour de  Cassation of Belgium of 
4 January 1973  (Bulletin et Pasicrisie  1973  1.434).  Other judgments of supreme courts of 
the Member States could be cited. 
4  [1973]  ECR 575. 
Ill-72 In its  judgment of 17 March 1976 in Joined Cases 67  to 85/75 the Court of 
Justice  further  conferred  upon  this  principle  the  status  of  a  rule  of 
Community law 1• 
11.  The principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse. 
In his opinion in Case 163/73 2  (judgment of 4 February 1975) Mr Advocate-
General  Trabucchi  said  inter  alia:  'A  decision  contrary  to  the  applicant's 
contention, therefore, is  not simply a  matter of invoking the basic rule  that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse ...  '. 
12.  The principle of the continuity of the legal system 
A dispute arose between the Netherlands tax administration and an official 
of the ECSC at a time when Article 16 of the Protocol on the Privileges and 
Immunities  of the ECSC  was still  in  force,  which provision conferred  upon 
the  Court of  Justice  a  special  jurisdiction with regard  to  interpretation.  At 
the time when the Netherlands court brought the matter before the Court of 
Justice and the latter had to give a ruling this protocol, had been repealed. 
In  its  judgment  of  25 February 1969 3  the  Court  held:  'The  procedure 
provided for by Article 16 ... and the provisions on preliminary rulings for 
interpretation of  the  Treaties  establishing the  EEC  and the  EAEC  have  an 
identical objective, namely,  to ensure a uniform interpretation and application 
·of the provisions of the Protocol in the six Member States. In accordance with 
a principle common to the legal systems of the Member States, the origins of 
which may be traced back to Roman law, when legislation is  amended, unless 
the legislature expresses  a  contrary intention, continuity of the legal  system 
must be ensured'. 
13.  The principle that consumers shall be placed upon an equal 
footing with regard to economic arrangements 
4 
In its judgments of 21  June 1958 5 the Court of Justice both acknowledged the 
existence  of  this  principle  and  explained  what  is  to  be  understood  by  an 
1  This judgment runs  thus:  'They  [the  applicants]  have  alleged  further that, having regard 
to  the  system  of subsidies  as  laid  down by  that regulation,  the sudden abolition  of the 
monetary  compensatory  amounts  constitutes ... an  infringement of the principle  of  the 
protection  of  legitimate  expectation.  Since  the  introduction  of  those  amounts  was 
motivated,  in  accordance  with  Community  rules,  by  concern  to prevent  disturbances  in 
trade and not by concern to ensure for producers unchanged remuneration, this complaint 
cannot be sustained'. 
2  [1975]  ECR 117. 
a  [1969]  ECR 43. 
4  Cf.  Subsection  1:  the  considerations  relating  to  this  principle  may  be  deduced  from 
Article 3 (b)  of the ECSC Treaty. 
5  Case 8/57, Recueil1958, p. 225. 
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in the law of the Member States the equal footing of the persons concerned 
with regard to economic arrangements does not prevent the establishment ot 
prices which vary according to the particular circumstances of consumers or 
of  categories  of  consumers  provided  that  differentiation  in  treatment 
corresponds  to  a  difference  in  the  circumstances  of  the  consumers.  In  the 
absence of an objectively established basis, differentiations in treatment are of 
an  arbitrary  and  discriminatory  nature  and  are  illegal.  It  cannot  be 
complained that the economic system is  unfair on the pretext that it entails 
different consequences or unequal sacrifices for the persons concerned when 
this  situation  proves  to  be  the  result  of  the  different  conditions  in  which 
undertakings conduct their business.' 
Another principle of equality: the equal treatment of officials. 
In its  judgment of 21 November 1974 1  the Court held that 'thus interpreted 
Article 1 (  4)  of the  implementing  provision,  affecting  all  persons  falling 
within its  area of application on the basis of objective and justified criteria, 
is  not incompatible with the general principle of equal treatment of officials 
or with other general principles of law'. 
14.  The principle of the unity of Community law 
It is  clear from the very nature of the European Communities and especially 
from the provisions of Articles 177 of the EEC Treaty and 150 of the EAEC 
Treaty, which made provision for special arrangements to ensure the unified 
interpretation  of  Community  law,  that  the  latter  must  receive  a  uniform 
application and interpretation 
2
• 
It is  futile  to create common rules  and  a common legal  system if such rules 
and system can be interpreted and applied differently. 
Considering  this  'unity'  with  skill  and  acumen,  Mr Pescatore in his  study, 
quoted  above,  states:  'First of all  a  series  of  judgments  which  perceive  the 
problem at what continues to be a technical level:  this is  the problem of the 
uniform interpretation of legal concepts which, whilst they must be inserted 
in  the  law  applicable  within  the  Member  States,  none  the  less  retain  a 
Community  significance ...  '.  He  continues:  'Although  the  judgments 
previously  cited  still  remain  to some  extent at the level  of legal  technique, 
they  none  the  less  constitute  a  series  of decisions  whose  importance  is  all 
t  [1974] ECR 1287. 
2  Vide R.  Lecourt, 'Le Juge devant le marche commun', Geneva 1970, p. 42 et seq. 
III-74 the  more  fundamental  since  they  concern  the  relationship  between 
Community law and national law'.  He refers  in  particular to the following 
section of the Costa v Enel judgment: recourse to rules or concepts of national 
law in order to appraise the validity of measures adopted by the institutions 
of  the  Community  would  jeopardize  the  unity  and  effectiveness  of 
Community  law.  The  validity  of  such  measures  can  be  appraised  only  in 
terms of Community law ... 
1
• 
Certain legal situations may be classified in accordance with a national legal 
system  and  accordingly  the question of the  application of the rules  of such 
a system  arises.  In its  judgment of 14 June 1967 2  the Court of Justice gave 
a  ruling on the common financial  arrangements  relating to the equalization 
of  ferrous  scrap.  An  undertaking  was  rendered  liable  to  pay  'a  scrap 
equalization  charge'.  It had  pointed  out  that,  'it  has  itself  produced  the 
ferrous  scrap  in  question  at  its  own  premises  and . . .  according  to 
Netherlands law, the ferrous  scrap belonged to it from the moment when it 
was  produced  and  that  it  gave  no  consideration  for  this  scrap  under  the 
contractual relationships referred to by the High Authority'. 
The Court  held:  'It is  impossible  strictly  to  relate  this  concept  to  the 
concepts  of  national  law  governing  the  relationships  in  civil  law  between 
undertakings  consuming ferrous  scrap.  Any  differences  existing between the 
national laws  of  the Member States  might  in  fact  make  impossible  the 
uniform  application  of  Community  provisions  throughout  the  Common 
Market as  a whole.  In  order to avoid  such a danger, the application of  the 
equalization scheme, to which common legal concepts apply ... is  essentially 
based on the acquisition of ferrous scrap for a consideration' 3• 
On 1  February  1972 4  the  Court delivered  a  ruling  concerning  regulations 
empowering  the  national  authorities  to  adopt  measures  laying  down 
conditions  or  procedures  for  their  'implementation'.  The  Court  held  that 
'although intervention agencies  are empowered under ... to adopt additional 
1  P. Pescatore, Op. cit., p. 354 et seq. 
2  Case 26/66 [1967]  ECR 115. 
3  Comparable problems exist in the national laws.  It is  generally maintained that civil law 
is  the basis  of national  positive  law ... In  fact  both criminal  law  or tax law or social 
law  . . .  are  based  on  concepts  which  are  qualified  and  whose  legal  consequences  are 
established  by  civil  law:  for  example  sale,  ownership  etc.  . .. This  does  not  prevent a 
specialized  field  of law,  such  as  criminal  law,  or social  or tax law ... from  derogating 
from those concepts of what we may term general law. It is  obviously necessary that this 
should follow  clearly  from  the letter and/or the spirit  of the  'specialized'  legislation.  Iri 
this  respect reference  is  made,  rightly  or wrongly,  to  the  'autonomy' of criminal,  social 
or tax law. 
4  Case 49/71  [1972]  ECR 23. 
HI-75 procedures  and  conditions  for  taking  over,  they  cannot  however  derogate 
from  the  Community  concept  of  an  offer  as  contained  in  particular  in 
Regulations ...  '. 
In  its  judgment of  15  December  1971 1  the  Court held:  'The concept  "day 
of importation", which is  conclusive  for  the purposes of the application  of 
the levy scheme, must have the same meaning in all  the Member States since 
otherwise there is  a  danger that different rates of levy  would be applied to 
goods  which  are in  the  same  situtation economically at the same date and 
the  introduction  of  which  into  the  territory  of  the  Member  States  has 
comparable effects  on the market in  agricultural products. This  meaning is 
to be inferred from the purpose of the levy system ...  2' 
It may  be  wondered  whether  'the  unity  of  Community  law'  is  really  a 
general or other principle in the sense that it constitutes a  rule, or a rule of 
law. 
Certainly it may be  said  that, by  reason of its  importance,  this  concept 'of 
unity' has the force  of a  'principle':  but then the meaning is  different  (Vide 
supra Chapter.JII, Section 2, Subsection 1). 
In  reality,  the  unity  of  Community  law,  as  it  has  been  expounded  in  the 
cases  above-mentioned,  is  no more than an essential  concept which  springs 
from. the very nature and spirit of the European Communities. 
15.  'Community preference' 
In  its  judgment of 13  March 1968 3  the Court emphasized that 'in balancing 
these interests, the Council must take into account, where necessary, in favour 
of  farmers  the  principle  known  as  "Community preference",  which  is  one 
of the principles of the Treaty and which in agricultural matters is laid down 
in Article 44 (2)'. 
It will  be  recalled  that this  article provides  inter alia:  'Minimum prices ... 
shall not be applied so as to form an obstacle to the development of a natural 
preference between Member States'. 
1  Case 35/71  [1971]  ECR 1083. 
2  This judgment relates  to  Article  15  (1)  of  the regulation of the  Council  on the  common 
organization of the market in cereals providing that the levy  to be charged, in particular, 
that  on  barley  coming  from  third  countries,  shall  be  that  applicable  on  the  day  of 
importation. 
3  Case 5/67 [1968]  ECR 83. 
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of  'Community  preference'  in  relation  to  the  judgment  of  4 July 1963 
(Federal  Republic of Germany v Commission) 
1
•  He emphasizes that, in this 
judgment,  the  Court  stated  that  the  need  to  intensify  economic  relations 
within  the  Community  takes  precedence  over  the  interest  which  Member 
States may have in maintaining their economic links with third States. 
Once  again  one must wonder whether this  'preference'  really  constitutes  a 
'principle'  constituting  a  rule  or a  rule  of  law  or whether,  in  accordance 
indeed  with  Mr Pescatore's  definition,  it  is  a  'concept'  which  furthermore 
follows  naturally from  the letter,  the  spirit  and  the  nature of  the Treaties 
but always within the limits of the latter 
2
• 
16.  Community 'public policy' 
In a  case  pending before the Court of Justice the applicant requested as  an 
interim  measure  that  judgment  should  be  suspended  until  a  decision  was 
given by the Italian Constitutional Court as  to whether various provisions of 
the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  were 
compatible with the constitution. In its  Order of 22 June 1965 3  the  Court 
held that 'such a claim is ... inadmissible in that ... any decision to suspend 
judgment would be  tantamount to reducing the Community to a  cipher ... 
therefore,  there  must  be  dismissed  as  contrary  to  Community  policy  any 
application the purpose of which is  to establish discrimination of this nature 
which no law of ratification  could introduce into  a  treaty prohibiting such 
discrimination'. 
In  the national legal  systems  the  concept  of 'public policy'  is,  theoretically 
at least, a functional concept. The effect of public policy is  to refuse to take 
certain  conventions  into  consideration or to  have  them  declared  null.  The 
concept  makes  it  possible  or  mandatory  to  dispense  with  a  foreign  law, 
which would normally have had to be applied. It extends the powers of the 
courts ... 
In  the  above-mentioned  order  of  the  Court of  Justice  'Community policy' 
was  employed to dismiss  as  unfounded an objection submitted by a litigant. 
1  Op. cit., p. 348. 
2  With regard to this concept and its limits see:  judgment of 27  October 1971  in Case 6/71, 
Rheinmuhlen  [1971]  ECR 838;  Rapport Spaak,  p.  14  to  15  and J.  Mertens  de  Wilmars 
in Miscellanea Ganshof van der Meersch, op. cit., p. 302 to 304. 
a  [1967]  ECR 27 et seq.  · 
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application for suspension submitted by one of the parties because this would 
be  liable  to  violate  the  basic  'principles'  on  which  the  Communities  are 
founded. 
Does  this  constitute a  'principle' or a  rule?  It appears possible to take into 
consideration  the  same views  which have  been  set  out above,  in  particular 
with regard to 'the unity of Community law'. 
17.  Other additional principles 
In  its  judgment  of  18 March 1975 1  the  Court  ruled  that,  according  to  a 
principle  recognized  in  the  labour  law  of  the  Member  States,  wages  and 
other benefits pertaining to days on strike were not due to persons who have 
taken  part in  that  strike  and  that this  principle  is  applicable  to  relations 
between  the  institutions  of  the  Communities  and  their  officials,  as  the 
Commission has already found on several occasions and, in particular, in its 
decision of 16 December 1970. 
Section 3  Rules  of international law and  Community 
!aw Judgments  of the  Court of Justice  and 
opinions of the Advocates-General 
'The Court of Justice is  empowered to make a finding with the force of law 
whether an  agreement  binding  the Community or the Member States  as  a 
whole is  or is  not directly applicable within the territory of the Community 
and, if so, whether a measure of a Community institution is  compatible with 
this  external agreement.  The term "validity"  within the meaning of  Article 
177 . . .  extends  not only  to  the  validity  of  acts  of  the  institutions  of  the 
Communities,  considered  in  the  light  of  the  Treaty  or  of  secondary 
Community law, but also to the validity of such acts  considered in the light 
of an international law other than Community law,  on  condition both that 
the provision of international law which has been invoked is  binding upon 
the Community and that it is  directly applicable within the Community legal 
system' 2• 
On 12  December 1972 the  Court of Justice  delivered  a  ruling  to  the  same 
effect 3 4• 
1  Joined Cases 44, 46 and 49/71, Acton [1975]  ECR 383. 
2  Opinion  of Mr Advocate-General  Mayras  in  Joined  Cases  21  and 24/72  International 
Fruit Co.  [1972]  ECR 1219. 
3  Idem. 
4  Cf.  the  judgment  of  the  Corte  di  Cassazione  of  Italy  of  8  June  1972  No  1773  which 
considers the self-executing nature of the provisions of GATT. Cf.  also  the commentary 
on this judgment in the Journal du droit international, Janvier-mars 1976, p. 153 et seq. 
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as  follows:  'Taken as  a whole, these limitations placed on the powers of the 
Member States in respect of control of aliens  are a specific manifestation of 
the  more  general  principle,  enshrined  in  Articles  8,  9,  10  and  11  of  the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
signed . . .  ratified  by  all  the  Member  States,  and  in  Article 2  of  Protocol 
No 4  to the same Convention ... which provide, in identical terms, that no 
restrictions in the interests of national security or public safety shall be placed 
on  rights  secured  by  the  above-quoted  articles  other  than  such  as  are 
necessary for the protection of those interests "in a democratic society" '. 
In its  judgment of 4 December 197  4 1  the Court of Justice stated that 'it is  a 
principle of international law, which the EEC Treaty cannot be assumed to 
disregard in the relations  between Member States,  that a  State is  precluded 
from refusing its own nationals the right of entry or residence 2• 
It appears  certain  that  the  international  conventions  concluded  by  the 
Communities themselves form  part of the law of the Member States and of 
Community law 3• 
Section 4  Special sources with regard to customs mat-
ters- the Common External Tariff 
Agreements  concluded  within  the  framework  of GATT,  con-
ventions  on nomenclature,  explanatory  notes  and classification 
opinions  ... 
The Protocols to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in particular, 
the  Protocol  recording  the  outcome  of  the  Tariff  Conference  of  1960  to 
1961,  are sometimes  incorporated or referred to in  Community regulations. 
1  Case 41/74, van Duyn [1974]  ECR 1337. 
2  It  is  stated  in  the  Juris-Classeur,  under  V  'L'Organisation  judiciaire  internationale', 
Section 230  No. 81  et seq., 'Les  sources  du  droit des  juridictions administratives interna-
tionales',  that  'international  administrative  courts  do  not  as  a  rule  apply  international 
law'.  The  author  of  this  study  quotes  an  example  which  does  not  appear  to  me 
convincing  when  he  writes:  'This  was  the  case,  for  example,  with  regard  to  the 
Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization:  although the tribunal 
was  requested  by  the  applicant to  do  so,  it did not consider  whether  a  decision  of the 
Director General  regarding the nationality of an official was consistent with the concept 
of  effective  nationality  developed  by  the  International  Court  of  Justice'.  A  concept 
developed by the International Court of Justice does not necessarily  constitute a  binding 
rule of international law. 
3  Cf.  R.  Kovar,  'Les  Accords  liant  les  Communautes  europeennes  et  l'ordre  juridique 
communautaire', Revue du Marche  Commun 1974, p. 345 et seq. 
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interpret the provisions of GATT. This was so in the judgment of 15 October 
1969 1• Rules of Community law are thus to be found in those protocols. 
In  its  judgment  of  26 April 1972 
2  the  Court  declared:  'Since  agreements 
regarding the C::ommon  Customs Tariff were reached between the Community 
and its partners in GATT the principles underlying those agreements may be 
of  assistance  in  interpreting  the  rules  of  classification  applicable  to  it. 
Consequently  account  should  be  taken  of  the  content  of  agreements 
concluded in the course of the Tariff Conference of 1960 to 1961 ...  ' 
'It  is  accepted  that  the  Common  Customs  Tariff  annexed  to  Regulation 
(EEC)  No  950/68  is  based  on  the  Brussels  Nomenclature,  which  was 
established  by  the  Convention  on  Nomenclature  for  the  Classification  of 
Goods in Customs Tariffs of 15 December 1950 to which the Member States 
were  parties  ... [Articles  III  and  IV  of  the  Convention]  provide  that  a 
Nomenclature Committee  under the  authority  of the  Customs  Cooperation 
Council  is  to  issue  explanatory  notes  and  classification  opinions.  These 
explanatory notes and opinions are a means of interpretation for the original 
and present  meaning  and scope  of the  individual  tariff  headings.  In  the 
absence  of  relevant  provisions  issued  by  the  Community,  therefore,  their 
authority  [of  these  notes  and opinions]  as  regards  the interpretation of the 
Nomenclature  cannot  be  ignored  by  the  institutions  called  upon  to  apply 
the  Community provisions  incorporating the Brussels  Nomenclature ... the 
observance  of  these  explanatory  notes  and  opinions  is  a  useful  means  of 
ensuring that the common external tariff is  uniformly interpreted and applied 
at all  frontiers  of  the  Common  Market . . .  (judgment  of  the  Court  of 
8 December 1970 in Case 14/70 ([1970] ECR 1001)' 1• 
1  Case 14/69 [1969] ECR 349. 
2  Case 92/71  [1972]  ECR 231:  [1973]  CMLR 562. 
3  The explanatory  notes  and  the  classification  opinions  for  which  provision  is  made  by 
the  Convention  on  Nomenclature  for  the  Classification  of  Goods  in  Customs  Tariffs 
have the status  of 'an authoritative source  for  the  purposes  of the interpretation of the 
headings  in  the  Common  Customs  Tariff'.  Cf.  also  the  judgments  of  14  July  1971  in 
Cases 13  and 14/71 [1971]  ECR 767 and 779. 
III-80 CHAPTER IV 
Methods of interpretation 
Section 1  General considerations 
Numerous  'methods  of  interpretation'  are  cited  m  treatises  on 
law, law books and university teaching. 
The  descriptions  conferred  upon  such  methods  do  not  always  coincide; 
indeed they vary infinitely. 
Although a  particular method may  be  described  by different authors in  the 
same manner they may regard its  subject-matter or characteristics as  widely 
different, thereby giving rise to confusion. 
As an introduction I shall merely cite certain methods: 
(1)  The exegetical method 
This method adopts as  its principal basis the meaning of words and phrases 
and attributes  fundamental  importance  to  the  context  and  punctuation ... 
Certainly  it  is  impossible  to ignore  the  importance  of the  text,  the words 
employed and the context in determining the meaning and scope of a written 
rule.  Certain exegetical schools have ruled out any reference to other formal 
sources of law on the postulate that laws, and above all  codes, are complete 
and indeed  perfect.  According  to  the  views  attributed to  certain  exegetical 
schools or their followers recourse might not be had to preparatory works in 
order to clarify  the meaning and scope of a rule  or concept.  There is  often 
much  exaggeration  and  partiality  in  assessing  this  method,  and  indeed  in 
assessing the entire exegetical school 1• 
1  A number, and indeed a large number, of writers who are classified under the exegetical 
school resort to preparatory works, the history of law, reasoning, common sense  and the 
aims and objectives of legal provisions ... 
111-81 Certain writers draw fine  and more objective distinctions in their review  of 
the  methods  of  this  school,  differentiating  between  the  grammatical  and 
psychological variants of the method. 
It is clear that -like the Belgian courts- the British courts also attach great 
importance to the wording of laws. But they too are cautious 1  - they apply 
successively the literal interpretation, the golden rule and the mischief rule 
2
• 
(2)  The logical or rational method 
It is usually held that this method is  characterized by its reference to analogy, 
to eiusdem generis~ corollary and 'de eo quod plerumque fit' reasoning ... 
It is  clear that the scope of the rational method as  a means  of inquiry and 
action is  very much wider. I shall return to this point in a special section of 
this review. (Vide Chapter V, Section 3). 
(3)  The method or methods of investigating  the  spirit, the aim 
and the objectives of the 'law' and at the same time the circum-
stances of its:genesis 
It is  also possible, at least to a certain extent, to describe this as  a functional 
method. 
It is  clear that one must consider resorting to preparatory works in order to 
discern such aims, spirit and objectives. 
In another part of this review I shall endeavour to consider in greater depth 
this  recourse to preparatory works, and also the very concept of these 'works'. 
(Vide Section 3 of this chapter). 
Let me point out that recourse to preparatory works is  often described as the 
historical  method.  In  fact,  in  may view  it  constitutes  rather  a  means  of 
1  Walter Van Gerven, 'Beginselen van Belgisch Privaat Recht', Algemeen deel, p. 53. 
2  Professor  Carbonnier  is  correct  when  he  writes:  'the  written  law  must  not resemble  a 
scroll which is  deciphered by an oriental scholar; a literal and grammatical interpretation 
would not reveal  its  nature':  '(the law)  is  a  declaration  and demonstration of intention. 
The  law  speaks.  What  does  it endeavour  to  tell  us?  . . .  Behind  the  wording  lies  the 
intention of the legislature which  the  interpreter must seek .. .' - Cit,il  law - Themis, 
Presses Universitaires de France, pp. 122 et seq. 
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in which it came into being . . . It is  not really  a  'method' of interpretation 
but a means of assistance in the use of a method. 
(4)  The so-called historical method 
I have  just indicated that this description is  used  when  resort  is  had  to 
preparatory works. Nevertheless, a different meaning and scope is  frequently 
conferred upon this method. 
In  his  opinion  in  Case  34/74  ([1974]  ECR  1237)  Mr  Advocate-Genera] 
Trabucchi  relies  upon  the  'historical-systematic'  method.  This  expression 
seems to mean the interpretation of a term or of a concept in the light of the 
aim pursued by the provision in question, of the circumstances of its genesis 
and of its  position in  the provision as  a whole. It cannot be concealed that 
the characteristics of such a method coincide with those summarized above 
at (3). 
The historical method sometimes relates  to the history of law and at other 
times to the history of the law ... and it is  clear that the latter may in large 
part be discerned by consulting the preparatory works 1• 
A fresh  distinction is  however necessary:  the history of law is  considered in 
some quarters to be a  method of interpretation, the purpose of which is  to 
investigate the economic, social and technical situations in which the rule was 
intended to produce its effects ...  ; others take the view that the purpose of 
this method is  to investigate, by reference to history, the meaning and scope 
of a rule or of a concept which a modern legislature has felt it unnecessary to 
clarify when including it in legislation 2• 
1  Paul  Scholten,  •.Algemeen  deel  der  Handleiding  tot  de  Beoefening  van  het  Nederlands 
Burgelijk  Recht',  Assers  Tweede  druk;  Stager,  •ne  Rechthistorische  Interpretatie  en  de 
W  esthistorische Interpretatie'. 
2  In Section 3  of  this  chapter certain examples of  the historical  method are provided. Let 
me  cite  another  example:  the  concept  of  the  liability  of  singuli  in  solidum.  Fran~ois 
Chabas,  •Remarques  sur  ['Obligation  in  Solidum'  in  the  Revue  Trimestrielle  de  Droit 
Civil  1967,  pp.  310  et seq.  writes:  The  liability  of singuli in  solidum  is  very  old.  Even 
in  the  14th  century  traces  can  be  found  in  our  law  of  the  liability  of  all  the  joint 
authors  of torts.  The wording of  the  formula  'the liability  of singuli  in  solidum  et pro 
toto' receives no explanation from writers, which is  an  indication of a long tradition. 
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effectiveness  method... further described as the 'ut res magis 
valeat quam pereat' rule 
I shall devote a special survey to this  method which is  now very frequently 
relied upon and which has been applied for so  long by the courts that it has 
never been necessary to define it. 
(  6)  The so-called sociological method or the sociological school 
1 
It forms  a counterpart to the exegetical or grammatical method. The phrase 
of Fran~ois Geny, 'by the Civil Code, beyond the Civil Code' is  often quoted 
to describe it. According to the followers of this 'school' a law is  merely the 
expression  for  the  time  being  of  the  legal  system  at  a  specific  point; 
consequently, as  soon  as  such  a  provision  is  published  it  is  completely 
divorced from the will of the legislator. 
Experience  has  shown  the  dangers  of  such  a  method,  in  particular  in 
connexion with legal certainty and the equality of private persons before the 
Jaw.  It is  superfluous  to recall  in this  context  the  extremes  of  President 
Magnaud, President of the Tribunal of Chateau-Thierry. 
(7)  The objective method - the subjective method 
It seems  that the first  method is  to be  treated  as  equivalent,  at least  to  a 
certain  extent,  to  the  sociological  method.  Using  the  objective  method  a 
law is  interpreted in  isolation:  using the subjective method it is  interpreted 
by endeavouring to discover the will of the legislation 1• 
(8)  The teleological method 
This  method  has  also  been  relied  upon  on  numerous  occasions  in  recent 
years  especially  with regard to the  case-law of the Court of Justice  of the 
European  Communities.  Nevertheless  it  is  not  always  accorded  the  same 
meaning  and  scope.  I  shall  devote  a  number of  additional  remarks  to this 
point in Section 3 of the present chapter. 
1  P.  Scholten,  Op.  cit.  states, p. 104, 'De  wet is  tegeli;k  wilsverklaring van  de  wetgever en 
zii is een waarde voor zichzelf'. 
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This method also calls for special treatment. 
(10)  The so-called scientific method 
It balances the excesses  of the so-called grammatical  (or exegetical)  method 
and the so-called sociological  method; it also fills  the lacunae. This method 
acknowledges,  as  it should,  that the law does  not consist  solely  of written 
provisions  and that the meaning of  such  provisions and above  all  the wide 
concepts  upon  which  they  are  based,  develop  . . .  that new  situations  arise 
which the legislature was unable to envisage or provide for ... that on many 
occasions regard must also be had to what the legislator would have decided 
or envisaged if he had known of the new situations or problems to be dealt 
with ... that the law must nevertheless be observed and that it is  not for the 
courts to put themselves in the place of the legislature who is  responsible to 
the Nation 1• 
(11)  Free choice of method? 
Some  lawyers  indeed  consider it  necessary  to  resort to  preparatory works; 
others, on the contrary, deny this. It is a question of choice of method. 
Some  lawyers,  influenced  by  the  nature  of  their  institutions,  respect  the 
separation  of powers  between  the  legislature  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
judiciary  on the  other.  Others take an  independent attitude.  This is  also  a 
question of choice. However, apart from this, it is self-evident that the courts 
cannot choose, when called upon to interpret one or more rules and to apply 
them to the facts, to have recourse inter alia to the grammatical or exegetical 
method and to ignore reasoning or a consideration of the aim and objective 
of  the  rules  and  the  manifest  evolution  or otherwise  of  certain  concepts: 
whether or not a  specific  method  is  appropriate  depends  on the  problems 
involved.  Certainly the views  of lawyers,  and especially of judges,  may vary 
in  this  respect,  but each  of them  applies  a  specific  method on the basis  of 
reasons  or considerations  which  appear  imperative  to  him.  Furthermore  a 
1  Clearly, there are numerous 'schools' of interpretation of a law or of the law as  a whole. 
Each  of them  has  its  own  characteristics,  emphases  or compromises ... Thus Professor 
Zonderland  ('Methode  van  het  Privaat  Recht',  Elsevier  1974,  Brussels  and Amsterdam) 
cites  the  following schools: German idealism, the historical school, evolutionary, utilitarian, 
analytical,  pure  (de  zuivere  rechtsleer ),  sociological,  American  realist,  Scandinavian, 
existentialist or relativist schools, the new natural law school, Neo-Kantism ... 
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of  21 February 1973 1  the  Court  quite  naturally  held:  'the  spirit,  general 
scheme and wording of Article 86 as  well as the system and objectives of the 
Treaty must all be taken into account'. 
In  the  same  judgment  the  Court  of  Justice  rejected  the  line  of  argument, 
either a contrario  or by  analogy,  on which the parties  relied  and,  in  order 
to  settle  the  question  whether  a  grouping  of  undertakings  constituted  an 
abuse of a  dominant position 2,  considered  all  the provisions  of Articles  85 
and  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty  in  the  context  of  the  'general  principles'  laid 
down in its Article 3. 
In  my  view  it  is  incorrect  to  deduce  from  certain  sentences  appearing  in 
judgments of the Court of Justice that it applies these methods in a particular 
hierarchical order. 
In its judgment of 29 November 1956 3  the Court stated that it was necessary 
to  seek  'an  adequate  interpretation  or  one  which  is  compatible  with  the 
wording, the context or the objectives' of the Treaty. 
Since  1963  the  Court appears  to  have  used  the  reverse  order and to  have 
relied  upon  interpretation  according  'to  the  spirit,  the  general  scheme  and 
the wordini of the Treaty 4? 
The importance of this inversion appears very slight. 
1  Case 2/67 [1973]  ECR 215. 
2  With regard  to  the various  methods  which  are  stated  to  be  open  to  the  'choice  of the 
court' the  Report of the  International  Law  Commission  concerning  the  draft treaty  on 
the  Law  of  Treaties  (United  Nations,  January  1966,  Monaco,  General  Assembly, 
Official  Documents,  21st  Session,  Supplement  No 9,  p.  52)  states  with  great  care  and 
realism:  'most  of the  time  the  principles  of  logic  and  common  sense  (which  must  be 
taken  into  account)  are  only  of value  in  determining  the  meaning  which  the  parties 
may  have  intended  to  confer  on  the  terms  employed  by  them  in  a  document.  The 
applicability  of those  principles  to  a  specific  case  depends  on  a  whole  series  of factors 
which  must first  of all  be  appraised by the interpreter  of  the  document:  the particular 
arrangement of words and sentences, their relation to each other and to the other parts of 
the document, the general  nature and subject-matter of the  document,  the circumstances 
under which it was drawn up ... Nevertheless, where it appears proper to  have recourse 
to one of those principles or maxims they  cannot be  automatically  applied,  because the 
interpreter  must  first  be  persuaded  that  it  is  appropriate  to  employ  them  in  the' 
particular circumstances of the case .. .'. 
3  Case 8/55 [1955-1956]  Recueil, 291. 
4  Cf. judgment of 5 February 1963 in Case 26/62 [1963]  ECR 1. 
111-86 Section 2  Considerations  relating  to certain  'methods 
of interpretation'  - the  teleological,  useful 
effect and evolutive methods 
(1}  The teleological method 
Teleology  is  the  study  of  final  causes  and  of  ultimate  objectives.  It is  a 
philosophical doctrine based on the concept of the ultimate objective. It has 
been written that knowledge of an entity, whereby the whole is  understood 
by reference to the parts, is teleological knowledge. 
The purpose  of  the legal  teleological  method  is  to interpret  a  rule  taking 
particular account of the purpose, the aim and the objective which it pursues. 
Certain  persons  proceed  further  and  consider  that  the  purpose  of  the 
teleological  method  is  to  confer  on a  rule  the interpretation which is  most 
appropriate to satisfy the requirements of society. 
It cannot  be  concealed  that in  this  latter sense  the  teleological  method  of 
interpretation  is  - at  any  rate  very  largely  - the  same  as  the  so-called 
sociological and 'objective' methods. 
In  his  survey,  to  which  I  have  already  referred  on  several  occasions,  Mr 
Judge  Pescatore  writes:  'It  is  the  teleological  method  which  stands  out 
with ever increasing clarity in the judgments of the Court of Justice. To this 
method we  owe the  both dynamic  and  ordered  development  of  a  body  of 
case-law directed by  the guide-line of a coherent concept. Furthermore, none 
of the dangers pointed out by proponents of caution has  materialized.  The 
Court has  taken  care  not to exceed  its  judicial  role;  despite  this  it  has 
succeeded in showing that law, appropriately interpreted, is  also  a powerful 
lever  towards  European  integration.  The  Treaties  establishing  the 
Communities  have  been  completely  moulded  by  teleology  ... the  Treaties 
establishing  the  European  Communities  are  based  upon  the  concept  of 
objectives  to  be  attained . . .  In  this  context the  teleological  method  is  not 
simply one method of interpretation amongst others: far from it. It constitutes 
a  method  which  is  particularly  suited  to  the  special  characteristics  of  the 
Treaties establishing the Communities 1• 
The author is  clearly correct:  a court must found on the aim  and objectives 
of  the  rules.  This  clearly  does  not lead  it to  exceed  the  role  which  the 
institutions confer on it. Such  a method indeed constitutes 'a powerful lever 
1  P.  Pescatore,  'Les  objectifs  de  Ia  Communaute  Europeenne  comme  principes  de  !'inter-
pretation dans  Ia  jurisprudence de  Ia  Cour  de  Justice',  Miscellanea  W.  J.  Ganshof  van 
der Meersch, Volume II, vide in particular pp. 326 to 328. 
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consequence  of  the  aim  and objectives  of  the  provisions  of the  Treaties  as 
the Member States intended them when creating real  Communities amongst 
themselves. 
The concept of teleological  interpretation is  often associated  with evolutive 
interpretation or the need to fill  lacunae in the legal system or in a particular 
law. 
Nevertheless,  I think that these  concepts  are different and indeed  that they 
belong to different categories. 
Any law, any corpus of laws and indeed any body of positive law inevitably 
contains lacunae for  the good  reason  that neither particular laws  nor legal 
principles have been able to provide exactly for the infinite variety of social 
phenomena and the problems to which they give rise. The teleological method 
is  certainly not the only one which renders it possible for a rule to be given 
its full scope and efficacity. 
'Evolutive'  methods  are  applied  where,  after  a  written  or  unwritten  rule 
has come into being, society changes and broad concepts included in written 
or unwritten rules  have 'evolved', or where scientific  and technical progress 
has altered, amongst other things, the nature of social relationships ... 
Not only may the teleological  method be  useful  when rules  'evolve' ... but 
it is clear that it is also applicable when there has been no evolution at all. 
The  Court  of Justice  has  wisely  and  consistently  adopted  as  its  basis  the 
'principles' 
1  which  constitute  the  very  objectives  of  the  Communities: 
equality,  liberty,  solidarity,  unity ...  ,  the  objectives  on  which  the  Treaties 
are founded. Does this necessarily imply an evolutive interpretation? Is  it not 
rather that the Court merely  gives  full  effect  to  these  fertile  concepts  and 
vital and effective principles? 
(2)  The 'useful effect' or 'implied powers' method, often described 
by the maxim 'ut res magis valeat quam pereat' 
2 
This method may be given two meanings. 
First sense:  to confer on a rule or rules the meaning and scope which emerge 
from  the  provisions  of  the  law  and  from  their  spirit,  as  well  as  from  the 
1  Vide the concecpt of 'principles' in Chapter III, Section 2. 
2  The maxim is  from Ulpian  (Dig.  XLV,  Title I):  Actus est interpretandus potius ut valeat 
quam  ut pereat.  As  regards  the  concept  of the  actual  effect  in  Community  law,  cf.  R. 
Ormand, 'La Notion de /'Effect Utile' {thesis), Paris 1975. 
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effect which  they  must necessarily  have.  It may  be  wondered, in  that case, 
whether it is  necessary  for the intellectual process of a  judge to be given  a 
scientific definition which may be  regarded as  modern. I shall return to this 
problem in  Chapter V,  Section  3,  in  which  I  consider  the  rational  and the 
deductive methods. 
Second meaning or scope: to give  a  rule or rules  the effect which the judge 
personally  considers  to  be  the  most  useful.  Consideration  of  the  aim  or 
objectives of rules them becomes an exercise in abstract logic on the basis of 
an intention or personal conception which the  judge sometimes  endeavours 
to bestow on the nation or the people. A method which results in a more or 
less subjective view of the aims pursued by the legislature js clearly dangerous. 
Both  national  and  international  courts  interpret  rules  according  to  their 
'useful effect' as defined in the first sense. 
Ch. de Visscher 
1 cites the following ground from a judgment of the Tribunal 
for the Settlement of Applications in the Kyugas Indians Case between Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States:  'No  rule  of  interpretation  is  more  firmly 
established than that which requires a meaning to be given to a clause rather 
than for it to be deprived  of all  meaning.  The choice before us  here is  not 
between  two  possible  interpretations.  We  are  asked  to  reject  the  clear 
meaning  of  a  clause  and to  rule  that it  has  no  meaning.  It  is  certainly 
impossible for us to do so'. 
At this point I wish to refer  again to a  judgment of the Cour de  Cassation 
of Belgium,  which I  consider to embody a  principle of pure common sense 
which  has  clearly  been  proclaimed  by  many  other  national  courts:  'it  is 
sometimes  necessary  to  establish  what the  legislature  wished  to  say  rather 
than what it  actually  said;  it  is  in  principle  preferable  to  assume  that the 
legislature  employed  an  expression  which  communicated  its  thought 
imperfectly rather than to. attribute a thought to it arbitrarily' 2• 
1  Ch.  de  Visscher,  'Problemes  d'Interpretation  ]udiciaire  en  Droit  International  Public' 
(Paris 1963), p. 84. 
2  Cour de Cassation of 9 February 1925; Pasicrisie 1925, I,  129, in particular at p.  142. 
The courts interpreting English law are  also acquainted with a fairly  similar concept: if a 
passage may be interpreted in two ways the court will chose that which does not produce 
an absurd result  (the Golden  rule)  (see  for  example Young v  Clarey  [1948]  Ch. 191).  As 
was stated in  R. v Oakes  [1959]  2QB  350  (CCA):  'a court is  entitled to  choose a possible 
meaning which  seems  reasonable rather than one which  produces an  inconsistency  or an 
absurdity or inconvenience'. 
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also  considered  that it  was  unnecessary  to  describe  such  a  means  of 
interpretation as  a method. Its report states: 'The Commission ... considered 
that in so  far as  the  maxim  uut res  magis  valeat  quam  pereat"  constitutes 
a  general  rule  of interpretation it is  incorporated in  the first  paragraph of 
Article  27  (Article 27  of  the  draft became Article  31  of the Convention  of 
1969)  which  stipulates  that  a  treaty  must  be  interpreted  in  good  faith  in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms used in their 
context and in the light of the object and aim of the treaty'. 
1 
The Court of Justice  has  referred  in  a  number of  judgments  to  the 'useful 
effect' or 'useful application'  but in doing so  it has merely emphasized that 
legal  rules  must be  interpreted reasonably, so  as  not to fail  in their aim or 
objective. 
Thus, in its  judgments of 15  July 1960 in  Cases  20/59 2  and 25/59 3  on the 
question whether or not the High Authority had a power to adopt decisions 
or make regulations  concerning the publication of rates  and conditions for 
the carriage of coal and steel, the Court held:  'it is ... necessary to consider 
whether  a  power  to  make  regulations  vests  in  the  High  Authority  by 
implication from other provisions of the Treaty or from its general structure 
and  background ... Legal  writers  and  case-law  agree  that the  terms  of  a 
treaty imply  certain  rules  without which  such  terms  cannot be  usefully  or 
reasonably  applied'.  On the  basis  of  this  line  of  argument  the  Court 
recognized the implied powers of the Community administration. 
When called upon to interpret Article 55  of the EEC Treaty, which excepts 
from  the  application  of the  Community provisions  concerning  the  right  of 
establishment  activities  which  in  a  State  are  connected,  even  occasionally, 
with the  exercise  of official  authority,  the  Court found  that the  profession 
of  'avocat'  and  the  practice  thereof  remain  governed  by  the  law  of  the 
various  Member States  and that the possible  application  of the restrictions 
1  Report  of the  International  Law  Commission  on  the  Law  of  Treaties,  January  1966, 
General  Assembly,  Official  Documents,  21st  Session,  Supplement  No  9.  This  report 
states:  'In  its  Advisory  Opinion  on  the  Interpretation  of Peace  Treaties  (International 
Court of Justice,  Rec.  1950,  p.  229)  the  Court declared:  'The principle of interpretation 
expressed  in  the  maxim  ut  res  magis  valeat  quam  pereat  and frequently  termed  the 
useful  effect  principle,  could  not  authorize  the  Court  to  extend  the  clause  regarding 
settlement of  disputes  written  into  peace  treaties  in  a  sense  which ... would contradict 
the  letter and spirit of that clause'. N. B.  The spirit makes  it possible  to  discover what 
the treaty intends and consequently what effect it must have, that is, its useful effect. 
2  Recueil 1960, at p. 688. 
3  Recueil 1960, p. 723. 
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connexion  with  each  Member State  having  regard  to the  relevant  national 
provisions.  It then emphasized that:  'This consideration must however take 
into account the Community character of the limits imposed by Article 55 on 
the  exceptions  permitted  to  the  principle  of  freedom  of  establishment  in 
order to  avoid  the effectiveness  of  the  Treaty  being  defeated  by  unilateral 
provisions of Member States' 1• 
The same meaning is  given  to the expression 'useful effect'  in  the judgment 
of  the  Court  of  3 December 197  4:  'In  particular,  a  requirement  that  the 
person providing the service must be habitually resident within the  territory 
of  the  State  where  the  service  is  to  be  provided  may,  according  to  the 
circumstances,  have the result of depriving Article 59  of all  useful  effect:~ in 
view of the fact that the precise object of that Article is to abolish restrictions 
on freedom to provide services imposed on persons who are not established 
in the State where the service is to be provided' 2• 
The judgment of the  Court given  on 31 March 1971 3  may  be regarded  as 
marking a development in the scope of the concept of 'useful effect'. 
The Court made the bold deduction from  the implementation of Regulation 
No 543/69 of the Council on the harmonization of certain social legislation 
relating  to  road  transport  that  the  bringing  into  force  of  the  regulation 
'necessarily  vested  in  the  Community  power  to  enter  into  any  agreements 
with  third  countries  relating  to  the  subject-matter  governed  by  that 
regulation'. 
An argument  based  on  the  text,  which  could  have  been  important in  the 
reasoning  of  the  Court  of  Justice,  (the  regulation  provides  that  the 
Community shall  undertake such  negotiations with third countries  as  prove 
necessary) is merely referred to as an extra detail. 
Certain  authors 4  have  described  this  as  the  'necessary  effects'  or 
'consequence'  method  ('effet  necessaire  ou effet-consequence').  The method 
remains the same but the extent of the consequences deduced from comparing 
a rule with the objectives of the treaties (in  particular in  Case 22/70 referred 
to above) may evoke suprise in certain quarters. 
1  Judgment of 21 June 1974 in Case 2/74, Reyners [1974]  ECR 631. 
2  Case  33/74,  van  Binsbergen  v  Bestuur  van  Bedrijfsvereniging  voor  de  Metaalnijverheid 
[1974]  ECR 1299.  Cf. also Case 56/65  [1966]  ECR 235:  Case 75/63  [1964]  ECR 177:  Case 
26/62 [1963] ECR 1. 
3  Case 22/70 [1971]  ECR 263. 
4  R.  M.  Chevaliier,  'Le  Contentieux  des  Communautes et  le  Droit Administratif Franyais' 
in 'La France et les Communautes Europeennes' (Paris 1975), p. 459. 
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Clearly, the need for such an interpretation only arises if there is  evolution. 
The term  'evolution'  means  that  since  a  specific  period  of time  a  change 
has  taken  place  in  social  conditions,  requirements  or possibilities,  methods 
and techniques, economic, social, philosophical and moral concepts ... 
Generally speaking,  the wording of a  recent law or treaty does  not require 
any evolutive interpretation. 
The wording of old laws may indisputably require an evolutive interpretation 
by the courts where the separation of powers and authority between, on the 
one hand, the legislator or the nation (which creates customs and sometimes 
principles of law) and, on the other, the courts so permits. 
Furthermore,  before  it  can  be  conceded  that  there  has  been  an  evolution 
which must be taken into consideration such evolution must be certain. This 
is  not  because  certain  social  groups  demand  with  force,  even  employing 
coercion and violence,  'changes'  and 'reforms' which  the courts of necessity 
must and indeed may take account 1• 
Evolution  may  evidently  play  a  very  important  role  where  the  courts  are 
required to apply concepts which are neither defined nor clarified and which 
are  commonly  or  at  least  frequently  referred  to  as  'vast  or  complex'  or 
even as 'vague'. 
It is  clear that the meaning given  today to  concepts  such  as  'boni  mores', 
'acts outraging public decency',  'public policy' or 'the authority of parents' 
could not be the same as in 1804 or 1940 or even 1950 or 1960 ... 
National  courts  often  make  an  evolutive  interpretation  of  old  texts, 
conferring  upon  them  the  meaning  and  scope  which  the  legislator  would 
have  given  them  if  he  had  been  able  to  take  into  consideration  the  new 
facts, circumstances or mores. 
To  make  such  an  interpretation  the  courts  may  also  have  regard  to  the 
substance and spirit of the laws subsequently adopted by the legislature. 
1  According  to  Roscoe  Pound  (justice  according  to  Law,  New  York  1963,  p.  278)  'The 
judges may not in  reason  be  asked to lead in  the present transition.  They must go  with 
the main body, not with  the advance  guard  and  with  the  main  body only  when  it has 
attained reasonably fixed and settled conceptions'. 
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be modified easily  and thus interpreted, when they are old, on the basis  of 
an evolution which emerges clearly from more recent laws. The Treaties must 
be  regarded  as  equivalent  to  constitutions...  and  as  I  have  already 
emphasized no provision has been made for a true revision even on the basis 
of a qualified majority. 
Nevertheless  it is  clearly  impossible  to  rule  out an  evolutive  interpretation 
based on new European Treaties or on other treaties signed  by the Member 
States  or even  by  the  Community.  However,  an evolutive  interpretation on 
the basis of regulations of the Council of Ministers or a fortiori of regulations 
of  the  Commission  would  clearly  pose  delicate  problems  regarding  the 
institutions and their jurisdiction. 
In  a  noteworthy report submitted at the IVth International Seminar  on the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 1  Judge S0rensen 
stated  that:  'without prejudging  the  final  outcome  it  can  at  this  point be 
stated that the Commission  (in  its  reports on the proceedings regarding the 
Syndicat national de Ia police beige and the Swedish Union of Engine-Drivers) 
referred  to  certain  of  the  conventions  of  the  International  Labour 
Organization in  order to  determine  the  meaning  and  scope  of the  concept 
of freedom  of association and the right to form  trade unions recognized  by 
Article  11.  It recalled  that these  conventions  have  been  ratified  by  a  very 
large  number of States,  including practically  all  those  who  were  parties to 
the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights,  and  that  those  conventions 
embody  rules  commonly  acknowledged  in  the  field  of  labour  law. 
Consequently they can only be ignored in the interpretation of Article 11  at 
the  risk  of the  European  Convention  being  overtaken  by  the  evolution  of 
labour law at international level'. 
Mr Serenzen  is  correct  in  stating  that  in  many  cases  it  is  necessary,  in 
accordance.with the intentions of the contracting parties, to regard the object 
and aim  of  a  treaty  as  preventing the rigid  establishment  of  legal  rules  in 
order to allow evolution to take place and that 'this is  particularly true with 
regard to treaties whose provisions, like those of our convention, abound in 
general,  undefined  concepts .  which  frequently  refer  to  non-legal  rules  or 
standards  such  as  "inhuman treatment",  "reasonable periods  of  time"  and 
"necessary  in  a  democratic  society" ' . . .  He further  states  that  the 
1  Rome, 5-8 November 1975,  Council  of  Europe,  Strasbourg 1975:  'Les  droits  inscrits  en 
1950 dans Ia  Convention Europeenne des  Droits de /'Homme ont-ils Ia  meme signification 
en 1975?' 
III-93 evolutive  interpretation  of such  wide  and  vague  concepts  has  also  been 
advocated  by  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
1  and  is  practised  under 
certain constitutions. 
Section 3  Means of assistance in applying a particular 
method of  interpretation-Preparatory \vorks 
- Comparative law - Reference  to  a pro-
vision of inferior  status  or  to a  subsequent 
attitude 
(1)  Introduction 
In  the  foregoing  I  have  endeavoured  to  give  some  details  regarding  the 
various 'methods' of interpretation. 
Reference  to  the  'preparatory works'  of  'laws'  is  generally  also  considered 
as constituting a method of interpretation. 
However,  I  consider  that  reference  to  such  works  constitutes  rather  a 
'means'  or  'tool'  which  enables  certain  methods  of  interpretation  to  be 
applied.  By  consulting  such  preparatory  works  it  is  in  fact  possible  to 
discover  the  meaning  and  scope  of  a  rule,  in  particular  its  raison  d' etre, 
spirit and objectives. 
The same applies as regards recourse to comparative law; this is  clearly more 
of a 'means' than a method of interpretation. 
At  this  point  I  must  define  the  term  'comparative  law'.  At  present  this 
aspect of law plays an important role in legal  science and holds a favoured 
place in university curricula. 
It is  clear that in order to  compare laws it is  first  necessary to discover the 
relevant  legislation.  It is  this  first  aspect  of  'comparative  law'  which  is 
relevant  to  the  problems  forming  the  subject-matter  of  our  review. 
Furthermore, as  I shall explain later, comparative law,  which usually concerns 
the law of the Member States, plays a double role in Community law. 
1  Opinion on the Legal Status of the Territory of Namibia, International Court of Justice 
Recueil 1971, p. 31. 
111-94 (2}] The so-called 'historical' method- reference to preparatory 
works and  parliamentary proceedings - background docu-
ments to international treaties, conventions and protocols 
A - General considerations 
We  talk  of  the  'historical'  method  but  this  description  is  likely  to  cause 
confusion.  First of all,  it is  necessary  to  clarify  whether it is  in relation  to 
'the law'  itself  or to the rule or the concept that the  method is  'historical'. 
If  it is  in  relation to the law, the aim of the so-called historical  'method' is 
to determine when, how and why the 'law'  came into being,  to  investigate 
the  circumstances  or facts  which  led  to  the  proposal  for  legislation,  to 
consider the reasons,  explanations  and objections made or expressed in the 
course  of  the  'parliamentary'  proceedings  or to  consult  the  'justifications' 
- preambles,  explanatory  memoranda,  reports  to  the  sovereign  or to  the 
president of the Republic - provided by  the executive in  the exercise  of  a 
power to  make  regulations  or  a  quasi-legislative  power  held  under  an 
enabling act or as a result of a delegation of legislative powers. 
Not only  laws  and  regulations  but treaties,  conventions  and  international 
protocols are preceded by preparatory work. It is  also  impossible to ·ignore 
in this context the work of international institutions such as  the International 
Committee for  Maritime  Law  or  the  International  Law  Association  in 
preparation  for  diplomatic  conferences  at  which  the  work  of  those 
institutions  is  adopted  for  subsequent  incorporation  into  international 
conventions  or  treaties.  The  courts  are  often  requested  by  their  national 
legislatures  to interpret such  conventions  in  the  light  of  the work of those 
institutions. 1 
As  I  have  just  explained,  the scope  of  the  so-called  'historical'  method,  or 
more precisely  of this  'means' or technique as  described  above,  is  relatively 
restricted,  that is,  it covers  the  law,  the  provisions  of  international treaties 
or perhaps secondary legislation. 
A true historical survey may have a different purpose and be much wider in 
scope: it may be to seek through history- for example, by  reference to the 
1  Thus,  for  example,  the  explanatory  memorandum  concerning  the  draft  which  became 
the Belgian Law of 28  November 1928  and the report of the Commission de la Chambre, 
state  that  the  studies  and  discussions  which  had  preceded  the  drafting  of  the  Hague 
Rules  (relating  to  bills  of lading in particular)  must be read  together  with the rules  of 
the Belgian  law in  interpreting the  latter  (Cf.  Pasinomie  1928,  pp. 477  and 478).  Cf.  in 
particular the judgment of the Cour de Cassation of Belgium  of 8 July 1955  which  was 
based on those works (Bulletin et Pasicrisie 1955, p. 1220 and note). 
III-95 history and evolution of the institutions and law of the Roman Republic and 
Empire, or of the institutions and the law which have grown .up in particular 
in  Great Britain  - the  meaning  and  scope  of  concepts  which  have  been 
adopted without explanation or justification in provisions of enacted law or 
even in principles of law. This holds good as  regards the meaning and scope 
of  the  concept,  recognized  in  particular in  French  and Belgian .law,  of the 
'enactment  of  the  law' 1,  and  the  principle  that  with  regard  to  chattels 
possession amounts to ownership (Article 2279 of the Civil Code). 2 
I have placed the word 'method' in inverted commas because I consider that 
it is  not so much a  'method' as  a. means of determining - in particular by 
using  parliamentary  proceedings  or  preparatory  documents  of  other 
institutions - the meaning, scope, objective and aim of provisions laid down 
by law or regulation or of concepts adopted by such provisions. 
It cannot be denied that this method or means has its  limits:  the documents 
constituting  the  'preparatory  work'  must  be  available  for  consultation  by 
the  courts  and  by  the  persons  concerned;  they  cannot  lead  the  courts  to 
ignore the actual wording of the law or of the regulation and it is  clear that 
they can only be taken into consideration in so far as they provide a definite 
explanation  of  the meaning  which  was  conferred  on  the  words  by  the 
parliamentary  majority,  where  the  'law'  in  question  is  the  result  of  the 
deliberations and the decisions  of legislative assemblies.  Scrutiny of the said 
works makes it possible,  on the one hand, to  ignore  documents  containing 
declarations or considerations which have no effect on the determination of 
the meaning and scope of the provision to be interpreted and, on the .other, 
to  discover  and  at the same  time  to  take account  of  documents  revealing 
information,. declarations or considerations from  which the meaning,  scope, 
intention and objective may be interpreted or established. 
1  Lafferriere,  'De  l'authenticite  du  texte  des  lois  publiees  au  journal  Officiel',  Revue  du 
Droit Public et de la Science Politique 1949,  pp. 117  et seq.;  J.  B.  Herzog et G.  Vlachos, 
'La  promulgation,  Ia  signature  et  Ia  publication  des  textes  legislatifs  en  droit  compare' 
(Travaux et recherches  de  l'lnstitut de  droit compare  de  l'Universite  de  Paris);  Opinions 
relating to the judgment of the Cour de Cassation of Belgium of 14 January 1976, Rechts-
kundig Weekblad, 1975/76, Columns 1745 et seq. 
2  Planiol and Ripert write in this respect (Traite Elementaire du Droit Civil, Volume I, 12th 
Edition,  No 2459):  'It is  probable that in our laws  there is  no provision which provides 
a better explanation of the need for historical studies in order to understand modern law'. 
With regard to the provision in Article 20  (5)  and (6)  of the Belgian Law of 26 December 
1851  on secured  debts  and mortgages  (a  provision  repeating French  legislation),  of.  also 
Planiol and Ripert, Op. cit., No 1543  et seq. 
III-96 Authors  in  a  number  of  countries  have  dwelt  on  the  problem  of  the 
authority  of  'preparatory  work',  some  are  in  favour  of  consulting  them, 
whilst others reject them unreservedly. 1 
Nevertheless,  recourse to preparatory work appears to me  to  be not merely 
useful  but on  many  occasions  indispensable.  I  consider  that  those  who 
oppose consulting it quite fail  to  take account of  the  innumerable present-
day laws  which  are of a very  technical  nature and, inevitably,  by  no means 
easy to understand. I  am thinking in  particular of economic legislation  and 
even  more  of  tax  legislation.  In  order  to  understand  the  provisions 
submitted to  members  of legislative  assemblies  it is  very  often  necessary  to 
provide explanations, cite examples and explain and illustrate them. All  this 
is  done in explanatory memoranda, in the reports of commissions, orally in 
the course of public discussions or through additional explanations furnished 
by  the minister who  submits  the proposed legislation.  It is  on the basis  of 
those  examples  and  explanations  etc.  that  the  members  of  legislative 
assemblies vote and thus give their approval to the provision submitted. 
Despite this, some people wish to deny access to the preparatory work which 
allowed  the  legislative  assemblies  to  come  to  their  decision,  although  the 
courts  are,  after  these  assemblies,  the  institutions  which  are  obliged  to 
clarify  the. meaning  and  the  scope  of  the  complex  laws  which  have  been 
passed! This really seems to me to be scarcely defensible. 
Preparatory work - Reference to such works by international and 
national courts 
Before  I  analyse  the  attitude of the  Court of  Justice  to  'preparatory work' 
let  us  consider  the  attitude  of international  and  national  courts  both with 
regard  to  international  treaties,  conventions  and  protocols  and  laws  and 
regulations etc. 
t  Cf.  in this  respect in particular (a)  F.  Frankfurter, 7he Reading of Statutes' in Essays  on 
Jurisprudence from the Columbia Law Review, New York 1963, pp. 59  and 60:  'Spurious 
use of legislative history must not swallow the legislation so  as  to  give  point to the quip 
that only when legislative  history is  doubtful do  you go to the statute. While  courts are 
no longer confined to the language, they are still confined by it. Violence must not be done 
to the words chosen by the legislature. Unless  indeed no doubt can  be left that the legis-
lature has  in fact  used  a  private code,  so  that what appears  violence  to  the language  is 
merely respect to special usage. In the end, language and external aids, each accorded the 
authority  deserved  in  the  circumstances  must  be  weighed  in  the  balance  of  judicial 
judgment':  (b)  H.  Lauterpacht,  Les  Travaux  Preparatoires  et  l'Interpretation  des  Traites, 
Recueil  des  Cours,  Annuaire  de  Droit International  1934,  p.  713:  (c)  S.  Neri,  Sull'Inter-
pretazione dei Trattati, pp. 184-197. 
III-97 (i)  International courts 
I wish first of all to consider the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
of 23 May 1969. Article 31 thereof provides: 
'1.  A  treaty  shall  be  interpreted  in  good  faith  in  accordance  with  the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose. 
A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is  established that the ,parties 
so intended. 
2.  The  context for  the  purpose  of  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty  shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a)  Any  agreement  relating  to  the treaty which  was  made between  all 
the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) Any  instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion 
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties 
as an istrument related to the treaty. 
3.  There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a)  Any  subsequent  agreement  between  the  parties  regarding  the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) Any  subsequent  practice  in  the  application  of  the  treaty  which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c)  Any  relevant  rules  of  international  law  applicable  in  the  relations 
between the parties.' 
Article 32 of the same treaty further refers in particular to preparatory work. 
It provides: 
'Recourse may  be  had to supplementary means  of interpretation,  including 
the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its  conclusion, 
in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of Article 31, 
or to determine the meaning when, the interpretation according to Article 31: 
(a)  leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b)  leads to a result which is. manifestly absurd or unreasonable.' 
Charles  de  Visscher 1  states  first  of  all  that  the  Permanent  Court  of 
International Justice and then the International Court of  Justice will  or will 
1  'Problemes d'Interpretation judiciaire en Droit International Public', Op. cit., p. 116. 
111-98 not  have  recourse  to  preparatory  work,  depending  on  the  nature ·of  the 
wording,  and  writes  that:  'although  preparatory  work  must  always  be 
employed  with caution  it does  not involve  a  question  of  principle:  this 
depends  on  the  individual  case  and  on  common  sense.  As  always  in 
interpretation it is  necessary to avoid dogmatic attitudes and to be guided by 
the  requirements  of  judicial  logic  which,  as  we  have  seen,  are  those  of  a. 
flexible  mind.  The  latter  automatically  has  recourse  to  the  origin  of  an 
obscure passage  and uses  the discussions  which  led  to its  drafting ...  '.  He 
states:  'a report drawn up  by  a  committee at a  diplomatic  conference  and 
approved by  it usually  carries considerable weight.  Such  a report may even 
be  decisive  if  the  conference  confers  upon  it  the  status  of  an  authentic 
interpretation'. 
Lord  McNair 1  states:  'A document  forming  part of  the  preparatory work 
may  be  cited  only in so  far as  it can  be shown that the contracting parties 
jointly  agreed  on this  passage either by  a  resolution to be written into the 
minutes or in another way •..  '. 
Guggenheim  also  considers  that:  'the minutes  of negotiations often  contain 
declarations  which,  due  to  their  clarity,  are  of  prime  importance  in 
interpreting a treaty'. 2 
V.D.  Degan  wrote:  'In  the  case-law  of  the  International  Court  of  Justice 
this  process  of interpretation is  in general  adopted although it is  subject to 
many  important  limitations'. 3  In  his  opinion  in  Case  8/55  Mr Advocate-
General Lagrange declared:  'It is  indeed true that the statement of. grounds 
for  a  law,  like  the  other documents which  are  usually  classified  under the 
heading  of  "preparatory work",  has  no  binding  force  with  regard  to  the 
interpretation  of  the  wording  and in  particular  can  never  be  cited  against 
the  wording  itself  if  the  latter is  clear  and  unambiguous.  However  it  is 
universally  acknowledged  that  the  courts  may  have  recourse  to  it  for 
information and to derive from it factors which can, if necessary, throw light 
on  the  legislature's  thinking.  The  courts  certainly  enjoy  a  complete 
discretion  in  this  matter.  No  doubt,  if  a  treaty  is  concerned,  national 
documents relating to the ratification procedure can show only the thinking 
or the intention of  one of  the  signatory  governments.  Nevertheless  it  must 
not  be  presumed  that  when  a  government  submits  the  Treaty  to  its 
parliament for  ratification it  would express  a  view  which  it knew was  not 
shared by the parliaments of other signatory States ...  '. 
1  P.  Guggenheim, 'Traite de Droit International Public', Vol.  1, 2nd Edition, p. 258, Note 6. 
2  Cf. Guggenheim cited supra at p. 260. 
8  Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europeen 1966, p. 189 et seq. 
111-99 In  his  opmwn in  Case  2/74  [1974]  ECR  at  p.  666  Mr Advocate-General 
Mayras  also  excluded  recourse  to  the  preparatory  work  of  treaties.  He 
stated:  'The  States,  signatories  to  the  Treaty  of  Rome,  have  themselves 
excluded all recourse to the preparatory work and it is very doubtful whether 
the reservations and declarations, inconsistent as they are ... can be regarded 
as  constituting true preparatory work. Nor can they be held against the new 
Members  of  the  enlarged  Community ... Above  all  you  have  yourselves 
rejected,  on several  occasions,  recourse  to such  a  method of interpretation 
by asserting the content and objectives of the provisions of the Treaty'. 
This opinion gives rise to two considerations: 
1.  It may  be  wondered why preparatory work - if recourse  may  be  had 
to them - are not applicable to the new Member States.  Those States have 
acceded to the Treaties as they exist, that is  to say with their spirit, aim and 
objectives ...  which may be deduced from the preparatory work. 
2.  'The  objectives'  of  the  Treaties  are  indeed  an  essential  factor  in 
interpreting  the  wording of  the  Treaties.  But  is  it  not in  fact  possible  to 
discern these objectives from the preparatory work? 
The  report  of  the  International  Law  Commission  which  drafted  the 
Convention of 23 May 1969  considered in  this  connexion:  'A Member State 
which accedes to a treaty which it has not helped to draft is  perfectly entitled 
to see the preparatory work before consenting to accede'. 1  It is  stated above 
in  this  report  (p. 56):  'The  Commission  (nevertheless)  considered  that  it 
would be scarcely realistic or appropriate to assert in the draft of the article 
that recourse might not be had to external means of interpretation such  as 
preparatory work so long as the application of the rules set out in Article 27 
(Article 31 of the Convention of 1969) has not shown that it is  impossible to 
deduce any clear or reasonable meaning from the wording'. 
In its  opinion on the interpretation of the Convention of 1919 on the Work 
of  Women  at  Night,  the  Permanent  Court  of  Justice  declared:  cThe 
preparatory work thus confirms the conclusions indicated by  a study of the 
wording  of  the  Convention,  that  is  to  say  that  there  is  no  valid  ground 
whatsoever for  interpreting Article  3  other than  in  accordance  with  the 
natural meaning of its wording'. 2 
1  Report  of  the  International  Law  Commission,  3  to  28  January  1966  and  4  May  to 
19  July 1966, General Assembly of the United Nations, Official Documents, 21st Session, 
Supplement No 9, p. 57. 
2  Permanent-Court of International Justice 1932, Series A-B, No 50 p. 380. 
III-100 (ii)  The national courts 
It  may  be  stated  that in  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  France,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands  and  Belgium 1  both  'administrative'  and 
other courts  have  recourse  in  varying degrees,  but generally  with prudence 
and caution, to preparatory work of the laws  of the legislature.  Frequently 
they have recourse in  addition to the statement of grounds, reports to heads 
of State, preambles ... preceding the text of orders, rulings, decrees ... 
It is generally stated that the practice differs in the United Kingdom. 
Lord Justice Scarman 2  has written in  this  connexion: 'If there be ambiguity, 
the courts would not look outside the context of the act to  resolve it. They 
would  not  look  to  "travaux  preparatoires"  or  to  Ministerial  declarations 
or to Government white papers and certainly never to parliamentary debates, 
to explain enacted words lest they find themselves treating as  law something 
which was not enacted. The Courts have in  the past said to Parliament: we 
accept your intrusion into our affairs as  irresistible, but we will not allow it 
to go one iota further than the enacted words of your statute'. 
Lord  Justice  Scarman  emphasizes  however  that  in  practice  courts  take 
account of reports of commissions which prepared the work of the legislative 
bodies  and  of  other  documents  which  may  provide  information  as  to  the 
facts,  circumstances  and  problems  which  give  rise  to  the  legislation. 
Parliamentary  debates  themselves  are  not  used.  'It  has  sometimes  been 
suggested  that we  should  not  have  regard  to  the  reports  of  the  Law 
Commission  which  lead  to  legislation.  But we  think we  should.  They  are 
most helpful  in  showing the mischief which Parliament intended to remedy' 
(by  Lord Denning, Wachtel v Wachtel  (1973),  2 W.L.R.  366, 375).  Cf.  also 
the  leading  case  of  Assam  Railways  and  Trading  Company  Ltd.  v 
Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1935) A.C. 445. 3 
In  the  Scandinavian  countries  the  courts  may  also  have  recourse  to 
preparatory  work  especially  in  order  to  discover  the  circumstances  which 
gave rise to the legislation. 4 
1  Cf.  the  judgment  of  8  July  1955,  above  cited,  and  of 4  May  1972,  of  the  Cour  de 
Cassation (Bulletin et Pasicrisie  1972,  I,  806)  which  adopted the preparatory works  as  its 
basis in interpreting an international treaty. 
2  The Approach of British Courts to Legislation, p. 7. 
a  Cf.  also  Lord Upjohn  in  Beswick  v  Beswick  (1968)  A.C.  58,  at p.  105  Regina v  Hyam 
(1973) 3 W.L.R. 475 at 481-482. 
4  Folke Schmidt, 'Construction of Statutes',  SSL  1957  (1)  155-198 Stig. Stroholm, 'Legislative 
Material and Construction of Statutes', SSL 1966 (10)  193-218. 
N. S.  Marsh 'Interpretation in a National and International Context' (Brussels 1973), p. 79. 
111-101 C - Preparatory  work - The Court of Justice  of the  European 
Communities 
(i)  Initial considerations 
The consultation  of preparatory work clearly  depends  on it being possible 
to have  recourse  to  it.  In  this  connexion it should be  stated  that the pre-
paratory work to the three  basic  Treaties  has remained  of a  secret or con-
fidential  nature.  A collection of extracts of  the essential points in the 'Val-
Duchesse' discussions which was prepared by two lawyers has never to this 
day  been  published.  The  only  document  which  has  been  published  is  the 
Rapport des  Chefs de Delegation aux Ministres des Affaires Etrangeres  (the 
'Spaak  report')  which  moreover  contains  information  which  sometimes 
clearly indicates the intention of the negotiators (this  is  so for example with 
regard to equal rights for men  and women which forms  the subject-matter 
of Article  119  of the EEC  Treaty).  Furthermore,  in  the  course of the pro-
cedures for approving the Treaties in the national parliaments, several pro-
visions  of the  Treaties  formed  the subject-matter of public  debates  and it 
appears  that  the  competent  ministers  took  particular  pains  to  confer  a 
common interpretation on the Treaties. 
Subsequent  international  European  conventions,  such  as  the  Protocols  of 
3  June  1971,  signed  at Luxembourg 1  were  accompanied  by  statements  of 
grounds or common 'reports'. 
These  statements  of  grounds  or  reports  were  submitted  to  the  national 
parliaments or to certain national parliaments in the course of the procedures 
for  approving  both the  Protocols  and  the  International  Convention  signed 
at Brussels  on 29 February and 27 September 1968  to which they relate. 
In  the  opening  sections  of  regulations,  directives  and  decisions  there  are 
'preambles' and 'recitals' which  explain  the meaning  and scope  of the pro-
visions which they contain. 
It may  be  wondered  whether  the  minutes  relating  in  particular  to  the 
'preliminaries' to decisions  may be taken into consideration by  the courts. 2 
Be that as it may it seems to me that the Court of Justice was very wise when 
it  decided  on  18  February  1970 3  that the  scope  and  effect  of  a  decision 
1  The  Protocols  of  3  June  1971  conferring  jurisdiction  on  the  Court  of  Justice  to give 
preliminary  rulings  on  the  interpretation  of  the  international  Conventions  signed  in 
Brussels on 29 February and 27 September 1968. 
2  Certain  national  'administrative'  courts  have  recourse  to them  in  particular in  order  to 
appraise the 'legality' or validity of a measure or decision. 
3  Case 38/69 [1970]  ECR 47. 
III-102 adopted  by  the  Council  by  virtue  of  Article  235  of  the  EEC  Treaty  must 
be  assessed  in  the  light  of  its  terms  and  therefore  could  not  be  restricted 
by  reservations  or declarations  which  might have  been  made  in  the  course 
of preparatory discussions  or which  might  emerge  from  the minutes  of  the 
meeting of the Council; such a decision is  adopted 'within the context of the 
institutions  and  is  thus  in  the  nature of  an  international  agreement  rather 
than a Community measure'. 
A  'Staff  regulations'  body  provides  opm10ns  on  the  arrangements  to  be 
adopted with regard to the rights and duties of officials. Sometimes the Court 
of Justice has regard to  them.  However the problem which obviously arises 
with  such  'preparatory  documents'  is  that  of  publicity:  how  can  a  court 
take them into  account when  the persons  concerned  do not have  access  to 
them? 
(ii)  Recourse  by  the  Court  of  Justice  and  by  the  Advocates-
General to the 'preparatory work' 
I have indicated above the views of Advocates-General Lagrange and Mayras 
on recourse to the preparatory work to the basic European Treaties. 1 
The preparatory work relating to the procedures  for  the approval  of those 
Treaties by the national parliaments were cited in particular by Mr Advocate-
General Roemer.  Thus, in  relation to Article 33  of the ECSC  Treaty which 
provides  that,  'the Court may  not examine the  evaluation  of  the  situation, 
resulting  from  economic  facts  or  circumstances,  in  the  light  of which  the 
High Authority took its decisions  or made its  recommendations, save where 
the  High  Authority  is  alleged ...  ', the  distinguished  Member  of  the  Court 
stated in  his  opinion in  Case 6/54:  'It is  important to  establish  the reasons 
which gave rise  to the restriction of the review by the Court. The statement 
of grounds  by  the  German  Government  states  in  this  connexion:  "With 
regard  to  the  extent of  the  review  by  the  Court ...  ". We  can  furthermore 
cite the report of the French delegation ... In our view the Court will require 
to take account of the statements of grounds of the instruments of ratification 
submitted  to  the  parliaments  of  other  countries.  In  our view  they  do  not 
indicate any divergence of opinion on this point'. 
In  its  judgment of 16 December 1960 2  the Court, in  order to determine the 
scope  of  the  provision  in  the  Protocol  on  the  Privileges  and  Immunities 
1  Opinion of Mr Advocate-General Lagrange in Case 8/56 and the opinion of Mr Advocate-
General  Mayras  in  Case  2/74.  Cf.  also  the  opinion  of  8  April  1976  of  Mr  Advocate-
General Trabucchi in Case 43/75, Defrenne. 
2  Case 6/60, Humblet, Recueil1960, p. 1130. 
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from national charges, held that: cthe  statements of grounds submitted by the 
governments on occasion of the parliamentary debates on the ECSC  Treaty 
are silent on this point ... This is  also the case with regard to the vote of the 
parliaments  on the EEC  and EAEC  Treaties  which  contain  a  substantially 
identical  provision  as  the  majority  of the  government statements,  with  the 
exception  of  the  statement  by  the  Luxembourg  Government  with  regard 
to the EAEC Treaty passed over this point in silence ... Apart from the fact 
that this  passage  (of  the Luxembourg memorandum)  refers  to the Protocol 
annexed to the Treaty of Rome and not to the ECSC Protocol it cannot by 
itself  prove  that the  authors  of those  Treaties  all  concurred  of  the  inter-
pretation thus advocated'. The Court then had recourse 'to a comparison of 
different national laws'. It considered that: 'whilst it is  true that the finance 
law of the French Republic is guided by the same concepts as Belgian case-law 
and practice it is  clear from  the law of the Federal  German  Republic  that 
the latter has interpreted the Protocol in the manner advocate by the appli-
cant ... and that the German legislature accordingly does not share the view 
of the Belgian administration ...  '. 
(iii)  Regulations, directives ... Recourse to the 'preamble' and to 
the 'recitals' ... 
In its  judgment of 15  October 1969 1  the Court held that:  'according to the 
seventh  recital  of the  preamble to the  regulation  in  question ... the  eighth 
recital of the same preamble states ... Taken as a whole these factors indicate 
anxiety to ensure for  the processing  industries  of the  Member States ... It 
must therefore be assumed that the authors of the first paragraph of Article 16 
intended . . .  This  solution  is  confirmed  by  the  penultimate  recital  of  the 
preamble to the said regulation according to which ...  '. 
In  its  judgment  of  4  October  1972 2  the  Court  interpreted  Regulation 
No 565/68 of 24 April1968 which provided for the non-fixing of an additional 
amount  for  slaughtered  fowls  originating  in  and  coming  from  the  Polish 
People's  Republic.  The judgment held:  'It is  clear  from  the  recitals  of the 
preamble to that regulation that this  exemption was granted as  a  result, on 
the one hand, of the guarantee given by the Government of the Polish People's 
Republic  that  exports  would  only  be  made  by  the  State  foreign  trade 
agency ... which would not deliver the said products at free-at-frontier prices 
1  Case 14/69, Markus v Hauptzollamt Hamburg-jonas [1969]  ECR 349. 
2  Case 9/72, Brunner [1972]  ECR 961:  [1972]  CMLR 931. 
111-104 lower than  the  sluice-gate  prices  and,  on  the  other,  of  its  undertaking  to 
enable the Commission to exercise continuous supervision of the effectiveness 
of the measures it has taken ...  '. 
When the Court in its  above-mentioned judgment of 23  January 1975  (Case 
31/74, Galli),  interpreted Regulation No 120/67 on cereals  the Court stated 
that: 'So as to ensure the freedom  of internal trade the regulation comprises 
a  set  of  rules  intended  to  eliminate  both  the  obstacles  to  free  movement 
of goods  and all  distortions in intra-Community trade due to  market inter-
vention  by  Member  States  other  than  that  authorized  by  the  regulation 
itself'.  The Court continued:  'This  objective  is  emphasized  by  the fifteenth 
recital  of the preamble according  to  which ... and by  the  sixteenth  recital 
according to which ...  '. 
1 
Confirming the view which he already expressed in the opinion cited above 
Mr  Advocate-General  Mayras  considered  in  his  opinion  in  Case  190/73 
2 
that: 'Rather curiously, from this account of the successive preparatory stages 
of the regulation the Commission nonetheless concludes that this Community 
provision does not exclude the intervention of "supplementary measures" ... 
I do not think I can follow them along this track. First, because this would 
amount to interpreting Regulation No 234/68 through its preparatory stages 
looking for the intentions, the motives of the Community legislator, a course 
which  the  Court has  always  refused  to take.  I  believe  that a  more certain 
method in this respect would be to take the regulation as it is - an objective 
text, binding in its entirety and of course having direct effect- and to base 
my interpretation upon the specific wording of its provisions and its general 
tenor'. 
It seems to me that to base an interpretation 'upon the general tenor' does not 
necessarily  exclude  recourse  to  the  preparatory  work.  The  latter  makes  it 
possible  to  determine  what constitutes  the  general  tenor of  the  regulation. 
In  its  judgment  of  26  June  1975 3  the  Court  had  to  decide  whether  the 
Council's  refusal  to  adjust the salaries  of officials,  notwithstanding the fact 
that the annual specific  indices  used  for  the purposes  of fixing  the salaries 
were  inaccurate,  constituted  an  infringement  of  the  rules  of  law  and  in 
particular of the rule of legitimate confidence which the officials and servants 
might have that the decision  previously  adopted by the  Council  on 20  and 
21  March  1972  would  be  implemented.  It certainly  appears  that in  order 
1  Cf. also in particular Case 93/74 [1975]  ECR 661, and Case 5/75 [1975]  ECR 759. 
2  [1947]  ECR 1141. 
3  Case 70/74 [1975]  ECR 795. 
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the report of the Council's working party on Staff Regulations approved by 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives. 
The Court held that the decision  of March 1972 provided that 'the specific 
index' would be  constituted by  the index of the variation of public salaries 
drawn up by the Statistical  Office  of the European Communities in  accord-
ance with the method used  until  now but with certain improvements  (N.B. 
the decision thus referred to a 'method used until now' and it was necessary 
to take it into account). 
The Court continued: 'this method had previously been fixed by the Council's 
Working Party on Staff Regulations in  a report approved by  the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives at its  meeting on ... According to this  report 
the concept of salaries should take account of ... The improvements envis-
aged  by  the  Decision  of  20  and  21  March  1972  have  as  their  object  an 
improved  harmonization of the  calculating methods  applied  by  the various 
national administrations and to  ensure that the Commission is  more comp-
letely informed, but do not call in question the basis of the method previously 
laid  down,.  The  Court  further  stated  that:  'No  doubt  this  same  report 
provided for the possibility of the Commission putting forward, where appro-
priate, factors  for consideration other than those resulting from the method 
adopted, but it left the Council free with regard to taking them into account'. 
3 - Comparative law 
I have already explained above (Section 3, introduction, in fine)  the meaning 
and scope which I ascribe here to the concept of 'comparative law'. 
It plays a double role in the task of interpretation which the Court of Justice 
undertakes. 
On the one hand, by consulting the law of the Member States, especially the 
case-law of the national courts, the Court of Justice can obtain information 
which makes it easier to solve the problems submitted to it and, in particular, 
to clarify  the rules  of the European  Treaties  and even  those  of regulations 
and directives  and the  concepts  to which the latter relate.  Certain of those 
concepts at least are common to the laws of the Member States, a situation 
which is to be expected. 
On the other hand,  the general  or other principles  on which  the European 
Treaties  are based,  constructed or supplemented  and which  thus  form  part 
of European law flow from the laws of the Member States. Those laws must 
thus be scrutinized. 
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indication or model and thus facilitate  or can  facilitate  the 
solution of a problem submitted to the Court of justice. 
When,  in  its  judgment of  12  July 1957, 1  the  Court of  Justice had to settle 
the  question  whether  it  is  permissible  to  annul  administrative  measures 
which  give  rise  to  individual  rights,  in  particular  measures  appointing 
officials, the Court held that 'this point constitutes a problem of administrat-
ive  law  which  is  well  known in  the  case-law  and  legal  writings  of  all  the 
countries  in  the  Community  but  the  Treaty  contains  no  rule  for  its 
solution ... The Court ... is  thus obliged to solve the problem on the basis 
of the rules recognized by the laws, legal writing and case-law of the Member 
Countries'. 
Perhaps written laws in  certain Member States  expressly provide a solution 
to this problem, but in other States the solution is found simply by deduction 
from  the  necessary  coordination  and  harmonization  between  two  or more 
rules.  We shall  return to this  point in  Chapter V,  in which the question of 
the harmonization and coordination of rules is considered. 
In  his  opinion in  Case  12/74, Commission v Federal  Republic of Germany, 
Mr Advocate-General  Warner quoted  three  English  cases  and  one Scottish 
case in  order to  clarify  concepts  or his  views  with regard to the protection 
of registered designations of origin. 
In  connexion  with  the  interpretation  of  Article  16  of  the  Protocol  on  the 
Privileges and Immunities, annexed to the ECSC Treaty, the Court considered 
whether or not all  means  of redress  under national law must be  exhausted 
before proceedings  are brought before it.  The Court held that 'the problem 
must be  considered  in  the light  of  the general  structure of  the  Treaty and 
of the rules of law generally recognized in the Member States'. 2 
Mr Advocate-General  Lagrange  considered  the  law  of  the  Member  States 
before putting forward his solution to the question whether, when an applica-
tion is lodged against a decision bringing a matter before the Court of Justice 
under  Article  177  of  the  EEC  Treaty,  the  Court  remains  seised  of  the 
application (Opinion in Case 13/61 3). 
In  his  opinion  in  Joined  Cases  48,  49  and  57/69,  the  dyestuffs  cases,  Mr 
Advocate-General  Mayras  referred  not  only  to  the  laws  of  the  Member 
1  Cases 7/56 and 3 to-7/57, Recueil 1957, p. 85. 
2  Judgment of 16 December 1960 in Case 6/60, Humblet, cited above. 
3  Mr Advocate-General Lagrange stated that:  'We must ... in accordance with the practice 
of this  Court ... take account of the general  principles  contained in the national law of 
the  Member States'.  ([1962]  ECR 45).  Cf.  the  opinion  of  Mr Advocate-General  Mayras 
in Case 127/73  (Judgment a£ 30 January 1974 [1974]  ECR 51). 
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in order to determine whether, within the meaning of Article 85  of the EEC 
Treaty,  the  Community  authorities  have  jurisdiction  over  undertakings 
established outside the Common Market and whose agreements or concerted 
practices affect trade within the Common Market. 1 
(B)  Recourse  to  the  laws  of Member States  m  order  to  clarify 
a concept of Community law 
In his opinion in Case 3/54 
2  (Judgment of 11  February 1955), Mr Advocate-
General  Lagrange  reviewed  at  length  the  meaning  and  scope  in  the  six 
Member States of the concepts of 'misuse of powers' or of equivalent concepts 
which might be contained in a wider concept. 
In its  judgment of 21  June 1958 3  the Court defined the meaning and scope 
of  the  concept  of  the  equality  of  the  persons  concerned  with  regard  to 
economic arrangements, referring to  'a principle generally recognized in the 
law of the Member States'. 
(C)  Recourse to the laws of the Member States in order to discern 
a  principle  of law forming  part  of Community law 
As  a typical example of this, I should like to cite the judgment of the Court 
of 5 June 1973 4  and in particular the opinion delivered in that case by Mr 
Advocate-General Warner. The case involved the question whether both the 
principle, 'patere legem  quam ipse  fecisti',  and the principle that the 'legiti-
mate  confidence', in  particular of those  subject  to  an  administration,  must 
be protected, exist in the laws  of the Member States  and, if  so,  what their 
meaning and scope were. 
4 - Interpretation by recourse to rules of a 'lower order' than the 
rule to be interpreted 
Further recourse to the subsequent attitudes of the 'High Con-
tracting Parties' or of other authorities 
(A)  Rules of a 'lower order' 
The view has often been put forward that, in its judgment of 6 April 1962, 
5 
the  Court interpreted,  at least  in  part,  the  scope of Article  85  of the  EEC 
1  The Advocates-General  very  often  invoke  the  laws  of the  Member States  in  support of 
their opinions in other contexts, too. 
2  Recueil 1954/1955, p. 146. 
3  Case 8/57, Recueil 1958, p. 225. 
4  Case 81/72 [1973]  ECR 575:  [1973]  CMLR 639. 
5  Case 13/61, de Geus v Bosch and van Rijn [1962]  ECR 45. 
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Nevertheless  I  do  not in  fact  consider  that it  can  be  held  that the  Court 
followed this method in this  case.  In  reality the Court had to interpret both 
Article 85 and Regulation No 17. 
In its  judgment of 8 May 1974 1  the  Court did  indeed hold that 'the Com-
mission's Explanatory Notes' constituted an important factor in interpreting 
the  Common Customs Tariff but it ruled that the Notes 'cannot modify its 
text nor the introductory Notes to the Chapters, which are an integral part 
of the Tariff'. 
In the view  of the  national  courts  it  is  scarcely  defensible  that a  provision 
should be interpreted in the light of a provision having inferior status: it is 
not for  the  legislature  to  interpret  the  constitution,  nor for  the  executive 
authority to interpret the laws. 
Certain fine shades of meaning in European law as  in international law may 
be  borne in  mind.  A treaty  is  signed  by  the Government with the  support 
of  a  simple  parliamentary  majority.  This  majority  'approves'  (in  certain 
States  at least)  the  treaty  signed  by  the  government or,  more  precisely,  by 
the  executive  authority,  or for  the  Head  of  State  vested  with  ministerial 
authority. Under a parliamentary system  a minister who is  a member of the 
Council  of  Ministers  of  the  European  Communities  when  a  regulation  is 
adopted also requires to have the backing of a simple parliamentary majority 
in  order  validly  to  represent  his  State.  The  situation  is,  of  course,  quite 
different with regard to the regulations of the Commission: those regulations 
are adopted by  a different authority from that which gave its consent to the 
making or to the approval of the treaty. 
(B)  Subsequent attitude 
As  we  have  already seen,  Article  31  (3)  of the International Convention of 
1969  on the Law of Treaties provides as  follows:  'There shall be taken into 
account, together with the context:  (a) ... (h)  any subsequent practice in the 
application  of  the  treaty  which  establishes  the  agreement  of  the  parties 
regarding its interpretation. 2 
1  Case 183/73  [1974] ECR 477. 
2  The previously-cited report of the International Law Commission (January 1966, Monaco, 
General Assembly,  Official documents, 21st Session, p. 55)  stated in particular: 'Subsequent 
practice in the  application of the treaty is  clearly an important element of interpretation 
since  it  constitutes  objective  evidence  of  the  agreement  to  the  Permanent  Court  of 
Arbitration,  'the  implementation  of  undertakings,  between  States  as  between  individual 
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employing this method in its judgment of 1 December 1960. 1 In this case the 
Court  held  in  particular:  'In  this  respect  it  must  be  recognized  that it  is 
impossible to discern a common view of the Member States which is  capable 
of serving as  a criterion in the interpretation of Article 11  (b)  of the Protocol'. 
Whilst  subsequent  practice  may  constitute  an  element  of  interpretation  in 
the case  of a  convention  between two States  or of obligations between two 
or more States ... it appears to me that the situation is  different with regard 
to  the interpretation  of the European  Treaties,  which  are  not restricted  to 
determining rights and duties as between States. 
In national law, of course, an earlier law may be interpreted in  the light of 
a more recent law. 2• 3In its  judgment of 5 February 1976 in  Case 95/75 the 
Court  of  Justice  interpreted  Regulation  No  142/69  of  the  Commission  in 
terms  of Regulation  No 700/73, which replaced  the Former and which  was 
not applicable to the case before the Court. 
A provision of a constitution may also be interpreted in the light of another, 
earlier constitutional provision. 
The  attitude  of  the  'High  Contracting  Parties'  is,  however,  quite  another 
matter. 
(Footnote 2 of previous page continued) 
persons,  constitutes  the  most  reliable  footnote  as  to  the  meaning  of  their  obligations 
(Recueil  des  Sentences  Arbitrales,  Vol.  IX,  11,  p.  433)  ... Recourse  to  this  practice as  a 
means  of interpretation is  firmly  established in the case-law of international courts'. The 
report cites the advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of Justice on the powers of the 
International Labour Organization and the judgment of that court in the Corfu Channel 
Case (International Court of Justice, Recueil 1949, p. 25). 
V.T.  Degan  (Revue  Trimestrielle  de  Droit Europeen  1966,  p.  189  et seq.)  also  cites  the 
judgment of 15  June  1962  of the International Court of Justice in the Temple de  Preah 
Vihear Case (Recueil1962, p. 32-33. 
1  Case 6/60, Humblet [1960]  Recueil 1154. 
2  On 11  June 1956  the Cour de  Cassation of Belgium  decided  (Bulletin  et Pasicrisie  1956, 
I,  1133)  that a court may interpret a law on the basis of its general structure by referring 
to the preparatory works of another law (that is  to say, of a previous law dealing with the 
same subject-matter). 
3  As  Cardozo  puts  it:  'There  are  times  when  uncertain  words  are  to  be  wrought  into 
consistency  and  unity  with  a  legislative  policy  which  is  itself  a  source  of law,  a  new 
generative impulse transmitted to the legal system' (cited by Dean Acheson in the Michigan 
Law Review 1938, 520). 
III-110 CHAPTER V 
General survey of the work of the Court of 
Justice in the field  of interpretation 
Section 1 - Consultation of texts - Texts in different 
languages 
The  wording  is  clearly  important,  indeed  of  fundamental  im-
portance;  no-one  would  dream  of  disputing  the  importance  of the  words, 
terms and expressions employed by the 'legislator'. 
In its advisory opinion of 15  September 1923 the Permanent Court of Justice 
stressed that 'the duty of the Court is  clearly defined; when it is  faced with 
a  provision  lacking  nothing in  clarity,  it is  bound to  apply  it as  it stands 
without the necessity of wondering ...  ' 
1 
On 3  March 1950  the  International  Court reiterated:  'The Court considers 
it necessary  to state that the first  duty of a  court called  upon to interpret 
and apply the provisions of a  treaty is  to endeavour to give  effect to them, 
taken in their context, in accordance with their natural and ordinary meaning. 
If, when the words in question are given their natural and ordinary meaning, 
they make sense in their context, scrutiny must then cease. 
2 
1  Series B, No 7, p. 20. 
2  Opinion cited by de Visscher, Op. Cit., p. 52. 
See  also  the  opinion  of Commissaire  du gouvernement  Corneille in  connexion  with the 
judgment of the Conseil d'Etat of France of 18 March 1921: 
'Learned  writers  state  that  resort  must  be  had  to  interpretation  if the  drafting  of  the 
legislator  is  in  itself  rather  contradictory  and  does  not have  a  full  and  clear  meaning. 
When  resort  must  be  had  to  interpretation,  the  first  method  to  be  employed  is 
grammatical  or  literal  interpretation  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  determine  the  exact 
meaning of a  word or words with the help  of  the  usage  of the  language  and the rules 
of syntax. Laws enacted by the French Parliament must, in principle, be drafted in French. 
If the  process  of  literal  interpretation  does  not  suffice  or  requires  confirmation  the 
process of reasoned and logical interpretation must also be employed.' 
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a  decision whether a  provision is  clear necessitates  already  being embarked 
on  a  certain  degree  of  interpretation.  The  maxim  'interpretatio  cessat  in 
claris'  is  certainly  dangerous.  As  the  eminent  judge  Anzilotti  has  indeed 
stated: 'I do not understand how it can be said that an article in a convention 
is clear before the objective or the aim of the convention has been established, 
as it is only within and in relation to that convention that the article acquires 
its  true  meaning.  It is  only  when  one knows  what the  contracting parties 
intended to do and the aim which they wished to attain that one can ascertain 
either that in  their natural meaning,  the words  used  in  a  particular article 
accord with the real intention of the parties or that, in their natural meaning, 
the words employed fall short of or go beyond that intention. The first thing 
to  be  done,  therefore,  is  to ascertain  the subject-matter and the aim  of the 
convention which contains the article to be interpreted. 1 
The clarity of a word, expression or concept must, moreover, be considered 
with  considerable  care  when  the  instruments  in  question,  like  the  treaties, 
regulations and directives of the European Communities are common to nine 
Member  States  and  must  be  interpreted  and  applied  inter  alia  by  courts 
which  are  accustomed  to  apply  national  laws  which  none  the  less  diverge 
significantly. 
Often the instruments are clear and precise but nevertheless they have mani-
festly  failed  exactly  to  express  the  intention  of  the  legislator  or,  as  those 
who  refuse  to  attach  any  importance  whatsoever  to  that intention  would 
say,  they  have  a  meaning  and  scope  which  conflict  with  what the  law or 
regulation must, of necessity, be read as intending to do. 
As  an example I should like to refer to the question which had to be settled 
by  the  judgment of  17  May 1972. 
2  According to Article  28  of Annex VIII 
to the Staff Regulations of Officials, the divorced wife of an official is entitled 
to a survivor's pension 'if the court which pronounced the decree of divorce 
found  that the  official  was  solely  to  blame'.  The Staff  Regulations  further 
state that the amount to which the divorced wife is entitled shall not be more 
than the amount of the maintenance 'awarded to her under the decree'. 
In the case in question, in  accordance with national law, the amount of the 
maintenance had not been awarded under the decree. 
1  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  Series  A-B,  No  50,  p.  383,  Interpretation  of 
the Convention of 1919 concerning the Work of Women by Night. 
2  Case 24/71  [1972]  ECR 269:  [1973]  CMLR 136. 
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obligation to pay maintenance by a judicial decision when the law governing 
the consequences of the divorce does not recognize or, at all events, does not 
require recourse to such a decision, would in such cases frustrate the exercise 
of the right to a survivor's pension ... This could not have been the intention 
of the authors of the Staff  Regulations.  Therefore, the final  sentence of  the 
first paragraph of Article 28  cannot be  interpreted as  excluding other means 
of proving the obligation to pay maintenance which are required or accepted 
by the law governing the consequences of the divorce'. 
The  courts,  and  the  Court  of  Justice,  generally  give  words  their  usua] 
meaning. 
1 
It is  self-evident  that the  Court is  very  often  obliged  to  confer  on words 
the meaning which they normally bear in the field referred to by the provision 
to be interpreted. Thus in its  judgment of 16 December 1962 2  the Court of 
Justice  considered  that  it  must  have  regard  to  the  meaning  employed  in 
'international tax terminology'. 
In its judgment of 18 May 1962 3  the Court established the meaning of certain 
words  in  Article  65  (1)  of  the  ECSC  Treaty by  reference  to  a  number of 
provisions of the Treaty and also to the provisions of Article 85  of the EEC 
Treaty, because the underlying purpose of the two provisions was the same. 4 
On perusing  the  judgment  of  11  July  1968  (Case  4/68) 
5  it will  be  clearly 
perceived  how dangerous,  and indeed ridiculous,  it is  to isolate a  provision 
from its  context. An  undertaking had been unable to effect the importation 
which it had bound itself  to  carry  out within  a  prescribed period and had 
consequently rendered itself liable to lose the deposit which it had to lodge. 
The undertaking thought that it was entitled to rely on a case of force ma;eure 
expressly referred to in Article 6 of Regulation No 136/64/EEC: it relied upon 
an  'engine  failure  in  dairy  machinery'.  The said  regulation  indeed  includes 
1  Cf.  in particular the judgment of  23  February  1961  in  Case 30/59,  Recueil  1961,  p.  3 in 
which  the  Court  exercised  caution  in  ascertaining  whether  the  usual  meaning  of  the 
words in  question fitted the system and the aims of the Treaty. The concepts in question 
were aids and subsidies. 
2  Case 6/60. 
s  [1962]  ECR 83. 
4  The International  Court  of  Justice  at  times  has  regard  for  the usual  meaning  of  words 
and at others it has  regard  for  a  special  meaning,  in  accordance with  the  cases  and the 
requirements  of  the  situation.  Cf.  advisory  opinion  of  28  May  1948  (Recueil  1947/48, 
p. 62)  and judgment of 27 August 1952 (Recueil1952, p.  195). 
5  [1968] ECR 377. 
111-113 'engine failure' amongst the cases of force majeure which are to be taken into 
consideration.  The  words  'engine  failure'  are  sufficiently  clear  but,  placed 
in  their  context,  that  is  to  say  viewed  in  conjunction  with  the  relevant 
provisions  as  a  whole,  it is  clear  that  they  cannot refer  to  engine  failures 
in dairy machinery because the regulation related only to engine failure in the 
context of navigation. 
Clearly the Court had to have regard to the meaning of the expressions and 
words but it was particularly careful. Even if the Court finds that a provision 
is  perfectly  clear  it  consults  the  Treaty  as  a  whole. 1  After  delivering  its 
interpretation on the  basis  of the wording,  the  Court ascertained  and held 
in  particular:  the  question  remains  whether the  conclusion  reached  by the 
Court,  guided  by  its  study  of  the  wording  and  the  ratio  legis,  does  not 
conflict  with  other  objectives  of  the  Treaty  or whether  it  is  liable  to  be 
invalidated by other considerations. 2 
In its  judgment of 13  July 1966 3  the Court, in reply to the submission that 
sole distributorship contracts did not fall within Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 
indeed found as  follows:  'Article 85  refers in a general way to all agreements 
which distort competition ... and does not lay down any distinction between 
those  agreements . . .  In  principle  no  distinction  can  be  made  where  the 
Treaty does  not make any distinction'. But it confirmed the outcome of its 
examination of the wording by invoking a logic explanation as well. 
In  reply  to  the  question  whether  the  other  person  to  whom  there  was 
addressed  a  decision  of  direct  and  individual  concern  to  an  applicant  can 
also  be  a  Member  State,  the  Court,  on  15  July  1963 4  decided  that  'the 
words  and the  natural meaning of this  provision  (the  second  paragraph of 
Article  173  of  the  EEC  Treaty)  justify  the  broadest  interpretation',  but it 
also  had regard to the nature and aim  of the provision in general and held 
that  'provisions  of  the  Treaty  regarding  the  right  of  interested  parties  to 
bring an action must not be interpreted restrictively ... Therefore, the Treaty 
being silent on this point, a limitation in this respect may not be presumed'. 
1  Judgment of 11  February  1955  in  Case 3/54  (Recueil  1954-55, p.  127).  The Court held: 
'Under  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  33  of  the  ECSC  Treaty,  the  wording  of  which 
is  perfectly clear, the requirements as  to admissibility are sufficiently met if the applicant 
formally  alleges  there has been a misuse  of powers affecting him ... The Treaty neither 
provides nor requires any additional condition for the admissibility of the application .. ,,, 
2  Judgment of 21  December 1954 in Case 2/54 (Recueil 1954-55, p. 77). 
3  Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 [1966]  ECR 299. 
4  Case 25/62 [1963]  ECR 95. 
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not ease  the  task of  interpretation.  Errors  in  translation  and  shades  of 
meaning introduced into a particular version may give  rise to differences  of 
interpretation  and  application.  Thus,  for  example,  the  Italian  and  German 
versions of Article 18  of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil  and Commercial matters differ from the French version, 
on which the preparatory discussions were based. 
Inconsistencies may be  found  both in the wording of the Treaty and in  the 
wording of secondary law. 
The  Court  of  Justice  has  encountered  this  problem  on  a  number  of 
occasions.  In  its  above-cited  judgment  of  12 November 1969 1  the  Court 
selected  the  version  which  allowed  the  most  liberal  interpretation  for  the 
beneficiaries of welfare measures adopted by the Community. In its judgment 
of  13 March 1973 2  the Court declared:  'No argument can  be  drawn either 
from  any  linguistic  divergeces  between  the  various  language  versions,  or 
from the multiplicity of the words used in one or other of those versions, as 
the meaning of the provisions in question must be determined with respect to 
their objective'. 3 
In  its  judgment  of  21 November 197  4 3  the  Court held:  'By  reason  of  the 
divergences that exist between the versions of this text in different languages 
it [Article 1 (  4)]  does not lend itself to a clear and uniform interpretation on 
the point in question. Accordingly, it must be interpreted by reference to the 
purpose  and  the  general  scheme  of  the  implementing  provisions  on  the 
treatment o£ another person as if he were a dependent child'. 
In  other words,  it is  necessary  to  have  regard  to  the  context  and,  m 
particular,  to  carry  out  a  systematic  analysis  of  the  regulation  and  of  its 
purpose. • 
Section 2  - The meaning  and scope of wide concepts 
ideas or definitions 
I  have  had occasion  to  mention  those  ideas,  definitions  or concepts  in  the 
course of considering the 'evolutive' interpretation. 
1  Case 29/69, Stauder [1969]  ECR 419. 
2  Case 61/72, Mij PPW International NV [1973]  ECR 310. 
3  In this case the Court did not, in fact, choose between the language versions. 
4  Cf.  judgment of the  Court of Justice of 1 December  1965,  Case  16/65  [1965]  ECR 877; 
and judgment of 8 May 1974, Case 183/73 [1974]  ECR 484. 
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such  as  bani mores,  'acts  which  affront public decency',  'public policy' ... 
As  Judge Serensen emphasized, the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights  also  contains  'vague  general  concepts'  such  as  'inhuman treatment', 
'measures which are necessary in a democratic society ...  '. 
It is  clear that such  ideas,  concepts and definitions  also  exist in  Community 
law. 
Here are some examples: 
The provisions of the European Treaties require all decisions to be reasoned. 
What is  the  scope  of  'reasoned'?  Its  scope  has, been  defined  in  countless 
judgments in  accordance with the nature of the Community 'measure'  and 
with the considerations which  gave  rise  to the duty to provide a  statement 
of reasons. 
The  ECSC  Treaty  draws  a  distinction  between  general  decisions  and 
individual  decisions  and  the  Treaties  of  Rome  distinguish  between 
regulations and decisions. 
What do these  concepts  mean?  The reply  to  that  question  Is  clearly  of 
fundamental  importance,  in  particular  with  regard  to  undertakings'  rights 
of application (ECSC Treaty) and those of persons concerned other than the 
Member States, the Commission and the Council (Treaties of Rome). 
Numerous judgments have defined the meaning and scope of those concepts. 
What is  the meaning and scope  of the concept 'concerted  practice'  referred 
to  both by  Article  65  of  the ECSC  Treaty  and  by  Article  85  of the  EEC 
Treaty? The judgments supply the answers. 
I  should  also  mention  the  judgment  of  18 May 1962  in  Case  13/60  which 
defines the concept of 'a substantial part of the products in  question within 
the common market ...  ' referred to by Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty. 
I  must also  point to the numerous, important and interesting judgments of 
the Court on the question of non-contractual liability:  must there be  fault? 
(under the second paragraph of Article 215  of the EEC  Treaty)  a  wrongful 
act or omission, liability arising from decisions in economic matters. 1 
1  Cf.  the relevant judgment of 4  February 1975  in  Case  169/73  in which  it is  emphasized 
that non-contractual liability  cannot  arise  from  the provisions  of  a  treaty, in particular 
from the Accession Treaty. 
Cf.  also  W.  Van  Gerven,  'De  niet  Contractuele  Aansprakelykheid van  de  Gemeenschap 
wegens ttormatieve Handelingen', Sociaal Economische Wetgewing, 1976, 2-28. 
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the meaning and scope of the concept 'wage-earners or assimilated workers' 
within  the  meaning  of Article  19  of  Regulation  No  3.  In  its  judgment  of 
5 July 1967 in Case 6/67 the Court had to decide the meaning in Article 45 
of  Regulation  No 3  of  the  concept  of  the  'authorities'  of  a  Member State 
which may  not reject  claims  or other documents  submitted to them  on the 
grounds  that they  are  written  in  the  official  language  of  another Member 
State. 
Another wide  concept  is  that of 'discrimination'.  In  a  recent  judgment,  on 
18  March 1975, in Joined Cases 44,  46 and 49/74, the Court did not define 
it  (that  is  always  extremely  difficult,  and  even  dangerous)  and  instead 
delivered a judgment which tends to define what it is, not. 
The concept of 'force ma;eure'  is  a familiar one in all national legal systems. 
It relates to all  branches of those  systems.  The national courts have had to 
define  it.  The  Court  of  Justice  was  clearly  faced  with  the  same  problem. 
In  its  judgment of  11  July  in  Case 4/68  the  Court held:  'as the concept of 
force  ma;eure  is  not  identical  in  the  different  branches  of  law  and  the 
various  fields  of  applications,  the  significance  of  this  concept  must  be 
determined on the basis of the legal framework within which it is intended to 
take effect ... Thus, the interpretation of the concept of force  ma;eure used 
in the regulation in question must take into account the particular nature of 
the  relationships  in  public  law  between  the  importers  and  the  national 
administration as well ;:ts the objectives of that regulation ... 
The public interest which requires the most accurate forecast possible of the 
future  development  of  imports  in  each  Member  State  and  warrants  the 
lodging  of  a  deposit  on  the  issue  of  an  import licence  must  be  reconciled 
with the  need,  which  is  also  a  matter of public interest,  for  trade  between 
States to remain unhampered by obligations, which are too rigid ...  ' 2 
Article 36 of the EEC  Treaty allows Member States to establish or maintain 
prohibitions and restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit 'justified 
on grounds of ... the protection of life ...  '. Such prohibitions or restrictions 
'shall  not,  however,  constitute  a  means  of  arbitrary  discrimination  or a 
disguised restriction on trade between Member States .. .' In its  judgment of 
20 May 1976  in  Case  104/75  the  Court  had  to  define  the  concepts  of 
'measures  for  the  protection  of  health',  'justified  on  grounds  of .. .'  and 
t  [1964]  ECR 177. 
2  Cf. also the judgment of 20 February 1975 in Case 64/74 ([1975]  ECR 261). 
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them,  a  court must take account of the facts  and circumstances  which  can 
develop  in  particular because  of the  possibilities  opened  up  by  technical 
developments  and  changes  in  social  relations.  Without laying  oneself  open 
to criticism it is  extremely difficult to appraise the requirements for and the 
means of protecting public health. 
Section 3  - Reasoning,  deduction, common sense -
The spirit  and objectives  of the rules to 
he interpreted 
1.  In general 
(a)  Introduction 
Amongst  the  numerous  methods  'of  interpretation'  legal  writers  cite  the 
'logical'  method  and  the  means  which  are  appropriate  to  this  method  or 
which  characterize  it: 1  reasoning  c a  contrarid,  by  analogy 2' 3  c de  eo  quod 
plerumque fif ... 
It is  self-evident that this  method does  not enjoy a  monopoly of logic.  The 
courts,  as  general  interpreters,  must  employ  reason,  logic,  circumspection 
and intelligence when they use other 'methods': they investigate the meaning 
and scope  of an instrument, of a  rule  on the basis  of the wording and the 
context  and scope  of  the  latter,  the  problems  or  questions  facing  the 
'legislator'  . . .  the aim  and objectives  of the  rule,  of the legislation,  of the 
regulations ... 
Indeed in order to make use of the sources of law, and to interpret, appraise 
and  judge  the facts,  this  must  be  done  with  intelligence,  logic,  zeal,  care, 
industry and perseverance, without which it is  impossible to solve the many 
delicate  and difficult problems involved in all  the facts  and facets  of human 
activity. 
1  The  Court o£  Justice,  like  many  courts,  clearly  has  recourse  to  it:  nevertheless  it does 
so  with  the  necessary  circumspection.  (C£.  in  particular the  judgments  of  29  November 
1956 in Case  8/55  and of 13  June 1958  in Case 9/56  and of 13  June 1958  in  Case 10/56 
and of 13 June 1958 in Case 15/57). 
2  Wide or strict interpretations also exist and I shall consider them later. 
3  In  British  law  care  is  exercised  not  to  fill  legislative  lacunae  by  the  expedient  of  an 
interpretation by analogy, which  leads,  in theory, to the exclusion  of all  recourse to this 
method; it appears nevertheless  that a  more  flexible  attitude  is  adopted  in  practice:  cf. 
Wachtel &  Wachtel (1973)  2 W.L.R. 366, 372. 
With regard  to interpretations by  analogy  cf.  in  particular:  J.  M.  Polak,  Op.  cit.,  p.  33, 
Marsh, Op. cit. p. 68  and Obermayer, Neue Juristische Zeitschrift 1966/2, 1889. 
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and the so-called  'logical' method.  I shall merely  emphasize first,  that these 
processes do  not really exhaust the possibilities of the 'method' and, second, 
that they  must,  and  generally  are,  treated  with  caution,  because  'analogy' 
and  'arguments  'a  contrario' . . .  are  only  applied  on  relatively  rare 
occasions. 
I  shall  thereafter  consider  the  reasoning,  deductions  and  common  sense  of 
the  courts,  in  particular,  of  the  judges  of  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European Communities, and then submit my findings  and reflections on the 
concept of 'wide or strict interpretation'. 
(b) Common  sense  - Nature  of the  concept  or rule  to  be  interpreted  -
Essential or fundamental principles of the Treaty 
'Methods'  of  interpretation  cannot  and  should  not  be  applied  universally. 
In very many cases the Court of Justice does what any court would also have 
to  do.  A  court is  composed  of people who think and is  not a  machine. It 
thinks  out its  decisions.  It does  so  with wisdom  and intelligence.  Thus the 
Court of Appeal, The Hague, asked the Court of Justice whether it must be 
considered that the 'national taxes  on salaries,  wages  and emoluments paid 
by  the  Community'  (second  paragraph  of  Article  12  of  the  Protocol  on 
Privileges  and Immunities)  also  refers  to the school levy  payable under the 
Netherlands  Law  on  school  levy'.  In  its  judgment  of  8  February  1968  in 
Case 32/67 the Court replied as  follows:  'A charge or due representing the 
consideration  for  a  given  service  rendered  by  the  public  authorities  is  not 
a  tax within  the  meaning  of  the  second  paragraph  of  Article  12  of  the 
Protocol ... even if that charge or due is  calculated on the basis of the salary 
paid by the Community to the person liable'. 
That conclusion was unavoidable. 
The Court of  Justice  recalled  the  reasons  for  the  immunity  as  to  salaries, 
wages  and  emoluments  paid  by  the  Community.  Such  salaries,  wages  and 
emoluments must be subject to a  common charge by  the Communities and 
cannot be  subjected  to different  taxes  depending  on the States  in  question 
in  such  a  way that the situation of officials  would vary  according  to their 
nationality.  The  judgment points  out  that Article  3  of  the  Protocol  itself 
clearly states that no exemption shall be granted in respect of taxes and dues 
which  amount  merely  to  charges  for  public  utility  services.  The  Court 
declared:  'Neither  the  spirit  nor the  wording ... of  the  Protocol  contains 
any  factor  capable  of  being  relied  upon  against  the  charges  and  dues 
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authorities'. 1 
The judgment of 4  April  1968  in Case 31/67 declared:  'The provisions  of 
Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community do 
not  prohibit  Member  States  from  imposing  internal  taxation  on  imported 
products  from  other  Member  States  when  there  is  no  similar  domestic 
product or other domestic  product capable of being protected'.  The Court 
arrived at this decision  after having held:  'Although ... Article 95,  both by 
the precision of the first paragraph and by the general nature of the terms of 
the  second  paragraph,  contributes  to  the  creation  of  a  common  market 
ensuring  the free  movement  of  goods,  nevertheless  its  ambit  would  be 
extended  beyond  its  proper objective  if  one  were  to  deduce  from  it  a 
prohibition on the imposition of internal taxation on imported goods which 
do not compete with a domestic product'. 
As  I have already indicated (see  Section  2 of this Chapter)  many judgments 
have been delivered concerning the extent of the duty to provide a statement 
of  reasons.  As  we  know Article  190  of  the  EEC  Treaty and  Article  15  of 
the ECSC  Treaty require  that a  statement of reasons shall  be  given  for  all 
regulations, directives and decisions of the Council and of the Commission. 
What is  the extent of this duty to provide a statement of reasons? It is  clear 
that this was not defined by the Treaties, and indeed it could not have been. 
The  Court  of  Justice  has  rightly  emphasized  that the  extent  of this  duty 
depends on the nature of the measure and of the facts and circumstances to 
which  it  relates.  In  order to determine  this  extent,  the  Court clearly  pays 
regard  to  the  raison  d' etre  for  the  statement  of  reasons:  to  avoid 
arbitrariness, to ensure that the measure has been thought out, to enable the 
persons  concerned  to know the  relevant facts  and,  in particular,  to  enable 
the measure to be reviewed, especially by the, courts. 
In the judgments of 1 February 1972 in Cases 49 and 50/71 the Court had to 
interpret an agricultural regulation, which required the national intervention 
agencies to purchase cereals which 'were offered to them', and in particular 
to  establish  the  meaning  and  scope  of  the  concept  of  'offer'.  The  Court 
noted  that,  save  in  exceptional  circumstances,  events  with  such  cogent 
consequences can become binding on the addressee ... only when they come 
to his knowledge. Is not this just plain common sense? 
1  Similar  considerations  were  involved  in  the  judgment  of 3  April  1968,  in  Case  28/67, 
relating to the second paragraph of Article 97 of the EEC Treaty. 
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concept of 'production in  the  coal  or steel  industry'  within the meaning of 
Article 80. 
The  Court held:  'It is  important above  all  to  take  into  consideration  the 
fact that the authors of Annex A have included in the list of products coming 
under the ECSC the category of foundry-iron and other pig-iron ... without 
excluding  from  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Treaty  foundries  effecting  initial 
smelting  whilst  other  industries  were  explicitly  excluded.  Accordingly  it 
appears certain that the draftsmen intended to bring foundries effecting initial 
smelting within the system  of the Treaty in so  far  as  they  produce molten 
pigiron  for  foundries.  The latter ... The  Court went  on:  'Whilst  such  an 
outcome implies  that an  intermediate product, which is  indeed to  a  certain 
extent  transitory,  is  brought  under the  Community  legal  system,  this  does 
not  appear  in  any  way  to  conflict  with  common  sense  and  the  basic 
principles of the Treaty'. 
{c)  Deductions- reasoning 
In  its  judgment  of  14 March 1973  in  Case  57/72  the  Court scrutinized  the 
provisions of a regulation of the Council and determined on that basis, as  it 
was  bound to,  the  powers  of the  Commission  which  had been  disputed  in 
proceedings  before  a  national  court.  It  decided  in  particular  that  the 
Commission was  enabled under Article 9  (8)  of Regulation No 1009/67, to 
exercise  the  powers  necessary  to  ensure  the  functioning  of  the  system  of 
denaturing premiums in  so  far as  the Council had not itself  provided for it 
in  another regulation.  It  followed  (the  Court declared)  that,  subject to the 
general  rules  laid  down  by  the  Council,  the  Commission  had the  right  to 
decide on both the grant and the amount of denaturing premiums and that, 
therefore, it hac\ the power to decide whether they should be suspended. 
In  its  judgment  of  23 January 1975  in  Case  51/74  the  Court  held:  'The 
prohibition  on  the  levying  of  charges  having  equivalent  effect  to  customs 
duties  on export in  trade within  the  Community  covers  any  charge  levied 
at the  time  of or by  reason  of export  of the  product  in  question  which 
produces the same restrictive effect as  a customs duty on the free  movement 
of goods'.  From this,  the  Court reasoned as  follows:  'To the extent that it 
may be established that the application of an internal levy falls more heavily 
on export sales  than on sales  within the country concerned the levy  has  an 
effect equivalent to a customs duty on export. Moreover, if an internal levy 
is  the same on domestic sales  and on exports,  it may  be  necessary  to take 
into account the use  to which the revenue  from  these  charges  is  put. If, in 
fact,  a levy is  designated to finance activities which serve to make marketing 
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give  preferential treatment to  the product intended for the internal market, 
to  the detriment of that intended for  export, it  is  liable  to  impede exports 
and thus to have an effect equivalent to a. customs duty ...  '. 
(d) Logical interpretation which confers a meaning on the provisions or rules 
to be interpreted 
I  have  already  stated  that the  Court  of  Justice  obviously  refrains  from 
drawing unreasonable conclusions. 
The Court rightly states, in its judgment of 29 November 1956: 1  'The Court 
considers  that it is  proper,  without  resorting  to  a  wide  interpretation,  to 
apply  a  rule  of  interpretation  generally  acknowledged  in  national  and 
international law in accordance with which the rules laid down by  an inter-
national treaty or by a law imply those provisions without which those rules 
would  be  meaningless  or could  not be  reasonably  and correctly  applied'.  I 
should like to recall that, in its  judgment of 9 February 1925, 2  the Cour de 
Cassation  of Belgium  held  that:  ' . . .  it is  sometimes  necessary  to establish 
what the legislator meant rather than what he literally said;  it is  preferable 
as  a  general  rule  to  assume  that  the  legislator  employed  wording  which 
imperfectly  communicated  his  thoughts  rather  than  arbitrarily  to  attribute 
thoughts to him'. 
The Staff Regulations of Officials provides for an appeal to the made through 
official channels to the administration before an appeal is  made to the Court 
of Justice.  In its  judgment of 8 July 1965, 3  the  Court declared:  'It appears 
from Articles 90 and 91  of the Staff Regulations, read together, that appeals 
though official  channels to the administration are subject to the same time-
limit as  applies to appeals  to the Court of Justice,  provided that they were 
themselves  instituted  within  the  time-limit  laid  down  for  appeals  to  the 
Court. In fact the intention of the authors of these regulations cannot have 
been  to  compel  officials  to  commence  simultaneously  an  administrative 
appeal  through  official  channels  and  an  appeal  to  the  Court of  Justice  in 
order to avoid being out of time'. 
The courts apply reason and make deductions ... without which they could 
not give a ruling. 
1  Case 8/55, Recueil 1955-1956, p. 290. 
2  Bulletin et Pasicrisie 1925, I, 129 especially p. 142. 
3  Joined Cases 27 and 30/64 [1965]  ECR 481. 
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Warner in Case 9/75 (Meyer- Burckhardt): 'In his  Opinion in  Case 48/65 
Mr  Advocate-General  Gand  convincingly  demonstrated  why  it  was 
impossible for a private person to have any right to challenge the validity of 
a  decision  of  the  Commission  declining  to  take  action  against  a  Member 
State  under Article  169.  Much  of  Mr  Advocate-General  Gand, s  reasoning 
seems to me  to lead also to the conclusion that such a person cannot sue the 
Commission for damages in respect of such a decision. In particular, for the 
Court to entertain such an action would involve that it should, in the absence 
of  that Member State  as  a  party,  and  without  affording  it  any  of  the 
safeguards  afforded  to  a  Member  State  under  Article  169,  decide  whether 
or not it was il\ breach of the Treaty'. 
It is  clearly  impossible  to  recount  all  the  other  examples  which  might  be 
cited. I have placed some emphasis on this point because in  certain quarters 
which ought to be  involved in rather more scholarly activity,  and in  certain 
publications  which  arrogate  to  themselves  the  right  to  keep  the  public 
informed  about  the  administration  of  justice,  the  role  played  therein  of 
logical  thought is  not only forgotten,  but is  regarded  as  futile,  feeble,  even 
harmful. 
2.  Strict interpretation - Wide interpretation 
(a)  In general 
This  'method'  is  applied  by  very  many  national  courts  and  also  by  the 
Court of Justice.  To refrain from conferring on certain rules  or concepts an 
interpretation  which  is  sometimes  wide  and  at  others  strict  would  distort 
their meaning, scope, subject-matter and aim ... 
The method is  also used by international courts. As  Ch. de Visscher 1  wisely 
wrote on the subject of wide or strict interpretation:  'A strict interpretation 
is  necessary if the provision in dispute derogates from the general law which 
is  acknowledged to apply, or to principles established by the treaty to which 
that provision  pertains;  if  the  provision  by  its  nature  must  be  strictly 
interpreted because it derogates from  the 'normal rule' in a certain field;  if, 
when the court is faced with two provisions of equal authority, one of which 
appears  to  have  a  wider  scope  than  the  other,  a  strict  interpretation 
reconciles the wording of the two provisions and to that extent accords with 
what was  in  all  likelihood,  the  common  intention of  the  parties;  or if  the 
1  Problemes d'interpretation jttdiciaire en droit international public, Op. cit., p. 91. 
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the general structure of the treaty'. 1 
This method of interpretation sometimes gives  rise to comments, findings  or 
conclusions  with  which  it is  not  always  easy  to  agree.  Thus  V. D.  Degan 
writes: 
2  'Whilst  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Communities 
frequently  employs  such  'processes'  of  interpretation,  the  International 
Court of Justice never does so'. The explanation which he provides for this 
difference  is  a  little  difficult  to  follow:  'This  marked  difference  in  the 
practice of the two courts is perfectly understandable when one bears in mind 
that they are different in nature. The jurisdiction of the International Court 
of Justice is  based on a special agreement between the parties to the dispute, 
unless  they  have  agreed  in  advance  to  submit  to  the  jurisdiction  under 
Article 36 of the Statute of that Court. In  either case,  the States which  are 
parties to the dispute have brought the matter before the court of their own 
free will; the Court must always take formal note of this. On the other hand, 
the  jurisdiction of the  European  Court of  Justice forms  an  integral part of 
the  Community legal  system  which  binds  the  Member  States  and  their 
nationals.  This jurisdiction is  thus peremptory and it derives  from  a  system 
superior to State sovereignty, although it was also established by treaties. The 
consideration  of sovereignty  cannot,  in  that case,  serve  as  a  pretext for  a 
strict interpretation. On the other hand, since this Court is  supra-national, it 
prefers  to  give  Community  provisions  a  wide  rather  than  a  restrictive 
interpretation,  and  this  cannot  be  done  by  ordinary  international  courts. 
This  is  in  practical  terms,  the  explanation  of  this  phenomenon.  From  a 
theoretical point of view there appears to be  no  justification whatsoever for 
any  interpretation  which  is  either  wide  or strict ... In  my  view,  artificial 
theories  whether based on a  strict or a  wide interpretation are a  departure 
from  the  essential  task  of interpretation,  as  described  above,  and for  that 
reason can never be justified on any grounds'. 
The principle of sovereignty is  not the only factor which can justify a strict 
or wide  interpretation.  There  are  many  other  cases  brought  before  the 
national  courts  and  the  Court  of  Justice  in  which  a  wide  or  strict 
interpretation is  adopted,  and is  unavoidable.  It is  usual  that if  the Treaty 
1  The International  Court of Justice  stated in  its  advisory  opinion  (International  Court of 
Justice,  Recueil  1956,  p.  97):  'The considerations  which  could have  been  cited in favour 
of the strict interpretation of provisions governing the jurisdiction of a court called upon 
to  deliver  judgments  between  States  and  which  was  based  upon  the  sovereignty  of 
these  States,  does  not  apply  to  a  court  called  upon  to  rule  on  the  application  of  an 
official  against  an  international  organization'.  Les  Sources  du  Droit  des  ]uridictions 
Administratives Internationales, Juris Classeur- 'L'Organization Judiciaire Internationale' 
- fasc.  230, No 81  et seq. 
2  Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europeen 1966, p.  189 et seq., especially pages 209 to 212. 
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derogations from this general principle. A study of the decisions of the Court 
reveals  countless  cases  in  which  a  sometimes  strict,  sometimes  wide, 
interpretation is wholly justified. 
Alain  Fresia 1  refers  in  an  interesting  study  to  'the  enlargement'  by  the 
Court  of  Justice  of  the  concept  of  discrimination  and  of  its  scope,  'the 
liberal  interpretation  by  the  Court',  the fact  that the  Court of  Justice  has 
laid down that derogations from  principle must be strictly interpreted, and, 
:finally,  to  the  fact  that  'the  Court  has  extended  the  case-law  on  direct 
effect to the free  movement of persons'. The principle of non-discrimination 
is,  indeed, wide but that was, essentially, the intention of the authors of the 
Treaty,  the spirit  of  the  Treaty,  the  effect  of  its  provisions  and even  of  a 
'principle'  which  is  of  the  essence  of  the Treaty. It is  the Treaty which  is 
liberal in the sense  in which I  understand it here.  That constitutes its spirit 
and  its  raison  d' etre.  It is  the  spirit  which  the  Court  must  reflect  when 
required to ensure the application of  the principle of non-discrimination, in 
particular  when  it  provides  an  interpretation  requested  by  the  national 
courts. Since  non-discrimination is  the principle, exceptions must be  strictly 
interpreted ... as, otherwise this principle would be violated or ignored. 
Indeed  it is  difficult  to  understand the  relevance  of  the  comment that 'the 
Court has extended its case-law on the direct effect of the provisions of the 
Treaty to the field of non-discrimination'. 
The  Treaty  contains  a  large  number  of  provisiOns  which  are  directly 
applicable and which relate to all the fields  which it covers. This is  inherent 
in the very nature of the EEC Treaty, in particular. 
(h)  The case-law of the Court of Justice 
In  this  case-law no arbitrary decision  is  made that a  wide  interpretation is 
necessary on some occasions and a strict interpretation on others. This body 
of case-law rests upon a foundation drawn from the provisions of Community 
law,  their  subject-matter,  aim  and  nature ...  :  it  goes  without saying  that 
these justifications are also based on a process of reasoning and deduction. 
Le~  us now consider some of those judgments. 
1  La  libre  circulation  des  personnes  et le  principe de  non  discrimination  dans  Ia  jurispru-
dence de Ia  Cour de  justice des  Communautes europeennes,  Revue  du Marche Commun, 
December 1975, p. 550 et seq. 
III-125 (i)  Strict interpretation 
Article  25  of  the  EEC  Treaty enables  the  Council  of Ministers  to  grant a 
Member State, in respect of imports of certain products from third countries, 
tariff. quotas at a reduced rate of duty or duty-free. 
In  its  judgment  of  4 July 1963 
1  the  Court of Justice  held  that this  article 
must be interpreted restrictively ... because it contains derogations from the 
common  external  tariff,  which  constitutes  one  of  the  'foundations'  of  the 
Community. 
The judgment of 21  June 1974: 
2  this case had to settle whether the practice 
of the profession of 'avo  cat'  by  a national of a Member State but who was 
not a  national of  the State in  which he was  to practise,  is  covered  by  the 
provisions  of  the  first  paragraph of Article  55  of  the EEC  Treaty.  As  we 
know, this  article provides as  follows:  'The provisions of this Chapter shall 
not apply, so far as  any given Member State is  concerned, to activities which 
in  that State  are  connected,  even  occasionally,  with the exercise  of  official 
authority ...  '. 
The Court held:  'Having regard to the fundamental character of freedom of 
establishment and the rule of equal treatment with nationals in the system of 
the Treaty, the exceptions allowed by the first paragraph of Article 55 cannot 
be given a scope which would exceed the objective for which this exetr._ption 
clause was  inserted.  The first paragraph of Article 55  must enable iv1ember 
States  to  exclude  non-nationals  from  taking  up  functions  involving  the 
exercise  of official  authority which  are  connected with one of the activities 
of  self-employed  persons  provided  for  in  Article  52.  This  need  is  fully 
satisfied when the exclusion of nationals is  limited to those activities which, 
taken  on  their  own,  constitute  a  direct  and  specific  connexion  with  the 
exercise of officiaL authority'. 
The  judgment  states  that  the  most  typical  actiVIties  of  the  profession  of 
avocat such as  consultation and legal  assistance and also  representation and 
the defence  of parties in  court, even  when the intervention or assistance of 
the avocat is  compulsory or is  a  legal  monopoly,  cannot be  considered  as 
connected with the exercise of official authority. 
In its  judgment of 26 February 1975 3  the Court of Justice had to interpret 
Directive No 64/221 of the Council of 25 February 1964 on the coordination 
1  Case 24/62 [1963]  ECR 63. 
2  Case 2/74 [1974]  ECR 631. 
3  Case 67/74 [1975]  ECR 297. 
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nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or 
public  health.  The question  was  raised  whether  the  directive,  particularly 
Article  3  thereof,  allows  the  deportation  of  a  national  of  a  Member  State 
for  the  purpose of  deterring  other foreign  nationals  from  committing such 
criminal  offences  as  those with which  the person deported was  charged or 
similar  offences  or other infringements  of public  security  or public  policy, 
that is,  for  reasons  of  a  general  preventive  nature.  The  Court  of  Justice 
replied  in  the negative:  those provisions  must be  interpreted in  the light of 
the objectives  of  the directive  which  "seeks  in  particular to  coordinate the 
measures  justified  on grounds  of  public  policy  and for the maintenance of 
public  security  envisaged  by  Articles  48  and 56  of  the  Treaty, in  order to 
reconcile  the  application  of  those  measures  with  the  basic  principle of  the 
free  movement of persons within the Community and the elimination of all 
discrimination ...  '. 
The  Court  continued:  'Article  3  of  the  directive  provides  that  measures 
adopted  on  grounds  of  public  policy  and  for  the  maintenance  of  public 
security  against the  nationals  of  Member States  of  the  Community  cannot 
be  justified  on  grounds  extraneous  to  the  individual  case,  as  is  shown  in 
particular  by  the  requirements  set  out  in  paragraph  (1)  that  "only"  the 
"personal conduct"  of  those  affected  by  the measures  is  to  be  regarded  as 
determinative'. 
The  Court deduced  from  the  foregoing  that,  as  departures  from  the  rules 
concerning  the  free  movement of persons  constitute  exceptions  which  must 
be  strictly  construed~  the  concept  of  'personal  conduct'  expresses  the 
requirement  that  a  deportation  order may  only  be  made  for  threatened 
breaches  of the peace and public security which might be  committed by the 
individual  affected.  A  deportation  order  may  not,  therefore,  be  based  on 
considerations of a general preventive nature. 1 
Article 90  (2)  of the EEC Treaty provides that: 'Undertakings entrusted with 
the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character 
of a revenue-producing monopoly shall  be  subject to the rules  contained in 
this  Treaty,  in  particular  to  the  rules  on  competition,  in  so  far  as  the 
application  of such  rules  does  not obstruct the  performance,  in  law  or in 
fact,  of  the  particular  tasks  assigned  to  them.  The  development  of  trade 
must not be  affected to such an extent as  would be  contrary to the interests 
of the Community'. 
1  Cf. also the judgment of 21  June 1974 in Case 2/74, Reyners [1974]  ECR 631. 
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the  expression  'undertaking  entrusted  with  the  operation  of  services  of 
general  economic  interest'  covered  an  undertaking  (SABAM)  entrusted  by 
its  members with the management of their copywrights.  In its  judgment of 
21  March  1974 1  the  Court stated:  'As  Article  90  (2)  is  a  provision  which 
permits,  in  certain  circumstances,  derogation  from  the  rules  of the  Treaty, 
there  must  be  a  strict  definition  of  those  undertakings  which  can  take 
advantage  of  it.  Private  undertakings  may  come  under  that provision,  but 
they  must be entrusted  with the operation of services  of general  economic 
interest by an act of the public authority ....  That is  not the position in the 
case  of  an  undertaking  to  which  the  State  has  not assigned  any  task and 
which  manages  private  interests,  including  intellectual  property  rights 
protected by law'. 
The  Staff  Regulations  grants  allowances  for  persons,  usually  children, 
dependent on officials.  The Staff Regulations  treat certain persons,  such  as 
a divorced wife, as. a dependent child. 
In its judgment of 21  November 1974 2  the Court held that it is  necessary to 
bear  in  mind  that treatment  as  a  dependent  child  has  an  exceptional 
character which is  emphasized by the very text of Article 2  (4)  of Annex VII 
to  the  Staff  Regulations  which  provides  that  this  can  only  be  done 
exceptionally and by special reasoned decision. 
A decision of the Commission of 12 February 1969 allowed certain categories 
of consumers to buy butter at a  reduced price  and authorized the Member 
States  to  make butter available  at a  reduced  price  to  certain  categories  of 
consumers  who are  beneficiaries  under  a  social  welfare  scheme  and whose 
income  does  not enable  them  to  buy  butter at normal prices.  Article  4  of 
this  decision,  which  was  addressed  to  the  Member  States,  was  drafted 
differently in the various languages of the European Communities. The Ver-
waltungsgericht  Stuttgart  asked  whether  Article  4  of  the  decision  of  the 
Commission,  making  the  sale  of  butter at  a  reduced  price  to  beneficiaries 
under certain welfare schemes subject to the condition that the name of the 
beneficiaries shall be divulged to  retailers~ can be considered compatible with 
the general principles of Community law in force. 
After  emphasizing that the  wording of  the  decision  must be interpreted in 
the light of the versions in all  four languages, the Court, in its  judgment of 
12  November  1969 3  held  that:  'In  a  case  like  the  present  one,  the  most 
1  Case 127/73 [1974]  ECR 313. 
2  Case 6/74 [1974]  ECR 1287. 
3  Case 29/69 [1969]  ECR 419. 
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the objectives pursued by the decision in question'. 
No doubt this  does  not really  constitute a  restrictive interpretation but it is 
a  similar  process;  lawyers  of  our background  confer  a  strict  interpretation 
on  any  provision  which  is  capable  of  adversely  affecting  human liberty  or 
dignity,  more  precisely  they  only  confer  upon  it  the  scope  which  is 
indispensable for attaining its objective. 
The Court held, in its  judgment of 15 July 1960 in Case 20/59, commenting 
on Article  88  of the ECSC  Treaty - which  relates  to  the  recording of the 
failure of a State to fulfil  an obligation, that this constitutes a procedure far 
exceeding the rules previously acknowledged in  classical international law in 
order to ensure that States fulfil  their obligations  and that 'Article 88  must 
therefore be interpreted strictly'. 
It is  impossible  seriously  to  dispute  that  this  line  of  reasoning  and  the 
decision  of  the  Court  are  well  founded.  The Member States  have  indeed 
alienated  their  sovereignty  but only  to  a  limited  extent.  If  the  Court  of 
Justice  were  to  interpret  widely  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  establishing 
those  alienations  of  sovereignty  it  would  exceed  its  task  and  moreover 
clearly infringe the law. 
Let me further cite the opinion of Mr Advocate-General Reischl in Case 63/ 
75:  'My basic view  on this  is  that Article 4  (2)  of Regulation  No 17 must 
not have  too  wide  an  interpretation since  it is  a  provision  constituting an 
exception'  (it  should  be  recalled  that  he  is  referring  to  Article  4  (2)  of 
Regulation  No  17  on competition.  Article  4  (1)  provides  that agreements, 
decisions  and  concerted  practices  etc.  which  come  into  existence  after  the 
entry into force  of the said  regulation  and in  respect  of which  the persons 
concerned  seek  the  application  of  Article  85  (3)  must  be  notified  to  the 
Commission ... Paragraph  2  provides  that paragraph  1  shall  not apply  to 
agreements, decisions or concerted practices where ...  ). 
1 
I wish  to  conclude these  citations  with the finding  that strict interpretation 
does  not exclude  the  need  to  accord  to  the  provision,  even  one  which 
requires to be restrictively interpreted, the entire scope which constitutes the 
justification and aim of its  existence.  This also  holds  good in  criminal  law 
which requires strict interpretation and excludes analogy. 
1  With regard to  derogations  from  the free  movement of goods  and the  establishment of 
the  common commercial policy  see  also  the  judgment of the  Court of  8  April  1976  in 
Case 29/75, Kaufhof. 
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The view  which  has  just been  expressed  is  not at variance with what was 
decided  by  the  Court  in  its  judgment  of  15  July  1963. 1  The  Court  was 
required to settle whether a  decision  addressed to a  Member State must be 
considered under the second paragraph of Article 173  of the EEC Treaty, as 
a  decision  addressed  'to another person'  which  is  of direct  and individual 
concern to one of the natural or legal persons referred to by the said second 
paragraph. 
The Court considered on the one hand that the words and natural meaning 
of  the  said  provision  justify  the  broadest interpretation,  and  on the  other 
hand  that  the  'provisions  of  the  Treaty  regarding  the  right  of  interested 
parties  to  bring  an  action  must  not be  interpreted  restrictively.  Therefore, 
the Treaty being silent on the point, a limitation in this respect may not be 
presumed'. 
It certainly  cannot be  disputed  that the authors of Article  173  of the EEC 
Treaty intended to limit the opportunities of the persons referred to by  the 
second  paragraph of  that provision  to  submit  to  the  Court  of  Justice 
applications  disputing  the  legality  of  measures  of  the  Council  or  of  the 
Commission,  and  that  they  have  thus  established  a  restricted  right  of 
application.  Nevertheless  it is  necessary  to  confer  on the  provisions  of  the 
second  paragraph of  Article  173  the  entire  scope  which  follows  from  the 
provision itself. 
The Court was  asked whether reduction cards issued  by  a  national railway 
agency  to  large  families  constitutes  for  the  workers  of  the Member States 
a  social  advantage  and whether  an  advantage which  is  conferred  after the 
death of the worker constitutes such an advantage. 
In  its  judgment  of  30 September 1975  in  Case  32/75  the  Court  of  Justice 
replied to those questions in the affirmative. 
It had been claimed before the Court of Justice that the advantages provided 
for  by  that  Community  provision  were  only  accorded  by  reason  of  the 
beneficiary's  status  as  a  worker  and  that  they  were  connected  with  the 
contract of employment itself. 
The  Court  held:  'Although  it  is  true  that  certain  provtstons  in  this 
regulation  refer  to  relationships  deriving  from  the  contract of employment, 
there are others ... which have nothing to do with such  relationships ... It 
1  Case 25/62 [1963]  ECR 95. 
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provision seeks  to  achieve,  the  substantive  area  of  application  must  be 
delineated  so  as  to  include  all  social  and tax  advantages,  whether  or  not 
attached to the contract of employment, such as  reductions in fares for large 
families'. 
This  undoubtedly  constitutes  a  wide interpretation  but one  which  follows 
from the regulation to be interpreted viewed as a whole. 
(c)  Conclusions 
It is  necessary  on  some  occasions  to  effect  a  wide  interpretation  and  on 
others a strict interpretation. The provisions of the Treaty are to be given the 
meaning and scope inherent in them. To refrain from such an interpretation 
often does  violence  to  the nature of  the provisions  and the effect  which  is 
clearly required. 
The external  common  tariff  constitutes  one  of  the  foundations  of  the 
Community.  Consequently  provisions  which  permit,  as  an  exception, 
exportations  to  be  effected  on  other  conditions  than  those  laid  down  by 
that tariff cannot be accorded a wide interpretation, that is  to say they must 
be strictly interpreted if  this 'foundation of the Community' is  not to be set 
at naught. 
Freedom  of  establishment  and  freedom  of  movement  also  constitute 
fundamental  'principles'  of  the  Treaty.  Those  principles  would  be 
frustrated if a  wide instead  of a  strict interpretation were placed upon the 
exception with regard to freedom  of  establishment concerning public offices 
as  well  as  to the exception with regard to freedom of movement concerning 
the  powers  retained  by  the  Member  States  in  order  to  maintain  public 
security, public order and public health. 
Similar  considerations  might  be  advanced  with  regard  to  the  strict 
interpretations (which I have already quoted)  by  the Court of the provisions 
on competition or proceedings instituted by officials. 
3 - Interpretation taking account of the generality, nature, sub-
ject-matter, aim, objective and of the spirit ••• 
(a)  The generality,  the  nature  of the  cscheme  of regulations',  the  organized 
system and the context 
The judgment of 25 June 1975 1  underlines the need to consider a scheme of 
regulations  in  its  entirety  and  to  discover  how  'it  fits  together'.  This 
1  Case 17/75 [1975]  ECR 781. 
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workers. 
When  required  to  determine  the  extent  of  the  Commission's  powers  and 
duties in implementing a  Council regulation and, thus, to decide whether or 
not  a  commission  regulation  was  'valid'  the  Court  of  Justice  held  in  its 
judgment of  18 March 1975 
1  that:  'When considered  in  the context of  the 
system  in  which  it  took  effect,  the  discontinuance  of  the  increase  in  the 
premium'  ordered  by  the regulation  of the  Commission  cobviously  has  the 
purpose ... of avoiding the disturbances  which  the  Council  Regulation  has 
in mind'. 
In  order  to  obtain  an  export  refund  - under  regulations  governing  the 
pigmeat sector - an application must be submitted by the person concerned. 
In  its  judgment of 22 January 1975 2  the Court said that 'Although, having 
regard  to  the  necessities  of  the  proper  functioning  of the  complex system 
of  export  refunds,  Article  15'  (of  the  regulation)  'must  be  interpreted  as 
implying  a  written  application,  formalism  which  would  go  beyond  the 
necessities  of  efficient  control  must  be  avoided' . . .  Consequently . . .  the 
control copy is  sufficient if  it .... The Court was called upon to determine 
the meaning and scope,  as  regards Article 56  (2)  of Regulation No 4, of the 
words  'direct notification' - that is,  notification  of  a  decision  of  a  social 
security body to a  claimant who is  resident in another State.  The judgment 
given  on  18 February 1975 3  provides  an  interpretation  which  does  not 
necessarily flow directly from the terms used, but rather, first, from the aim 
and the purpose of the provision in question when considered in the light of 
the Community rules  on social security  as  a  whole ... and, secondly, from 
the European 'harmonization' in  social  security matters which requires that 
the  words  'direct  notification'  be  given  a  meaning  which  coincides  with 
a  practice corresponding to such  'harmonization' and necessarily  preferable 
to  the  other traditional  means  of  notifying  administrative  decisions  which 
must be sent abroad. 4 
1  Case 78/74, [1975]  ECR 421. 
2  Case 55/74, [1975]  ECR 9. 
3  Case 66/74, [1975]  ECR 157. 
4  The International Court of Justice at The Hague, like the Court of Justice  of the Euro-
pean  Communities,  and  all  national  courts,  necessarily  considers  the  context  and  the 
rules  as  a  whole.  As  regards  the  International  Court  of  Justice  at  The  Hague  c£.  in 
particular the Etude by  V.  D.  Degan, in  the  Revue  Trimestrielle  de  Droit Europeen  for 
1966, pages 188 et seq. 
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regulation to be interpreted must implement 
In judgment of 9 June 1964 1  an interpretation was provided of Article 12 of 
Regulation  No 3  concerning  social  security  for  migrant  workers,  which 
provides that: 'Save as  otherwise provided under this Head, wage-earners or 
assimilated workers employed in the territory of one Member State shall be 
subject  to  the legislation  of  that State ...  '.  The  Court was  asked  whether 
this article must be construed to mean that the persons to whom it refers are 
subject  only to  the legislation  of the  Member State  in  whose  territory they 
are employed. 
The  Court of  Justice  considered  that:  (1)  Regulation  No  3  was  made 
pursuant to Article 51  of the EEC Treaty, according to which ... The Court 
concludes  from  this  that the  Treaty has  thus  placed  upon the  Council  the 
duty  to  lay  down  rules  preventing  those  concerned,  in  the  absence  of 
legislation applying to them, from remaining without protection in the matter 
of  social security.  (2)  With a  view  to achieving this object it was necessary 
to  make  provision  for  the  mandatory  application  of  specific  legislation. 
(3)  Article 12 includes no provision prohibiting the simultaneous application 
of  several  systems  of  legislation.  In  the  circumstances  the  intention  of  the 
authors of the regulation to impose such a restriction on the freedom of the 
national  legislature  should  be  presumed  only  to  the  extent  that  such 
simultaneous  application  is  clearly  contrary to the spirit  of  the Treaty and 
particularly  of  Articles  48  to  51.  (4)  These  provisions  do  not  preclude 
legislation  by  the  Member  States  designed  to  bring  about  additional 
protection by way of social security for the benefit of migrant workers. 
The Court therefore ruled: 
(a)  Article  12  does  not prohibit Member  States  other than  those  in  the 
territory of which  wage-earners  or assimilated  workers  are  employed  from 
applying their social security legislation to such persons, 
(b)  it is  otherwise only if  a Member State, other than that in the territory of 
which the worker is  employed,  requires  him  to  contribute to  the financing 
of an institution which would not accord him supplementary protection by 
way of social security in respect of the same risk of the same period. 
When called upon again in  Case 90/75  to interpret Article 12 of Regulation 
No 3,  the  Court of Justice repeated in its  judgment of 25  November 1975 
that,  in  order  to  define  its  meaning  and  scope,  this  regulation  must  be 
1  Case 92/63, [1964]  ECR 281. 
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determine  the  framework,  the  basis  and  the  bounds  of  the  social  security 
regulations. 1 
In  its  judgment delivered  on 30 October 197  4 2  in  reply  to the  question  of: 
'Whether a  regulation  such  as  the  Hyacinth  Cultivation  Regulation,  1971, 
in a Member State is  consistent with Article 10 of Regulation (EEC)  No 234/ 
68  of the  Council  of 27 February 1968  on  the  establishment  of  a  common 
organization of the market in live trees and other plants, bulbs, roots and the 
like, cut flowers and ornamental foliage' (Netherlands Decree). 3 
The Court considered  that:  'In the  absence  of  express  provisions  as  to the 
compatibility  of  a  national  regulation  restricting  production  with  the 
organization of the market set up by  Regulation No 234/68, it is  necessary 
to seek the solution to the question  referred in  the light of the objects  and 
the purposes  of the  Regulation within the framework of the principles  laid 
down  by  the  Treaty  itself'.  The  Court  concluded:  'Article  10  of  the 
regulation ... excludes any national system having the purpose of quantitat-
ively  restricting  the  cultivation  of  one  of  the  products  falling  within  the 
common organization of the market'. 
(c)  Object~ aim and purpose of the regulation- Meaning and spirit 
Object  and aim'  - Ch.  de  Visscher 4  writes  that the  two  terms  are  often 
regarded  as  synonymous.  However,  he  writes  that one must beware of the 
conclusions  which  may  be  drawn  from  their  use.  Properly  speaking  the 
object of a treaty is  the obligations it prescribes, that is,  its  legal  effect.  On 
1  When  required  to  interpret Articles  27  and  28  of  Regulation  No 3,  in  its  judgment in 
Case 1/67 ([1967]  ECR 181)  the Court defined the meaning and scope of Articles 27  and 
28  of Regulation No 3 in the following terms:  'In view of the difficulties of interpretation 
of these provisions it is  necessary to consider them in the light of Articles 48  to 51  of the 
Treaty  which  the  regulations  in  the  field  of  social  security  have  as  their  basis,  their 
framework  and  their  bounds  . . .  These  provisions  establish'  (Article  51)  'at the  outset 
that the regulations, regarded as a whole are intended, in certain circumstances, to benefit 
the migrant worker as  compared with the situation which would result for him  from  the 
exclusive  application of national law.  In  case  of doubt these  regulations  must therefore 
be interpreted in the light of this objective'. 
2  Case 190/73 [1974] ECR 1123. 
3  The terms  of  this  Royal  Netherlands  Decree  prohibit the  cultivation  of hyacinth  bulbs 
by any person who is  not the holder of a cultivation licence issued annually for a specific 
area of cultivation by the competent 'Produktschap'. Article 10 of Community Regulation 
No 234/68  prohibits, inter alia  in the internal trade of the  Community 'any quantitative 
restriction or measure having equivalent effect'. 
4  Problemes d'Interpretation ]udiciaire en Droit International Public, pages 62 et seq. 
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the contracting parties wish to  attain.  He further emphasizes  the  danger of 
giving premature priority either to the object or aim  of a convention which 
runs  the  risk  of  falling  into  the  exaggerations  of  the  so-called  teleological 
method. In spite of this  necessary prudence, the case-law of the two courts 
(of  two  international  courts)  demonstrates  the  importance  given  by  its 
interpretative decisions to the determination of the object or even  of a basic 
idea which merely underlies the convention. 1 
As we know, Article 48 of the EEC Treaty lays down the principle of freedom 
of movement for  workers, which entails the abolition of any  discrimination 
as  regards  remuneration  and  other  conditions  of  work  and  employment. 
However,  paragraph 4  of this  article  specifies  that:  'The provisions  of  this 
article shall not apply to employment in  the public service'. 
In  its  judgment of  12  February 197  4, 2  in  reply  to the  question of whether 
paragraph  (  4)  [of  Article  48]  permits  discrimination  to  be  practised  in  the 
public service between the nationals of a State who are employed in the public 
service  of that State and the nationals  of other States,  where both types  of 
nationals are employed in that public service, the Court rightly replied in the 
negative. It considered that: 
(a)  the exceptions made by Article 48  (4)  cannot have a scope going beyond 
the aim in view of which this derogation was included; 
(b)  the interests which this  derogation allows Member States  to protect are 
satisfied  by  the opportunity of restricting  admission  of foreign  nationals  to 
certain activities in the public service; 
(c)  on the other hand, this provision cannot justify discriminatory measures 
with  regard  to  remuneration  or  other  conditions  of  employment  against 
workers once they have been admitted to the public service; 
(d)  the  very  fact  that  they  have  been  admitted  shows  indeed  that  those 
interests which  justify  the exceptions  to  the principle of non-discrimination 
committed by Article 48  (  4)  are not at issue. 
In order to decide what action a Member State may or may not take  und~r 
Community  regulations  the  Court  takes  account  of  the  objective  of  such 
1  However,  the Institute  of International  Law  at its  meeting  in  Granada in  1956  showed 
a  certain reticence  as  regards  this  method of interpretation.  For this  reason  the  meeting 
placed it in the lowest category of proper methods of interpretation. 
2  Case 152/73, [1974]  ECR 153. 
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that 'since one of the principal objectives' of the common organization of the 
market in  cereals  'is  to  guarantee to  producers  a  price  based  on the target 
price this objective is  jeopardized where the actions of the State agency  are 
of such  a  nature as  to influence  conditions  on the  market and to  induce  a 
tendency to force prices below that level. It must therefore be concluded that 
the action of a Member State in purchasing durum wheat on the world market 
and subsequently reselling it on the Community market at a price lower than 
the target price is  incompatible with the common organization of the market 
in cereals ... Regulation No 120/67 is in fact intended to shield the develop-
ment  of  Community  agricultural  production  from  fluctuations  in  market 
prices  and  thereby  to  ensure  a  fair  standard of  living  for  the  agricultural 
Community  and  to  stabilize  markets  by  means  of  Community  levies  and 
refunds, protecting the operation of the common agricultural market against 
the risks of the world market ... Consequently, an individual farmer may not 
claim that he has suffered damage under Community law if the price which 
he has actually obtained on the market exceeds  the target price ... If  such 
damage  has  been  caused  through  an  infringement  of  Community  law  the 
State is  liable to the injured party for the consequences in the context of the 
provisions of national law on the liability of the State'. 
As  regards  Regulation  No 3  concerning  migrant workers,  the  judgment of 
the  Court of  Justice  of  30 June 1966 
2  stated  that its  interpretation  of the 
question submitted to the Court 'conforms with the spirit of Articles 48  to 51 
of the Treaty as  well  as  with that of Regulation No 3, which is,  in addition 
to protecting the migrant worker stricto sensu, to prevent territorial provisions 
from  being  applied  against workers  or their  survivors  in  matters  of social 
security'. 
Furthermore  the  judgment  of  13 July 1966 3  stated  that:  'The  question 
whether there  is  an  improvement  in  the  production  or  distribution  of  the 
goods  in  question,  which  is  required  for  the  grant of  exemption,  is  to  be 
answered in accordance with the spirit of Article 85'. 
The Court has further  considered  the  question  of the  legal  positiOn  of  an 
insured person who has continued to work and to pay contributions with a 
view to acquiring rights to a higher pension and against whom the national 
institution responsible for payment of the said pension had invoked  on the 
basis of Articles 27 and 28  of Regulation No 3 the right on its own initiative 
to make a payment of the pension on the same date when the insured person 
obtained the payment of another pension in another Member State. 
t  [1976]  ECR 45. 
2  Case 61/65,  [19661  ECR 261. 
3  Joined Cases 56 and 58/64, [1966]  ECR 299. 
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1  the  Court decided  that 'the solution 
to  this  question ... can  only  emerge  from  the  interpretation  of  those 
regulations  in  the  light  of  the  objectives  of  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
(Articles  48  to  51) ... Since ... this  system'  of  social  security  'aims  at 
conferring on migrant workers the advantages corresponding to their various 
periods  of  work,  it  may  not,  in  the  absence  of  an  express  exception  in 
conformity with the objectives of the Treaty, be applied so  as  to deprive them 
of the benefit of part of the legislation  of  a  Member State'.  The judgment 
continues  by  stating that there is  no  general  obligation in  Community law 
reqmrmg  an  insured  person  to  seek  the  simultaneous  payment  of various 
pensions. 
The judgment given  on 17 December 1970 2  determines the nature and scope 
of the Commissions's powers to adopt implementing regulations, taking into 
account the 'scheme  and objectives'  of the  Council  Regulation  which form 
the basis of the action taken by the Commission. 
The  Court was  asked  whether,  after  the  entry  into  force  of  the  Common 
Customs Tariff,  Member States  were free  to  introduce or maintain charges 
having  an  effect  equivalent  to  customs  duties  in  their  relations  with third 
countries.  In  its  judgment  of  13 December 1973 3  settling  this  matter  the 
Court pointed  out  that  although,  unlike  Section  1  of  the  Chapter  [of  the 
Treaty]  relating to the customs union, Section 2 of the same Chapter makes 
no  mention  of  'charges  having  an  effect  equivalent  to  custom  duties',  this 
omission  does  not  mean  that  such  charges  may  be  maintained,  still  less 
introduced. It stated that in  answering the question as  to the application of 
such charges in trade with third countries, account must be taken both of the 
requirements resulting from the establishment of the Common Customs Tariff, 
and of those resulting from a common commercial policy. It further specified 
that,  according  to  Article  113  (1)  of  the  Treaty,  the  common  commercial 
policy shall be based on uniform principles, particularly in regard to changes 
in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement 
of  uniformity  in  measures  of  liberalization,  export policy  and measures  to 
protect trade. The definition of these uniform principles involves, as  does the 
common tariff itself,  the  elimination  of national disparities,  whether in  the 
field  of taxation or of commerce,  affecting  trade with third countries.  The 
Court concluded:  'it follows ... that, subsequent to the introduction of the 
Common Customs Tariff, all Member States are prohibited from introducing, 
on  a  unilateral  basis,  any  new  charges  or from  raising  the  level  of  those 
1  Case 9/67, [1967]  ECR 229. 
2  Case 25/70, [1970]  ECR 1161. 
3  Joined Cases 37 and 38/73, [1973]  ECR 1609. 
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imported directly from  third countries is  a matter for the institutions of the 
Community'. 
In a case concerning a decision of the Commission adopted under Article 85 
of  the  EEC  Treaty,  which  the  Court  was  asked  to  declare  invalid,  the 
applicant had maintained that the agreement in question had been concluded 
not between undertakings, but between associations of undertakings, and that 
therefore it was not covered by Article 85.  In its  judgment given on 15  May 
1975 1  the Court of Justice considered that:  'Article 85  (1)  applies to assoc-
iations in so far as their own activities or those of the undertakings belonging 
to them are calculated to produce the results to which it refers. To place any 
other interpretation on Article 85  (1) would be to remove its substance. 2 
The Court has  thus  interpreted  the  rules  on the basis  of the  object of the 
regulations  or their  purpose  as  generally  expressed  in  precise  terms  in  a 
treaty,  or even  as  deduced from  such  treaty.  It has  done  this  inter alia  by 
comparing  the  rule  with  the  title  of  a  chapter  in  Treaty, 3  with  the  aims 
expressly assigned to the Communities by the Treaties 4  or with the aims  of 
the Treaties considered as a whole. 5 
4.  Overall view-Determination of the nature, essence and necess-
ary consequences of the European structure - 'Construction 
by the courts' 
The Court must,  of course,  take  an  overall  view  of the European structure 
as  it is  shown by  the Treaties.  This  view  enables  it to  define  in  detail  the 
meaning and scope of the fundamental 'concepts' on which the Communities 
1  Case 71/74, [1975] ECR 563. 
2  In  interpreting  Article  3  (2)  of  the  Treaty  of  Lausanne  (frontiers  between  Turkey  and 
Iraq)  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  considered  in  its  advisory  opinion 
given  on 21  November  1925  that:  'Thus, it is  in  the  wording that the Court must  first 
seek  to  discover  the  intention  of the  contracting  parties,  although  it may,  if necessary, 
consider later  the  extent to which  factors  other than  the  wording  of the  Treaty should 
be taken into account in pursuing this objective' (Series B, No 12, p. 19). 
3  Judgment of 19  March 1964 in  Case 75/63, Hoekstra (nee Unger)  [1964]  ECR 177; Judg-
ment of 5  July  1967,  Case  1/67,  Ciechelski  [1967]  ECR  181;  Judgment  of 9  June  1964, 
Case 92/63,  Mrs  Nonnenmacher,  Widow of H.  E.  Moebs  [1964]  ECR 281;  Judgment of 
27 October 1971, Case 23/71, Janssen [1971]  ECR 859. 
4  Judgment  of  21  February  1973,  Case  6/72,  [1973]  ECR  215  (this  judgment  shows  the 
binding force  of the preliminary provisions of the  Treaty); Judgment of 31  March  1971, 
Case 22/70, [1971]  ECR 263. 
1  Judgment of 9  July  1969,  Case  5/69, Volk  [1969]  ECR  295:  Judgment of 13  February 
1969, Case 14/68, Walt Wilhelm and Others [1969]  ECR 1. 
III-138 are built. As I have already said, Judge Pescatore has brilliantly explained the 
nature and meaning of these  concepts. 1  The Court has  referred to  them, in 
particular to give a proper interpretation to numerous Community provisions 2• 
Such an overall view, which pays particular attention to the essential charac-
teristics, is clearly also necessary in order to classify the Communities from a 
legal  point of view:  federal,  prefederal,  quasi-federal,  confederal  (?)  institu-
tions, union of States, special types of 'Communities' (?) 
It was  only  possible for  the noteworthy  judgments  of the  Court of Justice 
defining in detail the nature of the relationships between Community law and 
the national laws and the practical consequences which flow therefrom to be 
given  in  the  light  of  both this  overall  view  and,  in  particular,  the  nature, 
essence and necessary consequences of the European structure. I am referring 
here to the  judgments of the  Court of  Justice  concerning the supremacy  of 
European law which  have formed  the basis  of judgments of national courts 
which are generally in conformity with this concept. 3 
When trying to define the concept 'interpretation' in  the first  chapter of my 
examination, 4  I refered to 'construction by the court' while emphasizing the 
dangers of confusion to which such a description may give rise. 
This overall view also results in the essential harmonization and coordination 
of the rules with which I shall deal in the following section. 
Section 4 :  Harmonization and co-ordination of rules -
Decision as to which must be applied 
1.  General considerations 
In all developed societies, and particularly at the present day, rules of positive 
law are very  numerous.  They are  not intended to thwart or to weaken the 
application  of  each  other.  Their harmony  and  co-existence  are  dependent 
upon  the  vigilance  of  the  courts  which  must  also  take  account  of  the 
1  Les  Objectifs  de  Ia  Communaute Europeenne,  comme  Principes  d'lnterpretation dans  Ia 
Jurisprudence de  la  Cour de  Justice - in  Miscellanea,  W.  J.  Gansho£  van  der Meersch, 
pp. 325 et seq. 
2  See above, Section 3, Point 2, Strict interpretation - Wide interpretation. 
3  Cf.,  in  particular,  the  recent  Judgment  No  232  of the  Italian  Corte  Costituzionale  of 
22 October 1975. 
4  Chapter I, Interpretation - Concept - Section 1. 
III-139 amendment  or  'refinement'  of  the  old  rules  by  the  new.  Academic  legal 
writing is  quite wrong in referring, as it often does, to 'discrepancies' between 
rules  of  law:  genuine  discrepancies  only  exist in  rare  cases.  Of course,  an 
apparent  discrepancy  may  exist  where  a  rule  of  law  is  in  conflict  or  is 
irreconcilable either with another rule of higher status, or with a  provision 
of  international  law,  which  clearly  and  especially  includes  European  law. 
However,  in  such  cases  the discrepancy  is  only  apparent,  since  one  of the 
rules  must take precedence over the other which is,  therefore, without legal 
effect. 
The co-ordination and harmonization of rules is  often a difficult and delicate 
task, but one which is  necessary  and inevitable.  Very  often the courts must 
bring  rules  of  law  into  line  and  at the  same  time  take  into  consideration 
several of these rules - such as  laws, general principles ... - a task whose 
object and effect is  not to establish new or different rules of law but rather 
to define their scope or exact meaning and to discover, by means of decisions 
and judgments, which rule is applicable to specific situations. 
Where  several  rules  must  be  considered  the  courts  have  often  to  decide 
whether  one  is  to  take  precedence  over  another  and  whether  or not it  is 
necessary to 'borrow' elements from the other. 
These difficult tasks have been the work of the Court of Justice in particular, 
as well as of the other courts. 
Some examples will be given later. 
2.  The case-law of the Court 
(a)  Harmonization and co-ordination 
1.  The  members  of  the  European  Parliament  enjoy  immunity  from  lega] 
proceedings  'during the sessions  of  the Assembly'  (Article  9  of each  of the 
Protocols  to  the  three  Treaties  on  Privileges  and  Immunities,  before  the 
Merger Treaty). 
But  when  is  the  European  Parliament  in  session?  Article  22  of  the  ECSC 
Treaty provides that it shall meet, without requiring to be  convened, on the 
second  Tuesday in  May;  that the  session  may  not extend  beyond  the  end 
of the current financial year (namely 30 June); and that it may be convened 
in  extraordinary  session.  Article  139  of the  EEC  Treaty  provides  that the 
Assembly shall meet, without requiring to be convened, on the third Tuesday 
in October and that it may meet in extraordinary session. 
111-140 As  the  ordinary  session  begins  on  the  third  Tuesday  in  October,  it  must, 
in the absence  of any  provision for  its  closure on a  given  date,  be  deemed 
to be always in session after that date. 
In consequence, in its judgment of 12 May 1964, 1  the Court held that, as  the 
said Articles  9  apply to  an institution which is  common to the three  Com-
munities,  they  must  be  interpreted  together  with  Article  22  of  the  ECSC 
Treaty and Article  139  of  the EEC  Treaty  and  that the  words 'during the 
sessions of the Assembly in Article 9 must be interpreted as  follows:  subject 
to  the  dates  of  opening  and  closure  of  the  annual  session  determined  by 
Article 22 of the ECSC  Treaty, the European Assembly  must be  considered 
in session, even if it is not actually sitting, up to the time of the closure of the 
annual or extraordinary sessions'. 
2.  In  its  judgment  of  20  February  1975, 2  the  Court  had  to  'co-ordinate' 
a  provision  in  the  Staff  Regulations  of  Officials  relating  to  expatriation 
allowances and a provision prohibiting discrimination, in particular between 
male and female officials. 
The Staff  Regulations  provide  that officials  are  entitled  to  an  expatnatton 
allowance which, if the officials concerned are or have been nationals of the 
State  in  whose  European  territory  the  place  where  they  are  employed  1s 
situated,  is  only  payable if certain  special  conditions  are fulfilled. 
A female official of Belgian nationality had married an Italian. The judgment 
found  that, under Italian law, she  had automatically acquired Italian natio-
nality on her marriage. 
The Court held that it was necessary to 'define the concept of ... nationality 
under  Article  4 ... as  excluding  nationality  imposed  by  law  on  a  female 
official  upon her  marriage with a  national of another State,  when she  had 
no possibility of renouncing it'. 
The  Court  based  this  interpretation  on  the  need  to  take  account  of  the 
principle  that  there  must  be  no  discrimination  between  male  and  female 
officials,  'since  under no  national legislation  does  the  male  official  acquire 
the nationality of his wife'. 
1  Case 101/63 [1964]  ECR 195. 
2  Case  21/74  [1975]  ECR  221:  same  decision  in  the  judgment  of  the  same  date  in  Case 
34/74 [1975]  ECR 235. 
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administrative  measures  which  create  individual  rights,  in  particuler  the 
instrument appointing an official, can be revoked. 
It accepted  the view  that illegal  measures  may  be  revoked,  at least  within 
a reasonable time. It did not accept the view that legal and, therefore, valid 
measures were revocable. 
The issue was much more a question of harmonization and of co-ordination 
than of a lacuna. The written law enables an authority to appoint officials. 
But the public service  is  subject not only to the principle of continuity but 
also  to that of 'change' imposed by  its  actual requirements and by political 
considerations. 
Written rules  also provide that the official appointed has rights  and duties. 
Are the official's  rights  such  as  to  defeat any right the authority may have 
to go  back, within its discretion, on its previous decision?  The problem was 
therefore  to harmonize  the  rights,  powers  or jurisdiction  of  the  authority, 
on the one hand, and the rights of officials, on the other. 
4.  It has  been  necessary,  in  a  large  number  of  judgments,  to  define  the 
difference  between an action for annulment and an action for a declaration 
of liability,  to stress  that each  of these  actions is  a  separate remedy.  Other 
judgments  have  determined  whether  the  Community  can  be  liable  for  a 
wrongful  administrative  measure  even  if it  had  not  been  annulled.  Other 
judgments have taken into consideration the  distinction  between  a  measure 
which  is  illegal  and  a  measure,  the  illegality  of  which  gives  rise  to  non-
contractual liability on the part of the Community. I cannot mention here all 
those interesting judgments which have often been most helpfully summarized 
as a contribution to jurisprudence by the Advocates-General. 2 
5.  In its  judgment of 23  April  1956 3  the Court held that the provisions  of 
Article  4  of  the  ECSC  Treaty  constitute  the  provisions  establishing  the 
Common  Market  of  the  Community;  in  consequence,  they  are  directly 
applicable if they are not repeated elsewhere in the Treaty. If, however, the 
provisions  of Article  4  are  referred  to,  repeated  or supplemented  in  other 
parts of the Treaty, the wording of all the passages relating to one particular 
provision must be read together and simultaneously applied'. 
1  Joined Cases 7/56 and 3 to 7/57 (Recueil1957, page 85). 
2  Opinion of Mr Advocate-General  Roemer in  Case 5/71, Recueil  1971, page 975;  opinion 
of Mr Advocate-General  Trabucchi  in  Cases  4  and 30/74  and opinion of Mr Advocate-
General Warner in Case 9/75. 
3  Cases 7/54 and 9/54 (Recueil 1955/56, page 55). 
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must at all  times  be complied with, because they lay down the fundamental 
objectives  of the  Community.  Nevertheless,  the Court added, it is  necessary 
to reconcile  to a certain degree the various  obiectives in Article 3, since it is 
obviously  impossible  to  attain  all  of them  simultaneously  and  each  to  the 
fullest  possible  extent,  since  these  objectives  are  general  principles  and  the 
aim  must be  to put them  into  effect  and harmonize them  as  far  as  this  is 
humanly possible. 
(b)  Determination of the scope  of rules  which  have to  be  considered simul-
taneously:~ and:~ where  appropriate:~ their order of priority. 
The principle 'patere legem quam ipse fecisti' and the protection of legitimate 
expectations or legal certainty 
In its  judgment of 5 June 1973 2  the  Court was  asked to determine whether 
the Council of Ministers can be bound by a 'decision' which it has previously 
adopted. 
Under the law of several  Member States,  the principle cpatere  legem  quam 
ipse  fecisti'  3  does  not allow  an  authority which  has  adopted a  set of  rules 
to  derogate from  them  in  individual  cases  but this  in  no  way  prevents  the 
authority from amending this set of rules. 
This  was  the  first  rule  which  had to  be  considered  in  the  case  before the 
Court. 
Another rule was  that an administration must not disappoint the legitimate 
expectation of the persons subject to its administration. 
The two principles or rules were set against each other. 
The Court resolved the problem by giving the principle of the need to protect 
legitimate expectation a scope which it would not normally have had in the 
case-law of the Member States or of some of them. 
1  Case 8/57 (Recueil 1958, p. 223). 
2  Case 81/72 [1973]  ECR 575. 
3  This  principle  seems  to  me  to  be  based,  in  the  first  place,  on  common  sense;  if an 
authority  which  has  enacted  a  regulation,  that  is  to  say  a  general  provision,  cannot 
derogate  from  it  in  individual  cases,  it  runs  the  risk  of depriving the  regulation  of its 
force  and effect,  of its  raison  d'  etre.  (In  certain countries, the principle of the supremacy 
of Parliament may  justify  particular derogations  from  the  general provisions  of a  law). 
The principle is  based,  in  the second place,  on the needs  of a  State holding to the  rule 
of law and on legal certainy. 
III-143 The Court held that, under the terms of Article 65  of the Staff  Regulations 
of  Officials  'the Council  shall each year review the remunerations  [paid  by 
the  Communities] ... Both  the historical  background  and the terms  of the 
decision  [of  the  Council of 21  March 1972]  make it clear that the Council 
intended to bind itself to observe fixed  criteria in the working out of subse-
quent measures relative to the periodic determination of remunerations'. The 
Court went on to say that 'by its Decision of 21  March 1972, the Council ... 
assumed  obligations  which  it  has  bound itself  to  observe  for  the period  it 
has defined'. 
The  Court  concluded:  'Taking  account  of  the  particular  employer-staff 
relationship which forms the background to the implementation of Article 65 
of the Staff Regulations, and the factors  taken into account in consultations 
and  involved  in  its  application,  the  rule  protecting  the  staff's  legitimate 
expectation that the authorities would stand by undertakings of this nature, 
implies  that the Decision  of 21  March 1972  binds  the Council in  its  future 
action'. The Court was careful to state that although the rule for protecting 
legitimate  expectations  'is  primarily  applicable  to  individual  decisions,  the 
possibility  cannot  by  any  means  be  ruled  out  that  it  may  apply,  where 
appropriate,  to  the  exercise  of  more  general  powers . . .  Furthermore,  the 
adjustment each year of remunerations provided for  in  Article 65  only con-
stitutes an implementing measure of an administrative rather than a legislative 
nature, which is  within  the framework  of the  Council's  application  of that 
provision'. 1 
Section 5  The 'lacunae' in the 'law' or in Community 
law - Concept - Necessary restatement of 
this question. 
1.  Concept 
It must be said that the concept of  a lacuna would justify a  comprehensive 
and detailed jurisprudential study and obviously learned writers have already 
applied  their  minds  to  its  meaning  (very  frequently),  to  the  problems  it 
creates and their impact on the court's task. 
1  Another  example  is  provided  by  the  judgment  of  9  December  1975  in  Case  57/75 
relating to  the interpretation of Regulation No 3 and, in particular, to the determination 
under  this  regulation  of  the  rights  of  migrant  workers  to  an  invalidity  pension,  which 
held  that  the  answer  to  the  question  must  be  based  both  on  Article  27  (1)  and  on 
Article 28  (1)  (b)  and (c)  of the said regulation. 
III-144 First of all so  far as  the meaning of the word is  concerned;  a lacuna is  'une 
interruption dans le  texte ou une serie' 
1  ('a break in the wording or a list') 
or 'un espace  vide a l'interieur  d'un corps,  ce  qui  manque pour completer 
une chose quelconque' 
2  ('an empty space in a whole, what is needed in order 
to complete anything')  or 'se dit specialement d'une interruption, d'un vide 
dans le texte d'un auteur, dans le corps d'un ouvrage' 3  ('used particularly to 
mean a break, a blank in the text of an author, or in the body of a work') 
or 'espace vide,  solution de continuite dans un corps' 4  ('empty space, break 
in  the continuity in a whole')  or again 'interruption involontaire et facheuse 
dans  un  texte,  un  enchainement  de  faits  ou  d'idees;  absence  d'un  ou  de 
plusieurs  termes  dans  une serie ... lacune dans  un raisonnement ... lacune 
de  memoire ...  ' 5  ('unintended  and vexatious  gap  in  a  passage,  a  series  of 
facts  or train  of  thoughts;  absence  of  one  or several  terms  in  a  series ... 
lacuna in a line of reasoning ... memory gap ...  '). 
So  far  as  the meaning of the concept of a  ~lacuna' used in relation  to law 
is  concerned,  books  on general  law,  introduction  to the  study  of  the  law 
or jurisprudence refer to this concept. 
But has their examination of the concept being sufficiently thorough? Have 
they drawn the necessary distinctions? 
Consequently,  is  it  not  repeatedly  and,  therefore,  fruitlessly  discussed  on 
the basis  of concepts which have a  different scope  and meaning? 
A useful distinction has been drawn between: 6 
(a)  the deontological lacuna:  inadequacy of the legislative system;  the duty 
to be, Sollen, what should be  -co  osov  (failure to do what it ought to do), 
(b)  the  ideological  lacuna:  inadequacy  in  relation  to  an idea,  an ideology 
of the legal system and therefore inadequacy in relation to a 'Rechtsidee', 
(c)  the teleological lacuna:  inadequacy of the 'legal' order itself.  In a legis-
lative  system  which  lays  down  that  the  right  to  strike  shall  be  exercised 
within  the  framework  of  the  laws  which  govern  it,  there  is  a  teleological 
lacuna if there is no provision governing that right'. 
(d)  the ontological lacuna: inadequacy of the legislative system to be,  Sein, 
what is -co  4)v,  in  short  the  'infinite  variety  of  human  actions'  (failure  to 
cover a situation). 
1  Littre et Dictionnaire de 1' Academie Franc;aise. 
2  Larousse du XXe Siecle. 
3  Dictionnaire de l'  Academie Franc;aise. 
4  P.  Robert, Dictionnaire de  la Langue Franc;aise. 
s  P.  Robert, Op. cit. 
6  Amedeo  G.  Conte - Decision,  Completude,  Cloture ... in  Le  Probleme des  Lacunes  en 
Droit- Travaux du Centre National de Logique- 1968, page 66 et seq. 
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the one hand, a lacuna in  the law and, on the other hand a lacuna in a law 
or in the principles of law or custom. A lacuna in the law could be a deonto-
logical,  ideological or ontological lacuna. In particular a  lacuna which is  in 
'a law' would be a teleological lacuna as described by Conte. 
To determine whether there is  a lacuna in the law or not is  to make a value 
judgment. The relevant evaluations may differ:  some may take the view that 
there  is  no  lacuna,  others,  on  the  other hand that there  is,  the  latter not 
always suggesting the same way of filling it in. 
To point out that a  law does  not contemplate such a  solution but that an 
unwritten principle or custom, or again a rule which be be inferred from one 
or more laws, govern the said situation, is  merely a finding, if you like, that 
there is a 'lacuna' in a law. 
To record the finding that neither the EEC  Treaty nor any other provision 
of  Community  law  permits  the  control  of  mergers,  is  to  find  that  there 
is  a  lacuna  in  this  law,  if  the  view  is  held  that such  a  control  must  be 
permitted. To point out that Community law provides no procedure for the 
revision of the Treaties which would enable a  qualified majority to legislate 
to this  end  and that such  a  procedure should  be  adopted and,  again,  that 
the  European  Parliament  does  not  possess  the  legislative  power  which  it 
should nevertheless be able to exercise, is  also to call attention to lacunae in 
Community law. 
It is not normally the function of a court to fill  in gaps in the law; this is  the 
task of the 'legislature' and of the Nation which naturally develops customs 
and, in part at least,, legal principles of its own accord. 
On the other hand it is  for a  court to fill  in the lacunae  (if  importance is 
attached to this word 'lacuna')  in the provisions of laws by  considering the 
rules  which  emerge  from  one or several  other provisions,  from  their  spirit 
and purpose or rules  found  in  legal  principles  or custom. If it is  borne in 
mind that rules of law are only found in provisions, and in them alone, there 
are  unquestionably  lacunae,  and indeed  a  large  number of them,  but these 
are in any case only lacunae in 'a law'. 
Reference is, often wrongly, made to Article 4 of the Civil Code which deals 
with a refusal on the part of a judge to give a decision. 
1 It is  not the purpose 
1  'Le  juge  qui refusera de  juger sous pretexte du silence,  de l'obscurite ou de l'insuffisance 
de  Ia  loi,  pourra etre poursuivi  comme  coupable de  deni  de  justice'  ('Legal  proceedings 
may be taken against a judge, who refuses to give  a decision on the ground that the law 
is silent, obscure or inadequate, for refusal to give a decision'). 
III-146 of this provision, however, to entrust the judge with a legislative task which, 
moreover, would conflict with the constitutional institutions.  In  any case  it 
refers  to  the inadequacy  of  a  law and not of  the law.  It is  clear  that this 
provision, which is  held in great respect,  cannot mean that the  judge must 
always find a rule, and it doesn't much matter where he discovers it, in equity 
or in  law,  upon which  he  would bestow the force  and effect  of  a  rule  of 
substantive law by  applying it during the performance of his  judicial func-
tions.  The judge who comes  to  the  conclusion  that no rule  of  substantive 
law applies  to the case  complies with the requirement  of Article  4.  It is  in 
fact  clear that substantive law does  not have to cover every  kind of human 
relationship:  a  system  of  substantive  law  which  did  so  would produce  an 
intolerable system which Kant has already denounced. 
As  Mr Foriers  has  written  so  well  'the provision  in Article  4  of the Code 
Civile ... by no means makes it obligatory to fill  in gaps in the law but it 
imposes upon the Judge the duty to determine the issues  before him. These 
are  two  very  different  things:  the  legislature  intended  that  the  judge, 
appointed to perform judicial functions,  should determine the issues  before 
him but certainly does not oblige him to create a rule where none exists'. 
1 
Article  1  of the Swiss  Civil  Code  also  provides  that:  'In the  absence  of  a 
statutory provision  which  can  be  applied,  the  court  must  decide  the  case 
according to customary law and, if there is no such custom, according to the 
rules  which it would adopt if it had to act in a  legislative capacity'. In  this 
connexion it is  frequently emphasized 
2  that, in filling in a gap, a court does 
not enjoy the freedom of the legislature to begin  afresh by  derogating from 
previous laws; the court must always abide by all  the laws in force and the 
standards of behaviour and principles which flow from them. 3 
It is  the nature of the 'law' (here I also, when referring to this concept, have 
in  mind its  general meaning)  to be  of general application.  Consequently,  it 
cannot enumerate or set  out all  the  facts,  circumstances  and events  which 
1  P.  Foriers,  Les  Lacunes du Droit- in  Le  Probleme des  lacunes en droit - Travaux du 
centre national de recherches de logique, p. 11  and 12. 
2  See  especially on this point Professor Wolf - Les  Lacunes du droit et leurs solutions en 
droit suisse  in Le  probleme des  lacunes  en  droit - Travaux du centre international  de 
recherches de logique, page 118. 
3  It is  true,  as  Professor  Perelman  stresses  (Essai  de  synthese  in  Le  probleme des  lacunes 
en  droit, Op.  cit.,  p.  543),  that Israeli  law provides  that in a  case  which  is  not covered 
by 'Legal sources', 'the civil courts ... shall with certain exceptions decide in conformity 
with the substance of the  Common Law and the doctrine of equity in force in England'. 
But, on the one hand, Common Law constitutes a substantial part of substantive law and, 
on  the  other hand,  equity  in  England  certainly  does  not have  the  same  meaning  as  in 
Belgium,  France or the Netherlands but, on the contrary, is  a  body of precise  and well-
ordered rules which came into being for well-known historical reasons. 
111-147 vary enormously. Portalis has emphasized that 'the skill of the legislature lies 
in finding for each law the best principles for furthering the common weal; 
the  skill  of  the  judge  is  to  put these  principles  into  effect,  subdivide  and 
extend them  by applying them in  a  judicious and reasonable way to parti-
cular cases . . .  The function  of the  law is  to  determine,  on the  basis  of a 
wide-ranging outlook on life,  general legal  maxims,  to  lay  down principles 
which have far reaching consequences and not to go into the details ... It is 
for the judge, imbued with the general spirit of the laws,  to  supervise their 
application'. 1 
It is  therefore  a  mistake  to believe  that there is  a  'lacuna'  (in  other words 
an  empty  space,  omission  or  deficiency)  whenever  written  law  has  not 
expressly  provided for  and covered  every  situation and question which can 
arise and that the court, which in spite of this fact gives  a  decision in such 
cases, performs the function of the 'Praetor' which, is indeed legislative. 2 
In  this  connexion if  account is  not taken of what a  'law'  and the  Court's 
task consist of, one is bound to find that there are innumerable, more lacunae 
even than written rules. 
1  (a)  Expose Preliminaire du Code Civil- Locre Edition Beige, p. 159, No 17; 
(b)  Locre, t. I, Paris 1827, p. 258. No 9. 
2  Mr Lazar  Focsaneanu,  commenting on  the  case-law  of the  Court of  Justice  relating to 
Articles  85  and  86  of  the  EEC  Treaty  recently  wrote  that the  Court had  'formulated' 
and created  'praetorian'  rules  and  that, in  so  doing,  it had  not  adhered  to  the  classic 
rules  of interpretation. In  view of this  he believes  that he has to refer  not to 'the inter-
pretation' of those rules by the  Court but rather to their 're-reading' in accordance with 
the Court's own 'hermeneutics'  (Ia  jurisprudence de la Cour de  Justice de Communautes 
europeennes en matiere de concurrence- Revue  du Marche  Commun No 192,  January 
1976, p. 33  et seq.). But what is the meaning of 'hermeneutics'? According to 'le Larousse 
Encyclopedique' a hermeneut is  a person who interprets sacred and ancient texts, ancient 
laws ...  explains  the  rules  to  be  followed  when  searching  for  the  exact  meaning  of 
writings'.  According  to  the  same dictionary  hermeneuts  were  ministers  of the  Christian 
Church in the  first  centuries  (A.D.)  who were  responsible  for translating and explaining 
the writings  to  the people.  The 'Dictionnaire de  1' Academie'  has  'hermeneutic - adjec-
tive  - having  as  its  object  the  interpretation  of  texts.  Hermeneutic  science  and,  as  a 
feminine  noun,  the  hermeneutics  of  laws.  In  its  general  use,  hermeneutics  mean  the 
interpretation of sacred writings'. 
'Hermeneutical',  in  English,  has  acquired  a  wider  meaning  and  is  mainly  applied  to 
Scripture  (in  the opposite sense  to 'exegetical'), and can equally well be applied in  other 
fields  (Oxford Dictionary,  cf.  'hermeneutical':  belonging  to or concerned  with interpret-
ation). 
In a noteworthy article Professor Capurso also gives it a very wide meaning:  M. Capurso, 
Criteri  in  ordine  all'applicazione  di  norme  comunitarie,  convenzionali  e  derivate,  con-
fliggenti con norme primarie di diritto interno. Riv.  dir. pub. 1975, 1057-1095. 
III-148 When the Court ruled that Article 65  of the ECSC  Treaty covers agreements 
between  associations  of  undertakings, 
1  that Article  85  of  the  EEC  Treaty 
also applies to agreements with undertakings outside the Common Market, 2 
that purely national concerted practices  are  or are  not caught by  the  same 
article 3 or again, in particular, that the abuse of a dominant economic power 
within the meaning of Article 86  of the EEC Treaty may arise not only from 
the  practices  or conduct  of  an  undertaking  but  also  from  its  merger  with 
other undertakings, the Court did not fill in 'lacunae' but defined the meaning 
and  scope  of  rules  of  law  in  accordance  with  the  task  which  the  'law' 
entrusts it. 
It is  true that the Treaty does  not define the concept of  'subsidies'  or 'aids' 
within the meaning of Article 4 (c)  of the ECSC Treaty but this is  no reason 
for  concluding that on 23  February 1961 4  the  Court filled  in  'a lacuna'  by 
defining what subsidies or aids are, unless the view is taken that 'a law' must 
always  expressly  provide  for  every  single  situation  or question  and  define 
the exact meaning of words and concepts. 
Article  93  of  the  EEC  Treaty does  not specify  the  time-limit  within which 
the  Commission  must  make  its  attitude  known  on  national  proposals  for 
fresh  aid  or the  modification  of  an  existing  aid  but,  as  the  Court stressed 
in  its  judgment of  11  December  1973, 5  although the  Member State  cannot 
put its  proposed  measures  into  effect  until  this  procedure  has  resulted  in 
a  final  decision  and  while  this  period  [of  the  procedure]  must  allow  the 
Commission  sufficient  time,  the  latter  must,  however,  act  diligently  and 
take  account  of  the  interest  of  Member  States  in  being  informed  of  the 
position quickly  in  fields  where  the  need  to  intervene  can  be  of an  urgent 
nature. 
The  Court  accordingly  ruled  that  the  Commission  must  take  a  decision 
within a reasonable time. 6 
1  Judgment of 19 March 1964 in Case 67/63  [1964]  ECR 151 
2  Judgment of 14 July 1972 in Joined Cases 48,  49,  51  to 57/69  [1972]  ECR 619  - not yet 
published - [1972]  C.M.L.R. 557. 
3  Judgment of 17  October 1972 in Case 8/72 [1972]  ECR 977- not yet published- [1973] 
C.M.L.R. 7 
4  Judgment of 23  February 1961 in Case 30/59 Recueil 1961 
5  Case 120/73 [1973]  ECR 1480 and 1481 
8  The  Court  has  used  this  concept  of  a  reasonable  time-limit  in  relation  inter  alia  in 
relation to a limitation period which was  claimed and also, more particularly, in relation 
to the Staff Regulations of Officials (see  the judgments of 4 February 1970 in  Case  13/69 
and of 12  July 1973  in Joined  Cases  10  and 47/72  [1973]  ECR 763.  National courts are 
also familiar with this concept of a reasonable time-limit. Where the provisions of written 
law  do  not  include  a  specific  time-limit,  the  courts  sometimes,  and  more  particularly 
in  administrative  cases,  rule  that  a  reasonable  time-limit  be  complied  with:  see  the 
opinion  of  Commissaire  du  Gouvernment  Mr  Galmot  before  the  judgment  of  the 
111-149 Can  this  be  filling  in  a  gap?  It may  amount  to  completing  the  written 
provision  but by  applying  other rules  of Community law:  the principle  of 
legal  certainty,  or of  the protection of legitimate expectations or again  the 
principle that a  wrongful act must be  prevented. It also  amounts simply to 
applying  reasonably  and  carefully  the  written  provision  according  to  the 
meaning which the 'legislature' had of necessity to give it. 
2.  Judgments in which the Court expressly or by implication re-
lies upon the concept of a 'lacuna' 
In  describing  the  task of 'harmonization and co-ordination'  (in  Chapter V, 
Section 4), I quoted the judgment of 12 July 1957 1  on the question whether 
administrative acts which create subjective rights for officials may be revoked. 
The  Court held  that:  'This  is  a  problem  arising  under  administrative  law 
with  which  the  case-law  and  learned  writers  of  all  the  countries  of  the 
Community are familiar but the Treaty contains no rules for its solution. To 
avoid committing the offence of refusal of the judge to give a decision ('cun 
deni  de  justice"):~  the  Court is  accordingly  obliged  to  solve  it in  the  light 
of the rules recognized by the legislation, the learned writers and the case-law 
of the member countries'. 
There would, in fact,  have been  a refusal on the part of the Court to give 
a  decision if it had decided that, since the relevant instruments provided no 
guidance at all, it could not settle the dispute which had been brought before 
it:  it clearly never occurred to the members  of the superior European court 
to adopt such an attitude. 
With regard to the concept of a lacuna envisaged  by the words 'the Treaty 
contains  no rules  (for  the solution  of  the problem)', it is  true that no text 
expressly provides the  solution,  but,  as  I have endeavoured to show in the 
chapter  on  'harmonization  and  co-ordination',  it  results  from  the  meaning 
and  scope  of  legal  rules  which,  as  in  so  many  other  cases,  must be  read 
together. 
Conseil d'Etat de  France of 27  November 1964, :ij..ecueil  des  arrets du Conseil d'Etat 1964, 
p. 598,  the  judgment  of  the  Cour  de  Cassation  of  Belgium  of  23  April  1971  and  the 
opinion  of  the  Advocate-General,  Bulletin  et  Pasicrisie  1971.1.751,  the  judgment  of  the 
Conseil  d'Etat de  Belgique  of 19  June 1968,  No 13.030,  R.J.D.A.  and C.E.  1969,  p. 142. 
1  Case 7/56 and Joined Cases 3 to 7/57, Recueil 1957, page 85,  CMLR. 
111-150 On  15  December  1970 1  the  Court,  after  stating  that  'neither  Regulation 
No 19 nor the implementing regulations issued thereunder contain provisions 
whereby the rate of the levy  applicable to a specified category of cereals can 
be  reduced  because  of  damage  and  loss  of  value  suffered  by  these  cereals 
before  being imported', ruled  that:  ~In view  of the  absence  of such  provis-
ions, this problem must be solved by reference to the system of the regulation, 
having  regard  to  the  principles  governing  the  common  organization  of 
agricultural markets and the aims attributed to it by the Treaty'. 
No specific  solution  is  to  be  found  in  the  provisions;  there  may  therefore 
be  a  'lacuna' in  these  provisions. But  a  solution  can be found  in  the regu-
lations taken as  a whole and their objectives;  in  fact,  therefore, there is  no 
lacuna. 
The same  obvervations  apply  to  the  judgment of  30 January 1974  in  Case 
159/73, in which the Court stated that: 'the rules of the common organization 
of the market in sugar form  a complete system  in the sense that it does  not 
leave  the  Member  States  the  power  to  fill  a  lacuna  by  resorting  to  their 
national law'.  The Court went on  to  hold  that:  'It is  thus  proper to seek 
a solution in the light of the aims and objectives of the common organization 
of the .market, taking account of considerations of a practical and administra-
tive nature'. 2 
On 30  October  1972, 3  with  reference  to  the  question  whether  a  national 
regulation concerning the cultivation of hyacinth bulbs was compatible with 
Article  10  of Regulation No 234/68  of the  Council  of 27 February 1968  on 
the establishment of a common organization of the market in live trees and 
other plants, bulbs,  roots  and the like,  cut flowers  and ornamental foliage, 
the Court stated: 'in the absence of express provisions as  to the compatibility 
of  a  national regulation  restricting production with the organization of the 
market set up by Regulation No 234/68, it is  necessary to seek the solution 
to  the question  referred in  the light of the objects  and the purposes of the 
regulation within the framework of the principles laid down by  the Treaty 
itself ... It thus follows from the general tenor of the regulation that ...  ' etc. 
1  Case 31/70 [1970]  ECR 1062 
2  The case  was  concerned  with  the  interpretation  of  Regulation  No  1009/67/EEC  of  the 
Council of 18  December 1967  on the  common  organization of the market in  sugar and 
Regulation  (EEC)  No  142/69  of  the  Commission  of  27  January  1969  laying  down 
certain detailed rules for the application of the quota system for sugar. 
3  Case 190/73  [1974]  ECR 1123 
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provision)  but for  all  that there is  no lacuna in  the particular 'rule of law', 
and, still less, a gap in the law. 1 
As  I have already mentioned in  Chapter I,  the  Court sometimes emphasizes, 
and rightly, that it cannot fill  in gaps in the law by creating new regulations 
because by doing so it would exceed its powers. 
In  its  judgment  of  14  July  1972, 2  it  pointed  out  that  the  Community 
legislature alone is  empowered to lay down a limitation period for competi-
tion. The Court, relying on the principle of legal certainty, which it is entitled 
to do, nevertheless ruled that proceedings must be initiated within a reasonable 
time. 
1  In its judgment of 18  February 1975, in Case 66/74,  the Court recognized that a problem 
arises  concerning the language to be used  when a  decision  of a  social  security authority 
has  to  be  notified  to  a  legal  person  abroad  who  does  not  understand  the  national 
language  used  by  the  authority concerned.  It stated that certain provisions of European 
Community  rules  on  social  security  contain  special  provisions  governing  the  use  of 
languages.  The  Court  concluded  after  examining  these  provisions  that  the  national 
authorities  of a  Member State  must  ensure  that legal  certainty is  not adversely  affected 
when  a  decision  of  such  an  authoritiy  is  communicated  to  the  national  of  another 
Member State who was unable to know the language of the decision. 
Community  and  national  regulations  cannot  anticipate  every  situation;  it  is  for  the 
court to deduce from the whole of the legislation or regulations concerned the rules which 
must be applied  in  those cases  for  which  no  express  provisions  could  have  been  made. 
At  this  point  it  is  appropriate  to  mention  the  judgment  delivered  by  the  Cour  de 
Cassation of Belgium  on 24  October 1975  (in  the  case  of Stadt Jugendamt Kassel  v  De 
Storcke)  which  held  that the  Cour d'Appel  in  its  judgment which  was  appealed  against 
had correctly applied Article 2(2)  of the International Convention of 15  April 1958  on the 
recognition  and enforcement of decisions  of the  courts  concerning the  duty to  maintain 
and support children  and that a  foreign  decision  by  default could  neither  be  recognized 
nor enforced, because the pleadings sent to  the defendant were  in German  without any 
accompanying translation  and the person  concerned  did  not appear to have a  sufficient 
knowledge of the German language. 
2  Case 48/69, I.C.I., Recueil 1972, page 656 
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Criticisms  directed  at  certain judgments  of 
the  Court of  Justice 
Section 1  Introduction 
I emphasized towards the end of Section 3 of Chapter II  that, when carrying 
out their judicial task meticulously  and efficiently,  judges  sometimes  adopt 
solutions  which  would  not have  satisfied  other  judges  who have  the same 
standing and conception of their duties. I have tried to give the main reasons 
for this while at the same time drawing particular attention to the fact that 
differences  in  the  training  of  lawyers  and  differences  in  the  national 
institutions to which they are accustomed cause or may cause them to take 
different views of a court's decision. 
It is, in consequence, to be expected that while some approve, others criticize 
the judgments of the Court even if it has kept to its  judicial role,  and  not 
assumed powers which it does not possess and has made use of methods of 
interpretation to which no-one would think of objecting. 
Moreover,  some  judgments  are  frequently  criticized  on  the  basis  of  a 
misconception of the court's task. 
In the second section of this chapter I will consider certain judgments which 
have  given  or  could  give  rise  to  such  approval  or  criticism.  Many  other 
judgments could, of course, be quoted. 
In the third section I will  review  certain  other judgments which could give 
rise to criticisms which are not necessarily unjustified. 
111-153 Section 2  Certain judgments which have been or cou]d 
have been  the  subject  of  criticisms  which, 
however, do not call in question the  correc-
tness  of the methods used or  the nature and 
extent of the powers of the court 
1.  In its judgment of 15 July 1963 1 2  the Court stated:  'The words and the 
natural meaning of  this  provision  [the  second  paragraph of Article  173  of 
the EEC  Treaty]  justify the broadest interpretation. Moreover provisions of 
the Treaty regarding the right of interested parties to  bring an action must 
not be  interpreted  restrictively.  Therefore,  the  Treaty  being  silent  on  this 
point, a limitation in this respect may not be presumed'. 
A  criticism  suggests  itself.  It is  clear from  the  second  paragraph of Article 
173, especially if it is  compared with the provisions of Article 33 of the ECSC 
Treaty,  as  interpreted  by  the  Court of  Justice,  that the  authors  of  Article 
173 wished to restrict the right to bring an action of the persons referred to in 
the  second  paragraph  of  Article  173.  The  Court's  assertion  that  the 
provisions of the Treaty on 'the right of interested parties to bring an action 
must not be interpreted restrictively' could therefore be criticized. 
But this  criticism  can  be  answered  with the  argument that the  Court does 
not conceal the fact  that the second paragraph of Article  173  restricted  the 
right to institute proceedings of those concerned, particularly if a comparison 
is  made between this right and that which is  secured under Article 33  of the 
ECSC  Treaty  but that,  within  the  limits  laid  down  by  this  provision,  full 
effect must be given to the right which the parties concerned are recognized 
as having to bring an action. 
Thus, the line of reasoning followed  by  the Court can  certainly give  rise  to 
criticisms which however, in my view, appear to be unjustified. 
2.  The Court could conceivably be criticized for having, in its  judgment of 
21  February 1973, 3  given Article 86 of the EEC Treaty a meaning and scope 
which this provision does not have and for having allowed the Commission, 
contrary to the intention of the Treaty, to exercise control over mergers. 
, According  to  Article  1  of  the  Commission's  decision  which  the  Court  of 
.Justice  was  asked to  annul,  the  abuse  consisted in  Continental  Can having 
1  Case 25/62 [1963]  ECR 106. 
2  In  this  judgment,  the  Court had to decide  whether  a  decision  addressed  to  a  Member 
State can be treated as  a decision  addressed to another person within the meaning of the 
second paragraph of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty. 
3  Case 6/72, Europemballage et Continental Can  [1973]  ECR 215. 
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convertible  debentures  of  another  financial  and  commercial  entity  and  m 
this  purchase  having  in  practice  lead  to  the  elimination  of  competition  in 
packaging products in a substantial part of the Common Market. 
The Court dismissed  the complaint that the contested  decision  gave  Article 
86 of the EEC Treaty a meaning and effect for which there was no authority 
in the Treaty and which thus enabled the Commission to exercise  a control 
over mergers, which is illegal. 
One  may  or may  not consider  the  conclusion  which  the  Court  of  Justice 
reached  in  that judgment to be  the  one which  is  wanted.  But it  cannot be 
denied  that the  decision  is  based  on a  consideration  of all  the  rules  of the 
Treaty  and  on  the  system  which  is  inferred  both  from  the  fundamental 
principles of the Treaty and the provisions of Articles 85 and 86 read together. 
From  those  principles  and  articles  the  Court drew  a  conclusion which  can 
undoubtedly be justified. It in  no  way creates  a new rule  of law permitting 
the control of mergers, and, in consequence, does not go beyond the limits of 
the task with which, as an institution, it is entrusted. 
The ratio  decidendi may  give  rise  to  criticism,  it may  be  unconvincing but 
it 1 has been arrived at by proper judicial methods. 
1  In essence the Court reasoned as follows: 
(a)  The question  is  whether the  word  'abuse' in  Article  86  refers  only  to the  course  of 
conduct of an undertaking or whether this word refers also to changes in the structure 
of an undertaking which lead to competition being seriously distorted in  a substantial 
part of the Common Market. 
(b) The  distinction  between  measures  affecting  the  structure  of  the  undertaking  and 
practices  affecting  the  market  is  not  decisive,  since  any  structural  measure  may 
influence  market conditions,  if it  increases  the  size  and  the  economic  power  of the 
undertaking. 
(c)  In  order  to  answer  this  question,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  spirit,  general 
scheme  and wording of Article 86,  as  well as  the system  and objectives of the Treaty. 
(d) If Article  (3)  (f)  provides for  the  introduction of a  system  ensuring  that competition 
in  the Common  Market is  not distorted,  then it  requires  a  fortiori  that competition 
must not be eliminated. 
(e)  The  distortion  of  competition  which  is  prohibited  if  it  is  the  result  of  behaviour 
falling  under  Article  85  cannot  become  lawful  because  such  behaviour,  under  the 
influence  of  a  dominant  undertaking,  turns  out  to  be  successful  and  results  in  the 
merger of the undertakings concerned. 
(f)  In the absence  of any express  provision it cannot be assumed that the Treaty, which 
prohibits by  Article  85  certain  decisions  of ordinary associations  of  undertakings ... 
permits  in  Article  86  that  undertakings,  after  merging  into  an  organic  unity,  may 
achieve  such  a  dominant  position  that  any  serious  opportunity  for  competition  is 
almost impossible.  Such  disparate legal  treatment would make a  breach in  the entire 
competition  law  which  could  jeopardize  the  proper  functioning  of  the  Common 
Market. 
(g) In  any  case  Articles  85  and  86  cannot  be  interpreted  in  such  a  way  that  they 
contradict each other, because they serve to achieve the same aim. 
III··155 3.  The regulation relating to imports of cereals provides  that the importer 
may request the advance fixing of the levy which will be applicable to him on 
the date of submission  of  the  application for  a  licence.  This  regulation, 
however, lays down that the rate of this levy will only apply to importations 
effected during the period of validity of the said licence. 
The  regulation  relating  to  the  importation  of  cereals  from  third  countries 
expressly provides  that,  in  case  of  force  majeure,  the  rate  of  the  levy 
applicable on the date of submission of the application for the licence  will 
continue to  apply even  if  the importation has  not been  effected  during the 
period of validity of the licence. 
In  its  judgment of 20 February 1975  the  Court ruled  that the  exception  of 
force  majeure  must  be  applied 'by way of analogy' to trade between Member 
States. 
Some will  criticize  the court for having recourse to reasoning 'by analogy', 
others will  also be able to claim that it was unnecessary to have recourse to 
it,  since  force  ma;eure  can  usually  be pleaded in  any legal  matter,  even  if 
there is no text which can be quoted in support. 
4.  Article 36 of the EEC Treaty permits the Member States to introduce or 
maintain in force  prohibitions and restrictions on imports, exports or goods 
in  transit 'justified  on grounds  of the protection of health'  but it provides 
that such measures  'shall not constitute a  means of arbitrary discrimination 
or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States'. 
In its  judgment of 20 May 1976 in  Case  104/75, which was  concerned with 
national regulations relating to imports of medicinal preparations, the Court 
had to define these wide concepts of 'measures for the protection of health' 
which  'are justified'  and  in  no way  constitute  'arbitrary discrimination'  or 
'a disguised restriction on trade between Member States'. 
For this  purpose, it also  had to  evaluate facts  and circumstances which,  of 
course, are liable to develop and change. 
Was  the  Court's  evaluation  of  the  'requirements'  and  the  'options'  for 
protecting health good or bad? Obviously opinions can vary on this point. 
5.  On 30 September 1975,  in  Case  32/75,  the  Court held  that 'in view  of 
the  equality of treatment which  the  provision  (Article  7  (2)  of Regulation 
(EEC)  No 1612/68) seeks to achieve, the substantive area of application must 
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attached to the contract of employment, such as  reductions in fares for large 
families'. 
There are those, of course, who will be able to take the view that the area of 
application  delineated  for  the  concept  'social  advantages'  is  too  large ... 
but no-one can  deny  that the Court proceeds on the  basis  of the consider-
ations which it could and had to take into account. 
6.  On  28 October 1975,  in  Case  36/75,  the  Court,  interpreting  the 
provisions of Article 48  of the EEC  Treaty and several  regulations  adopted 
to implement it, ruled that a Member State cannot (specifically on grounds of 
public policy)  prohibit a national of another Member State from residing on 
part  only  of  its  territory  except  in  those  cases  where  'such  (partial) 
prohibitions may be applied to nationals of the State concerned'. 
The view could be taken that this conclusion does not necessarily follow from 
the  Community  provisions  which  called  for  interpretation.  The  opinion 
could even be held that the interpretation by the Court of Justice may in the 
end  render  ineffective  the  'supervision of aliens'  which  Community  law,  in 
any case, allows Member States to continue. 
In Chapter II of my review I referred to a number of judgments on economic 
matters.  Inevitably  there  are  those  who  will  consider  that  the  review  of 
these  matters  by  the Court has gone too far  while  there  are  others  on  the 
contrary who will say that it has not gone far enough. 
I  devoted  a part of Chapter V of my review, on the one hand, to consideration 
of the need to adopt a particular line of reasoning and of the interpretation, 
at times  wide and at others strict, of a concept or a rule and, on the other 
hand, to the question of 'lacunae'. 
ft has  seemed  to  me  that the  arguments  and  good  sense  of  the  Court  in 
general  carry  conviction.  Nevertheless  the  possibility  cannot  be  ruled  out 
that others may take a different view. 
As  for  the  so-called  'lacunae',  if  a  text  does  not  expressly  provide  the 
answer,  the  Court must look for help to all the factors which I have described. 
Obviously the possibility cannot be  ruled out that some may think that the 
factors  taken into consideration were  irrelevant or that others  should have 
been taken into account. 
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ject of criticism which may not be unjustified 
1.  On  18 March 1970 1  the  Court  ruled  that  all  national  courts  are 
'authorities  of  the  Member States'  within  the  meaning  of Article  9  (3)  of 
Regulation  No  17.  This  ruling  was  given  on the  ground  that  'Article  88 
refers  to national  rules  on jurisdiction  and procedure,  with  the  result  that 
the concept of 'authorities in Member States' includes national courts'. 
It may  be  asked  whether  Article  88  contains  any  justification  whatsoever 
for this  ruling of the Court and, in particular, whether other provisions  of 
the Treaty do not call for a different ruling from that given by the Court. 
It is  helpful to recall the wording of Article 88:  'Until the entry into force of 
the provisions adopted in pursuance of Article 87, the authorities in  Member 
States  shall rule on the admissibility of agreements,  decisions  and concerted 
practices and on the abuse of a dominant position in the common market in 
accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions of Article 
85, in particular paragraph 3 and of Article 86'. 
No ordinary court has (at least under the system of administration of justice 
adopted in some of the Member States) the power to rule that a provision of 
Article 85  (1)  is  inapplicable for any of the reasons set out in paragraph (3) 
of that article.  Consequently, when Article  88  states that the 'authorities in 
Member States' shall apply paragraph 3 of Article 85, that expression cannot 
have been intended to include every court (for example the ordinary Belgian 
courts). 
·Moreover Article  89  of  the  EEC  Treaty  also  refers  to  the  concept  of 
·'competent  authorities  in  the  Member  States'  and  there  seems  to  be  no 
doubt that it cannot embrace all the courts of the Member States since this 
provision  states  that  the  Commission  shall  investigate  cases  of  alleged 
infringement  'in  cooperation  with  the  competent  authorities'.  There  is  no 
doubt that the set up of the  Community means that 'cooperation' between 
the court and the administrative authorities is impossible. 2 
1  Case 43/69 [1970]  ECR 127. 
2  I have  already pointed out that the  judgment of 18  March  1970  was  confirmed  on this 
point by  that of 6 February 1973  in  Case 48/72.  However this point was  decided differ-
ently in the judgment of 30 January 1974 in Case 127/73. 
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1  has apparently given rise to a number of 
comments and even criticisms which have often been regarded as justified. 2 
It has even  been claimed that, in holding that France had not failed to fulfi1 
its  Community  obligations,  the  Court  w~s motivated  by  considerations  ot 
expediency or 'policy'. 
I do not believe that these criticisms can be accepted as valid. 
The  Court  held  that  the  application  brought  by  the  Commission  against 
France  under  Article  169  of  the  EEC  Treaty  'must ... be  rejected  as  not 
sufficiently well founded'. 
France had excluded imports of goods originating and coming from Tunisia 
from the application of the levy provided for by  Regulation No 136/66/EEC 
on  the establishment  of  a  common  organization  of  the market in  oils  and 
fats. This was the failure for which France was blamed. 
France  relied  on  a  Protocol  (known  as  Protocol  1.7)  annexed  to the EEC 
Treaty to  justify the continuance of a  system of  duty-free  entry of the said 
imports  until  the  entry  into force  of  the  provisions  made  by  a  subsequent 
association agreement between the Community and Tunisia. 
The Court found that, as from the entry into force of Regulation No 136/66, 
the  objective of Protocol1.7, which France believed it could proceed to attain, 
had  henceforth  to  be  achieved  by  means  of  provisions  compatible  with 
principles  forming  the  basis  of  the  common  organization  of  the  market 
concerned,  and that the  rights  reserved  to the French Republic  by Protocol 
1.7  had to  be  adapted  to  the new  organizational  techniques  introduced by 
the  regulation.  In  addition,  the  Court found,  first,  that  the  Community 
authorities  ought to  have  adopted  provisions  for  the  purpose  of  adapting 
the  system  applicable  to  the  said  imports  in  the  light  of  the  new  legal 
situation created by the regulation and, second, that 'the fact that Regulation 
No 136/66 is  silent on the point may have given rise to the question whether 
the unchanged exercise of the rights deriving from Protocol 1.7 was, at any 
rate  provisionally,  compatible  with  the  provisions  of  that  regulation'  and 
that  'bearing  in  mind  the  equivocal  nature  of  the  situation  thus  brought 
about' there had been no 'failure' on the part of France. 
1  Case 26/69  [1970]  ECR 565. 
2  See,  in  particular,  Audretsch,  Communautaire  Contr6le,  Het  Toezicht  in  de  Europese 
Gemeenschappen op de Naleving van de Verdragsverplichtingen door de Lid-Staten. 
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regulation  but its  conduct  was  held  not  to  be  wrongful  (and  one  can 
understand this decision without being forced to assume that it was based on 
considerations of  expediency  or policy)  in  view  of  the  equivocal  nature of 
the  regulation  and  the  omissions  of  the  Community  authorities.  A  court 
which,  after  taking  the  circumstances  and  normal  conduct  into  account, 
determines  whether  an  act  or  an  omission  is  or  is  not  wrongful,  is  still 
performing its  judicial  task.  It seems  to  me  necessary to bear in  mind  the 
nature of the task assigned to the Court of Justice by Articles 169 to 171  of 
the EEC Treaty. 
3.  The Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Finance Court) had annulled the judgment 
of  the  Finanzgericht  (Finance  Court)  on the ground  that  a  provision  of 
Community law  had been  infringed.  This superior court had sent the case 
back  to  a  Finanzgericht  which,  under the  provisions  of  German  law  'was 
bound by the judgment of the court of last instance'. 
However,  as  this  Finanzgericht  considered  that  the  Bundesfinanzhof's 
reasoning  was  not  consistent  with  Community  law,  after  staying  the 
proceedings and before deciding the case, it referred a question of interpret-
ation  to the  Court of  Justice.  An  appeal  against  this  decision  was  lodged 
with  the  Bundesfinanzhof  which,  in  turn,  stayed  the  proceedings  and 
referred  the following  question  to  the  Court  of  Justice:  'Does  the  second 
paragraph of Article 177 give to a court or tribunal against whose decisions 
there is  a  judicial  remedy  under national law a  completely unfettered right 
to refer questions to the Court of Justice, or does it leave unaffected rules of 
domestic law to the contrary whereby a  court is  bound on points of law by 
the judgments of the court superior to it?' 
In its judgment of 16 January 1974, 1  the Court held that 'a rule of national 
law whereby a court is  bound on points of law by the rulings of a superior 
court cannot deprive the inferior courts of their power to refer to the Court 
questions of interpretation of Community law involving such rulings'. 
There can be  no doubt that any court or tribunal has the right at all  times 
to refer a question of interpretation to the Court of Justice under Article 177 
of the EEC Treaty. But it is much more difficult to decide whether a national 
court which, by virtue of its  national law, is  no longer able to give a  ruling 
on a  question,  is  given  back the  right to do  so  by  Article  177 of the  EEC 
Treaty. 
1  Case 166/73 [1974]  ECR 33. 
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Article  177  does  not  alter  the  powers  and  rules  of  procedure  of  national 
courts. 
Let us  take the case of a decision given by a court of first instance based on 
an  interpretation  of  Community  law  which  has  been  appealed  against.  If 
the  appeal  had  been  lodged  out of  time,  it  goes  without  saying  that  the 
appeal court would be  unable to give  a fresh  ruling on that interpretation, 
however mistaken it might consider it to be.  In  the circumstances it cannot, 
after making a reference to the Court under Article 177, alter the decision of 
the court of first instance, because it is now a final judgment. 
There seems to me to be a similar situation in the case which culminated in 
the  judgment of 16 January 1974.  The decision  of the Bundesfinanzhof was 
in  law final  and the Finanzgericht had no power to  set it aside.  Article  177 
was not intended to modify the powers of the courts. 
Consideration might  have  been  given  to  criticizing  the Bundesfinanzhof for 
not having, pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 177, made a reference 
to  the  Court  of  Justice  and  to  setting  in  motion  on  the  strength  of  this 
paragraph  the  procedure  for  obtaining  a  declaration  that  the  Federal 
Republic 1  had 'failed' to fulfil  its  obligations under the Treaty (Article  169 
of the EEC Treaty), 
4.  In its judgment of 8 April1976 in Case 43/75, the Court gave a clear and 
strict ruling that Article 119 of the EEC Treaty has direct effect and that the 
persons  concerned  can  therefore  avail  themseleves  of  it before  the national 
courts. It stated that the principle of equality, laid down by the said article, 
was  to  have  been  fully  secured  by  the  original  Member  States  as  from 
1 January 1962 and by the new Member States as from 1 January 1973. 
The  Court  rightly  emphasized  that  neither  the  resolution  of  the  Member 
States of 30 December 1961  nor Directive No 75/117 could alter the legal or 
temporal effect of Article 119. 
The Court, after having surpassed itself when it laid down the principles in 
this way, recoiled however from the consequences, in particular from the fact 
that the parties concerned might  assert  rights  taken from  Article  119  either 
as  from  1 January 1962 or as  from  1 January 1973  and, on the ground, inter 
1  On  the  responsibility  of  a  Member  State  for  the  failure  of  its  organs,  including  its 
legislative  and  judicial  organs,  to  comply  with  provisions  of  Community  law, see  the 
opinion of Mr Advocate-General Warner in Case 9/75  [1975] ECR 1184, in particular 1187. 
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which can only be  described as  ambivalent, could have created confusion in 
the minds of those concerned ruled that 'except as regards those workers who 
have  already  brought  legal  proceedings  or made  an  equivalent  claim,  the 
direct effect  of Article  119  cannot be  relied  on in  order to  support claims 
concerning pay periods prior to the date of this judgment'. 
I find it difficult to  accept that the Court, after having correctly stated that 
neither  a  resolution  of  the  Member States  nor of their  representatives  nor 
even  a  resolution  of  the  Members  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  nor  even 
a directive can weaken the direct effect,  which stems from the Treaty itself, 
of a  Community provision,  can repudiate its  own doctrine by  assuming the 
power, which it does not have, to restrict, in a general and unlimited manner, 
as  a law does,  the temporal  effect  of  a  directly  applicable provision of  the 
Treaty.  It may  well  be  asked  whether  several  of the  considerations  which 
engaged the attention of the Court would not have justified a decision that 
Article 119 does not have direct effect. It is of course easy to criticize! 
III-162 Corrigendum 
1.  P.  14  lines 3  and 4  for 'thus the law common to the Member States' 
substitute 'is thus called upon to act as judge of the ordinary law of the 
Community'. 
2.  P.  32 line 4 after 'might' insert 'not'. 
3.  P. 40 for the sentence in lines 6 and 7 substitute 'Nevertheless fine distinc-
tions are possible when a court reviews the facts on the basis of which the 
administration has acted'. 
4.  P. 41line 18 for '(a)' substitute '(i)'. 
5.  P. 43  at the beginning of line 5 insert '(ii) '. 
6.  P. 44 line 33  for 'EEC' substitute 'ECSC'. 
7.  P. 48line 6 delete 'been'. 
8.  P.  52 line 5 of footnote 1 after 'be made on the' insert 'basis of a single 
translation'. In matters of discipline let me mention in particular the'. 
9.  P. 82line 9 for 'corollary' substitute 'a contrario'. 
10.  P. 88line 2 of footnote 2 for 'the actual effect' substitute 'effectiveness'. 
11.  P.  89 lines 26  and 27 for 'legislature wished to say rather than what it 
actually said' substitute 'legislator meant rather than what he  literally 
said'. 
12.  P.  148, penultimate line of footnote 2 after 'Criteri' insert 'ermeunitici'. 
13.  P.  161  last paragraph for 'having surpassed itself when it laid down the 
principles in this way' substitute 'thus laying down the principles in a 
perfectly satisfactory manner'. 
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1976 I have been  asked to address you briefly on the evolution of the 
work of  the  Court since  its  inception  to  the  present  day.  This  means 
concentrating into little more than 24  minutes  a  story that it has  taken, so 
far, nearly 24 years to enact. 
For it was  in December 1952, pursuant to the Treaty of Paris,  creating the 
European Coal and Steel  Community (the 'ECSC'), that the Court was first 
set up. It was then of course only the Court of the ECSC. 
And  so  it remained  until  October 1958,  when, following  the ratification of 
the  Treaties  of  Rome,  creating  the  European  Economic  Community  (the 
'EEC')  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  ('Euratom')  it  was 
reconstituted as the Court of all three Communities. 
The next great event in its life, or so I like to think, was the accession to the 
Communities on 1 January 1973  of three new Member States,  including my 
own country. As  a result of this the Court was, like the Communities them-
selves, enlarged. 
Old hands here will describe to you with humour the very early days of the 
Court,  when  seven  Judges  and  two  Advocates-General,  and  their  staff, 
awaited with avidity their first case. They spent the time concocting the first 
set of the Court's Rules  of  Procedure, basig themselves,  in  so  doing,  on the 
Rules of Procedure of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Since 
then there have been successive revisions  of the  Court's Rules  of Procedure. 
The  set  now  in  force  was  adopted  in  December  197  4,  following  the 
enlargement of the Communities and of the Court. 
The first  case  ever  before  the  Court was  brought in  April  1953.  It was  an 
action by a German undertaking against the High Authority of the ECSC. It 
seems  to have been  settled.  At all  events  it was withdrawn and never came 
to Judgment. In fact,  altogether four actions were brought in  1953, none of 
which ever came to Judgment. 
It  was  on  21 December 1954  that  the  Court  delivered  its  first  Judgment. 
That was  in  an action brought by  the French Government against the High 
Authority. On the same day the Court delivered Judgment in a parallel action 
brought by  the Italian Government against the High Authority. Those were 
the only Judgments delivered in 1954. 
V-3 In 1955 five Judgments were delivered. Of these three were in actions brought 
by associations of Italian steel undertakings against the High Authority, one 
was in an action by the Dutch Government against the High Authority, and 
one was  in  a  staff  case.  This,  in  a  way, set the pattern for  the future:  the 
litigants before us are far more often private individuals or undertakings than 
Governments, and always  our work includes a fair proportion of staff cases 
- those are disputes  between officials  of Community Institutions and their 
employing Institutions. 
In  1956 there were six Judgments, in  1957 four and in  1958  ten. After that 
there  was,  not a  steady  increase  in  the  number  of  Judgments  delivered 
annually - there  have  always  been  fluctuations  from  year to year - but 
·  a general tendency for the numbers gradually to increase. Thus in 1974 the 
Court delivered 64 Judgments, in 1975  it delivered 80,  and this year it had, 
up to 15 July, delivered 54. 
I think for my  part that the statistics of Judgments delivered  are, generally, 
a more accurate measure of the volume of work done by the Court than the 
statistics  of  cases  brought.  This  is  partly because  cases  are  now and  again 
withdrawn, and partly because cases between which there is a nexus are often 
joined.  To take  an  extreme example,  there  were  initiated  in  1973  a  group 
of  81  staff  cases  all  raising  the  same  point;  they  were  joined,  so  that the 
Advocate-General had to  deliver  only  one Opinion and the Court only one 
Judgment. But of course they swelled the 1973 statistics of cases brought, and 
particularly those of staff cases  brought, to  a  considerable extent.  One can 
however think of converse examples. One that springs to mind is  that of the 
Sugar cases, also brought in 1973. These were 16 actions brought by various 
Belgian,  Dutch,  French,  German  and Italian  sugar  concerns  to  challenge  a 
Decision  of the Commission holding them guilty of breaches  of the compe-
tition law of  the  EEC  (Articles  85  and  86  of  the  Treaty).  There  was  a 
sufficient nexus  between the actions for them to be  joined, but the issues in 
them  were  not  identical.  They  gave  rise  to  only  one  Opinion  and  one 
Judgment, but the Judgment alone runs to over 350 pages  ([1975]  ECR pp. 
1671  to  2027).  So  the  statistics  of cases  brought are  also  useful.  They,  of 
course, are the only measure of the work falling on the Court's Registry. The 
joinder of cases  does  not reduce  the number  of files  that the Registry  has 
to handle. 
With that in mind, here are the figures of cases brought in 1974, 1975 and up 
to  15 July this year.  They are respectively  102, 130 and 67.  In what follows 
I shall sometimes refer to numbers of Judgments delivered and sometimes to 
numbers of cases brought. 
V-4 Leaving  aside staff cases,  all  the Judgments delivered  by  the  Court down to 
1960  (inclusive)  were  in  ECSC  cases;  and  such  cases  continued  to  form  a 
substantial part of the work of the  Court until 1966.  Since  then there have 
been few  ECSC  cases.  The maximum number brought in  any year has been 
four. In some years there have been none. 
It  is  interesting  perhaps  that,  of  the  ECSC  cases  brought  since  1 January 
1973, all  but one have been brought by  English companies. In two instances, 
English steel companies invoked the 'concentration' provisions of the Treaty 
of Paris  (Article  66)  in  an endeavour to resist take-over bids.  In another -
this case is still pending - an English coking company is seeking redress from 
the  Commission  for  the  alleged  failure  of  that  Institution  to  prevent  the 
company being driven  out of business  by  the pricing policies  of  the British 
Government and of the National Coal Board. The one case to which I have 
alluded  that was  not brought  by  an  English  company  was  brought  by  a 
German wholesale coal merchant. The Judgment in it contains an important 
ruling  by  the  Court  on  the  protection  of  fundamental  human  rights  in 
Community law (Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491). 
I doubt if I should take up time analysing the subject-matter of the earlier 
ECSC  cases. It was of course in those cases that the Court laid some of  the 
foundations of Community law, but the actual topics with which they dealt 
are not on the whole of major interest today. An  astonishing proportion of 
the cases brought (about half)  concerned a levy on purchases of scrap which 
had been  instituted by  the  High  Authority in  order to  even  out differences 
in the prices at which it could be obtained by  steelworks situate in different 
parts of the Community. 
Before  I  turn to  the EEC  cases,  a  word about Euratom.  This  has  been,  in 
terms of litigation, the least prolific of the three Communities. 
Again leaving aside  staff cases,  Euratom has yielded  only one direct action. 
This was an action brought by  the Commission against the French Republic 
in 1971. The action was about contracts entered into by the French Republic 
with  various  countries,  including  Canada and  South Africa,  for  the supply 
of enriched  uranium and of plutonium. The Court held  that France had in 
some respects failed to comply with its obligations under the Euratom Treaty 
in connexion with those contracts. 
Euratom  has  also  yielded  three  references  to  the  Court  for  preliminary 
rulings.  All  three,  though not strictly staff cases,  were  concerned with staff 
matters. The first  two  (in  1968  and 1969  respectively)  were references  from 
the Cour de Cassation of Belgium about the consequences of a road accident 
V-5 caused by an Euratom official while driving in Belgium on official  business. 
The third was  a reference from  the Guidice del  Lavoro  at the Tribunale of 
Varese.  Essentially it was about the limits  of the jurisdiction of respectively 
this  Court and that Tribunal over  disputes  concerning the  terms  of service 
of locally recruited staff of the Joint Nuclear Research Centre at Ispra. 
I turn to the EEC cases, which have constituted the bulk of the Court's work 
, ,  in the last fifteen years or so. 
Once more leaving  aside staff cases,  the first  Judgment of the Court in  an 
EEC  case  was  delivered  on  19 December 1961,  almost  seven  years  to  the 
day  after its  first  Judgment in  an  ECSC  case.  It was in  an  action  brought 
by  the  Commission  against  the  Italian  Republic  under  Article  169  of  the 
Treaty.  The  Court  found  that the  Italian  Republic  had  failed  to  comply 
with its  obligations under Article 31  of the Treaty in suspending imports of 
certain products from other Member States. 
Article  169  has  always  provided  a  small but important part of the  Court's 
business,  the average  being about two or three actions a year,  though there 
were  two  years  (1966  and  1967)  in  which  there  were  none,  and there was 
one exceptional year (1969)  in which there were eleven. Actions under Article 
169  are  often  settled.  Down  to  15 July 1976,  40  such  actions  altogether 
had been brought, of which 11  had been settled. In 28  of them the Court had 
delivered Judgment and one Judgment was awaited. Of those 28  Judgments, 
24 were in  favour of the Commission and four in favour of the Defendant 
Member State.  It  would  perhaps  be  invidious,  before  an  audience  such  as 
this,  to  go  into  the  statistics  as  to  how many  times  each  of  the  Member 
States  has  been found to be in  breach of the Treaty. I will  say only that it 
has happened to all six of the old Member States, though in the case of one 
of  them  (the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany)  only  once  and  that not until 
1975;  and that it has not yet happened to  any  of the new Member States. 
What is  more  important  is  that,  with  some  delay  in  some  cases,  every 
Judgment of the Court against a Member State has been complied with. 
The cases  that come to the Court under Article 169  have been described  as 
the tip of an iceberg. Although no figures  are published about this, I believe 
that fewer than one in ten of the cases in which the Commission embarks on 
the procedure under Article 169 eventually come to the Court. 
In contrast to Article 169, Article 170, which enables a Member State to bring 
an action against another Member State for failure to comply with the Treaty 
has  never  been  invoked.  So  far,  the Member States  have  chosen  to  leave  it 
to the Commission, acting under Article 169, to secure compliance with the 
V-6 Treaty  by  their fellow  Member States.  It would,  however,  be  a  mistake  to 
think that Article  169  is  the  only  means  of  ensuring  compliance  with  the 
Treaty  by  Member  States.  Often  such  compliance  is  secured  by  private 
persons  bringing  actions  against  national  authorities  in  national  Courts, 
relying  on  the  direct  effect  of  many  provisions  of the  Treaty  and of  EEC 
secondary legislation. Such actions of course frequently lead national Courts 
to  refer  to  this  Court under Article  177  of the Treaty questions  as  to the 
compatibility with Community law of particular provisions  of national law. 
I shall come to references under Article 177, generally, in a moment. 
Before I do so, I must mention actions by Member States against Community 
Institutions:  the  Commission  and  the  Council.  These  also  have  provided  a 
small but important part of the Court's work. 
Down to  15 July 1976, 21  such  actions  had been  brought against the Com-
mission. The first of them ever was an action brought in 1962 by the Federal 
Republic  of  Germany.  It was  successful.  The Court delivered  Judgment in 
it,  in  favour  of  the  Federal  Republic,  on  4 July 1963.  Such  actions  were 
comparatively  frequent  in  the  early  years  of the  EEC.  Of the 21  actions  I 
have  mentioned,  10  were  brought  in  the  period  1962-1965.  Since  then 
there  have  been  five  years  (1966,  1967,  1968,  1970  and  1974)  when  none 
was brought, and four years  (1971,  1972, 1973  and 1975)  in  each of which 
only one was brought. There has however been a small revival of such actions 
this year. There are at present pending four actions in  which Member States 
(namely  France,  Germany  and  the  Netherlands)  are  challenging  aspects  of 
the  Commission's  accounting  in  connexion  with the European  Agricultural 
Guidance and Guarantee Fund (more generally known as  'the Farm Fund'). 
One  action  was  brought  against  the  Council  as  well  as  the  Commission. 
This  was  an  action  brought by  Italy  in  1965  for  declarations  that  certain 
Regulations adopted by those Institutions in implementation of Article 85  of 
the Treaty were void. The action failed. 
There has been one action by a  Member State against the Council alone.  It 
also  has the distinction of having been the first  and only  case ever  to have 
come  to  the  Court from  Ireland.  It was  an  action  by  Ireland  against  the 
Council for  a  declaration that a  Regulation  adopted by the Council fixing, 
pursuant to the transitional provisions of the Act of Accession, certain 'com-
pensatory amounts' applicable to trade in tomatoes was void in so  far as  it 
affected  Ireland.  The Court delivered  Judgment in  favour  of  Ireland on 21 
March 197  4.  I have it on the authority of the President of Ireland that the 
Court's health was drunk in the pubs of Dublin that night. I suspect he had 
in mind some near the Four Courts. 
V-7 The Court has also  had to entertain three actions  brought by  the Commis-
sion  against the Council, each  of which has  aroused a great deal  of contro-
versy. 
The first,  the famous  E.R. T.A.  case,  brought in  1970  and decided in  1971, 
provided the first occasion on which the Court had to consider the limits of 
the competence of the Community and of the Member States respectively to 
negotiate agreements with non-member States. This subject came to the fore 
again in 1975 when the Court was called upon by the Commission to deliver 
its first  Opinion ever under Article 228  of the Treaty. It is  too soon yet to 
comment on the value of the latter procedure. I will say only that that too 
is controversial. 
The other two actions brought by the Commission against the Council were 
about the method of determining increases in the remuneration of members 
of the staffs of the Community Institutions. In the first, brought in 1972 and 
decided in  1973,  the  Commission was successful.  In the second,  brought in 
1974 and decided in 1975, the reverse was the case. 
As  I  have  already  mentioned,  the  bulk  of the  litigation  before  this  Court 
comes here at the instance of private persons. Procedurally, it can be classi-
fied  under  two  broad  headings,  namely  direct  actions  and  references  for 
preliminary rulings. 
Direct actions brought by private persons are invariably against Community 
Institutions. The majority of them have been brought against the Commission. 
But there have been, such actions against the Council too. 
Indeed the first group of direct actions (always leaving aside staff cases)  ever 
brought under the EEC Treaty by private persons were brought against the 
Council.  They  were  a  group  of  six  actions  brought  in  1962  by  various 
French,  Dutch  and  German  trade  associations  for  declarations  that certain 
Regulations  adopted  by  the  Council  when  it  was  initiating  the  common 
agricultural policy were void.  The actions, which were pm.:p_ortedly  brought 
under_.A.rticl~l-73 of the Treaty, were held to be ina_gmissible.  This indeed 
has  been  the  fate  of  many  actions  brougnCby prl"~ate persons  under that 
Article, which is  notoriously restrictive of them. It allows of course a private 
person to bring an action challenging the validity of a Decision addressed to 
that person. The typical Article 173  action brought by a private person as  to 
the  admissibility  of which  there  is  no question  is  an  action  brought by  an 
undertaking  or group  of  undertakings  which  have  been  held  by  the  Com-
mission to be in breach of the competition rules of the Community and who 
wish to challenge the Commission's Decision to that effect. There have been 
V-8 many such actions. But actions brought by private persons to challenge Regu-
lations  or  Decisions  addressed  to  others,  e.g.  Member  States,  are  usually 
inadmissible. So  far,  only five  such actions have been held admissible, one in 
1965, two in 1971, one in 1975, and one in 1976. 
Problems as  to admissibility have also  bedevilled actions  brought by private 
persons under Article 175  of the Treaty, for alleged failure of a Community 
Institution to act when it should have done, and under Article 178 for com-
pensation (under the second paragraph of Article 215)  for damage caused by 
an Institution otherwise than by a breach of contract. There has been recently 
a  spate  of  cases  raising  the  question  when  a  person  complaining  of  such 
damage  should  sue  the  Institution  concerned  in  this  Court  and  when  he 
should sue in the competent national Court the national authority responsible 
for  administering  the relevant  branch  of  Community law.  That question  is 
far from  being,  as  yet,  completely and satisfactorily solved.  There is,  so  far 
as I am aware, no case in which an action brought by a private person under 
Article 175 or Article 178, even where it has been held admissible, can be said 
to have succeeded. The nearest to it is  a group of actions brought by certain 
German concerns against the Commission in  1966, where it was established 
by  a Judgment of the Court in  1967 that the Commission was at fault,  but 
where  it has  not yet  been  established  whether  the  applicants  suffered  any 
damage for which the Community is liable. 
In  the  1960s  and early  1970s  the flo_F  of direct actions  brought by  private 
persons fluctuated to an astonishing exterrr.  For  instance, in  1965  there was 
only one, in 1966 there' were twenty, and in 1967 there was again only one. 
But in recent years  the flow  has  been  consistently substantial. Thus in  197  4 
20  such  actions  were  brought, in  1975  29  and  in  1976,  up  to  15  July,  13. 
Those bringing such  actions  have  been  predominantly  German,  Italian and 
French trading concerns.  Actions  originating from  Belgium  and the Nether-
lands have  been  relatively  few  and Luxembourg, whilst it generated several 
direct  actions  under the ECSC  Treaty,  has  generated  none  under the  EEC 
Treaty. Since  the enlargement of the Community there has  been one action 
brought  by  an  English  company,  but it  was  settled.  It  is  to  be  observed, 
.however,  that  applicants  in  direct  action~  are  not  confined  to  persons 
established in the Community. The-competition law of the  Community can 
affect concerns outside the Community, just as,  for instance, American anti-
trust law can  affect  concerns  outside the U.S.A.  Thus the applicants in the 
famous  Dyestuffs  cases,  which  were  brought in  1969,  included  an  English 
company  and  two  Swiss  companies.  American  companies  too  have  several 
times  been involved in competition cases;  and, in one such case  at least, the 
applicant  was  a  world-wide  association  of  manufacturers  of  a  particular 
product (Transocean  Marine  Paint  Association  v  Commission  [1974]  ECR 
1063). 
V-9 I turn to references for preliminary rulings, which have, since 1967, constituted 
the major part of the Court's work in terms of Judgments delivered. 
The first Judgment ever delivered  by the  Court on such a  reference was de-
livered  on  6 April 1962.  It  was  a  reference  from  the  Gerechtshof  of  The 
Hague raising  a  number of questions  of interpretation of Article  85  of  the 
Treaty (De  Geus v.  Bosch  [1962]  ECR 45.  Its  admissibility was  challenged, 
so that the Court was called upon to rule on the interpretation of Article 177 
itself.  It laid down in  this  respect  a  number of principles  which  have  been 
applied many times  since, such  as  the principle that a reference need not be 
in  any  particular  form  and  that,  if  it  raises  questions  going  beyond  the 
jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will not reject it but will distil from it the 
questions of Community law that call for an answer. 
With some fluctuations from year to year, the number of Judgments delivered 
by the Court on references for preliminary rulings has increased fairly steadily. 
Out of the 64 Judgments delivered in  197  4, 41  were on such references.  In 
1975 the figures  were 45  out of 80.  This year there have been 33  out of the 
59 Judgments so far delivered. For the first time this year the Court exercised 
the power newly conferred on it to assign to the Chambers references 'which 
are of an essentially technical  nature or concern matters for which  there is 
already an established body of case law' (Rules of Procedure, Article 95). 
A noteworthy fact is  the imbalance that exists as between the Member States 
as  regards the number of references that their Courts and Tribunals send to 
this  Court.  Down to  the  end  of  1975  there had been  167 references  from 
Germany,  58  from  the  Netherlands,  41  from  France,  40  from  Belgium,  38 
from Italy, 6 from Luxembourg, 2 from the United Kingdom, 1 from Denmark 
and none from Ireland. The French and Italian Courts were noticeably slow 
to  make  references  until  fairly  recently.  Thus,  of those  41  references  from 
France, 15  were made in  1975. Similarly, of the 38  references from Italy, 14 
were in 1975. 
In  the  context  of  references  for  preliminary  rulings  I  cannot  forbear  to 
mention the case of EMI v CBS.  This is  a dispute about trade-marks between 
an English and an American company, which has led to parallel proceedings 
in  the  Chancery Division  of the High Court in  London, in  the S0-og  Han-
delsretten in Copenhagen and in the Landgericht of Cologne. Defences based 
on Community law having  been  raised  in  each  set of proceedings,  each  of 
those Courts, in  197  5, referred to this  Court for a  ruling the same, or very 
similar,  questions.  The three  cases  were  heard  together  and  the  Court de-
livered Judgment on them together last June. This, I think, vividly underlines 
V-10 the value of the preliminary ruling procedure. As  a result of its use by those 
three Courts,  the interpretation  and application  of  Community law in  that 
case will be uniform in the three Member States concerned. 
The subject-matter both of direct actions  and of references  for  preliminary 
rulings has been very diverse, but in both types of proceeding the Regulation 
giving effect to the common agricultural policy have been by far the greatest 
single source of work. In this field it is  not so much members of the farming 
community  as  members  of  the  trading  community  (importers,  exporters, 
millers and the like) who litigate before us-though there was one celebrated 
case about the grants that an Italian lady was to receive on the slaughter of 
her cows. 
Competition  cases  have  been  the  second  most  numerous  category,  closely 
followed  by social security cases - the latter being as  a  rule references for 
preliminary rulings, not direct actions. Next come cases about customs duties 
between Member States and charges having equivalent effect to them (though 
there have been fewer of these lately than there were in the 1960s and early 
1970s);  cases  on the removal of restrictions  on the free  movement of goods 
between Member States, including cases  about the exercise of industrial and 
commercial  property  rights  and  about  State  commercial  monopolies;  cases 
about the interpretation of the Common Customs Tariff (usually references 
for  preliminary  rulings);  and  cases  about State  aids  and  internal  taxation. 
Although  there  were  comparatively  few  in  earlier  days,  there  has  recently 
been  a  spate  of  cases  about  the  free  movement  of  workers,  freedom  of 
establishment and freedom  to provide services  within the Common Market. 
In contrast, the subject of transport, about which there was a certain amount 
of litigation in earlier days, has not been a lively one recently. 
I am conscious  that my  recurring theme has been 'leaving aside staff cases'. 
Staff cases, to my mind, are like mosquitoes, persistent and distracting. Nor 
are they negligible in number. In 1974 there were 13 Judgments in staff cases; 
in 197  5 22, nearly half as  many as  in references for preliminary rulings. The 
amount of work involved in  a staff case,  for the Advocate-General at least, 
is on average greater than that in a reference for a preliminary ruling, because 
staff cases so often give rise to issues ·ffl-tact. I propose to say no more about : 
staff cases except - alia in this I think I speak for the whole Court - that 
the  Court very  much  welcomes  the proposal,  which  has  been  approved  in 
principle  by  the  Council  of Ministers  of Justice,  to set up a  Court of  first 
instance to hear staff cases, from which there would be only a right of appeal 
on law to this Court. 
My survey  would be  incomplete if I  did  not mention  the  new jurisdiction 
that has  been  conferred on the Court as  a  result of the entry into force on 
V-11 1 September 1975  of  the  Protocol  concerning  the  interpretation  by  the 
Court  of  the  Convention  of  27 September 1968  on  Jurisdiction  and  the 
Enforcement  of  Civil  and  Commercial  Judgments.  This  Protocol  confers 
power on certain Courts, Tribunals and other authorities in the Contracting 
States to refer questions of interpretation of the Convention to this Court for 
preliminary ruling. 
Down to 15 July last, 7 references had already been made under it. The first 
two  were  heard  on  30  June  and  a  third  on  14  July.  So  this  looks  like 
becoming a fertile fresh source of work for the Court. 
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Cases  completed  - 2  5  8  10  10  18  58  27  39  31  44  62  39  34  26  32  70  77  90  89  146  114  79  1110 
] udgments  given 
in cases completed  - 2  5  5  4  10  13  19  11  20  17  31  50  24  22  26  29  64  59  61  79  60  76  52  739 
Interlocutory 
judgments  - - - 1  - - - - - - - - 2  1  2  - 1  - 1  - 1  2  2  2  15 
Total judgments  - 2  5  6  4  10  13  19  11  20  17  31  52  25  24  26  30  64  60  61  80  62  78  54  754 
Interim  orders  - - 1  2  2  17  10  - - 3  8  4  4  2  - 1  1  - 1  2  7  7  5  2  79 5.  Subject matter of direct  5.  Subject matter of direct 
actions  actions 
11953- 15.  7.  1976  11953- 15.  7.  1976 
a.  EEC  Non-contractual liability 
(Tr. Art. 215)  78 
Customs  duties 
(Tr. Arts. 12-17)  17  Protective  measures 
(Tr. Art. 226)  22 
Common customs  tariff 
(Tr. Arts. 18-29)  1 
b.  EAEC 
Quantitative restrictions 
Supply  (Tr. Arts. 30-35)  4 
(Tr. Arts. 52-76)  1 
Industrial  property 
(Tr. Art. 36)  3 
c.  ECSC 
Agriculture  Coal market  15 
(Tr. Arts. 38-47)  96 
Control by the High Authority  2 
Agricultural  guidance  fund  Aids granted by States  (Tr. Art. 40)  6 
(Tr. Art. 4c)  4 
Freedom of movement for  Consultative  Committee 
workers  (Tr. Art. 18)  1 
(Tr. Art. 48)  1 
Non-contractual liability 
Right  of  establishment  (Tr. Art. 40)  65 
(Tr. Arts. 52-58)  2 
Levies 
Freedom to provide services  (Tr. Arts. 49-50)  8 
(Tr. Arts. 59-60)  1  Equalization of scrap metal 
Transport  (Tr. Art. 53)  167 
(Tr. Arts. 74-84)  3  Investments 
Cartel agreements, dominant 
(Tr. Art. 54)  2 
positions  Prices 
(Tr. Arts. 85-90)  56  (Tr. Arts. 60-64)  19 
Aids granted by States  Cartels  and concentrations 
(Tr. Arts. 92-94)  6  (Tr. Arts. 65-66)  24 
Internal taxation 
Transport 
(Tr. Arts. 95-99)  15 
(Tr. Art. 70)  35 
Approximation of laws  d.  Privileges  and 
(Tr. Arts. 100-102)  3  Immunities  2 
Conjunctural Policy 
e.  Staff  Cases  468  (Tr. Art. 103)  4 
European  Social  Fund  f.  Functioning  of 
(Tr. Arts. 123-128)  2  the Communities  1 
V-18 6.  Subject matter  of prelimin- 6.  Subject  matter of prelimin-
ary rulings  ary rulings 
11953- 15.  7.  1976  11953- 15. 7.  1976 
EEC  Aids granted by States 
(Tr. Arts. 92-94)  8 
Common customs tariff 
(Tr. Art. 3)  32  Internal taxation 
(Tr. Arts. 95-99)  27 
Free movement of goods 
(Tr. Arts. 9-11)  9 
Approximation of laws 
Customs  duties  (Tr. Arts. lOQ-102)  2 
(Tr. Arts. 12-17)  41 
Conjunctural policy 
Quantitative restrictions  (Tr. Art. 103)  3 
(Tr. Arts. 3Q-35)  16 
Industrial property 
Balance of payments 
(Tr. Arts. 104-109)  1 
(Tr. Art. 36)  12 
National monopolies 
Social policy 
(Tr. Art. 37)  9  (Tr. Arts. 119-122)  2 
Agriculture  Procedural questions 
(Tr. Arts. 38-47)  177  (Tr. Art. 177)  10 
Agricultural Guidance  (and  Non-contractual liability 
Guarantee)  Fund  (Tr. Art. 215)  1 
(Tr. Art. 40)  4 
Protective measures 
Free movement of workers  (Tr. Art. 226)  3 
(Tr. Art. 48)  17 
Social Security for migrant 
Functioning of the Communities  3 
workers 
(Tr. Art. 51)  76 
Right of establishment  Associations between EEC  and 
(Tr. Arts. 52-58)  3  third countries  4 
Services 
(Tr. Arts. 59-60)  3 
Privileges and Immunities  7 
Transport 
(Tr. Arts. 74-84)  8 
Cartel agreements, dominant  Convention on jurisdiction 
positions  (27. 9. 1968)  7 
(Tr. Arts. 85-90)  30 
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Vl-3 The  application  of  Community  law,  more  specifically  its 
application  through  the  courts  and  tribunals  in  the  Member  States,  is  a 
particularly difficult subject on which to speak. It is difficult by reason of the 
extent of the  problem, since  its  salient  features  have  to be  sought in  nine 
States and the situation has to be evaluated in relation to legal contexts which 
differ quite profoundly one from another. It is not only a difficult subject but 
also a delicate one, since as the investigation progresses, if one is really trying 
to get to the root of the matter, it reveals, alongside an obvious manifestation 
by the courts and tribunals of the Member States of an open-minded attitude 
and  of  an  unfaltering  will  to  ensure  the  application  of  Community  law, 
certain residual difficulties, certain perplexities in the face  of undeniably real 
and serious  problems.  Consequently,  a  realistic  presentation  of the  subject 
demands that in taking note of the positive achievements, we do not overlook 
the problems which  are still  with us,  all  the more so  as  their solution will 
depend upon an ultimate consolidation of Community law. 
With this  in  mind,  I  shall first  of  all  set  out in  Part 1 of  this  address  the 
background to the problem and its salient features,  and then go on to show 
in  Part  2  in  what circumstances  and  to  what extent  it  has  been  possible 
to ensure application of Community law within the Member States. 
VI-$ Part 1.  Background and salient features 
of the problem 
1.  In the majority of cases application proceeds with no problem 
The instances of the application of Community law in its different 
forms- the Treaty provisions themselves, Community regulations, national 
provisions  adopted  to  give  effect  to  directives  and  decisions  of  the 
Community  institutions  - have  by  now  become  too  numerous  to  count. 
Whole sectors of public administration, such as  those dealing with customs, 
with external trade, with social  security and with control of foreigners,  are 
already 'taking their cue from European law'. 
The diversification of Community law is  so  great and its penetration within 
the Member States so deep, that the impact of provisions of Community law, 
sometimes in the most unexpected contexts, is  manifested to the judge in the 
Member State in the most diverse legal actions - commercial and civil cases, 
fiscal  cases  and administrative actions, social cases  and even  criminal cases. 
His most usual reaction, quite properly, is to bring these elements of law into 
his  legal reasoning, and thus to ensure their application on an equal footing 
with the rules prescribed by his own national law. Community law is  already 
so well  established in our Member States, so  well incorporated into judicial 
principles  that  it  is  applied  without  question  and  raises  no  particular 
problem. Thus it is that the most positive and the most substantial part of the 
implementation  of  Community  law  passes  unnoticed,  precisely  because  it 
does not present any difficulty. 
However, in certain cases, less  numerous than the foregoing, the application 
of Community law does raise doubts, and can indeed give rise to difficulties. 
In this connexion two sorts of problems of differing degrees of difficulty must 
be  distinguished according as  one looks at Community law in itself or in its 
relationship to national law. 
(a)  First  of  all,  uncertainties  may  arise  concerning  the  interpretation  of 
Community law;  the  problem  is  not intrinsically  different from  that posed 
by the interpretation of national law. Furthermore, a dispute may be brought 
before  the  national  court  as  to  the  validity  of  a  measure  of  secondary 
Community  law;  the  Community  is  indeed  founded  on  the  principle  of 
Vl-7 compliance  with  the  law,  and  consequently  any  individual  subject  to  it is 
entitled to dispute before the courts the validity of a measure of secondary 
law which purports to apply to him, if he considers that it does  not comply 
with the rules  of the basic Treaty or with the general legal principles which 
form an integral part of the Community legal system.  These are doubts and 
disputes which concern Community law in itself; with a view to solving this 
problem logically, the EEC Treaty adopted the procedure of the preliminary 
ruling under Article 177. Thus one category of cases in which the application 
of  Community  law  causes  problems  within  the  Member  States  can  be 
discerned  through this  procedure. These problems do  not give  us  cause for 
concern,  since,  precisely  because  of  the  intercommunication  between  the 
courts and tribunals of the Member States and the Community Court, they 
can  be  satisfactorily resolved.  This is  subject  always  to  one condition:  that 
the courts and tribunals of the Member States do in fact avail themselves of 
this procedure every time they are faced with a hitherto unresolved problem 
of  interpretation  or with  a  dispute  on  validity  where  Community  law  is 
concerned. 
(b}  The  cases  where  the  application  of  Community  law  gives  rise  to 
a conflict between Community law and national law are more difficult,  for 
in such cases  the national court is - or considers itself to be - faced with 
conflicting demands deriving, on the one hand, from Community law and, on 
the other, from the national law which it has a duty to apply. The difficulty 
is  particularly acute when this conflict, be it apparent or real, involves a rule 
of high  standing in  the hierarchy  of the provisions  of the national law,  as 
is the case with a provision of statute law or even of constitutional law. From 
the Community's point of view, the situation involves an element of profound 
uncertainty since, in this ca"e, the duty to find the solution rests solely on the 
court or tribunal of the Member State. Of course, it will  be  able to  ask the 
Court of Justice - and numerous courts have not hesitated to do  so  - to 
enlighten it about the scope and requirements  of Community law, which is 
one of  the  adversaries  in  the  conflict;  but in  the last analysis  the  national 
court will still have to settle the conflict on its own authority. Consequently 
there  is  no  guarantee  that the  conflict  will  be  resolved  in  a  way which  is 
wholly satisfactory to the Community. 
Thus at the very time when a deep  and massive penetration of Community 
law into the domains of national law is  proceeding quietly and uneventfully, 
our attention is focused on a small number of problems of jurisdiction which 
give  rise  to  rather difficult  questions  on the scope  of  Community law  and 
on its effectiveness in  the national framework; It is  understandable that our 
concern should centre on the disputes which may thus attend the application 
of Community law, despite their being the exception. For we well know that 
it is the decisions in the exceptional cases which determine - for good or for 
ill-the evolution of the law. 
VI-8 2.  Unity of Community law and diversity of national contexts 
Community law  presents  itself,  by  its  nature,  as  a  body  of  common  rules. 
They  are common in their source,  in  their formal  expression  (which  is  far 
from  coinciding  with  the  customary  forms  of  national  law),  and  in  their 
objectives.  The aim  is  that these rules  shall  be  implemented in  each  of  the 
Member  States  in  an  identical  manner  as  regards  their  subject-matter  and 
with equal effectiveness. 
This  law,  in  essence  unique,  has  to  take  effect  in  national  legal  contexts 
which, while akin in many respects, are none the less far from being identical. 
Each  Member  State  possesses  its  particular  social  structures  and  legal 
traditions, based on age-old historical developments. Even within one and the 
same  country  the  'receiving  end'  may  be  more  or  less  open  or  closed, 
welcoming or hesitant according to the different kinds of legal subject-matter: 
the  reactions  are  not  always  the  same  according  as,  for  example,  a  civil, 
administrative, social or constitutional court or tribunal is involved. 
;Furthermore,  one  must  take  into  account  a  noticeable  difference  in  the 
positions from  which  the  Member  States  started  out,  in  that the  situation 
regarding  the  problems  of  applying  Community  law  was  very  different 
according  as  old  Member  States  or newly  acceding  States  were  involved. 
Paradoxically, the difficulties of application seem to be greater for certain of 
the 'old members' than for the 'new members'. 
For the old Member States, the formation of the European Communities was 
indeed a 'leap in the dark'. The first of the Communities, the European Coal 
and Steel  Community  (the  ECSC)  arose  out of a  sort of  political  upheaval 
which abruptly presented the Member States with the difficulty of solving the 
strange  new  legal  problems  set  by  entering  into  a  scheme  of  integration. 
When the Economic Community was formed five  years later, it had already 
been possible to derive some benefit from that short experience but the fact 
remains that in  most of the Member States the problems set by the internal 
application of Community law had to be resolved in  a state of more or less 
obvious unpreparedness. 
In  this  respect,  the  position  of  the  three  States  which  adhered  to  the 
Community in 1973 was more favourable.  At that time extensive experience 
had  already  been · acquired  of  the  problems  raised  by  the  application  of 
Community  law within  the Member  States;  it was  possible  to  draw upon 
a  considerable  stock of  judicial decisions  and of thinking by  the text-book 
writers. In these circumstances, the new Member States were able to make in 
advance  the  arrangements  necessary  to  ensure  the  smooth  application  of 
Community law within their internal legal systems;  these arrangements took 
VJ-9 a concrete form in legislative measures introducing Community law into the 
internal legal  systems.  These measures have  the advantage of providing the 
jurists  and  the  judges  of  those  countries  with  a  clear  and  sure  legislative 
foundation.  On the other hand, in the old Member States, it was  necessary 
to  derive  what  assistance  one  could  from  the few  factors  available  which 
helped towards a solution: constitutional provisions, generally not too clear; 
some few  judicial precedents. The main effort had to come from judge-made 
law and contributions by the text-book writers; undertaken as  it was at this 
basic level, this effort at creating new law involved considerable uncertainties. 
These differences in the legal environment of this problem explain why, even 
now,  decisions  of  courts  in  the  different  Member  States  sometimes  fall 
considerably  out  of  step,  both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively.  Although 
many lessons  can be learned from the comparative study of the situation in 
the different Member States, it should not in any circumstances lead us  into 
making value-judgments, for the circumstances in which  Community law is 
to  be  brought  into  effect  differ  too  fundamentally  from  one  country  to 
another. 
3.  Identification of the obstacles to proper application of 
Community law 
The full  effectiveness  of Community law in the different Member States has 
not been  easily  achieved;  far  from  it.  We have  witnessed  a  gradual growth 
of awareness and a gradual process of adjustment which has developed very 
unevenly.  This is  hardly surprising, seeing that Community law has  opened 
up  entirely  new  perspectives  before  the  judiciaries  of  the  Member  States, 
presented  the  courts  with  unusual  tasks  and  required  them  to  do  some 
rethinking on many points. This quiet revolution took time and will take yet 
more time. It is  essential to identify the obstacles  in order to see  better the 
points on which effort should be brought to bear in the aim of ensuring for 
Community law the  effectiveness  within the  national framework  to  which, 
by its very nature, it aspires. Three problems at least must be raised in this 
connexion. 
(a)  The first  obstacle is  commonplace:  lack  of information. If Community 
law  is  not  everywhere  applied  as  fully  as  could  be  desired,  the  reason  is 
simply that its existence is  still largely unknown. Litigants and their advisers, 
the lawyers,  are  not yet  well  enough  acquainted  with  the  resources  which 
Community law has to offer for the defence of their interests, for example, 
in the sphere of business dealings, in that of work and of social security or in 
their relations with the public administration. Judges in their turn are often 
still unaware of the requirements of Community law in regard to cases which 
come before them; certain cases of patent failure to give effect to Community 
VI-10 law which have been detected among the decisions of courts in the Member 
States are attributable quite simply to ignorance. 
It does  not seem  too hard to deal with this  difficulty.  A sustained effort is 
made  by  the  institutions  of  the  Community  - and  in  particular  by  the 
Commission and the Court of Justice- in the 'dissemination of information' 
as regards Community law. By means of the study days which it has regularly 
organized,  the Court has  been  able to welcome  some  thousands  of judicial 
officers from  all the Member States and thus make them more aware of the 
problems of Community law.  Certain universities,  prompted particularly by 
specialist institutes, have included European law in their syllabuses; at present 
this  effort,  still  all  too  sporadic,  deserves  to  be  put on  a  more  systematic 
footing. In this context, mention should be made of a recent initiative by the 
French  Garde  des  Sceaux  (Minister  of  Justice)  who  sent  circulars  to  the 
courts  and  tribunals  drawing their  attention to  the growing importance of 
Community law and to the desirability, in this perspective, of making more 
systematic use of the procedure for preliminary ruling under Article 177. 
Finally  attention should  be drawn to  the desirability,  for the dissemination 
of Community law, of providing lawyers and judges with the more important 
texts, that is  to say the Treaties, the principal regulations and directives, the 
further conventions, including reference to the relevant cases, in a manageable 
form, as  is  done in the case of national legislation in  all  the Member States. 
In  a word, we have a need for a 'handy compendium'  on Community law, 
for  our Official  Journal  is  a  publication which  is  both too  bulky  and  too 
expensive to  effect a real dissemination of Community law in all  the circles 
concerned. 
(b)  A second problem- which pertains to the fundamentals of legal life-
results from the national legal structures and national legal thought not being 
adapted to the solution of the problems set by the application of Community 
law. Indeed everything which constitutes our legal world has been developed 
within an essentially national framework: the structure of the institutions, the 
legislative procedures, the judicial organization, the methods of interpretation 
and even the depth and generality of our legal thinking. In our time, a time 
favourable to international and cultural exchanges, the world of jurists is still 
an  astonishingly  closed  and  introspective  universe.  Such  an  environment 
obviously  does  not lend  itself  to the  acceptance  of something  so  novel  as 
Community law, the basic aspiration of which is  precisely  to transcend the 
confines  of  national  frontiers  which,  for  the  majority  of  jurists,  are  also 
mental frontiers. Thus, when confronted with this new phenomenon, the jurist's 
first step, taken albeit with genuine goodwill, has been to seek the resolution 
of the problems raised by the application of Community law within the range 
of, and with the help of the methods peculiar to national law. 
VI-11 Such  methods  cannot produce  adequate  results.  For  Community  law  is  in 
essence  a  common  system  of  law.  The problems  which  it  raises,  both  in 
legislation  and  in  litigation,  cannot  be  properly  resolved  in  the  light  of 
concepts which have  evolved  to meet the needs  of an internal legal  system. 
They cannot be approached in a 'unilateralist' perspective. If Community law 
is  to be saved from  disintegration at the point where it is  applied, recourse 
must very clearly be had to solutions worked out and arranged in common. 
This is  particularly true of  anything concerning the interpretation of  Com-
munity law and the solution of the highly  delicate problems of its  relations 
with  internal  law.  Such  problems  cannot  be  decided  unilaterally  with  no 
consideration  paid  to  the  coherence  of  the  whole.  Regrettable  errors  of 
judgment could  have  been  avoided  by  the  realization  of  the fact  that the 
problems  raised  by  Community law fit  into  a  multilateral  context,  and  by 
accepting that there is  a contradiction in applying to them solutions inspired 
solely by the needs of national law. 
(c)  Finally, reference must be made to a more specific  circumstance, which 
in its way has made the proper application of Community law more difficult. 
It is  that in getting to know the realities  of international life,  we must not 
forget  that  international  law~ public  and  private~  historically  came  before 
Community law. The first contacts between the closed world of national law 
and the  outside world were in  practice established at the level,  on the one 
hand,  of public  international  law  and,  on  the  other,  of  the  resolution  of 
conflicts  of  laws.  Thus  it  is  that  the  constitutional  provisions  which  are 
devoted to external relations are above all centred on the conclusion and on 
the effect of international treaties; the courts and tribunals, for their part, are 
acquainted  with  law  external  to  their  State  in  the dual  form  of problems 
raised by the application of those treaties and by the resolution of conflicts 
of laws.  Treaties  and foreign  laws  are  the two phenomena which  thus far 
have symbolized, from the point of view of the national court, the intrusion 
of  influences  from  the  outside  world.  However,  the  ideas  implanted  by 
encounters  with  international  law,  public  and private,  are  ill-suited  to  the 
needs  of  Community  law.  The  treaties  on  which  the  constitution  of  the 
Community rests  are  an  entirely  different matter from  treaties  designed  to 
regulate relations  between independent States;  it is  with integration treaties 
that we are concerned. Secondary law, especially in the form of Community 
regulations, has no equivalent in the system of international law. In short, it 
would be  a  disastrous mistake to assimilate  Community law to foreign  law 
and  to  approach  it  with  the  spirit  of  relativism  which  characterizes  the 
methods  applicable  to conflicts  of laws. It is  to counteract such  tendencies 
that the  Community  Court has  repeatedly  stressed  the  specificity  and the 
autonomy of Community law. 
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Community law within the frame-
work  of  the  individual  Member 
States 
Looking back on the experience we have acquired over the years 
- nearly  a  quarter-century  of  it  - one  is  struck  by  the  extraordinary 
'dynamism with which Community law has penetrated into the internal legal 
systems, particularly if one takes the trouble to make a comparison with other 
sectors  of  international legal  life.  The penetrating force  of  Community law 
is  a  phenomenon  sui  generis.  It can  be  explained  by  a  whole  number  of 
factors:  the  cultural  affinity  of  the  European  peoples  in  their  amazing 
diversity;  the  will  to  restore  to  Europe  a  place  in  the  world  by  dint  of 
concerted effort,  and the awareness  of the essential  contribution of the law 
in carrying out this process. There is  also a more cogent explanation, which 
is  of greater interest in the context which concerns us. To a large extent, the 
dynamism of Community law can be explained by the successful interaction 
between the jusrisprudential activity of the Community Court, at the centre, 
and the corresponding  activity  of  the  courts  and  tribunals  of  the Member 
States, each within its  own national or regional domain.  So  it was  that the 
authors  of  the European Treaties  had the foresight  not only to endow the 
Community  with  an  autonomous  judicial  power,  but  also  to  set  up  an 
organic link between 'the Community Court and the courts and tribunals of 
the  Member  States  with  a  view  to  harmonious  application  and  coherent 
development  of this  our common system  of law.  That is  one major reason 
explaining  the  deep  and  swift  penetration  of  Community  law  within  our 
States. 
Broadly speaking, the action of these two factors - that is  to say the Com-
munity  Court  and  the  national  courts  - has  been  concomitant  and 
reciprocal;  they  have  led  to  mutual  stimulation  and improvement.  Indeed, 
while  the evolution  of  case-law  in  our different  Member  States  would  be 
unimaginable  without  the  stimulus  emanating  from  the  judgments  of  the 
Community Court, this Court has been subjected, in its turn, to the influence 
of the national courts; nor should the reciprocal influences  exercised by the 
courts  of  the different  Member States  on one  another be  overlooked.  This 
process  of  interaction,  which  generally  proceeds  discreetly  and  almost 
imperceptibly,  from  time  to  time  produces  something  quite  outstanding 
VI-13 which  has  profound,  widespread  repercussions:  the  decisive  impulses  have 
emanated from a small number of 'pilot' decisions, some of which were made 
by the Community Court while others, among them perhaps the boldest and 
most interesting ones, were made by national courts. 
An  attempt  will  be  made  hereafter  to  describe  this  process  rather  more 
precisely. For convenience, first  of all  a survey will be given of the case-law 
of the Court in so  far  as  it relates to the characteristics of Community law 
and to its relations with national law; this will be followed by an exposition 
on the stage reached in dealing with the problem of the application of Com-
munity law in the different Member States. However one must not lose sight, 
at any point in this account, of the close interaction subsisting between these 
two classes  of factors  which have  had to be separated - artifically - for 
clarity of presentation. 
I  - The  case-law  of  the  Community  Court  as  a 
'catalyst' 
1.  Procedures  which  provide  an  opportunity  for  defining  the 
requirements of Community law in regard to national law 
Among  the  forms  of  action,  there  are  two  which  have  given  the  Court 
occasion  to  pronounce  upon  the  characteristics  of  Community  law,  on its 
effectiveness and on its requirements in regard to national law: the action for 
the failure of a State to fulfil its obligations and the reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling. The use made of each  of these procedures has made a powerful 
contribution to  the  definition  of the  relationships  between  Community law 
and national law. 
(a)  Proceedings for the failure  of a State to fulfil its obligations are relatively 
few  in  Community practice.  But  they  are highly  significant in  dealing with 
our problem, given  that the purpose of these  actions  is  precisely  to impose 
a  sanction  on  Member  States  which  have  failed  to  meet  requirements  of 
Community  law.  Occasionally  they  raise  the  issue  of  the  omissions  and 
defaults  of  Member States;  more  often  they  concern  positive  violations  of 
Community commitments; the usual form which these violations take is  the 
introduction  or the  maintenance  of  legal  provisions  incompatible  with  the 
requirements  of  Community  law.  In  such  situations  the  Court has  had to 
affirm,  sometimes  forcefully,  the  overriding  power  of  Community  law  in 
relation to national law. 
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contribution to  the solution  of  the  problem  under consideration.  Indeed  it 
is  through them that the national courts are given  the opportunity to apply 
to the Community Court with a· view to removing the obstacles which inhibit 
proper  application  of  Community  law  within  the  national  framework: 
uncertainty  about  the  meaning  of  the  requirements  of  the  Treaties  or of 
secondary  Community law;  disputes  against the effectiveness  of regulations 
or other Community measures. The national courts often seek interpretations 
in the context of a  conflict between  Community law and national law:  the 
national court asks the European Court to specify, by way of interpretation, 
what are  the requirements  of the Treaty or of measures  of  secondary law, 
in  order to  decide  on the compatibility of its  own national law with Com-
munity law.  In  such  a situation, it is  not for the European Court to decide 
on the compatibility of  the national law with the provisions of Community 
law;  the European Court only supplies  the premise for  an  appraisal which 
it is  for the national court to make. But one must not be under any illusion 
about this  matter:  once  the  premise  is  clearly  laid  down,  the  decision  on 
compatibility inevitably follows from it. 
2.  The case-law of the Community Court as  a 'common model' 
Thus, as  one case has followed another, the Court has been led step by step 
to define the main characteristics of Community law (see the judgments listed 
in Appendix I).  These characteristics may be summed up in one phrase:  the 
effectiveness of Community law. The judgments of the Court relating to this 
problem  all  proceed from  the  simple  truth  that  a  legal  system  exists  and 
is  a reality only in so  far as  it is  operative in practice. And to say that it is 
operative in practice within the Member States  is,  perforce, to postulate the 
principle of its precedence in cases of a conflict with national law. 
More  precisely,  the  case-law  of  the  Court  has  brought  out the  following 
characteristics and requirements. 
(a)  In numerous judgments, the Court has stressed the fullness  of the effect 
of  Community law. Concepts such as  the 'practical effect' or the 'full effect' 
of  Community law run like a live wire through its  decisions.  In the face  of 
attempts  by  one  or other  of  the  Member  States  to  evade  certain  parts  of 
Community  law,  the  Court  has  vigorously  stressed  the  wholeness  of  the 
Community legal system, which is  all  of one piece, organized and coherent; 
consequently it does  not tolerate any  selective  attitudes by  States seeking to 
enjoy the benefits of it without assuming the corresponding burdens. Several 
times  over,  and  on  occasion  emphatically,  the  Court  has  affirmed  the 
irreversibility  of  Community  commitments  in  order  to  counteract  any 
inclination on the part of Member States to withdraw from them. 
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of Community law.  This must be the same throughout the Community and 
inside  every  Member State.  The Court has  asserted  this  unity not only  in 
relation to the substantive meaning of the provisions of Community law (this 
is  the  well-known  problem  of  uniform  interpretation),  but also  from  the 
point  of  view  of  the  effectiveness  of  that  law:  Community  law  must  be 
applied throughout the whole Community not only with the same substantive 
meaning,  but  also  with  an  equal  degree  of  effectiveness.  To  this  end,  a 
constructive effort is required of the national court so that, in the midst of the 
complications  of a  national  legal  situation,  the overriding power of Com-
munity law is recognized and its objectives fully attained. 
(c)  Community  law  is  mandatory  law;  in  certain  judgments  reference  is 
made to the concept of 'maintenance of Community law and order', a very 
meaningful  and  evocative  concept.  This  mandatory  nature  is  moreover 
asserted  in  two  distinct  perspectives:  on  the  one  hand,  the  Court  has 
repeatedly  asserted  the binding nature of the commitments  assumed  by the 
Member States;  on the  other, it has  had occasion  to  assert  the mandatory 
nature of Community rules in regard to private individuals and organizations 
formed on private initiative, in such areas as the business world, relationships 
at work and even sporting life. 
(d)  Community law is directly applicable within the Member States; as  such 
it can be relied upon in law by private individuals and it confers rights upon 
them which the courts are called upon to protect. I refer here to one of the 
largest and best consolidated bodies of law within the case-law of the Court. 
Starting with the well-known  Van  Gend  &  Loos  judgment, the  Court has 
asserted  repeatedly  and in the  most diverse  circumstances  that Community 
law is not merely a matter between States, but that at the same time it directly 
concerns  private  individuals.  This  body  of  case-law,  which  time  does  not 
permit  me  to  go  over  here,  is  truly  the  cornerstone  of  the  whole 
jurisprudential edifice for the effectiveness of Community law. 
(e)  Finally the Court has resolutely maintained the unconditional precedence 
of  Community  law  in  relation  to  internal  law.  This  precedence  has  been 
asserted  in  the  most  diverse  contexts:  in  the  face  of  contrary practices  by 
Member States, even  when it was  a  question of a  prolonged and concerted 
failure  by  Member States  to  meet  their  obligations;  in  the face  of  the,  in 
a sense,  conventional conflict between  Community law and national law; in 
the face  of contradictions arising from the judicial organization or any other 
constitutional structure in a Member State. In such circumstances, the Court 
has consistently asserted that a Member State may not unilaterally attenuate 
the effect of Community law, that it may not unilaterally withdraw from its 
commitments;  it  cannot,  for  this  purpose,  rely  on  the  provisions  of  its 
statutes, on its political or judicial organization, or even on its constitutional 
rules. 
VI-16 These positions which the  <::ourt  has  taken up  in one case  after another in 
legal  disputes  of the most  diverse  kinds, in terms  varying in their mode of 
expression  but  with  only  one  meaning  as  to  their  essential  content,  have 
defined 'model' attitudes which have since been the inspiration for numerous 
decisions  by  national  courts.  Some  of  the  terms  originally  coined  by  the 
Community  Court  have  been  adopted  by  the  most  diverse  courts  and 
tribunals  in  the Member States,  sometimes  word for word, sometimes in  a 
form  adapted  to  the  national  context.  Legal  problems,  concerning  for 
instance  international  law,  which  the  national  courts  previously  had  to 
approach  in  total  isolation  are  now  resolved  in  the  light  of  a  common 
inspiration, emanating from the judicial centre of the Community. 
II  - Response of the national courts and tribunals to 
the requirements of Community law 
1.  Preliminary observations on the uneven distribution of decisions 
of national courts 
If we  look  at the  decisions  on questions  of  Community law taken  by  the 
national courts we see a clear disparity in that, in some Member States, legal 
decisions on the problems involved in the application of Community law are 
rare, even non-existent, whilst in other Member States such decisions are not 
wanting and some  of them  lay  down principles  of  the highest  importance. 
How does this disparity come about? 
It follows  from  the fact,  to which I have  already  referred,  that the various 
Member States  came into the Community system  in very  differing states of 
preparation. In some States the problems posed by  the application of Com-
munity law  and,  in particular, those  raised  by  the transfers  of sovereignty 
which  are  the  essence  of  any  system  of  integration  were  resolved  on  a 
constitutional,  legislative  or judicial level  before  accession.  This  applied,  as 
regards  the  original  Member States,  to  Luxembourg  and  the  Netherlands. 
It also applies to the new Member States, where the problems raised by the 
application  of  Community  law  in  the  internal  legal  system  have  been 
expressly and positively resolved by legislative measures. As  a result there are 
no legal decisions which rule in principle on the problem of the application 
of Community law to be found in the case-law of these States. 
On the other hand, decisions of principle in connexion with this  pro~lem are 
to  be  found  in  the  case-law  of  four  Member  States:  Germany,  Belgium, 
France  and  Italy.  In  these  four  States  historical  and  constitutional  reasons 
peculiar to each have caused disputes of more fundamental importance to be 
VI-17 brought  before  the  courts  and  settled  by  them.  After  initial  periods  of 
uncertainty  of  varying  duration  the  highest  courts  in  each  of  these  States 
have finally  ruled  on the  question  with the result that we may  regard  the 
problems  concerning  the  application  of  Community  law  as  in  the  mam 
satisfactorily resolved. 
These  preliminary  observations  explain  the  somewhat  peculiar  order  in 
which I shall now consider the position in each of the Member States. Rather 
than  going  through  the States  in  alphabetical  order,  which  would  be  too 
artificial, I shall begin with those cases  in which the position is  simple  and 
go on to the more complicated ones, describing in turn the position in: 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands; 
the new Member States; 
Germany, Belgium, France and Italy. 
2.  Luxembourg  and the  Netherlands:  no  problems  as  regards 
case-law 
Apart from  the  many  cases  in  which  it has  simply  been  applied,  there  is 
scarcely  any  case-law  in  these  two  Member States  on the  effects  of  Com-
munity law.  This  situation is  explained  by  the fact  that in  these  Member 
States the problems concerning the application of Community law were -
in different contexts - resolved entirely satisfactorily before accession to the 
European Communities. 
Luxembourg 
In Luxembourg, the application of international treaties by the courts (what 
is  now called 'direct effect')  and the precedence of the treaties over national 
law  have  always  been  regarded  as  incontrovertible  axioms.  Thus,  in  a 
judgment of 13  June 1890, in the case of Actien-Brauerei Coln Niedermendig 
v  Schwartz~ the Cour Superieure de Justice confirmed the precedence of the 
treaties  governing  the  customs  union  over  a  subsequent  national  law  by 
stating  that  'that law  could  not  affect  international  treaties  and  had  not 
sought to do so'. It went on to say that 'it is  an established principle that the 
enforcement of  conventions  is  one of  the principal  rules  of interpretation'. 
In  the  judgment of 14 July  1954 Chambre des  Metiers  v  Pagani~ the same 
court reaffirmed  in  even  stronger terms  the precedence  of an international 
treaty - once again a convention governing economic union - over internal 
law, even adopted subsequently, by stating that 'a treaty is a law of a higher 
nature,  of  a  nobler  origin  than  the  will  of  a  national  body'.  On  the 
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Constitution  in  1956,  enables  the  exercise  of  powers  reserved  by  the 
constitution to the legislature, executive and judiciary to devolve upon inter-
national  institutions.  The EEC  and  Euratom  Treaties  were  ratified  on  the 
basis of this  provision, with the result that the fundamental problem of  the 
transfer of sovereign powers to the European Communities has been resolved 
positively in Luxembourg. It must be noted that, with the exception however 
of  the  Conseil  d'Etat,  the  Luxembourg  courts  have  repeatedly  made  use 
of the procedure under Article 177 for referring a question for a preliminary 
ruling. This attitude of detachment has meant that in its recent judgment of 
23 April1975 in the Mohammad Alimuddin Subhani case (a British national), 
the Conseil  d'Etat was  surprised  to  find  itself  in  conflict with the  case-law 
of the Court of Justice on the interpretation of the limitations on grounds of 
public policy in the EEC Treaty. 
The Netherlands 
For the Netherlands the solution of the problem of the relationships between 
Community law and national law was predetermined by the revisions of the 
Constitution  in  1953  and  1956  which  led  to  the  assertion  in  the  new 
Article 66 of the Constitution that international treaties take precedence over 
national  legal  provisions,  in  so  far  as  the  provisions  of  such  treaties  are 
'binding  upon  everyone'.  Two key  concepts  of  Community  case-law  thus 
appear in the constitutional law of the Netherlands: what has come to be the 
principle  of  the  'direct effect'  of  Community law  and the  principle  of the 
precedence of  the treaties. It is  therefore not by  chance that the first  cases 
on the direct effect  of Community law referred  to  the  Court of Justice for 
preliminary  rulings  came  from  the  Netherlands,  since  in  that  country 
recognition of the precedence of international rules is, under the Constitution, 
dependent  upon  their  direct  applicability.  One  of  these  requests  for  a 
preliminary ruling forms  the  basis  of  the well-known  judgment in  the Van 
Gend and Loos case which has profoundly influenced the whole evolution of 
Community law. Since that time, communication between the Court and the 
Netherlands  courts  by  means  of the  procedure for  obtaining  a  preliminary 
ruling  under  Article  177  has  remained  particularly  active  at  all  levels 
including the highest courts, that is, the hoge Raad and the Raad van State. 
3.  Denmark,  Ireland,  United  Kingdom:  solutions  provided  in 
advance by legislation 
In Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom the application of Community 
law by  the courts appears to raise no major problems.  The reason for  this, 
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relating  to  the  application  of  Community  law  within  the  national  legal 
system  have  been  positively  resolved  by  legislative  measures  which  have 
incorporated  Community  law  into  those  systems.  The legislative  measures 
involved  are,  in  Denmark,  the  Law  of  11  October  1972,  in  Ireland,  the 
European Communities Act 1972 and, in the United Kingdom, the European 
Communities Act 1972. The noteworthy feature of all three measures is  that 
they provide, in substantially identical terms, that Community law must take 
'effect  in  the  national  legal  system  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Community  law  itself.  As  a  result  of  that  incorporation  by  reference 
European law is  applied in accordance with terms which it itself lays  down, 
so that all sources of conflict between Community law concepts and possibly 
differing  concepts  of  national  law  over  this  vital  problem  of  validity  and 
efficacy are eliminated in advance. 
Denmark and Ireland 
This  fact  appears  to  explain  why  there  is  scarcely  any  case-law  on  Com-
munity law in  either Denmark or Ireland. The truth of this finding appears 
to be reinforced by the fact that these two States have been careful to adopt 
their  national  constitutions  to  the  requirements  of  integration;  Denmark 
amended  Article  20  of  its  Constitution  as  early  as  1953  and  Ireland 
amended Article 29  of its  Constitution on a  revision  of  the  Constitution in 
1972, for the express purpose of enabling accession to the European Commu-
nities.  Furthermore, it must be  remembered that in both States  accession  to 
the Communities formed the subject of a referendum whose positive outcome 
contributed to  the creation of psychological  and political  conditions  which 
were particularly favourable to the acceptance of Community law. 
United Kingdom 
There is  rather  more  case-law  in  the  United  Kingdom  but,  owing  to  the 
existence of the European Communities Act, it has had no need to deal with 
the  fundamental  problems  which  have  preoccupied  the  courts  in  other 
Member States.  The principles  of direct  effect  and the precedence of  Com-
munity law are accepted as  incontrovertible axioms. Problems relating to the 
application of Community law and concerning such  areas as  the free  move-
ment  of  goods  (in  particular in  the  context of the protection  of  industrial 
and commercial property rights), competition, free movement of persons and 
social security have on several occasions been brought before courts of first 
instance and appeal courts. In this context discussions have taken place as  to 
how proceedings under Article 177 fit in with the special features of internal 
legal  procedure.  So  far,  references  to  the  Court of Justice  for  preliminary 
rulings,  which  are  becoming  more  and  more  frequent,  have  revealed  no 
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style of the Common Law courts - a style which is  their own - a perfect 
understanding  of  the  legal  implications  of  European  integration  and  the 
desire to ensure that, within the territory of the United Kingdom, Community 
law is  as effective as by its nature it should be. This has already been brought 
out  very  strikingly  in  Lord  Denning's  judgment  in  Blackburn  v  Attorney-
General on 10  May 1971  - some  years  before  accession - and has since 
been confirmed on many occasions. 
4.  Germany, Belgium, France, Italy: legal debate concerning the 
fundamental problems of application 
In  Germany, Belgium,  France and Italy the case-law reflects  the uncertainty 
surrounding  the  problems  concerning  the  application  and  effectiveness  of 
Community law. At present however, it can be said that, happily, since  this 
period of  uncertainty  decisions  given  by  the  highest  courts  in  those  States 
have come down firmly in favour of the full effectiveness of Community law. 
In particular, many important decisions of principle have been given in recent 
years. This is  not to say, however, that in every case the problems have been 
settled unequivocally. It is  therefore necessary to outline the situation in each 
of  the  four  Member  States  individually,  in  the  light  of  the  particular 
constitutional features and case-law of each. 
Germany 
The problem was clarified relatively quickly in the Federal Republic. In this 
Member State the first paragraph of Article 24 of the Constitution provides 
for the possibility of 'transferring sovereign rights to international institutions 
by  legal means'.  Despite this favourable  beginning certain lower courts had 
questioned the compatibility  of  Community law with the provisions  of  the 
national  constitution.  Thus,  the  effectiveness  of  this  law  has  occasionally 
been called into question in certain of the courts. Precisely  because of these 
disputes, the Constitutional Court quickly made clear its views  on the effect 
of Community law within the national framework. Reference should be made 
to two decisions  on this  question:  that of 18  October 1967, which contains 
some remarkable developments  as  regards  the structure of the  Cqmmunity, 
the autonomy of Community law and its  effect  within the Member States, 
and that of 9  June 1971, which specifically states that Community law has 
precedence over conflicting national law. The pronouncements by the Consti-
tutional Court in these two cases have finally put an end to all debate in the 
Federal Republic of Germany as  to the effectiveness of Community law and 
its position in relation to national law - subject to one reservation to which 
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-in  themselves of major importance- in no way manifest the scale of the 
legal debate which has taken place as  regards Community law and its effects 
in the Federal  Republic  of Germany.  In fact,  an  extremely important body 
of case-law exists on this subject to which both civil  and commercial courts 
and financial,  administrative  and  social  courts  have  contributed.  A  further 
indication of the repercussions of Community law on legal life in the Federal 
!Republic  is  shown  by  the  fact  that approximately  one  half  of  all  the 
references  to  the  Court of  Justice  for  preliminary  rulings  has  come  from 
German  courts  of  all  kinds  at every  level.  In  this  way  an  extraordinarily 
intense legal dialogue has developed between these  courts and the Court of 
Justice which has greatly contributed to the development of Community law. 
Belgium 
In  order to explain the position in  Belgium  it is  first  necessary  to  mention 
that the Belgian Constitution is  completely silent as regards the application of 
both Community law and international law. A new provision, Article 25  his, 
was inserted  into  the Constitution only as  recently  as  1970 for granting to 
international  institutions  powers  which  fall  within  the  sphere  of  nationa1 
sovereignty. The problems connected with the application of Community law 
have  thus  been  settled  exclusively  by  means  of  case-law.  In  fact,  in  this 
connexion  the  Belgian  courts  were  very  severely  handicapped  by  the  old 
judgment  of 26  November  1925  of  the Cour de  Cassation  in  the  Schieble 
case  concerning  the  Tt.:,eaty  of  Versailles,  which  was  dualist  in  tone  and 
opposed to  the effectiveness  of international law.  Over the years  a flow  of 
legal writing and case-law had arisen in reaction against this precedent and 
this  movement  culminated  in  the  judgment  of  the  Cour  de  Cassation  of 
27  May  1971  (Etat  beige  v  SA  Fromagerie  Franco-Suisse  (Le  Ski)),  which 
stated that 'where a conflict exists between a rule of national law and a rule 
of international law which has  direct effect in the internal legal system, the 
rule laid down by  the Treaty must prevail.  The predominance of that rule 
arises  out  of  the  very  nature  of  international  law  on  conventions'.  This 
reasoning is  transported a  fortiori  to the relationship between national law 
and  Community  law.  This  judgment  is  in  accordance  with  the  detailed 
opinion of the Procureur-General, W.  J.  Ganshof van der Meersch, which is 
a  document of vital  importance in  the development of  concepts  relating to 
the  application  of  Community law.  Apart from  this  outstanding  action  at 
Supreme ~ourt level it may be observed that the Belgian courts take an active 
interest  in  Community  law  as  is  shown  mainly  by  the  steady  flow  of 
questions referred to the Court of Justice for preliminary rulings from courts 
of all  kinds. It must be  mentioned that the questions put by Belgian labour 
and social security courts and tribunals form the basis  of particularly note-
worthy developments in the case-law of the Community on matters of soda] 
security. 
VI-22 France 
With  regard  to  the  French  Republic  it  may  be  said  that  where  the 
Constitution  is  concerned,  Community  law  was  incorporated  into  the 
national legal  system  in favourable  circumstances. In fact,  Article 26 of the 
Constitution of 1946, which was in force when France acceded to the Com-
munities, provided that 'diplomatic treaties which have been properly ratified 
and  published  shall  have  the  force  of  law  even  where  they  conflict  with 
French  laws  without  any  necessity  to  adopt  legislative  provisions  for  the 
purposes  of their implementation other than those necessary to ratify them' 
- direct  effect  and precedence  thus  dealt with in  a  single  sentence  of  the 
Constitution.  Article  55  of  the  present  Constitution  also  lays  down  that 
treaties are 'of higher authority than laws'. Despite this favourable beginning 
French  case-law  has  long presented  an  uncertain  picture with,  in  addition, 
a  visible  rift  between  the receptive  attitudes  of the ordinary  courts  to this 
new phenomenon of Community law and the more reserved reactions of the 
administrative  courts.  Recent  developments  have,  however,  taken  the form 
of  an  increasingly  clear  recognition  of  the  inherent  requirements  for  the 
effectiveness of Community law. At the same time, communications between 
the French  courts and the  Court of Justice has  increased  as  a  result of the 
procedure for obtaining a preliminary ruling provided for under Article 177 
and this  Court regularly  receives  questions  referred  to it by  French  courts 
of  all  kinds  and  at every  level,  including  the  highest  courts,  the  Cour  de 
Cassation and the Conseil d'Etat. Decisive pronouncements have been made 
recently  by  the Cour de  Cassation.  In  its  judgment of 24 May 1975  in  the 
jacques  Vabre  case,  ruling  on  the  noteworthy  opinion  delivered  by  the 
Procureur-General,  Mr Touffait,  the  'Chambre  Mixte'  of  that  Court held 
that the EEC  Treaty 'is  of greater  authority than laws'  and  'establishes  its 
own legal system which is  incorporated into that of the Member States. As a 
result of that characteristic the legal  system which it has  created  is  directly 
applicable to the nationals of those States and is  binding upon their courts'. 
In  a  more recent judgment given on 15  December 1975  in the Von  Kempis 
case,  which  was  of  a  particularly  delicate  nature  because  it  concerned  the 
recovery of rural property by a national of another Member State, the Cour 
de  Cassation  reaffirmed  the  precedence  of Community  law  by  stating that 
Article 52  of the EEC Treaty, which deals with freedom of establishment, 'is 
directly applicable to the nationals of the Member States of the Community' 
and 'is binding on their courts and tribunals, prohibits any restriction on the 
freedom  of  establishment  of  such  nationals  in  France'  and  that,  therefore, 
'provisions  of  French  internal  law  which  required  persons  wishing  to  run 
an  agricultural  undertaking in  France  to obtain  an  authorization  from  the 
administration  are  no  longer  applicable'.  These  judgments  of  the  Cour de 
Cassation  may  be  seen  as  defining  the  basic  principles  of  application  of 
Community law in the French Republic satisfactorily and incontrovertibly. 
Vl-23 Italy 
In Italy also  the relevant case-law reflects intense efforts and slow progress. 
Here,  too,  the  first  step  was  taken  through  the  Constitution,  that  is,  by 
Article 11, whereby the Italian State agrees 'to the limitations of sovereignty 
necessary for the establishment of a system ensuring peace and justice among 
nations'.  However,  between  the  adoption  of  this  general  formula  and  the 
statement that Community law is  fully  effective in the national legal  system 
- a principle which is  on the whole accepted today except for certain side-
issues- progress was slow, since it was first necessary to break with a whole 
tradition of dualist thinking which was expressed as  late as  the judgment of 
the Constitutional Court of 24  February/?  March  1964,  No 14,  which was 
opposed to  the principle of the effectiveness  of Community law within  the 
national territory. The existence of this decision clearly explains the vigorous 
terms  used  by the  Community  Court in  a  judgment given  soon  afterwards 
on 15  July 1964 in  a  parallel  case,  Costa  v ENEL.  Since  then,  the  amount 
of case-law has risen steadily. It has come from the lower courts, in particular 
those of first  instance and is  closely  linked to the procedure for  requesting 
preliminary  rulings  since,  in  several  cases  referred  to  the  Court of  Justice 
under Article 177, Italian courts have asked it to define the scope of certain 
provisions  of  Community  law  to  enable  them  to  give  a  ruling  as  to  the 
compatibility  of  their  own  national  legislation  with  the  provisions  of  that 
law. It must also be pointed out in this context that as  early as 7 November 
1962 the Consiglio  di Stato  gave  judgment in  favour of the effectiveness  of 
the EEC Treaty. The supreme Corte di Cassazione gave clear rulings in favour 
of  the  direct  application  and  precedence  of  Community  law  in  1972  in 
judgments  Nos 1171  and 1173  of 8  June  1972  and No 2896 of 6 October 
1972. The last-mentioned judgment referred expressly to the case-law of the 
European Court and to the judgment of the Belgian Cour de Cassation in the 
SA  Fromagerie  Franco-Suisse  case.  This  case-law  was  consolidated  - at 
least as  regards the question of the direct applicability of Community law -
in  the  judgment  of  the  Constitutional  Court  of  18/27 December 1973, 
No  183,  which  contains  a  remarkable  and in  a way classic  analysis  of the 
basic characteristics of Community law and its effect within the territory of 
the  Member  States.  However,  a  more  recent  judgment,  No  232  of 
22/30  October 1975,  shows  that that case  was  not the  last word from  the 
Constitutional Court, as I shall explain more fully below. 
5.  Assessment  of the developments  which  have  taken place  in 
case-law  regarding  the  application  of Community law;  the 
dark side of the picture 
After this  short analysis,  which  is  somewhat inadequate in  the light  of the 
enormous number of constitutional and legislative factors, case-law and legal 
VI-24 writings which might be  discussed,  let me  try to  take stock of the develop-
ments which have taken place. 
The first  observation  to  be  made  is  that despite  some  wavering  and  the 
occasional setback the general tendency of these developments has been in the 
same direction: this tendency is  marked by either an immediate or a gradual 
awareness  of the requirements  of  Community law and by  a  constant effort 
to  ensure  the  maximum  effectiveness  of  that  law  within  the  particular 
political and legal framework of each State. The second observation is that in 
the main the basic requirements of Community law are fulfilled.  This law is 
in fact applied in all the Member States with the same degree of effectiveness. 
It cannot be denied  that conflicts have arisen  between  Community law and 
national law on the way but these collisions have only amounted to what we 
generally  call  'minor  mishaps'.  No  major  confrontation  has  ever  arisen 
because nobody has wanted one and because both legislatures and courts are 
aware that, in order to act in the common interest, Community law must be 
implemented  on the same  terms  throughout the  Community.  Having made 
this observation, which is on the whole reassuring, I must conclude by raising 
a few queries. 
(a)  The  first  concerns  the  protection  of  fundamental  rights  in  the  Com-
munity system. This issue has been raised only in those of the Member States 
which  have  a  Constitutional  Court,  that is,  in  Germany  and  Italy.  Let  us 
consider the facts. 
At  the  end  of  the  noteworthy  order  of  18  October  1967,  which  strongly 
emphasizes  the  autonomy  of  Community  law,  the  German  Constitutional 
Court made the reservation that it might re-assert its  rights of review if any 
question of a  conflict between  Community law  and the fundamental  rights 
guaranteed  by  the  national  Constitution  again  came  before  it.  The Italian 
Constitutional Court made a  similar reservation in its  jugdment No 183  of 
18/27 December 1973:.  although in a rather hypothetical way.  Finally,  in its 
order of 29 May 1974, the Second Senate of the German Constitutional Court 
acted on the reservation made in 1967. In an appeal brought before it against 
a  Community  regulation,  the  validity  of  which  had  been  considered  and 
accepted  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  as  regards,  inter  alia,  the 
protection  of human  rights  (judgment  of 17  December  1970  in  the  Inter-
nationale Handelsgesellschaft case), the Constitutional Court asserted its own 
jurisdiction to assess  the regulation in question in the light of the measures 
necessary  to  protect  the  fundamental  rights  laid  down  by  the  national 
Constitution.  In  substance  the  German  Constitutional  Court  upheld  the 
findings  of the European Court of Justice.  However,  the  problem does  not 
lie there but in the fact that a national court has asserted its  own power to 
make  a  unilateral  examination  of  the  validity  of a  Community  regulation. 
VI-25 This case has drawn attention to the fact that the builders of the European 
Communities  thought too little  about the legal  foundations  of their edifice 
and  paid  too  little  attention  to  the  protection  of  the  basic  rights  of  the 
individual within the new European structure. Here, therefore, is  a question 
which remains open.  One must not, however,  exaggerate the scope of what 
has been said and done by the German and Italian Constitutional Courts: the 
question  is  limited  to  the  possibility  - which  in  practice  occurs  very 
infrequently  - of  a  conflict  between  Community  law  and  basic  human 
rights. In other matters, the precedence of Community law is  not in question 
and the two Constitutional Courts have made this quite clear. 
(b)  A further dark area is  that of the application of Community law where 
there is a real or imagined conflict with the national law. 
This was  seen,  for  example, in  certain old  decisions  of the French  Conseil 
d'Etat which omitted to refer relevant questions to the Court of Justice when 
the compatibility of internal legislative provisions with certain rules of Com-
munity law was  contested  before  it.  Two judgments  are involved,  both of 
which have been widely commented upon in legal circles in the Community; 
the  judgment of  19  June  1964  in  the  Shell  Berre  case,  which  the  doctrine 
known as the 'acte clair' was called in aid and the judgment of 1 March 1968 
in the case of the Syndicat General des  Fabricants de  Semoule~ in which the 
application  of  Community  law  was  set  aside  in  favour  of  a  provision  of 
national  law.  According  to  the  submissions  of  the  Commissaire  du 
Gouvernement in this latter case these decisions  were inspired by  a number 
of  different  considerations:  a  consciousness  of  the  limits  imposed  on  the 
powers  of the court by the division  of the prerogatives provided for  under 
the  Constitution,  the  unconditional  observance  required  by  the  law  and 
perhaps also a lack of confidence in the ability of the Court of Justice of the 
European  Communities  to  appreciate  the  finer  points  involved  in  certain 
national issues.  As  these judgments were given in very special circumstances, 
it would certainly be wrong to interpret them as  the expression of a view on 
a matter of principle. 
As  regards the consequences of the conflict between Community law and the 
provisions  of  a  national  law,  a  restrictive  view  recently  appeared  in  a 
judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court~ No 232 of 22/30 October 1975~ 
the reasons for which were stated at length and which was given following 
a reference from the Corte di Cassazione on a question of legality under the 
Constitution.  The  problem  was  whether,  where  a  conflict  exists  between 
a  national law and the provisions of Community law,  any court may hold 
that the internal  rule  is  inapplicable  or whether  this  finding  may  only  be 
made by the Constitutional Court as the Court which decides on the validity 
of laws. Without in any way calling into question the direct applicability and 
VI-26 precedence of  Community law the Constitutional Court stated that it alone 
has  jurisdiction  to  rule  on  the  inapplicability  of  a  national  law  where  it 
conflicts with the requirements of Community law. It appears that in the end 
the effect of this decision must be that all  disputes arising out of at conflict 
between  Community  law  and  national  law  must  be  settled by  the 
Constitutional Court alone. It is  open to question whether that decision does 
not severely limit the possibilities open to an individual of obtaining a ruling 
that the legislature is  in  breach of Community law, particularly in  the light 
of  the  fact  that the  decisions  of  the  Constitutional  Court,  which  rule that 
a  legislative  measure  is  invalid,  only  take  effect  in  futuro.  Thus,  a  serious 
procedural obstacle has been set up in Italy to the practical acceptance of the 
principle of the precedence of Community law and to its immediate effect. 
One  observation  must  be  made  which  concerns  all  the  decisions  of  the 
national  courts  to  which  I  have  just  referred:  every  one  has  been  taken 
unilaterally,  without  the  courts  in  question  availing  themselves  of  the 
opportunity provided by  Article 177 of getting into touch with the Court of 
Justice. In fact, as  each case under consideration raised a question concerning 
the  rules  and  requirements  of  Community  law  several  opportunities  of 
implementing legal cooperation have been missed which would have enabled 
problems of prime importance for the effectiveness of Community law to be 
resolved to the satisfaction of all parties. 
VI-27 Conclusions 
At the end of this short analysis it is  appropriate to draw certain 
conclusions. They derive from three successive propositions: first, that Com-
munity  law  subjects  our States  and  their  courts  to  certain  mandatory 
requirements; secondly, that the Treaties contain all  the necessary means for 
us to make an appropriate response to new requirements; thirdly, the reaction 
of the national authorities and, in particular, of the courts to these require-
ments has on the whole been positive and, what is more, constructive. 
1.  Requirements  of Community law in relation to the 
national  legal  system 
Let me say a word first of all about the requirements which emerge f~om this 
consideration  of  the  manner  in  which  Community  law  is  applied  in  the 
Member States.  Its  application must enable the overriding power which is, 
in  constitutional  terms,  inherent in  the  existence  of Community law to be 
implemented. 
First  of  all,  a  definition  of  the  relationship  between  Community  law  and 
national law must take into account the fact that we are here dealing with 
a  common legal  order established in  the collective interest of all our States 
and our peoples.  Community law is  not foreign  law nor is  it external law. 
It belongs to each of our States just as  much as  the national law. However, 
it is  peculiar in  that at the same  time  it provides  a  common  standard for 
us  all.  So  we  are all  directly affected  by it.  At the same time, there can be 
no  unilateral  solutions to the problems raised  by  its  application.  The right 
solutions can only be found in a spirit of cooperation and mutual trust. 
!Furthermore,  and  this  is  the  second  idea  which  must  be  fully  accepted, 
Community law can only exist in  real terms as  a legal  order in so far as it 
is  actually capable of being applied within the Member States. The case-law 
to which  I  have referred shows that this  principle of effectiveness  has  two 
complementary  requirements:  first,  the  'direct  effect'  of  Community  law, 
which means that this law must be applied as  positively within the Member 
States  as  national law itself,  without the need for any national order to be 
VI-29 made for its implementation. This also means that in critical cases of conflict 
Community law must be able to take precedence over any contrary provision 
of national law. If, in a conflict with national law, Community law did not 
succeed  in  asserting  its  supremacy,  the  very  existence  of  the  Community 
would be instantly threatened. This supremacy has  been repeatedly asserted 
by the Court. 
2.  Means  of finding  common  solutions 
A second conclusion which may  be drawn from  the foregoing investigation 
and reflexions  is  that the  treaties  which form  the basis  of the  Community 
have put at our disposal  all  the necessary  means  of pursuing the common 
search for that unity and necessary effectiveness of Community law. 
The Communities are made up  of a  number of institutions,  each of which 
contributes in its own way to the development of Community law: first, there 
are  the  three  institutions  which  share  - although  admittedly  still  very 
unequally - legislative power, that is,  the European Parliament, the Council 
and  the  Commission.  Secondly,  there  is  the  Court  of  Justice,  the  legal 
institution,  which,  in  addition  to  settling  disputes  arising  out  of  the 
functioning of the Community, is  involved in the increasing case-law relating 
to this common law. All these institutions are constituted in such a way as to 
represent the Community as  a whole and, what is  of importance to us,  the 
legal  systems  which  it  combines  within  it.  The legal  argument  before  the 
Court of Justice  is  wider  in  scope  and  more  representative  than  argument 
before  national  courts  because,  in  addition  to  the  parties  to  the  case,  the 
governments of the Member States and the Community institutions take part 
in it. On the whole, although these combinations vary from case to case, the 
legal discussions bring in  a highly representative range of legal interests and 
opinions. The Court is  at grips with practical problems and is  able to take 
account of all the relevant factors and it is here that a European law is being 
created  which  is  acceptable  to  all  the  Member  States  as  law  which  is 
genuinely common to them all. 
Among these representative influences there is  a procedure which is  specially 
adapted to  the requirements  of legal  cooperation:  the procedure for giving 
preliminary  rulings  under Article  177 of the  EEC  Treaty to  which  I  have 
repeatedly  referred  in  this  context.  It  is  this  procedure  which  enables  the 
national courts, when faced  with a question of Community law which gives 
rise to difficulties, to consult with this  our common Court in order to find 
appropriate solutions.  The few  national  decisions  with which  we  can  find 
fault  are those in which  the opportunity to  use  this  consultative procedure 
has been missed. 
Vl-30 3.  Constructive  contributions  to the  solution  of  the 
problems  raised  by the  application  of Community 
law 
What  has  been  the  response  of  the  national  courts  to  this  sort  of  legal 
'challenge'?  An  analysis  of national case-law shows that there has  been  no 
lack of problems and difficulties,  at least in certain Member States.  On the 
whole, however, reactions have been more than positive. Patterns of thought 
which  have  come  into  being  over  long  periods  and  represent  respected 
national traditions have had to be modified and sometimes all but cast aside. 
Legal  problems,  which  henceforth  will  be  common  ones,  have  had  to  be 
thought out again in new settings. This effort to make a fresh start has been 
made with goodwill and often even with enthusiasm. 
This  common  effort  has  brought concepts  into  being  which  will  not only 
enable us  to consolidate permanently this  'Community experience'  but also 
to remove any final misunderstanding of Community law and break down all 
resistance  to  its  full  effectiveness.  The purpose of this  review  has  been  to 
make a  modest  contribution  to  that effort  by  pointing out certain guiding 
legal  principles which may encourage the coherent and effective  application 
of Community law. These guiding principles appear not only in the work of 
the  Community  Court but  also  in  the  remarkable  contributions  made  by 
national courts of every kind. It is  clear that we are all engaged in one great 
mov-ement  to bring about the convergence  of the legal  systems  into  a  new 
community of interests. 
VI-31 APPENDIX I 
The most important judgments of the Court of Justice 
concerning  the  application  of Community  law  in  the 
Member States 
Over the years the cases  before the Court of Justice have thrown 
light  on  various  aspects  of  the  effect  of Community  law  on  the  Member 
States  and  its  effectiveness  within  their  internal legal  systems.  Such  themes 
as the binding nature of the undertakings entered into by the States, the direct 
effect  of  Community law,  its  mandatory  and unconditional  nature  and its 
precedence  over  national  law  have  been  brought  out.  The following  is  a 
summary  of  the  most  interesting  judgments  of  this  type,  showing  the 
principal theme in each case. The references except for the first case are to the 
European  Court Reports, in English;  the reports for the years  1954 to 1961 
and 1971 and 1972 have not yet been published. 
23  February  1961,  Gezamenlijke  Steenkolenmijnen  in  Limburg  v  High 
Authority,  Rec.  1961,  p.  1  (within  a  system  of  partial  integration  it  is 
necessary to interpret the provisions of the Treaty in such a way as to ensure 
their effectiveness). 
14  December  1962,  Commission  of the  European  Economic  Community  v 
Grand  Duchy  of Luxembourg and Kingdom  of Belgium  [1962]  ECR  425, 
known as  the 'gingerbread' case  (the  provisions of the Treaty are  complete 
and mandatory in  nature and are opposed  to  national practices  which  are 
capable  of  jeopardizing  the  achievement  of  the  objectives  of  the  Common 
Market). 
5  February  1963,  NV Algemene  Transport- en  expeditie  Onderneming van 
Gend and Loos  v  Netherlands Inland  Revenue Administration [1963]  EC  1 
(judgment of fundamental importance for the question of direct effect:  Com-
munity  law  confers  on  individuals  rights  which  the  national  courts  must 
protect). 
VI-33 15  July  1964,  Costa  v  ENEL  [1964]  ECR  585  (judgment  of  fundamental 
importance for the question of the precedence of Community law: mandatory 
and  unconditional  nature of  Community  law;  the  internal  legal  provisions 
of a State cannot prevail unilaterally over Community law). 
13  November 1964,  Commission  of the  European  Economic  Community  v 
Grand  Duchy  of Luxembourg and  Kingdom  of Belgium  [1964]  ECR  625, 
known as  the 'milk powder' case  (unconditional nature of the undertakings 
entered into by the Member States within the Community and the impossi-
bility for those States to take the law into their own hands). 
22  June  1965,  Acciaierie  San  Michele  SpA v  High  Authority of European 
Coal and Steel Community (Order)  [1967]  ECR 27  (final  and unconditional 
nature of the undertaking entered into by  the Member States; effects  of the 
Treaty identical in  all  the Member States;  ineffectiveness,  in relation to the 
Treaty, of exceptions provided for by national legislation or a national legal 
system, in particular by a Constitutional Court). 
4  April  1968,  Firma  Fink-Frucht  GmbH v  Hauptzollamt  Munchen,  Lands-
bergerstraf5e,  Firma  Gebruder  Luck  v  Hauptzollamt  Koln-Rheinau,  SpA 
Salgoil v Italian  Ministry  for  Foreign  Trade  [1968]  ECR 223,  245  and 453 
respectively  (obligation  on the national court to make a  constructive effort 
in order to ensure that full effect be given to Community law; the complexity 
of certain situations  in  a  State  cannot alter the nature and  effectiveness  of 
a Community provision). 
13  February  1969,  Walt  Wilhelm  and  Others  v  Bundeskartellamt  [1969] 
ECR 1 (precedence of the competition rules of the Community over national 
laws pursuing the same object). 
10  December  1969,  Commission  of the  European  Communities  v  French 
Republic  [1969]  ECR  523,  the  'rediscount  rate'  case  (obligation  on  the 
Member States to act together in monetary matters and inability of any State 
to derogate unilaterally from the rules laid down by the Treaty). 
17 December 1970, lnternationale  Handelsgesellschaft  mbH v  Einfuhr- und 
Vorratsstelle  fur  Getreide  und Futtermittel  [1970]  ECR 1125  (independence 
of Community law; effectiveness  of that law cannot be avoided by reference 
to  the  constitution  of  a  Member  State  or  the  principles  of  a  national 
constitutional  structure;  protection  of  fundamental  rights  within the  Com-
munity legal system). 
14  December  1971,  Commission  of the  European  Communities  v  French 
Republic  [1971]  EC  1003,  the  'Euratom  Supply  Agency'  case  (irreversible 
nature of undertakings entered into within the context of the Community). 
VI-34 14  December  1971,  Politi  SAS  v  Ministry  for  finance  of  the  Italian 
Republic [1971]  ECR 1039  (precedence of a Community regulation over any 
national  legislative  measure,  even  if it  is  enacted  subsequently,  which  is 
incompatible with its provisions). 
13  July 1972,  Commission of the European Communities v Italian  Republic 
[1972]  ECR 529,  case  concerning the enforcement of the judgment in  Case 
7/68  (prohibition  on  the  competent  national  authorities  against  applying 
a  national  rule  recognized  as  incompatible with  the  Treaty  and obligation 
to  take  all  appropriate  measures  to  enable  Community  law  to  be  fully 
applied;  application of Community law at the same time and with identical 
effect over the whole of the territory of the Community). 
7  February  1973,  Commission  of  the  European  Communities  v  Italian 
Republic [1973]  ECR 101, case concerning 'premiums for slaughtering cows 
and  for  withholding  milk  from  the  market'  (responsibility  towards 
individuals  in  the  case  of  a  failure  by  a  State  to  discharge  its  obligation 
within  the  Community;  incomplete  or selective  application  of  Community 
regulations  unacceptable;  equality  of  States  before  Community  law  and 
respect by them for their duties of solidarity). 
16  January 1974,  Rheinmiihlen-Diisseldorf v  Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle  fiir 
Getreide  und  Futtermittel  [1974]  ECR  33  (full  effect  of  Community  law 
within the framework of the judicial systems of the Member States; national 
rules  which  prevent  a  national  court  referring  questions  to  the  Court  of 
Justice under Article 177 are incompatible with the Treaty). 
8 April 1976, Defrenne v Sabena [1976]  ECR 455  (failure by a Member State 
over a long period to implement a provision of a Treaty does  not affect the 
effectiveness  of  such  provision;  intervention  by  the  national  legal  authority 
in  order  to  ensure  the  performance  of  undertakings  entered  into  by  the 
Member States). 
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Books, articles and leading decisions of national courts 
concerning  the  application  of Community  law in  the 
Member  States 
This  Appendix  contains,  first,  a  summary  of  the  principal 
publications,  general  and  comparative,  and,  secondly,  a  list  of  the 
p·ublications and legal decisions, if any, relating to each Member State. 
Badiali, Giorgio, 11  diritto degli Stati negli ordinamenti delle Comunita Euro-
pee,  Milano 1971 
Baermann, J., Categories et autonomie du droit communautaire, Revue inter-
nationale de droit compare, 1974, 33 
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